Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume V

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/145

IC–181C

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unit, Paris, on Tuesday, May 6, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, May 6, 1919, 11 a.m.

• Present
  • United States of America
    • President Wilson.
  • British Empire
    • Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. Secretary.
    • Professor P. J. Mantoux, Interpreter.

Arrangements for Meeting at Versailles Sir Maurice Hankey said he had received a communication from the Secretary-General stating that for the indispensable material arrangements, such as protocol drafting, placing of the Delegations, assignment of cards and seats, arrangements with representatives of the Press, etc. one Secretary per Great Power and two Secretaries for the Secretary-General would be insufficient. Mr. Dutasta had therefore asked that the numbers might be raised to two Secretaries each for the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan, with one Secretary for each of the other Delegations, and three members of the Secretary-General’s Secretariat.

(The above proposal was agreed to.)

2. Guarantee to France by the British Empire and the United States M. Clemenceau pressed very strongly that the guarantee by the British Empire and the United States of America, which it had been agreed should be given to France, should be furnished immediately, as it was important to him to be able to make an announcement on the subject.

M. Tardieu said that after discussion with Mr. Frazier,¹ he suggested that the undertaking should be announced simultaneously with the signing of the Treaty of Peace to the Press, but should not form part of the Treaty. He then read the attached form. (Appendix I.)

President Wilson said he did not like this form, which confused the question. It was provided in the Treaty that Germany should not maintain permanent facilities for mobilization west of the Rhine. If that was put in, as M. Tardieu contemplated, it would look as though, if Germany should do so, the United States would have at once to send troops. This was not what was intended. Troops were only to be sent in the event of an act of aggression. He then read Mr. Balfour’s draft, which had been handed to him by Mr. Lloyd George (Appendix II), and which stated the matter perfectly clearly. In Mr. Balfour’s draft, however, he detected an error in paragraph 2, where the word “any” should be substituted for “either”. He himself would be quite prepared to sign a similar document, the paragraph in regard to Dominions of course being omitted.

M. Clemenceau said he would be satisfied with this.

Mr. Lloyd George said he would be prepared to sign. He said that he had already informed the Imperial War Cabinet of the decision.

M. Tardieu said he could alter his draft to meet President Wilson’s criticisms.

President Wilson said he considered Mr. Balfour’s draft sufficient. M. Tardieu’s draft gave the impression of a triple agreement, which the United States, of course, would object to. The agreement was triple in effect, but not in form.

M. Clemenceau then raised the question of the form which the announcement should take.

M. Tardieu proposed a draft in some such words as the following:—“So far as the question of the French frontier on the Rhine is concerned, the United States Government and the British Government are in agreement to submit to their respective legislatures the text of the Treaty according to the terms of which the Republic of the United States of America and Great Britain will immediately bring their assistance in case of an unprovoked German aggression.”

President Wilson pointed out that the mention of the approval of the League of Nations had been omitted.

M. Tardieu proposed to introduce the words “with the approval of the League of Nations” after the words “respective legislatures”.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the mention of the League of Nations would assist him in getting it through Parliament.

President Wilson then proposed the following alternative draft:—

“In addition to the securities afforded in the Treaty of Peace, the President of the United States of America has pledged himself to propose to the Senate of the United States, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain has pledged himself to propose to the Parliament of Great Britain an engagement subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations to come immediately to the assistance of France in case of unprovoked attack by Germany.”

(It was agreed

(1) That the announcement should be made in the words proposed by President Wilson.

(2) That President Wilson on behalf of the United States of America and Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour on behalf of Great Britain, should respectively send letters to M. Clemenceau, based on Mr. Balfour’s draft (Appendix 2).

(At this point the Drafting Committee was introduced.)

3. Renunciation by Germany of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty Mr. Hurst said that the Drafting Committee had found itself in a difficulty. On Friday, May 2nd, the text of an article had been approved by the Supreme Council in regard to the renunciation by Germany of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and other matters relating to Russia. This had been forwarded to the Drafting Committee (I.C. 171.C. [I.C. 179C] Minute 11).² The Drafting Committee, however, had found that this article was less far-reaching than articles already included in the Financial and Economic Sections of the Peace Treaty, and had accordingly submitted a revised draft which was approved by the Supreme Council and duly transmitted to the Drafting Committee to supersede the original draft (I.C. 181.A. Minute 2).³ Today, however, the Drafting Committee had been told that the original clause was to be reinserted.

In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said he thought the new instructions had been given to M. Fromageot by M. Pichon.

M. Clemenceau said that if the revised draft had been approved by the Supreme Council it ought to stand.

(It was agreed that the revised draft approved on May 3rd should stand and the Drafting Committee was given verbal instructions to carry this out.)

4. Austria Mr. Hurst said that on May 2nd, the Supreme Council had approved the following Article for incorporation in Austria the Treaty of Peace, which had been duly notified to the Drafting Committee.

“Germany acknowledges and will fully respect the independence of Austria within the frontiers established by the present Treaty as inalienable except by consent of the League of Nations”. (I. C. 179.C. Minute 12.)⁴

The difficulty in which the Drafting Committee found themselves was that the frontiers of Austria had not been fixed. It was true that the frontiers between Germany and that part of the old Austrian Empire which was now comprised in the new Czecho-Slovak State had been fixed, but nothing had been said either about the frontiers between Germany and the new Austria, or about the other frontiers of Austria.

Mr. Lloyd George proposed that the 1914 frontier between Austria and Germany should be adhered to.

President Wilson pointed out that this only provided for the boundary between Germany and Austria, whereas the Article quoted above referred to “the frontiers established by the present Treaty,” and contemplated the whole of the boundaries of Austria.

Mr. Hurst said that the Drafting Committee had proposed an amendment to the effect that Germany should recognise Austria within frontiers which might be approved by the Allied and Associated Powers.

(The Drafting Committee’s proposal was agreed to, and the Drafting Committee was given verbal instructions to amend the Treaty accordingly.)

5. Canada and the Labour Convention Mr. Lloyd George said he had an appeal to make in regard to Canada and Canada. Sir Robert Borden had pointed out that Canada was, by the existing wording, ruled out of the League of Nations Council.

President Wilson pointed out that it was not the League of Nations Council but the Labour Convention⁵ to which he understood Sir Robert Borden referred.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Sir Robert Borden’s point was not so much that he wanted Canada at present to be represented on the Council, but he wanted the regulation so altered that Canada could be included in the Council. He had pointed out that South American Republics such as Nicaragua, Honduras, etc. could be represented, and he maintained that the United States influence in those countries was greater than the influence of the United Kingdom in Canada.

President Wilson demurred to this, but said he did not want that point to be made in order to convince him of the justice of Sir Robert Borden’s contention. This Convention, however, had been drawn up by a Commission which had now dispersed, and passed by the Plenary Conference, and it was difficult to change it.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Sir Robert Borden had actually moved and passed a resolution through the Plenary Conference,⁶ which he believed to be adequate, but the Drafting Committee did not consider it adequate. Sir Robert Borden had said that if the Drafting Committee’s view was upheld, he would have to raise the question at the Plenary Session in the afternoon, and Mr. Lloyd George wanted to avoid this if possible.

President Wilson asked if anyone had the exact terms of the resolution moved at the Plenary.

Mr. Hurst said the substance of it had been that the Drafting Committee was instructed to bring the Labour Convention into line with the League of Nations Covenant.

Mr. Lloyd George asked if M. Clemenceau would agree to put Canada in the same position in regard to the Labour Convention as it was in regard to the League of Nations Covenant.

M. Clemenceau agreed.

President Wilson said that that was his understanding of the situation. He was so anxious not to hold up the printing of the Peace Treaty that he thought alterations of this kind might be put into an errata.

Mr. Hurst asked that the form in which the correction should be made might be left to the Drafting Committee.

(It was agreed that the necessary alterations should be inserted in the Labour Convention, to place the Dominion[s] in the same position as regards representation on the governing body of the Labour Convention as they were already in as regards representation on the Council of the League of Nations.

2. That the form in which this should be incorporated in the Treaty of Peace should be left to the Drafting Committee.)

The Drafting Committee were given verbal instructions to carry out this decision.^*

Note:—At the end of the meeting, Sir Maurice Hankey received a note from Mr. Hurst to say that the decision would be carried out by suppressing the following sentence in Article 393 (Labour Convention); “no member, together with its dominions and colonies, whether self-governing or not, shall be entitled to nominate more than one member.”

(M. Loucheur was introduced at this point together with Lord Cunliffe.)

Note:—The following passages were extremely difficult to follow, as all present were standing up, and the conversation was very general.

6. M. Loucheur handed in the attached document proposing a drafting alteration in the text of Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace. (Appendix III.)

Reparation. Article 232 of the Treaty (The object of this alteration, as explained by Reparation. M. Loucheur, was understood to be to prevent the Germans from giving too narrow an interpretation of this Article. Annex 1, to the Reparation Clauses includes among the categories of damage for which compensation may be claimed pensions to naval and military victims of the war, whereas the actual text of this Article, although referring to Annex 1, indicates that it is only damage done to the civilian population that shall be compensated. This was the reason for inserting the words “and generally for all damage in accordance with the definition contained in Annex 1.”)

M. Clemenceau insisted very strongly that this alteration, which was merely a drafting one, was essential to him, as his colleagues pressed very strongly for it.

Mr. Lloyd George said the question was really a legal one, and he greatly regretted the absence of Lord Sumner. After consulting Lord Cunliffe and Mr. Hurst, he said that so far as he was concerned, he would accept the change.

President Wilson, after consulting Mr. Brown Scott, also accepted it.

(It was agreed that the alteration proposed by M. Loucheur, should be approved, and the Drafting Committee was given verbal instructions to amend the Treaty of Peace accordingly.)

7. Provision in the Treaty of Peace for Restitutions as Provided in the Armistice Continuing Pending Ratification of Peace Treaty M. Loucheur raised a question, which he said had up to now been overlooked in regard to Reparation. It was provided by the terms of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, and the Conventions renewing it, for certain restitutions, including the surrender of ships, to take place regularly during the Armistice. Unless some provision was made for a continuation of these restitutions, they would come to a stop on the signature of Peace, and would not be renewed until the Treaty was ratified. He said that Mr. Lamont and Mr. McCormick were in agreement with him on the subject. He urged therefore, that some clause should be inserted to provide for this defect.

(This was agreed to.)

8. Poland and Reparation Mr. Lloyd George said that on the previous evening M. Paderewski had pointed out to him that under the Reparation Clauses, the old Government buildings and forests of Poland, which had during the war been seized by Germany, and had now reverted to Poland, would have to be paid for by the Poles.

Mr. Hurst, in reply to a question by Mr. Lloyd George, said that under the Reparation Clauses, all State property would have to be valued and accounted for to the Reparation pool by Poland.

President Wilson said that the Reparation Committee had powers to remit in such cases as these.

Mr. Hurst said it would involve a diminution in Poland’s share in the pool.

(On President Wilson’s suggestion, it was agreed that the Reparation experts should prepare a clause to provide for this difficulty, which should be forwarded to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty of Peace.)

9. Reparation. Joint and Several Liability M. Loucheur said that M. Crespi had communicated with him to say that the decision as regards the participation of Italy in reparation was contrary to Article 11 of the Treaty of London, namely, “Italy will receive a part corresponding to her efforts and her sacrifices in the eventual war indemnity.” M. Crespi had asked that this provision might be withheld.

Mr. Lloyd George said it was too late.

President Wilson agreed. He said it would involve a most elaborate alteration.

Mr. Lloyd George said it created an awkward situation, but he pointed out that Italy had not declared war against Germany for more than 12 months after she signed the Treaty of London.

President Wilson pointed out that reparation was provided for, but no war indemnity.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that this narrow, interpretation of indemnity would hardly be fair to Italy. Italy’s real weak point was that she had not declared war against Germany until nearly two years after the beginning of the war. Her efforts against Germany had been by no means great.

President Wilson pointed out that the formula on April 30th (I.C. 178.C. Minute l)⁷ related to the attacks on Italy by Germany, and not Italy’s operations against Germany.

Mr. Brown Scott suggested that the matter might be settled in the Treaty with Austria.

President Wilson said that this meant that Italy would receive nothing. It was a very complicated business, to make a change now.

M. Loucheur read a draft Article which he proposed should be substituted for the present Article.

(The Secretary was unable to obtain this.)

Mr. Lloyd George said that the effect of M. Loucheur’s proposal would be a protest on behalf of Serbia and Roumania.

M. Loucheur then suggested that the original text should be restored. (This was agreed to.)

(At this point, the Drafting Committee and M. Loucheur withdrew, M. Tardieu having withdrawn during the discussion.)

M. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Conference, was introduced.

10. States To be Represented at the Meeting With the Germans President Wilson asked M. Dutasta which Governments had been invited to attend the Plenary in the afternoon.

M. Dutasta said the whole of the Plenary Conference had been invited.

In a reply to a further question from President Wilson, he said that in addition to the great powers, the following States would be represented to meet the Germans:—

Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, and Czecho-Slovakia.

President Wilson pointed out that many other States, including some of the Central and South American States had declared war on Germany and would have to sign the Treaty.

Mr. Lloyd George said this was because of the League of Nations. Some neutrals, however, were to join the League of Nations, and these would not be present to meet the Germans.

President Wilson said he hoped at any rate the Chinese would be included.

Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau agreed.

Sir Maurice Hankey said he was informed that Siam had sent aviators to the theatre of war.

Mr. Lloyd George said in these circumstances it would be difficult to leave Siam out.

(It was agreed that China and Siam should be added to the list of States represented when the Treaty of Peace was handed to the Germans.)

11. The Neutral Zone of Savoy M. Dutasta handed in a Memorandum in regard to the neutral zone of Savoy, of the Free zones of Savoy, and of the Gex district, (Appendix IV) as well as an Article proposed by the French Government for incorporation in the Treaty of Peace, (Appendix 5). He said that the text of this Article had been agreed between the French and Swiss Governments.

President Wilson said he knew nothing about the matter.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he knew nothing of it either. He proposed that the Foreign Ministers should be invited to meet at once, with full powers to decide the question.

(It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be summoned at once by the Secretary-General, and should meet with full powers to decide the questions raised in the documents presented by the Secretary-General.)

12. The Return of the Italian Delegation Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to notify M. Orlando that a meeting of the Supreme Council would be held on the following day at President Wilson’s house in the Place des Etats-Unis, at 11 a.m.

13. The Position With Italy Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to an article in the “Matin”, which was generally well informed about Italian affairs. This indicated that Italy would now claim the sovereignty of Fiume under the League of Nations.

President Wilson asked how long it would take the Italians to realise that they could not get Fiume under any circumstances. The only advantage in letting the Italians have Fiume would be that it would break the Treaty of London, which he was disturbed to find allotted the Dodecanese to Italy.

M. Clemenceau said he had bad news of Italian military movements.

Mr. Lloyd George asked what the result of President Wilson’s enquiries in regard to the proposed Military re-disposition of forces in Turkey had been.

President Wilson said he regretted to have to say that his legal advisers informed him that he had no authority to send troops to Turkey. One result of the United States policy of isolation had been that laws had been placed on the Statute Book restricting the movements of troops outside of the United States. Under existing laws it would not even be possible for him to agree to send troops to Turkey, nor could he send them unless at war with Turkey. He had tried his best to find some way out but could not. The most he could do at present, and though that was not much it might do to steady the Italians, was to express his willingness to propose to Congress legislation on the subject when he submitted the Treaty of Peace. Such legislation would practically form part of the scheme of mandates.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that in the meanwhile Italy might establish herself in Anatolia.

President Wilson said that in that case Italy would be compelled to get out again. The United States was the only country where Italy could get credits for essential purposes.

Mr. Lloyd George said that no discussion had taken place in regard to the mandates for Anatolia.

President Wilson said that certain authoritative Turk had expressed the view that the whole of Turkey ought to be under a single mandate. He himself thought that this was more than he could induce the United States to undertake. The Turks were hated in the United States, and the only ground on which a mandate would be accepted in Turkey, would be to protect subject races against the Turks. He was assured that to put in a disturbing authority in Anatolia would inevitably cause trouble with the Greeks on one side and the Roumanians [sic] on the other. There would be constant friction between them. Moreover, when the Italian people saw what additions were involved to their budgets they would not like the arrangements. He could not understand the position of the Italian Government in this matter. He compared it to the popular clamour against the destruction of warships, the fact not being understood how heavy was the cost of their upkeep.

14. New states. Conditions To Be Accepted by Them. Extension of Terms of Reference to Committee Sir Maurice Hankey stated that he had received a letter from M. Berthelot stating that the Committee set up on May 1st (I. C. 178 B[178 D] Minute 8)⁸ established that the problem applied equally to certain countries such as Roumania and Greece which would receive territorial increases very much in the same conditions as new States like Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the kingdom of the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes. The question was especially important by reason of guarantees to be formulated for the Jews of Roumania and the Mussulmans of Thrace and Albania. The Committee therefore asked for an extension of its terms of reference to include Roumania and Greece.

The above proposal was approved and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to notify M. Berthelot accordingly.

15. Albania President Wilson drew attention to the position the Italians had assumed in Albania.

Mr. Lloyd George said that a Protectorate had been announced without informing any of their Allies.

President Wilson said that Albania ought to be independent.

Mr. Lloyd George doubted if sufficient unity could be ensured.

16. Turkey Mr. Lloyd George said he thought some attempt ought to be made to proceed further in regard to Turkey. Otherwise the Italians would establish themselves there. M. Clemenceau on the previous day had told them that Italy had seven battleships at Smyrna. This meant that they intended to land troops. It was said that Italy was making trouble between the Greeks and Turks, and having done so they would land troops with the ostensible object of keeping the peace.

President Wilson remarked that they would have to be informed that if they did not evacuate they would get no money.

Mr. Lloyd George said that America had had a good deal of experience of bankrupt countries in central America, and Europe had had a good deal of experience of the same kind in the Balkans and Turkey. The one thing these countries could always do was to make war.

President Wilson suggested that they did it by living on the country.

17. Smyrna. Proposed Landing of Greek Division Mr. Lloyd George said he thought it ought to be decided that M. Venizelos should be allowed to land two or three Divisions at Smyrna to protect his fellow-countrymen in Turkey.

President Wilson pointed out that the report of the Greek Commission was now unanimously in favour of giving this area to Greece.

M. Clemenceau said he was ready to allow M. Venizelos to send troops.

President Wilson said that undoubtedly he was ready.

M. Clemenceau recalled the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne.⁹

Mr. Lloyd George said that the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne had been conditional on Italy playing an adequate part in the war against Turkey, and had also been subject to the agreement of Russia. He asked for a decision that M. Venizelos might be authorized to send troops on board ship to Smyrna to be kept there ready for landing in case of necessity.

President Wilson asked why they should not be landed at once? The men did not keep in good condition on board ship.

Mr. Lloyd George said he had no objection.

18. Reparation Commission. Report by Third Sub-Commission Sir Maurice Hankey read a letter he had received from Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia in his capacity Report of Chairman of the Third Sub-Commission¹⁰ of the Commission on Reparation enclosing a report presented by the Third Sub-Commission. The last paragraph of this report read as follows:—

“Under all the circumstances the Sub-Commission thinks that no useful purpose can be served by proceeding to make recommendations unless the Supreme War Council expresses a wish that it should do so.”

Sir Maurice Hankey was authorized in replying to this letter to thank Mr. Hughes for his letter and report, and to state that as this aspect of reparation had been dealt with as part of the general discussions of the Supreme Council, it would not be necessary for the Sub-Commission to make further recommendations at present.

19. Proposed Postpone Postponement of the Meeting With the Germans At the conclusion of the meeting a message was received from the Marquis Imperiali stating that the Italian Delegation could not arrive from Rome on the following day before 12 o’clock even if the train was punctual; as the Italian delegation would wish to establish contact with the Allied and Associated Governments before meeting the Germans, he asked for a postponement of this meeting for twenty-four hours.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the Italian credentials had not yet been presented. He suggested that M. Pichon ought to ask M. Bonin whether he wished the Italian credentials to be presented.

President Wilson said it would be impossible to change the date of the meeting. The Italians were entirely responsible themselves for the delay in their return, and must take the consequences. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that M. Bonin should be asked if he wished the Italian credentials to be presented. Italy had left the Conference without any justification and no postponement was possible.

M. Clemenceau agreed, and pointed out that the Italians could have returned earlier.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed.

(It was agreed that M. Pichon should be asked to consult M. Bonin as to whether he wished the Italian credentials to be presented to the Germans.)

Publicity of the Peace Treaty Just as the Meeting was dispersing the question was raised in the ante-room by Mr. Baker and Mr. Mair who were waiting there, as to the date on which the summary of the Treaty of Peace should be made public.

Sir Maurice Hankey consulted M. Clemenceau who was already in his Motor car, and President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George who were in the ante-room, with the result that it was agreed that the summary of the Treaty of Peace should be published in the morning newspapers of Thursday, May 8th; that arrangements should be made to secure publicity simultaneously in all the countries concerned; and that no publicity should take place before that date.

(The question of publicity by wireless telegraphy was left to be decided when the Council of Three met in the afternoon at the Plenary Conference.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 6 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC–181C

[Translation]¹¹

Communiqué

The President of the United States has addressed to M. Clemenceau the following letter:

(text of letter)

The Prime Minister of Great Britain has addressed to M. Clemenceau the following letter:

(text of letter)

The engagement foreseen in these two letters, for which legislative approval will be requested by the Governments, will be founded upon the following bases:

(1) Any violation by Germany of the engagements undertaken by her concerning the left Bank of the Rhine and 50–kilometer zone on the right Bank (Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Peace) will be considered by the signatories as an act of hostility against them and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

(2) The signatory (the United States in one case, the British Empire in the other) will immediately give its assistance to France, if any move of unprovoked aggression is directed against France by Germany.

(3) This agreement will be submitted for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations by majority vote.

(4) The agreement remains in force until the signatories consider that the League of Nations itself constitutes a sufficient guarantee.

Appendix II to IC–181C

[Draft by Mr. Balfour of letter from Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour to M. Clemenceau. Same as letter printed as appendix I to IC–181D, on page 494.]

Appendix III

Reparation

Article 2	(Article 232 of the Treaty)
actual text	text as proposed by the french delegation
	(Approved by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr. Lloyd George, 6th. May 1919.)
The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.	The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.
The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage in accordance with the definition contained in Annex I hereto done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air.	The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage from the air and generally for all damage in accordance with the definition contained in Annex I hereto.

Appendix IV

I. Neutral Zone of Savoy

II. Free Zones of Savoy and of the Gex District

I. Neutral zone of Savoy—In 1815, the king of Sardinia, having regained possession of Savoy, wished to protect that province against a French invasion. He obtained from the Powers by the final act of the Congress of Vienna (art. 92) confirmed by the declaration of Nov. 3rd/20th. 1815,¹² the following advantages, viz.

a). That the provinces of Chablais and of Faucigny and the territory North of Ugines, should be included in the Swiss neutrality.

b). That in case hostilities have broken out or are threatening to break out between the States adjoining Switzerland, Sardinian troops should be withdrawn.

c). That no troops in arms should be permitted to march across or to remain in the aforesaid territories, except such troops as Switzerland might consider advisable to keep therein.

Switzerland had not been a party in those acts. When Savoy was ceded to France by Sardinia, the Treaty of Turin, Nov. [March] 24th, 1860¹³ stipulated in art. 2 that France should come to an agreement with the powers represented at the Congress of Vienna and also with the Helvetic Confederation, concerning the guarantees established in 1815.

France did not consider that she should at the time claim the benefit of art. 2 of the treaty of Turin. But the present war has shown the necessity of amending the clauses of 1815. If the Swiss neutrality had been violated, as was the case with the Belgium neutrality, a hostile army could have marched into Savoy before the French military authorities had time to organise the defense of that zone in which no military establishment of any kind including even hospitals, was to be contemplated.

The French Government, having previously come to an agreement with Switzerland, request that the Powers should recognise and make Germany recognise also, that the neutralization of the Northern portion of Savoy, resulting from the Treaty of 1815, has now ceased and that the neutralised zone is abolished.

II. Free zones.—Taking into account the isolated geographical position of the Gex district, which is separated from the French territory by the Jura, the treaty of Nov. 20th 1815 had put back the customs frontiers beyond that district. By the treaty of Turin, Nov. [March] 16th 1816,¹⁴ between Sardinia and Switzerland, a similar arrangement had been made, as regards the immediate neighbourhood of Geneva.

When Savoy became French, the French Government of their own account, extended the small Sardinian zone, as part of the population had expressed a wish to that effect.

The economic regime as established by the treaties of 1815 and 1816, originally included complete reciprocity of treatment for French goods going into Switzerland and Swiss goods coming into the aforesaid zone.

From 1849, the Confederation began to raise economic barriers around their territory. As such a policy could be considered as contrary to the spirit of the treaties, France and Switzerland entered into negotiations on the matter, but they only concluded special agreements for a limited period, such as the convention of 1881.¹⁵

Through recently denouncing this convention, France has recovered her freedom in that part of the zone which was extended in 1860, but in order to recover her freedom in the former Sardinian zones of 1815 and 1816, she must have the old treaties, which placed her in economic bondage, declared void.

France moreover does not intend to abolish purely and simply the regime of the free zones. She expressly desires to have the question settled by a treaty entered into, of their own consent, by the only two powers concerned, such a treaty as will be consistent with the economic development and will bring about a notable improvement in the trade relations between France and Switzerland.

It is to be expressly understood that the regime of the free zones shall remain in force until the ratification of the convention which is now being negotiated between France and Switzerland.

Appendix V to IC–181C

3 May, 1919.

[Article Proposed by the French Government for Incorporation Into the Treaty of Peace]

The High Contracting Parties, while they recognise the guarantees stipulated by the treaties of 1815 and especially by the Act of Nov. 20th 1815 in favour of Switzerland,—the said guarantees constituting international obligations for the maintenance of peace,—declare however that the provisions of these treaties and conventions, declarations and such other acts as concern the neutralised zone of Savoy, are no longer consistent with the present circumstances. For that reason, after taking note of the agreement thereon entered into by France and Switzerland, they state that the stipulations concerning the neutral zone of Savoy, as determined by art. 8 of the treaty of Nov. 20th 1815, are and shall remain abrogated.

The High Contracting Parties, in the same way agree that the stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and other supplementary acts concerning the free zones of Haute-Savoie and the Gex district are no longer consistent with the present circumstances and that it belongs to France and Switzerland to come to an agreement together, with a view to settling between themselves, the regime of these territories, under such conditions as shall be considered suitable by both countries.

Appendix VI to IC–181C

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s Home May 6, 1919

The question having been raised as to the meaning of Article IV of the League of Nations Covenant, we have been requested by Sir Robert Borden to state whether we concur in his view, that upon the true construction of the first and second paragraphs of that Article, representatives of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire may be selected or named as members of the Council. We have no hesitation in expressing our entire concurrence in this view. If there were any doubt it would be entirely removed by the fact that the Articles of the Covenant are not subject to a narrow or technical construction.

Dated at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, the sixth day of May, 1919.

• G. Clemenceau
• Woodrow Wilson
• D. Lloyd George

1. Arthur Hugh Frazier, Counselor of the American Embassy in France; member of the Secretariat of the Conference.
2. Ante, p. 421.
3. Ante, p. 451.
4. Ante, p. 421.
5. See protocol No. 4, plenary session of April 11, 1919, annex I, vol. iii, p. 261.
6. See vol. iii, p. 260.
7. Note by the Secretary. At the Plenary Meeting in the afternoon the attached statement (Appendix VI) was signed by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr. Lloyd George, the original being retained by the Prime Minister of Canada. [Footnote in the original.]
7. Ante, p. 387.
8. Ante, p. 394.
9. Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne between Great Britain, France, and Italy, April 19–21, 1917, Current History (March 1920), vol. xi, p. 500.
10. The Committee on Measures of Control and Guarantees.
11. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
12. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. iii, p. 234.
13. Ibid., vol. l, p. 412.
14. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. vii, p. 21.
15. Archives diplomatique, recueil mensuel de diplomatic, d’htetofre, etc. 1880–81, 2me série, vol. iii, p. 182.