Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/123
IC–176H
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s Residence, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday April 26, 1919, at 12.15 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- President Wilson.
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. Secretary,
- Professor P. J. Mantoux. Interpreter.
- United States of America
1. Reparation, Dye Stuffs and Chemiclas, Drugs, Coal and Coal Derivatives (Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith who had remained on from the previous Meeting and Commandant Aron1 were Present during the short discussion of this subject.) The Articles having been agreed by the British and United States Experts and Commandant Aron having assured M. Clemenceau that M. Loucheur had accepted them, the Articles in Appendix I were approved and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward them to the Secretary General for a Drafting Committee.
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith and Commandant Aron then withdrew.
2. Italy Attention was drawn to reports of the movements of Italian troops towards Fiume apparently from Austria and of Italian naval movements towards Fiume.
3. Roumania and Hungary President Wilson suggested that Roumania should be asked to cease their aggressive action towards Hungary. Roumania had had considerable assistance from the Allies and was pressing her advantage of numbers and equipment. Her action was distinctly aggressive and might constitute a danger to the Peace. He recalled General Smuts’ suggestion that the Austrians should be invited to come to Paris. He suggested that an invitation might be sent giving a date a short time in advance to quiet things in Austria. This might arrest the danger to the Hungarian ferment extending to Austria. If Austria were put on a footing of respect this danger might be checked. This suggestion, President Wilson said, came from Mr. Hoover who had very good sources of information [Page 292] through his Relief Agencies. Mr. Hoover was afraid of a collapse in Austria. He asked if General Franchet D’Esperey commanded the armies in that region.
M. Clemenceau said that General Graziani2 was now in command there.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that M. Bratiano might be invited to attend and asked to stop the Roumanian aggressive movement.
President Wilson suggested that in view of the pressure of time it might be better to send him a joint letter.
M. Clemenceau thought it would be best to hear M. Bratiano for ten minutes after which a letter might be sent.
President Wilson suggested that the Austrians might be invited for the 15th May.
Mr. Lloyd George said there was not a great deal to be settled now with the Austrian Treaty.
President Wilson said it was particularly confined to questions of boundaries, which were in process of settlement and the proportion of Austria’s debt to be borne by the States formerly constituting the Austro-Hungary Empire.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he was not sure if the proportions could not be fixed. His view was that general principles should be stated first, and then a Commission should be set up to work out details. The calculation was a very difficult one involving not only the population but also the wealth of the country.
President Wilson agreed that the best plan would be to get a Commission set up.
This question was then dropped without any actual decision being taken.
4. A Communication of the Preliminary of Peace to the German Delegates The Council had before them a document prepared by the Secretary General assisted by the United States, British and Japanese Secretaries (Appendix II).
5. Examination of Credentials The first proposal for an examination of credentials by an Examining Commission presided [over] by M. Jules Cambon was approved.
The proposal that the President of the Conference should determine the date and hour of the examination as soon as the German Delegates arrived was also agreed to.
6. Recognition of Yugo-Slavs It was pointed out that the question of the recognition of the Jugo-Slavs was raised by the suggestion that the Germans might ask for an examination of the Allies credentials.
President Wilson said that the United States had already recognised Jugo-Slavia.
[Page 293]Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau said that Great Britain and France had not.
(It was agreed that a provisional decision should be taken for the British and French Governments to recognise the Jugo-Slavia Government before the Germans arrived at Versailles but that action should be suspended pending M. Orlando’s return. Unless some reason was shown to the contrary however, the Jugo-Slavs would be recognised before the arrival of the Germans.)
7. It was agreed that the Germans should submit their observations on the Treaty of Peace in French and English.
8. Written Procedure. Germans communicate Their observations in writing (1) It was agreed that the maximum time limit to the Germans to make their observations Peace Treaty should be fifteen days.
The Time Allowed to the Germans To Make Their Observations (2) That they should be required to make their observations on particular subjects within such shorter period as might be determined.
(3) That M. Clemenceau should instruct the Secretary General to place himself in communication with the groups which had considered the different subjects and invite their suggestions as to how long a time should be permitted to the Germans for the consideration of each of the subjects mentioned in his list.
It was pointed out that the League of Nations was not included in the Secretary General’s list.
9. Powers To Present The Secretary General’s proposal that the President should hand Powers To over Treaty to the German Delegation in the presence of the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers and of the Belgian Delegation only was not approved.
It was agreed:—
1. That the full number of the Plenipotentiaries of all Belligerents should be present when the Treaty was handed over.
The question of the inclusion of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegation as belligerents was discussed but not decided.
10. Danzing Mr. Headlam-Morley stated that in a conversation on Thursday the 24th with M. Paderewski3 he had explained to him the proposed arrangement for Danzig. M. Paderewski had Danzig obviously been seriously disturbed, but had recognized that the matter had been decided in principle. He had asked, however, that two points should be provided for to which he attached the greatest importance:—
- (1)
- That there should be secured to Poland not only the use and service of the docks, etc., but the actual ownership, especially of those situated at the mouth of the Vistula and outside the walls of the city.
- (2)
- He suggested that the Polish control over Danzig would be secured by the disarmament of Germany, and that in order to help the general principle of disarmament it would not be desirable that Poland should make any display of military force in Danzig. While acquiescing in this idea he still wanted the power of protection against unorganised attacks by German “free-booters”.
Mr. Headlam-Morley had then said he would try and secure something giving to Poland the right if required for the protection of Danzig against external attack.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said he had not been able to ascertain who were the present owners of the docks.
President Wilson did not consider that either of these requests by M. Paderewski could be acceded to.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that M. Paderewski would be satisfied with power of development of the Port of Danzig.
(This proposal was agreed to, and Mr. Headlam-Morley was instructed to draft the final clauses on this assumption.
It was also agreed that the protection of Danzig against external attack would be vested in the League of Nations.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 26 April, 1919.
- Of the office of the French Minister for Industrial Reconstruction.↩
- Gen. J. C. Graziani, of the French Army.↩
- Ignace Jan Paderewski, Polish President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.↩
- Leland Harrison, Diplomatic Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; Herman C. Norman, Secretary of the British delegation; and Sadao Saburi, Secretary of the Japanese delegation.↩