Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume V

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/114

IC–175E

Notes of a Meeting Which Took Place at President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 22, 1919, at 4:30 p.m.

Paris, April 22, 1919, 4:30 p.m.

• Present
  • United States of America
    • President Wilson.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
  • British Empire
    • The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
  • China
    • Mr. Lou Tseng-Tsiang.
    • Mr. V. K. Wellington Koo.
      Accompanied by:—
    • Mr. Chuan Chao.
    • Mr. William Hsieh.

Secretary	Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.
Interpreter	Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Kiauchau and shantung. The Chinese Case President Wilson said that the Chinese Plenipotentiaries knew the interest he felt in the Kiauchau-Shantung settlement. On the previous day he had a Conference with the Japanese representatives, and this morning they had come to confer. M. Orlando, unfortunately, could not be present. Since he had last seen Mr. Koo, he had carefully read the documents, from which he gathered the following was the chain of events.

Before China entered into the war, there had been an exchange of Notes. He thought in 1915 (Mr. Koo said it was the 25th May). In that exchange of Notes, the Japanese Government had said that when the German rights in Kiauchau were transferred after the war to Japan, Japan would return them to China. The Chinese Government had taken note of this. Subsequently, there had been a further exchange of notes, and he believed, also a treaty although he had only seen Notes, in which the Japanese Government laid down certain conditions. The Chinese Government had accepted these conditions. Great Britain and France (Mr. Lloyd George said that this had occurred between the two exchanges of Notes between China and Japan) had entered into a similar but not identical agreement with Japan to the effect that they would support the claims of the Japanese Government on the Continent and in the islands North of the Equator. In the case of the British Government it had been on the understanding that Japan supported her claim to German islands South of the Equator. Hence, Great Britain and France were in much the same position in the matter.

Mr. Lloyd George explained that at that time the submarine campaign had become very formidable. Most of the British torpedo-boat-destroyers were in the North Sea, and there was a shortage of those craft in the Mediterranean. Japanese help was urgently required, and Japan had asked for this arrangement to be made. We had been very hard pressed, and had agreed.

President Wilson then read extracts from the exchange of Notes printed on page 62 of the official Claim of China for direct restitution to herself of the leased territory of Kiauchau, etc., circulated by the Chinese Delegation:—

“When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiauchau Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions.”

He then read the following reply of the Chinese Foreign Minister, in which, after rehearsing the whole of the Japanese Note, he had said “In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of this declaration”. He then read an extract from page 82, namely, exchange of Notes dated September 24, 1918.

“The Japanese Government, mindful of the amiable relations between our two countries and out of a spirit of friendly co-operation, propose to adjust all the questions relating to Shantung in accordance with the following articles.

1. Japanese troops along the Kiauchow-Chinan railway, except a contingent of them to be stationed at Chinanfu, shall be withdrawn to Tsingtau.

2. The Chinese Government may organise a Police Force to undertake the policing of the Kiauchow-Chinan railway.

3. The Kiauchow-Chinan Kailway is to provide a reasonable amount to defray the expense for the maintenance of the above mentioned Police Force.

4. Japanese are to be employed at the Headquarters of the above-mentioned Police Force, at the principal railway stations, and at the Police Training School.

5. Chinese citizens shall be employed by the Kiauchow-Chinan Railway Administration as part of its Staff.

6. The Kiauchau-Chinan Railway, after its ownership is definitely determined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint enterprise.

7. The Civil Administration established by Japan and existing now is to be abolished.

The Japanese Government desires to be advised of the attitude of your Government regarding the above-mentioned proposal.”

To this the Chinese Minister replied:—

“In reply I have the honour to state that the Chinese Government are pleased to agree to the above articles proposed by the Japanese Government.”

The Chinese Delegation would see, President Wilson continued, the embarrassing position which had been reached. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau were bound to support the claims of Japan. Alongside of them the Chinese had their exchange of notes with Japan. He reminded Mr. Koo that when urging his case before the Council of Ten at the Quai d’Orsay, he had maintained that the war cancelled the agreement with the German Government.¹ It did not, however, cancel the agreement between China and the Japanese Government, which had been made before the war. What he had himself urged upon the Japanese was that, as in the case of the Pacific Islands, the leased territory of Kiauchau should be settled by putting it into the hands of the Five Powers as Trustees. He did not suggest that Treaties should be broken, but that it might be possible, in Conference, to bring about an agreement by modifying the Treaty. He also proposed to them that all Governments should renounce the special rights they had acquired in China, so as to put China in a position free from the special limitations which had been imposed upon her. The Japanese were not willing to have Kiauchau handed over to the Five Powers, and the British and French Governments were embarrassed by their Treaties. When he pressed the Japanese for explanations of the meaning of their agreement, they had replied that the exploitation of two coal-mines and one iron-mine had not proved a successful venture, and were now bound up with the railway. They stated, however, that they would withdraw the civil administration; that they would maintain troops only on the termini of the railway; and that if a general agreement was reached, they would withdraw their extraterritoriality. They urged that they wanted a community of interest with the Chinese in the railway, and the only reserve they made was for a residential district in Kiauchau.

Mr. Koo said that the Treaties of 1915 and the subsequent exchange of Notes were the outcome of the 21 demands which Japan had made on China and were all part and parcel of one transaction. He hoped he had made this clear before the Council of Ten. He felt that the Treaties and Notes which had been exchanged after Japan had delivered an ultimatum stood outside of the regular procedure and course of Treaties. They dealt with matters arising out of the war.

Mr. Lloyd George asked what ultimatum he referred to.

President Wilson asked if Mr. Lloyd George had never heard of the twenty-one points.

Mr. Lloyd George said he had not.

Mr. Koo said that in January 1915 after the capture of Kiau Chau that port had been opened up to trade; China then asked Japan to withdraw her troops from the interior of the province. The Japanese took occasion to treat this note as though it were an unfriendly act and shortly after sprung on China twenty-one demands divided into five groups—for example, that China should accept Japanese advisers; that they should give up railway concessions in which Western Powers were concerned, and he would draw Mr. Lloyd George’s attention to the fact that Great Britain was concerned. China was put in an extremely embarrassing position. She resisted and resisted and only gave up when she was absolutely compelled to. On the 7th. May the Japanese sent China an ultimatum in regard to the majority of demands giving China only 48 hours within which to accept; otherwise Japan would consider herself free to take such steps as she thought fit to enforce them. This caused absolute consternation to the Chinese Government which eventually had to submit to force majeure.

Mr. Lloyd George asked if they had not appealed to the United States of America.

President Wilson said they had and the United States had intervened in regard to the infringement of sovereignty and political independence. The whole transaction, however, had been kept extremely secret and the United States only learnt of it in a roundabout way.

Mr. Koo said that secrecy had been imposed upon China by Japan under severe penalties. It had been said that Japan had informed the Allied Governments and the United States Government that there had been only 11 Demands; but actually 21 Demands had been made on China. The Chinese Government felt that the Treaties and Notes exchanged as a result of these demands followed by an ultimatum were on a different footing from the ordinary. China had always endeavoured to carry out to the letter all engagements made in good faith. These, however, had been made against China’s free will, and the same applied to the notes exchanged in the previous year. For the last four years since they had captured Kiauchau, Japanese troops had penetrated far into the Province of Shantung, where there was a population of 36,000,000 people. This had been very uncomfortable for the general population, and the results had been disturbance and trouble. The Chinese Government had protested, and asked Japan to withdraw her troops who were stationed 250 miles up the railway, but they had refused and had established civil administration bureaux in the interior of Shantung and extended their control even over the Chinese people by levying taxes on Chinese people and asserting judicial power over them. The feelings of the Chinese people against the extension of Japanese control were so strong that the Chinese Government felt constrained to take some immediate step to induce Japan to withdraw her troops and remove the civil administration bureaux, the object being to relieve the tense situation until the question could be finally settled at the Peace Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George said that it looked that by the Treaty with China; the Japanese Government would get more than the Germans had had. He asked Mr. Koo which he would prefer—the Treaty with Japan, or the transference to Japan of the German rights?

Mr. Koo said that the situation was so difficult that he felt he must speak very frankly. The Japanese position was so close to China; especially in Manchuria, where they occupied a railway which was connected with Pekin; that merely to transfer German rights would create a very serious situation. With the Japanese on the Manchurian railway, and the Shantung railway, Pekin would be—as it were—in a pincers.

President Wilson pointed out that the Japanese claimed that the administration of the Shantung railway would be a joint one, and they proposed to withdraw the Japanese administration.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Mr. Koo had not quite answered his point. Supposing the Great Powers had to decide (and this really was his position since he was bound by a Treaty) between Japan inheriting Germany’s rights in Shantung or exercising the rights under the treaty with Japan, which would China prefer? He pointed out that Great Britain was only bound by the rights which Japan inherited from Germany.

President Wilson said that if Japan inherited the German rights, it would involve her retaining the leased territory. He thought Mr. Lloyd George’s point was that possibly Japan was claiming greater rights than Germany had exercised. As the British and French Governments had to support the Japanese claim to what Germany had had, they wanted to know whether China would be better off according as Japan could exercise the rights that Germany had or those that she obtained by her Treaty.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that this was the point, and said the real question was whether the Treaty with Japan was better for China than Germany’s rights.

(At this point there was an interval to permit the Chinese plenipotentiaries to confer.)

Mr. Koo said that he had now consulted his colleague. He could make no choice, because both alternatives were unacceptable; he would merely compare them. The Treaty and Notes with Japan provided for restoration of the Leased Territory to China on certain conditions, but such restoration would be only nominal. Between the two, he thought that the German rights were more limited than the rights claimed by Japan under her Treaty and Notes with China. Even mere succession to the German rights, however, would create a grave situation for China’s future. In claiming direct restitution of German rights, he was not asking for any compensation or remuneration for China as a result of her entry into the war, but only for what was necessary for peace in the Far East. The experience of the last three years made it so clear what the Chinese position would be if Japan was allowed either to succeed to the German rights in Shantung or to retain the rights she claimed under her treaty with China. It was an uncomfortable position both to the Chinese people and the Government. He was not in the least exaggerating, but only saying what was necessary to explain the situation.

President Wilson said that M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George would bear witness that he had put the Chinese case as well as he could to the Japanese Delegation in the morning. He had emphasised the great need of trust and friendship between Japan and China, which he regarded as essential to peace in the Far East. He had urged that China should be free and unfettered to carry out her development. What he asked now was only a means of getting out of a position that was extremely difficult. In this Conference the United States of America was the only power that was entirely unbound. Great Britain, France, China and Japan were all bound by Treaties. They were bound to keep these Treaties because the war had largely been fought for the purpose of showing that Treaties could not be violated.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that in the exchange of notes of September 1918, China might have stood out.

Mr. Koo said that the exchange of notes in 1918 was the result of the Shantung Treaty, made in consequence of the 21 demands. It was part of the same transaction.

President Wilson said that the exchange of notes had grown out of the previous agreement. He looked for the Shantung Treaty.

Mr. Koo said that it was on page 59 of China’s Claim for Direct Restitution of Kiaochow, etc.

President Wilson read the following extracts from the treaty and said that China had then had to accept and had had no other choice:

“Art. 1—The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

“Art. 2—The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Chinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Wehsien line China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.”

Mr. Lloyd George said he would like to have the two positions examined by British, French and American experts, and to learn their views as to which course would be best for China.

M. Clemenceau said he had no objection.

Mr. Lloyd George said that it was also only fair that China should be given more time to consider this question. This seemed to be the only alternative there was to acquiescing in the Treaties between China and Japan. Great Britain and France, however, were not bound by this latter Treaty, but only by their own arrangements with Japan.

President Wilson then read the following extracts from the 21 Demands on page 52 and 53 of the Chinese Document.

Group IV

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.

Group V

“Art. 1.—The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

“Art. 3.—Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police department of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

“Art. 4.—China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50% or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government) or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.”

President Wilson recalled that there were other demands designed to exclude other Powers from the commercial and industrial development; (Mr. Koo said, on page 52).

President Wilson read Article I of the Group III as follows:

“The Two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her act dispose of the rights and property of whatever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.”

Mr. Koo pointed out that the Hanyehping Company was the largest coal and iron mining Company of China, situated in the Yangtze Valley. He requested the reading of Article 2 which, he said, was even more serious.

President Wilson read the following:

“Art. 2—The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of these owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests’ of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.”

Mr. Lloyd George asked whether China had agreed to this Article.

Mr. Koo said that the Chinese Government had had to accept most of the 21 Demands with slight modifications. That was why China was seeking some redress.

President Wilson asked if the following point of view would make any appeal to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries? Hereafter whatever arrangements were made both Japan and China would be members of the League of Nations, which would guarantee their territorial integrity and political independence. That is to say, that these matters would become the concern of the League and China would receive a kind of protection that she had never had before and other nations would have a right which they had never had before to intervene. Before it had been, comparatively speaking, none of our business to interfere in these matters. The Covenant, however, laid down that whatever affected the peace of the world was a matter of concern to the League of Nations and to call attention to such was not an hostile but a friendly act. He, himself, was prepared to advocate at the Council of the League and at the Body of Delegates that the special positions occupied by the various nations in China should be abandoned. Japan declared that she was ready to support this. There would be a forum for advocating these matters. The interests of China could not then be overlooked. He was stating this as an element of security for China in the future if the powers were unable to give her what she wanted now, and he asked the Chinese Delegates to think the matter over. While there was doubt as to the Treaty and Notes between China and Japan, there was no doubt whatsoever as to the agreements entered into by France and Great Britain. Hence, even if the agreements between them and Japan were abandoned, these two Governments were bound to support Japan in getting whatever rights in Shan Tung Germany had had. Hence, the question which the Chinese Plenipotentiaries had to consider was, would they prefer to retain the rights which Japan had secured in their treaty with her or would they prefer that Japan should inherit the German rights in Shan Tung.

Mr. Koo said that he could not lay too much emphasis on the fact that the Chinese people were now at the parting of the ways. The policy of the Chinese Government was co-operation with Europe and the United States as well as with Japan. If, however, they did not get justice, China might be driven into the arms of Japan. There was a small section in China which believed in Asia for the Asiatics and wanted the closest co-operation with Japan. The position of the Government, however, was that they believed in the justice of the West and that their future lay there. If they failed to get justice there, the consequential re-action might be very great. Further, he wished to suggest that the validity of the arrangements was questionable owing to the following facts: (1) They arose out of the war: (2) China had subsequently come into the war herself: (3) New principles had now been adopted by all the nations as the basis of the peace and the agreements with Japan appeared to be in conflict with them. Consequently, in thanking the Supreme Council for hearing the views of the Chinese Delegation, he wished to state the great importance of attaining a peace which could be relied on to endure for 50 years instead of a peace so unjust that it would only sow the seeds of early discord.

President Wilson said that these were serious considerations, but he would not like Mr. Koo even personally to entertain the idea that there was injustice in an arrangement that was based on treaties which Japan had entered into. The sacredness of treaties had been one of the motives of the war. It had been necessary to show that treaties were not mere scraps of paper. If treaties were inconsistent with the principles on which the peace was being formed, nevertheless we could not undo past obligations. If that principle were accepted, we should have to go back and France would have the treaty of 1815 and there would be no end to it. He would not like to feel that because we were embarrassed by a treaty we were disregardful of justice. Moreover, the unjust treatment of China in the past had not by any means been confined to Japan. He hoped that the quandary in which the Powers were would be stated to the Chinese people. He hoped that it would be shown to them that the undoing of the trouble depended on China uniting in reality with other nations, including the Western Nations. He felt absolute confidence that the opinion of the world had the greatest sympathy for the realm of China. The heart of the world went out to her 400 millions of people. Much depended on the state of mind of these 400 million people. Any statesmen who ignored their fortunes were playing a dangerous game. But it would not do to identify justice with unfortunate engagements that had been entered into.

Mr. Koo said he believed prevention to be better than cure. He thought that it would be better to undo unfortunate engagements now, if they endangered the permanence of the future peace.

Mr. Lloyd George said the object of the war was not that. The war had been fought as much for the East as for the West. China also had been protected by the victory that had been won. If Germany had won the war and had desired Shan Tung or Pekin, she could have had them. The very doctrine of the mailed fist had been propounded in relation to China. The engagements that had been entered into with Japan had been contracted at a time when the support of that country was urgently needed. He would not say that the war could not have been won without this support. But he could say that Kiau Chau could not have been captured without Japanese support. It was a solemn treaty and Great Britain could not turn round to Japan now and say “All right, thank you very much. When we wanted your help, you gave it, but now we think that the treaty was a bad one and should not be carried out.” Within the treaties he would go to the utmost limits to protect the position of China. On the League of Nations he would always be prepared to stand up for China against oppression, if there was oppression. China was a nation with a very great past and, he believed, with a still greater future. It would, however, be of no service to her to regard treaties as Von Bethmann Hollweg had regarded them, as mere scraps of paper to be turned down when they were not wanted.

M. Clemenceau said that Mr. Koo could take every word that Mr. Lloyd George had said as his also.

President Wilson asked whether assuming for the sake of argument that the engagements were unfortunate nevertheless they had been entered into for the salvation of China, because they had been entered into for the salvation of the world, of which China was a part. In fact, it would be said that the very engagements were instruments for the salvation of China.

Mr. Koo said they had been designed apparently to meet a situation in Europe and not in the Far East.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that if Germany had won the war in Europe, she would have won it in the Far East also. The world would have been at her feet.

M. Clemenceau agreed.

President Wilson pointed out that the German project was not only domination from Hamburg to Bagdad but also the control of the East. Germany knew China to be rich. Her objects were mostly material. The Kaiser had been the great exponent of what was called the “Yellow Peril”. He had wanted to get France and Great Britain out of the way and afterwards to get everything else he could. One result of the war undoubtedly had been to save the Far East in particular, since that was an unexploited part of the world.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished to consider the question further before arriving at a decision.

President Wilson asked the Chinese Delegates also to give further consideration to the question and hoped that it could be taken up soon again.

(The Chinese Representatives then withdrew.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 23 April 1919.

1. See BC–13, vol. iii, pp. 755–757.