Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume V

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/110

IC–175A

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House at the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, April 21, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, April 21, 1919, 4 p.m.

• Present
  • United States of America
    • President Wilson
  • British Empire
    • Mr. Lloyd George
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau
    • Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary
    • Prof. P. Mantoux, Interpreter.

1. Italian Claims Mr. Lloyd George told President Wilson the suggestion he had made at the end of the meeting in the morning,¹ namely, that, in order to give Italy the strategical requirements for her defence, which was the principal case on which the claim for Dalmatia was based, she should be allowed to have the islands off the coast, but not the mainland. Mr. Philip Kerr,² he said, had met a Jugo-Slav, who had told him that if the Italians held Fiume the Jugo-Slavs would fight them. If they held Dalmatia there would be sniping. But that he had not expressed any strong views about the islands.

President Wilson said that he himself had talked about the island of Cherso with M. Trumbitch, who had pointed out that, owing to its position across the Gulf of Fiume, the Italians, if they held it, would make trouble up and down the Gulf.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that, if the Italians held Cherso, there ought to be a stipulation that the channel between that island and Istria should not be regarded as territorial waters. There should be some clause providing for free access through the channel except in time of war.

President Wilson said even then there should be free access if the Jugo-Slavs were neutral.

Mr. Lloyd George said M. Clemenceau, to whom he had spoken, was convinced that the Italians would not accept his proposal. He suggested, therefore, that perhaps Baron Sonnino could be induced to agree by some offer in Asia Minor.

At Mr. Lloyd George’s request, M. Clemenceau produced a map³ giving a new scheme for the distribution of mandates in Turkey, whereby Italy would secure a mandate over a considerable part of Anatolia touching territory mandated to Greece in the region of Smyrna, and the territory mandated with Constantinople, and Armenia.

President Wilson said the real trouble was that the Greeks and everyone else appeared to dread the Italians as neighbours. The Patriarch of Constantinople had called on him the other day and had expressed strong objections to having the Italians as neighbours. He felt great care would have to be exercised in this matter for inasmuch as we were endeavouring to secure the peace of the world we could not enter into any arrangement that would not make for peace.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested there should be an Italian sphere of influence such as the British had in various parts of the world.

President Wilson said that the British Empire, through a long experience, had learned all sorts of lessons and gained all sorts of ideas in administration of this kind, and did not interfere unduly. The Italians, however, had no such experience. The Italians also had no ethnological claim to this territory, such as the Greeks had. In the case of the Greeks, we only desired to make them comfortable masters in their own home. The Italians had not inherited any traditions of colonial administration.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the Italians should merely have a sphere of influence and it should be made clear that their authority was limited to commercial and railway development, and that they were not to interfere with the people more than necessary.

President Wilson pointed out the trouble was that the Turks could not govern anyone.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the Turks did not interfere much in railways; they were a quiet docile people except towards Armenians and those whom they did not like.

M. Clemenceau agreed with this.

President Wilson pointed out that he did not like, as it were, paying the Italians for something they had no right to.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that there was some strength in the Italian case that they had come into the war on the basis of a certain agreement and that Baron Sonnino’s position would be extremely difficult if it were not fulfilled.

M. Clemenceau pointed out the inaccuracy of statements that had been made to the effect that the Italians could have obtained almost as much from Austria without fighting as they were going to obtain in the Treaty as at present contemplated. He had consulted the Green Book⁵ on the subject and found that in fact they had been offered very little.

President Wilson suggested that perhaps the Italians might take the line their position being what it was they must go home and report to their Parliament and ask for instructions.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that it was better politically for them to present Parliament with an accomplished fact. Supposing he were to go and ask the British Parliament for instructions about indemnities, the position would not be very satisfactory. It was better to give Parliament a lead in matters like this.

President Wilson suggested that the Italians would not be in the position of having to say to their Parliament: We have surrendered. On the contrary, they could say: We refused to surrender, but we now want your advice.

There was some further discussion at this point on the subject of the Italian Parliamentary position and generally as to the attitude to be taken towards the Italians in the existing position. It was eventually agreed that Sir Maurice Hankey should be sent to deliver a verbal message to M. Orlando and Baron Sonnino, reminding them of Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal made at the end of the morning meeting, which they had now had some time to consider, and asking if they would consider it worth while to meet their colleagues and discuss the question on this basis.

Sir Maurice Hankey reported that he had seen M. Orlando, Baron Sonnino and Count Aldrovandi. He had delivered his message in the very words that President Wilson had used. After recalling Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal made at the morning meeting, which they had had some hours to consider, he had asked whether they would consider it worth while to discuss the question of the Italian claims on the basis of the cession of a series of strategic islands off the coast. M. Orlando had asked him if he could give the proposal in writing, but he had replied that he had only authority to deliver a verbal message. The proposal had not commended itself to M. Orlando and Baron Sonnino, who had absolutely rejected it as a basis for discussion. They had said that, of course, they were always prepared to discuss anything with their colleagues if asked to do so, but they would be in the wrong if they encouraged any hopes that this could be a basis for a solution. M. Orlando had elaborated his objections to the proposal a little. He had explained that even from the point of view of defence in its narrower strategic aspects the proposal did not commend itself. He had, however, always regarded defence in the wider aspect of the defence of the Italian populations in the towns on the east of the Adriatic. He mentioned in this connection especially Fiume, but also referred to Zara and Sebenico. Questioned as to the precise terms of Mr. Lloyd George’s suggestion, Sir Maurice Hankey said he had been given to understand that it did not include islands such as Pago, which were almost part of the mainland, but would doubtless include the other islands allotted to Italy in the Treaty of London. Sir Maurice Hankey mentioned that M. Orlando had said that the question had rather retrograded within the last two days, owing to the proposal for the establishment of a free port and city at Fiume similar to that to be established at Dantzig having been dropped.

On the conclusion of Sir Maurice Hankey’s statement there was some discussion as to the desirability of President Wilson publishing a statement on the subject which he had prepared.

M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George urged that he should not do so. Their grounds for this were that the statement rather assumed that Italy had closed the door to an agreement and would be regarded as a final act. It would make it difficult for Italy to recede from her position.

President Wilson pointed out that his statement was [as?] drafted did not close the door to negotiations, but in deference to his colleagues he agreed not to publish immediately.

2. Japanese Claims in Regard to Kiau-chau and Shantung President Wilson reported a conversation he had had that morning with Baron Makino and Count Chinda.⁶ He had made the suggestion that Mr. Lansing had already made at the Council of Foreign Ministers, namely, that all claims in the Pacific should be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers as trustees leaving them to make fair and just dispositions.⁷ He had, at the same time, reminded the Japanese Delegates that it had been understood that Japan was to have a mandate for the islands in the north Pacific although he had made a reserve in the case of the island of Yap, which he himself considered should be international. He had suggested that, similarly, in the case of Kiau-Chau, where there was a definite Treaty relating to Kiau-Chau and Shantung,^7a Japan should place the question in the hands of the 5 Powers. He had asked whether there could not be some modification of the Treaty with the consent of both parties. The Powers had no right to force Japan but they had the right to try and persuade her to make some agreement with China on the subject. The Japanese had been very stiff about it. They had said that they would return Kiau-Chau to China, the only reservation being the retention of a residential section and a free port for China [sic]. In regard to the railway, they surrendered all control except the joint interest with China in the railway and certain concessions. He had pointed out that China had no capital and had asked whether in that event China could take advantage of this position. They had replied that she could and quoted another instance where they had for 10 years shared some concern of the kind with China, which was run on the same lines. They were absolutely set on obliging China to carry out the bond. They insisted that Germany should resign the whole of her interests in Kiau-Chau to the Japanese and that the Powers should trust Japan to carry out her bargain with China.

Mr. Lloyd George asked why Japan should have a different treatment in regard to Kiau-Chau to what other Powers had in respect to German colonies.

President Wilson said the reason was because in the Treaty it had been made clear that the transfer was to precede the retrocession of the territory to China.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that it ought to be ceded by the League of Nations.

President Wilson said that the Japanese were too proud to accept this solution. He had then repeated to the Japanese the proposal he had already made to his colleagues that the spheres of influence in China should be abrogated. They had replied that they were ready to do this. They had defined spheres of influence to include the right of putting in troops and extraterritoriality. He thought it would be a great thing if we could get rid of the right of Japan to maintain troops in Kiau-Chau.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he thought it was very important that in the Treaty with Germany all the Powers should be put on the same footing. Japan should not have a special position.

President Wilson then read the notes which had been exchanged between China and Japan. The first note from Japan to China⁸ had been sent before the entry of China into the war and had been to the effect that when, after the war, the leased territory had been left to the free disposal of Japan the latter would restore it to China under conditions which included a free port in Kiau-Chau Bay: a concession for Japan; the disposal of property was to be effected by mutual arrangement between the two countries. China’s answer had merely been to take note and President Wilson did not think the Government had accepted. Another declaration had been made by Japan on September 24th, 1918.⁹ Japan then proposed to adjust the questions in Shantung on the following lines:—

1. All Japanese troops, except those at Chinan Fu the terminus of the line, to be withdrawn to Tsingtau.

2. The Chinese Government to be allowed to organise a police force for the railway.

3. The railway to pay for this police.

4. The Japanese to be represented at the headquarters of the police, at the various stations, and at the training establishments for the police.

5. Part of the staff of the railway to be Japanese.

6. The railway to become a Chino-Japanese enterprise.

7. The Japanese civil administration to be abolished.

The Chinese reply¹⁰ had been that she was “pleased to agree in the above mentioned articles.” Thus it was not a Treaty but an exchange of notes.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he could see no ground for differentiating in the case of Japan. This territory should be placed on exactly the same footing as all other German territory.

President Wilson said that to be perfectly fair to the Japanese he thought they would interpret this as a challenge of their good faith. He had put it to the Japanese representatives that the peace of the Far East depended more on Chino-Japanese relations than on anything else. China was full of riches. It was clearly to the advantage of Japan to take the most generous position towards China and to show herself as a friend. The interest of the world in China was the “open door”. The Japanese had assented and expressed benevolent intentions.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that it was the triumph of the Great Powers in the west that enabled Japan to make this arrangement. He felt strongly that Japan should be in the same position as other States. Otherwise other nations could insist on the same right.

(It was arranged that the next meeting should take place on the following morning at 11 a.m. M. Clemenceau said that he hoped by that time he would have a reply from the Germans. It was agreed that this was a question which would properly be discussed with the Japanese. As, however, M. Clemenceau had certain questions relating to the Western Front to raise, Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to invite the Japanese for 11:30 a.m. He was also authorised to telephone to Count Aldrovandi to let him know of the Meeting that had been arranged.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 21 April, 1919.

1. Minutes of this meeting not found in Department files.
2. Secretary to Lloyd George.
3. No map accompanies the file copy of the minutes.
5. Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Documents Submitted to the Italian Parliament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sonnino), Austria-Hungary, Session of the 20th May, 1915 (London, 1915).
6. Japanese Ambassador in Great Britain; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
7. See FM–4, vol. iv, p. 556.
8. Of May 25, 1915; Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 171, 197.
8. Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 177 and 198.
9. ibid., 1919, vol. i, p. 571.
10. Ibid., p. 572.