Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume V

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/109

IC–174A

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Easter Sunday, April 20, 1919, at 10 a.m.

Paris, April 20, 1919, 10 a.m.

• Present
  • United States of America
    • President Wilson.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
  • British Empire
    • Mr. Lloyd George
  • Italy
    • M. Orlando.
    • Baron Sonnino.

Count Aldrovandi	}	Secretaries.
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Prof. P. Mantoux, Interpreter.

(1) M. Orlando read the following declaration:—

Italian ciaims “I must maintain all the declarations which I have made so far as the question of Fiume is concerned. In reducing the matter to its minimum terms I must observe to President Wilson that, from the point of view of his noble intention of maintaining peace in the world, he is too eminent a politician not to realise that an essential condition for arriving at this object is that of avoiding between peoples the sentiment of reaction against injustice, which will form, without doubt, the most fatal germ of future wars. But I affirm here that if Fiume is not granted to Italy there will be among the Italian people a reaction of protest and of hatred so violent that it will give rise to the explosion of violent contrasts within a period that is more or less close. I think, then, that the fact that Fiume may not be given to Italy would be extremely fatal just as much to the interests of Italy as to the peace of the world. Nevertheless, since the British and French Allies have declared yesterday that they do not recognise the right of Italy to break the Alliance in the event of her being accorded only what the Treaty of Alliance guarantees her, I am so convinced of my responsibility towards the peace of the world in the event of a rupture of the Alliance to consider it necessary to safeguard myself against every possible accusation in this respect. I declare in consequence formally that, in the event of the Peace Conference guaranteeing to Italy all the rights which the Treaty of London has assured to her, I shall not be obliged to break the Alliance, and I would abstain from every act or deed which could have this signification.” (The original of this statement in French is attached.) (Appendix I).

After a pause, President Wilson said it was incredible to him that the representatives of Italy should take up this position. At the centre of the War there stood three Powers—France, Great Britain, and Italy—which undoubtedly had borne the brunt of the War, especially the two first engaged. Undoubtedly, however, the whole world perceived that the War had been largely undertaken to save these Powers from the intentions of the Central Powers. These Powers, however, had not brought the war to an end. Other Powers had come in which had nothing to do with the Alliance, and were not bound by the Pact of London. These Powers had rendered indispensable assistance; for example, the material and financial assistance of the United States of America had been essential to the successful conclusion of the War. (M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George interrupted to express agreement in this). As soon as the United States of America entered the War they declared their principles. These were acclaimed particularly by those peoples to whom they gave a new assurance of peace, namely, the smaller Powers. They were also greeted with acclamation by the peoples of the Great Powers. When he wrote these principles he knew that he was not writing merely his own conscience, but the point of view of the people of the United States of America. These principles were found to be identical with the sentiments of all the great peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers. Otherwise, these principles would have no effect. The world did not ask for the opinions of individuals. What it did ask was that individuals should formulate principles which called to consciousness what every man was feeling. The opinions expressed first by Mr. Lloyd George, and a few days afterwards by himself, had accomplished this. On these principles the United States of America and some other Powers had entered the War. This world conference must, in formulating the peace, express the conclusions of the whole world and not those of a small group, even though he hastened to add the most influential group who had entered earlier into a Treaty. The object of our principles was not to exclude any legitimate natural aspiration. In this connection President Wilson read the following extracts from his Fourteen Points:—

“XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.”

“IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality.”

This, he said, was what we had been attempting to do. If we did not do what M. Orlando had so eloquently referred to and carry out our principles, but were to base ourselves on the Treaty which Italy invoked, we should be raising antagonisms which would never be stamped out until what we were now doing was rectified. Hence, the result of M. Orlando’s proposal, namely, that other Powers than those bound by it should adhere to the Treaty of London, and if Italy insisted on the carrying out of this Treaty she would stand in the way of peace. The United States of America were not bound, and besides they regarded it as unsuited to the circumstances of the day. If the Austro-Hungarian Empire had survived, his attitude would have been entirely different. For then Italy would have been entitled to every outpost of security. Those dangerous circumstances, however, did not now exist, and though the signatories of the Pact of London did not consider themselves relieved of their undertaking, other Powers need not regard the Pact as binding. He asked his Italian brethren whether they were determined to take action which would result in reducing the chance of peace with Germany, of increasing the risk of the resumption of the War, and of alienating people who had been enthusiastically friendly to Italy. Would they refuse to enter the new circumstances of the world because they could not renew the old circumstances? Without the Pact of London Italy would receive her natural boundaries; the redemption of the Italian population; a restoration of her old glory, and the completion of her integrity. A dream would be realised which, at the beginning of the War, would have seemed too good to be true. The dream had come true by the gallantry of the Italian armies and the force of the world. It was incredible to him, even though he had actually heard it, that Italy should take up this attitude. It was the supreme completing tragedy of the War that Italy should turn her back on her best friends and take up a position of isolation. He deplored it as one whose heart was torn. But as representative of the people of the United States of America he could not violate the principles they had instructed him to carry out in this settlement.

M. Orlando said that he ought to declare to President Wilson that if he spoke of the Pact of London it had only been at the last moment and in spite of himself. He had only done so in order to reply to remarks made by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. They had said that he would take too great a responsibility in breaking an Alliance towards a people who say that they are ready to honour their signature and to fulfil their obligations. He had made all possible efforts to demonstrate that the rights of Italy rest within the bounds of reason and remain in the field of argument. No one more than he would regret to rely on the text of a Treaty instead of applying reason. Italy had not been, and was not, intransigent. No way to conciliation had yet been offered to her. In regard to the Fourteen Points, he asked the President to recognise that those relating to Austria-Hungary were obsolete because Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist. Yesterday President Wilson had recognised this himself. The President had interpreted the Fourteen Points as if Serbia had a right to Fiume. As a matter of fact, however, Serbia’s extreme ambitions in regard to a sea port had extended to St. Jean de Medua, Alessio, and they had never even dreamed of Ragusa. Now they were assured of far more. He asked President Wilson to bear two things in mind, first, that although those parts of the Fourteen Points applying to Austria-Hungary ceased to be valid after the fall of Austria-Hungary, those relating to Italy remained; and second, that he had made a definite reservation at the beginning of the Peace Conference with the United States of America, through Colonel House, in regard to their application to the Austro-Hungarian Treaty. Consequently, he was not bound by them in the Austro-Hungarian Treaty. President Wilson had said with emotion that the War had been waged for justice and right. Italy also considered that she had fought for justice. There, Italy was on the same ground as President Wilson. He deeply objected to President Wilson’s suggestion to the contrary, for Italy also had made war in good faith, and he himself could say that he could sign no peace contrary to justice and right. He had said this not to criticise President Wilson, but to explain his own point of view. President Wilson had concluded that his heart was torn by the separation of Italy. He expressed his deep thanks for this, and he declared that his heart was still more torn. He felt exactly the same sentiment of friendship, loyal and mutual affection and esteem, not only between the two peoples, but between the two men. But he also experienced sentiments of anguish when he thought of his own country. As he had said on the previous day, if he must face death, it must be for a just cause.

President Wilson said that M. Orlando might rest assured that he himself had no misconception as to the Italian motives. It was merely a fundamental difference of policy between them. He fully realised that Italy was not bound by the Fourteen Points in making peace with Austria. He was not inclined to insist on any particular principle in the Fourteen Points, but his position was that he could not make peace with Germany on one set and with Austria on another set of principles. Throughout their consultations the drawing of frontiers had been based on ethnic lines as a principle.

Mr. Lloyd George regretted that the Supreme Council found itself confronted with the most difficult situation that had faced it since the beginning of the Conference. The question was a very troublesome one, and he could not see a way out. We were first confronted with the possibility that Italy was feeling she could not continue her association with her Allies in making peace, because of this troublesome Austrian question. Another alternative was that the United States of America could not assent to a Treaty based on principles involving a grave departure from those for which she had entered the War. Either way it was a very serious matter. Personally, he did not feel free to discuss the question of merits, because he must respect his bond. It had been honoured by Italy in blood, treasure, and sacrifice. He would tarnish his country’s honour if he receded from it, though no one more than he recognised the President’s powerful plea. He realised that it was a very serious matter for Italy to antagonise two of the most powerful races in Europe, the Germans in the Tyrol, and the Slavs in Austria. He, however, was not entitled to discuss that. He wished to put to President Wilson the reason why Italy found it difficult to recede from the Treaty. He had been profoundly impressed by M. Orlando’s reasoning, but he had also been greatly moved by what Baron Sonnino had said. Baron Sonnino had been in the War from the very outset, and had taken upon himself a very heavy responsibility in rejecting Austria’s terms. What could he say to the people of Italy? If he returned to Italy without the Treaty, he would almost have to leave the country. After incurring heavy losses and large debts he had only got little more than what he could have had without risking a single life. His suggestion was that the representatives of the Powers signatories to the Treaty of London should meet separately to consider President Wilson’s grave decision. If, however, Italy could not modify her attitude, he was bound to take his stand by his bond. Anything he could say would be by way of suggestion and appeal only. He asked if President Wilson agreed to this course?

President Wilson assented. He said he felt it to be his duty to mention any counsel of accommodation that had been made to him. He, therefore, asked the question as to whether, supposing Fiume were conceded to the Serbo-Croats, as provided in the Pact of London, and if the lines of the Pact and all within it were, for the time being, handed over to the five Great Powers as trustees to determine its disposition, would the Italian representatives then say they could not consent—always on the assumption of no guarantee of ultimate cession to Italy of what lay within the line. There was one point on which he had said that he would make an exception to Italy, that was in the case of the island of Lissa. He recognized, however, that this was only a very small part of the Pact of London. He would not be frank if he held out to the Italian representatives any hope of the assent of the United States of America to the ultimate cession of the islands and other territory involved in the Pact of London to Italy. The proposal he had made, however, would relieve the present difficulty and give the Great Powers further time to consider the matter. As the suggestion had been made to him he would like to know if it had any weight at all with the Italian representatives.

Mr. Lloyd George said he would like time to think the matter over, and he suggested that the signatories of the Treaty should meet on the following day.

Baron Sonnino agreed. He thanks Mr. Lloyd George for his exposition of the Italian point of view. His own responsibility towards his conscience made it necessary—the responsibility of those present towards their own consciences made it necessary that everything possible should be done to try to see a way out. Perhaps he himself was too agitated and pre-occupied to see the whole of the picture. He and M. Orlando consented to meet and examine every point of view and to try to find a way out. It was his duty to do all he could to find a settlement. It had been said that it involved death, moral death to him. He did not care a pin about that. He only thought of his country. It would be said that he had ruined his country, and nothing could trouble a man more than that.

Mr. Lloyd George said that it was really an essential element in the case. Italy had rejected one (the Austrian) offer and accepted another and was now threatened with not having that made good.

President Wilson said that he fully realised that Italy had no imperialistic motives and gave her entire credit for that. He also fully appreciated the tragic personal position in which Baron Sonnino was placed. He honoured him for his steadfastness, which merely verified the steadfastness he had shown throughout the War. If Italy could see a way out consistent with permanent peace, he would like to assist if it were only for personal reasons. He hoped that Baron Sonnino would never think he had ruined his country. He would really have given it a more glorious record and no one could say that he had ruined it.

Baron Sonnino thanked President Wilson for what he had said. The word “imperialistic” had been used. Italy, however, had never had any intention to damage others. She only sought security at home. She asked for no positions from which she could menace her neighbours. In other matters referred to in the London Convention in regard to Greece, Italy had made it clear that she would not take an overbearing position. She merely wished to keep out of dangers. She wanted to keep out of Balkanism, for example. She wanted full freedom to her own commerce, culture, and influence, but not to be drawn into the confluence of Balkan States. She wanted a safe basis for keeping out of these questions. If Italy were to do what President Wilson wanted, she would inevitably be drawn in. Her reasoning might be wrong about this island or that island, but the whole political basis of the Pact of London was Italy’s desire to keep out of the danger of being attacked or of the temptation to attack herself in order to forestall a danger. For centuries of her history Italy had been overrun by barbarians—Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, &c. (Mr. Lloyd George interjected that Italy had herself overrun Britain). The reason was that Italy had fair lands. Now she desired to keep in her own corner of Europe outside it all and President Wilson wanted to stop her.

President Wilson said that if he thought this would be the result he would help.

Baron Sonnino continued that even Fiume, which was outside the Pact of London was not asked for as a means of aggression. Other considerations prevailed here. There had been a movement by Fiume itself that had brought it up. The War undoubtedly had had the effect of over-exciting the feeling of nationality. This was not Italy’s fault. Perhaps America had fostered it by putting the principles so clearly. In the discussions about the Pact of London M. Sazonoff¹ had insisted on the names of places being put in, and Italy had conceded without discussion a number of big islands and the port of Segna, in order to give Jugo-Slavia means of defense. He could not see that anything that Italy had done contravened the principles. It was very easy to make principles, but enormous differences arose in their application. It was their application that created differences between people who were agreed on the principles themselves. Even in the settlement of the German Treaty concessions of principle had repeatedly to be made.

(2) German Representatives at peace Conference M. Clemenceau read a telegram he had received from the German Foreign Office in reply to the invitation to the Germans to come to Versailles on April 25. The gist of this reply was that Germany would send, on the 25th April, Minister Von Haniel, Councillor Von Keller, and Councillor Ernst Smitt. These delegates would be provided with the necessary powers to receive the text of the proposed Preliminaries of Peace which they would bring back to the German Government. A list was then given of the functionaries and servants who would accompany them.

Mr. Lloyd George said we could not deal with messengers. He was altogether opposed to it. He then invited his colleagues to read a dispatch he had just received from Berlin which threw some light on this question. (Appendix II).

After Prof. Mantoux had read the document in French, Mr. Lloyd George said that it had a most important bearing on the German reply. The suggestion to send more [mere] messengers to Versailles was a foolish one, because if not intended as insolent, it was purely futile. If circumstances were such as the British agent suggested in the Paper that had just been read, it might be desirable to force the Germans to choose a Government that could represent them.

President Wilson agreed in Mr. Lloyd George’s suggestion that we could not receive mere messengers and must insist on plenipotentiaries.

At M. Clemenceau’s request he drafted a reply to be sent to the German Government somewhat on the following lines:—

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot receive envoys merely authorised to receive the terms of peace. They must require that the German Government shall send plenipotentiaries fully authorised to deal with the whole question of peace as are the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers.

(The discussion was then adjourned).

Villa Majestic, Paris, April 20, 1919.

Appendix I to IC–174A

[This appendix consists of the French of Orlando’s statement printed on page 95.]

Appendix II to IC–174A

Berlin, 17.4.19.

1. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Ebert-Scheidemann Government cannot long continue in its present form.

Reasons:—

a) Great numbers of the rank and file of the Government supporters are going over to the left and joining either the “Independents” or (though to a less extent) the “communists”. Both Government and National Versammlung have lost the confidence of the country. The working classes believe that the failure to carry out a socialistic programme is due, not to the inherent difficulties of the problem, but to the presence in the government of bourgeois elements whose sole object is obstruction.

b) The strikes and disturbances throughout the country are no longer merely food riots or “unemployed” riots but have taken on a definitely political, i. e. anti-Scheidemann, character (Scheidemann is of course merely regarded as the personification of bourgeois-socialist Government in league with capitalism).

c) The idea of the “Rate” or Soviet system has spread to such an extent and taken such a hold on the popular imagination that it has become impossible to leave it out of consideration. Scheidemann’s attitude on this question is one of the chief causes of his unpopularity.

d) The food that is being sent and such raw materials as there might be a possibility of sending, are not sufficient in quantity, so to change the outward circumstances of the working man’s life as to make him forget his dissatisfaction at the incompetence of the Government, whom he makes responsible for all his troubles.

2. Unless the government [is] modified or remodelled in some way either

• a) it will be overthrown before peace is signed—by a general strike or Spartacist coup de main. In this case the Entente is faced with a Germany without any constituted government that can sign the Peace Treaty;
• or b) on learning the terms on which the Allies consent to make peace, Scheidemann and Brockdorff-Rantzau² will do their best to make a virtue of necessity and leave the stage with the “grand geste” of outraged dignity. It is becoming daily more evident that this government does not intend to sign the peace they will be offered. And the National Versammlung is already practising the gestures of sympathy with which it will accompany the exit of its cabinet.

3. If then the Government is overthrown before peace or retires in a body on refusing to sign, there only exist two alternatives for the succession

(i) a military dictatorship backed by the Right wing—such a regime could not sign peace on behalf of the country even if it wanted to. It is questionable whether the troops would support it in any large numbers. The result will be civil war and complete anarchy, with sooner or later the necessity of military intervention by the Entente.

(ii) A soviet government probably leading to a Spartacist (or Bolshevik) dictatorship? The result in this case would equally be anarchy and the probable necessity of Entente intervention and occupation.

4. There is one possibility of avoiding either of these extreme results.

Negotiations are being carried on with great energy between the right wing of the “Independents”, the majority socialists and the military men who stand behind Noske³ and constitute his force. The objects are as follows:—

1. to remodel the cabinet (retaining Ebert as Reichspräsident) on a purely Socialistic basis including “majority” and “independents”.

2. to secure for such a government the support of the troops even supposing Noske himself were removed. It is stated that Captain von Papst, the moving spirit of the present military organisation, is in favour of the plan and would support the government if reconstituted on these lines.

3. to persuade the “Independents” to abandon that part of their programme which involves the disbanding of the troops. The majority of their leaders have, it is said, now realised the necessity for this.

4. to form a second chamber of the Kate or councils which should have the right of initiative and of veto in legislation. It is argued that the Räte system has developed into a genuine political ideal among the proletariat and unless a far-reaching concession of this kind is made to them there will be no possibility of avoiding the worst evil of a Soviet dictatorship.

5. The two strong arguments in favour of such a reconstitution of the government are as follows:—

(1) It would start with the confidence of the country. The proletarians will feel that “their men” are at the helm and the bourgeois and capitalists have nothing to say. If “their men” cannot do all the workmen expect, they will realise it cannot be done.

(2) They will be inclined to sign the peace treaty and the second (or Rate) chamber will be likely to bring pressure to bear on the National Versammlung to do so too. If a deadlock ensues, there must be a referendum to the country.

The present government (at any rate Scheidemann and Rantzau) quite evidently do not intend to sign the peace treaty. A purely socialist government on these lines would be much more likely to do so.

6. If the Entente does not desire to see the whole country thrown into anarchy there remain only these two possibilities:—

1. A military occupation of all Germany by Entente troops. If this were done at once it would not be necessary to send more than 10 or 12 divisions—provided the action were accompanied by skilful propaganda. If it is done only when anarchy has spread further, it will need several armies.

[2.] A purely socialist Government, regarded as a remodelling of the present government and supported by the Entente in respect of still further supplies of food, concessions as to the independent purchase of food by Germany from Neutrals and the importation of the most necessary raw materials such as cotton, wool, iron-ores etc.

With regard to raw materials, the entente is in a position to control the supply so that only such amounts are imported as a [are] necessary for Germany’s internal needs, so as to avoid any conceivable danger of dumping.

7. Should the Entente Governments decide that such a modification of the present Government is desirable, it is suggested that a hint might be given to Ebert in the form of a confidential note through, say, the Swiss Minister to the effect that “The Associated Governments are inclined to form the opinion, on the basis of information received, that the government in its present form does not enjoy the confidence or represent the feelings of the people, that under the circumstances they feel that its signature to the peace treaty does not afford a sufficient guarantee for its execution, and that though the Associated Governments are far from having any desire to interfere in Germany’s political affairs, they feel they are entitled to the assurance that the position of the government with which they are to negotiate is perfectly clear.”

8. A reconstitution of the Government on the above lines would certainly clear the political atmosphere, and would make it possible that peace be signed. It could not however stand more than a month, unless its position were strengthened by an immediate announcement from the Entente that the necessities of the industrial situation were realised and raw materials in considerable quantities were introduced.

1. Sergei Dmitrieyich Sazonoff, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 1910–July 1916.
2. Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
3. Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defense.