Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/39

BC–32

SWC–8

Minutes of the 14th Session of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 14, 1919, at 6:30 p.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • President Wilson
      • Mr. R. Lansing
    • British Empire
      • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
      • The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau
      • M. Pichon
    • Secretaries
      • Mr. A. H. Frazier
      • Mr. L. Harrison
      • Lt. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, K.C.B.
      • Sir P. Loraine, Bt.
      • M. Dutasta
      • M. Berthelot
    • Italy
      • H. E. Baron Sonnino
      • Secretary
        • Count Aldrovandi
    • Japan
      • H.E. M. Matsui
  • Joint Secretariat
    • America, United States of
      • Col. U. S. Grant
    • British Empire
      • Captain E. Abraham
    • France
      • Captain A. Portier
    • Italy
      • Major A. Jones
    • Japan
      • M. Saburi
  • Also Present
    • America, United States of
      • General Bliss
    • British Empire
      • The Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P.
      • General Sir H. H. Wilson, G.C.B., D.S.O.
      • Maj. General W. T. Thwaites, C.B.
    • France
      • General Belin
      • General Alby
      • General Le Rond
    • Italy
      • General Cavallero

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

[Page 1040]
1.

Passage of Troops Supplies Through Dutch Territory M. Clemenceau declared the meeting open.

Mr. Balfour said that he was sorry to be responsible for calling together a meeting at that unusual hour. He had, however, two urgent matters to put before the Council which he thought required solution before President Wilson’s departure. The first related to the passage of troops and supplies through Holland.

Mr. Balfour said all his Military advisers assured him that there were no means of maintaining the British forces on the Rhine other than transit of troops and stores through Dutch territory. The reason for this was the extreme congestion of the railways in Belgium and Northern France. He did not feel, however, that Great Britain should act alone on such a question and he therefore wished to ask the Council to approve the joint action suggested in the following identic telegram:—

“The 5 allied and associated Powers consider it of vital importance to the interests of the general Peace which they are earnestly striving to conclude at the earliest possible moment, that the preliminary arrangements already entered into with the enemy to this end, shall be effectually carried out.

Those arrangements provide, among other things for the occupation of the German territories left of the Rhine by allied and associated troops, and necessarily cover all measures which are essential for the purpose of effecting and maintaining such occupation, including the actual transport of the troops and supplies to their destination.

Owing to the extreme congestion of the railways in Belgium and Northern France the most serious difficulties are being encountered in carrying out the arrangements which have been agreed upon by both parties and which cannot be allowed to fail except at the risk of gravely imperilling the early establishment of a satisfactory peace.

A ready means exists to meet this difficulty; and that is the utilisation of the communications by rail and by water across Holland.

The German Government having assented to the arrival of the troops on German territory cannot be, and in fact are not, interested in the routes to be followed in journeying to the Rhine, and no question of an infringement of any rule of neutrality therefore arises out of the transit of the troops across Dutch territory.

In these circumstances, the 5 Powers, sensible of the solemn duty which lies upon them to see that their efforts directed to the speedy conclusion of a durable peace for the benefit of the whole community of nations, call upon the Netherlands Government to co-operate with them to this end by facilitating in every way the movements of troops and supplies across Dutch territory strictly for the purposes agreed upon with the German Government under the terms of the Armistice.

The matter is so grave and so urgent that the 5 Powers must press upon the Netherlands Government the necessity of immediate action, failing which the responsibility for the state of things which may ensue and which may endanger both the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government.[”]

[Page 1041]

General Alby said that an agreement had been reached with the Dutch concerning the passage of food, but not, as far as he knew, to the passage of troops.

General Bliss, in reply to an enquiry from President Wilson, said that he had been trying to get into communication with General Pershing but had not succeeded. However, he had been told during the afternoon that an assistant to General Mosely who had been charged with the negotiations for General Pershing had stated that the matter had been arranged with the Dutch Government at the Hague. According to this account, permission had been obtained for the creation of an American base at Rotterdam and for the conveyance of troops and supplies on the Rhine for the use of the American Army of Occupation.

Mr. Balfour asked whether he might be authorised to wait until the news was confirmed. He assumed that the Dutch would be ready to do for the British what they had done for the Americans.

President Wilson pointed out that the news was still unofficial.

Mr. Balfour thought that if it turned out to be correct no joint action need be taken. If, on the other hand, the Dutch were still unwilling, he asked them whether the joint action proposed in the identic telegram would be approved.

Sir Henry Wilson pointed out that the Dutch allowed troops to pass down the Rhine away from Germany, but not up towards Germany.

Baron Sonnino asked what the Allied and Associated Powers could do if the Dutch should refuse.

M. Clemenceau said that means of pressure would be found.

(It was decided that the joint action proposed by Mr. Balfour should be taken if the Dutch Government had not already conceded the principle of free passage.)

2.

Meeting of the Russian Representative at Prinkipo Mr. Balfour said that the second point to which he wished to draw the attention of the Council was that of the proposed Meeting with the various Russian Governments at Prinkipo. He only wished to introduce the subject, and he asked Mr. Winston Churchill, who had come over for the purpose, to explain the present views of the British Cabinet.

Mr. Churchill said that on the previous day there had been a Cabinet Meeting in London, at which great anxiety had been manifested concerning the Russian situation, particularly in respect to the policy of the Prinkipo meeting. In view of the imminent departure of President Wilson, the Cabinet had asked him to go over and obtain some decision as to the policy on this matter. Mr. Lloyd George had expressed a wish to know whether the Allied policy [Page 1042] which had led to the suggestion of the meeting at Prinkipo was to be pursued or, if not, what policy was to be substituted for it. If it were possible to go on with the original policy, so much the better; but if only the Bolsheviks were to attend the Conference, it was thought that little good would come of the meeting. The military aspect of the case must be considered. Great Britain had soldiers in Russia who were being killed in action. Their families wished to know what purpose these men were serving. Were they just marking time until the Allies had decided on policy, or were they fighting in a campaign representing some common aim? The longer the delay continued, the worse would be the situation of the troops on all the Russian fronts. The Russian elements in those forces were deteriorating rapidly because of the uncertainty of the support they might expect from the victorious Allies. The Allied troops were intermingled with these Russian troops, which were weakening and quavering, and they were themselves becoming affected. If the Prinkipo meeting were not going to procure a cessation of arms, this unsatisfactory condition might last an indefinite time.

M. Clemenceau expressed the opinion that a matter of such im-portance could not be settled at a short and unexpected meeting.

President Wilson said that since Mr. Churchill had come over specially to anticipate his departure, he felt that he should express what his personal thoughts on the subject were. Among the many uncertainties connected with Russia, he had a very clear opinion about two points. The first was that the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers were doing no sort of good in Russia. They did not know for whom or for what they were fighting. They were not assisting any promising common effort to establish order throughout Russia. They were assisting local movements, like, for instance, that of the Cossacks, who could not be induced to move outside their own sphere. His conclusion, therefore, was that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to withdraw their troops from all parts of Russian territory.

The second related to Prinkipo. The policy tending to a meeting at Prinkipo had been instituted in order to find out what the people in Russia were thinking and purposing to do. As far as he was concerned, he would be quite content that informal American representatives should meet representatives of the Bolsheviks. In their reply the Bolsheviks offered a number of things which had not been asked for, such as repayment of debts, concessions and territorial compensations. This answer was not only uncalled for, but might be thought insulting. What the Allies had in mind was the establishment of peace in Russia as an element of the world’s peace. The [Page 1043] first condition of the meeting asked for by the Allies was the cessation of attacks by Russian troops on the communities outside their borders. If the other Russian Govts. would not come to Prinkipo to meet the Allies, why should the Allies not imitate Mahomet, and go to them? What we were seeking was not a rapprochement with the Bolsheviks, but clear information. The reports received from Russia from various official and unofficial sources were so conflicting that it was impossible to form a coherent picture of the state of the country. Some light on the situation might be obtained by meeting the Russian representatives.

Mr. Churchill said that complete withdrawal of all Allied troops was a logical and clear policy, but its consequence would be the destruction of all non-Bolshevik armies in Russia. These numbered at the present time about 500,000 men and though their quality was not of the best, their numbers were nevertheless increasing. Such a policy would be equivalent to pulling out the linch-pin from the whole machine. There would be no further armed resistance to the Bolsheviks in Russia, and an interminable vista of violence and misery was all that remained for the whole of Russia.

President Wilson pointed out that the existing forces of the Allies could not stop the Bolsheviks, and that not one of the Allies was prepared to reinforce its troops.

M. Sonnino asked whether the Allies might not continue to supply arms to the non-Bolshevik elements?

President Wilson observed that they made very little use of them when they had them.

Mr. Churchill agreed that none of the Allies could send conscript troops to Russia. He thought, however, that volunteers, technical experts, arms, munitions, tanks, aeroplanes, etc. might be furnished.

President Wilson understood the problem was to know what use would be made of these forces and supplies. In some areas they would certainly be assisting reactionaries. Consequently, if the Allies were asked what they were supporting in Russia they would be compelled to reply that they did not know. Conscripts could not be sent and volunteers probably could not be obtained. He himself felt guilty in that the United States had in Russia insufficient forces, but it was not possible to increase them. It was certainly a cruel dilemma. At present our soldiers were being killed in Russia, if they were removed many Russians might lose their lives. But some day or other the Allied troops would have to be withdrawn; they could not be maintained there for ever and the consequences to the Russians would only be deferred.

Lord Milner pointed out that the only troops that could at present-be removed were those in Siberia. The troops on the Archangel [Page 1044] Front were ice-bound and could not, for the time being, be removed. Should the Allies proceed to remove their troops immediately from Siberia there might be an overwhelming concentration of Bolsheviks on the Archangel Front.

President Wilson thought that there were no considerable Bolshevik forces in Siberia.

Mr. Lansing observed that the Bolsheviks had a large army in Eastern Russia at the point of contact with the Anti-Bolshevik Siberian Forces.

Mr. Churchill said that he would like to know whether the Council would approve of arming the Anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia should the Prinkipo Conference prove a failure.

President Wilson said that he hesitated to express any definite opinion on this question. He had explained to the Council how he would act if alone. He would, however, cast in his lot with the rest.

(The meeting adjourned and it was agreed that the subject should be considered again at the conversation to be held the following afternoon).