Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/36
BC–29
SWC–6
Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council at 11:00 a.m.,
Wednesday, February 12, 1919, Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai
d’Orsay, Paris
Paris, February 12, 1919, 11:00
a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- President Wilson
- Mr. R. Lansing
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
- The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M.
G.
- France
- Secretaries
- Mr. A. H. Frazier
- Mr. L. Harrison
- Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
- Mr. E. Phipps
- M. Dutasta
- M. Berthelot
- M. de Bearn
- Italy
- H. E. M. Orlando
- H. E. Baron Sonnino
- Secretaries
- Count Aldrovandi
- M. Bertele
- Japan
- Baron Makino
- H. E. M. Matsui
- Joint Secretariat
- America, United States of
- British Empire
- Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
- France
- Italy
- Japan
- Also Present
- America, United States of
- Gen. Tasker H. Bliss
- Admiral Benson
- Maj. Gen. McAndrew
- Lt. Comdr. Carter
- Captain de Marenches
- British Empire
- Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K. T.
- Lieut. Gen. The Hon. Sir Henry [Herbert?] Lawrence, K. C. B.
- Maj. Gen. the Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M.
G.
- Maj. Gen. Thwaites, C. B.
- Rear Admiral Hope, C. B.
- Capt. Fuller, R. N., C. B., D. S. O.
- Mr. Keynes, C. B.
- France
- M. Klotz
- M. Loucheur
- M. Clémentel
- M. Leygues
- Marshal Foch
- Marshal Petain
- Gen. Degoutte
- Gen. Belin
- Admiral de Bon
- Lt. Odend’hal
- M. de Lasteyrie
- Gen. Weygand
- Italy
- H. E. M. Crespi
- H. E. General Diaz
- General Cavallero
- Admiral Grassi
- Japan
- General Nara
- Colonel Nagai
- Captain Fujioka
- Capt. de Vaisseau Nomura
- Capt. de Vaisseau Yamamoto
Interpreter: Professor P. J.
Mantoux.
Terms for Renewal of the Armistice With Germany: (a)
Conclusions of Committee Assembled in Accordance With the Decision
of Supreme War Council Dated 10th, Feb, 1919 1. M. Clemenceau having declared the meeting
opened, called for the report of the Committee which had assembled at
Marshal Foch’s Headquarters in accordance with the decision of the
Supreme War Council, dated 10th February, 1919.1
(General Weygand then read the conclusions of
the Committee assembled in accordance with the decision of the Supreme
War Council of the 10th February, 1919. For full text, see Annexure
“A”.)
M. Clemenceau inquired whether it was thought
advisable by the Conference to discuss the report at once.
President Wilson thought the sooner this was
done, the better.
(It was agreed that the report should be discussed forthwith).
M. Orlando expressed the desire to ask a
question in regard to the report just read. The concluding paragraph of
the Committee’s report contained the following declaration: “The members
of the Committee are of the opinion that naval and military terms of
peace should be drawn up immediately by a Commission appointed for the
purpose, and shall be imposed on the enemy.” He understood that “the
naval and military terms of peace” therein referred to were not the same
as the conditions contained in the body of the report, which were purely
provisional. The two sets of conditions constituted, in fact, two
entirely separate propositions.
(b) Mr. Balfour’s Suggestion for Naval & Military
Terms of Peace To Be Imposed on Germans
Mr. Balfour agreed that there were evidently
two quite different questions to be decided, namely:—First, how should
the execution by the Germans of the unfulfilled promises be assured.
Second, what was to be the future policy of the Associated Governments
in regard to the renewal of the Armistice: should the Armistice
constantly be renewed, with new clauses and new conditions, or were the
final Naval and Military Terms to be drawn up immediately and imposed on
the enemy? The two questions should be kept quite distinct.
M. Orlando remarked that that was exactly the
distinction he had meant to emphasise.
M. Clemenceau held that the final peace terms
must not now be discussed. The Committee had certainly made that
suggestion; but
[Page 972]
this report
contained no indication as to what the naval or military terms of peace
should be. The question would no doubt eventually have to be referred to
the Committee for advice. But the Council was not in a position that day
to discuss peace terms. On the other hand, the first of Mr. Balfour’s
two points, namely, the enforcement of the conditions already accepted
by the Germans, called for an immediate decision, as Marshal Foch would
have to confer with the Germans almost immediately for the renewal of
the Armistice.
Marshal Foch pointed out that the armistice
would expire at 5.0 a.m. on the 17th February next, and the renewal
would have to be signed on the 16th. He would therefore be obliged to
leave Paris on the 14th or 15th.
M. Clemenceau resuming said that only two days
would therefore be available for a decision to be reached. Obviously,
more than two days would be required to decide the final naval and
military clauses to be included in the Treaty of Peace. Consequently,
the consideration of that question would have to be postponed, but the
conditions for a renewal of the armistice must at once be decided.
Mr. Balfour agreed that it was impossible to
discuss then and there the final peace terms; but the general policy
which should govern their arrangements in regard to the renewal of the
armistice, in view of arriving at the final peace terms was quite
another question. Doubts had been expressed as to the advisability of
using the renewal of the armistice each month as a means of getting new
terms out of the Germans. From time to time some slight modifications
might be desirable and necessary. For instance, the question of Poland
was one which called for immediate action, but many of the members of
the Council held the view that it was inexpedient to introduce new terms
every time the armistice was renewed. No satisfactory end could,
however, be put to that method of procedure until the conditions of the
final peace terms had been decided, and, he agreed, that a decision on
that question could not be reached on that day. His proposal, therefore,
was that only inevitably small changes, or no changes whatever, should
be made in the armistice until the Allies were prepared to say to
Germany: “These are the final naval and military terms of peace, which
you must accept in order to enable Europe to demobilise and so to resume
its life on a peace footing and re-establish its industries.”
President Wilson said that Mr. Balfour’s
proposal for the first time seemed to suggest to him a satisfactory
solution. All along his difficulty had been that little and irritating
secondary demands were continually being added to the armistice
conditions whilst at the same time reports were being received to the
effect that the previously accepted terms had not been fulfilled. Each
time he had
[Page 973]
asked the question
“What will be the result of adding these new conditions? How can the
enforcement of the unfulfilled conditions be secured?” And he had been
conscious of the fact that either might involve a renewal of
hostilities. He was perfectly prepared to renew the war if the Germans
refused to accept the final terms of peace, decided upon by the Allies.
But he was not prepared to renew hostilities because the Germans might
refuse to accept some little portion of the eventual peace terms. Each
time something was asked for which, if not accepted, meant the renewal
of the war; but each condition by itself was not worth the renewal of
the war. On the other hand, a refusal to accept the Allies’ final terms
of peace would be worth renewing the war, and ultimately the Allies
would have to insist on the acceptance of their peace terms. Moreover,
renewal of the armistice, with certain small additional conditions
merely meant a repetition and a continuance of endless debates with the
Germans as to the reason why they had been unable to comply with the
accepted conditions, close technical distinctions being raised in regard
to the meaning of those conditions. It seemed to him that this procedure
placed the Allied Governments in the undignified position of debating
with the Germans, while conscious all the time that a stop could be put
to the debate by a renewal of hostilities. There could be no desire to
debate with the Germans and, therefore, the final conditions to be
imposed must be decided upon. That was business, as compared with the
present policy which meant asking for things that formed only a part of
the programme and not the whole programme. Personally he was deeply
interested in the fulfilment of the entire programme, and he was ready
to employ the whole strength of the American army to obtain the
acceptance of the whole of the naval and military terms of peace: but he
was not prepared to make use of that Army for the little pieces. It was
reported that Germany had failed to fulfil part of the terms of the
Armistice. What was to be done? It was suggested that more conditions
should be imposed on the enemy at the next renewal of the Armistice. The
enforcement of the new conditions would, however, inevitably lead to
more debates and further discussions with the Germans. Would it not be
better, as had been suggested, to go to Spa and to say to the Germans:
“The present situation is altogether unsatisfactory. You have failed to
keep your promises. You have failed to carry out the terms of the
Armistice. The Armistice will be renewed, on the present terms, for a
period which will be terminated on a few days’ notice. Meanwhile the
final Military and Naval terms of peace will be drawn up and presented
to you for acceptance on the understanding that non-acceptance of the
whole
[Page 974]
of the terms would mean
an immediate resumption of hostilities.”
The proposal he had just made had been suggested to him that morning and
it appeared to him as a thoroughly sound and statesmanlike idea.
M. Clemenceau protested that yet once more, in
his long career, he felt compelled with great regret to state that his
views differed very considerably from those he had just heard. It had
been stated that the Germans had not carried out the terms of the
Armistice, but that it would merely be irritating to the Germans if
difficulties were constantly raised about the non-fulfilment of
secondary demands.
Mr. Balfour remarked that M. Clemenceau should
have said: “future secondary demands.”
M. Clemenceau accepted the correction and said
that he had a great many remarks to make on that point. He proposed to
begin his argument at the end, by referring to the proposals put forward
by the Economic and Military Committee.
According to President Wilson’s proposal, the Allies would condescend to
explain to the Germans that the Naval and Military terms of peace would
be drawn up and presented to them for acceptance as soon as possible.
But the military terms depended I largely on the other terms. If the
differences existing between the thirty odd nations represented at the
Conference were settled; if the creation of the League of Nations gave
the guarantees that were expected from it, the military terms would be
different from what they would be if no agreement were reached on these
various points. Consequently, he believed the military terms could not
be separated from the political, economic and financial terms.
Next, President Wilson had said: “I am ready to employ the whole strength
of the American Army to obtain acceptance of the final conditions of
peace. As to secondary questions—well, let them go. For vital questions,
I am ready to renew the war, if necessary.” If President Wilson would
allow him to say so he thought that would be putting the question in an
academic, theoretical and doctrinal light. In practice the question
would present itself quite differently, for the final conditions of
peace would only be settled after a large proportion of the troops had
been sent home, when the Americans, the English and the Italians had
gone. What would be the Allies’ military situation when the present
accepted demobilisation schemes had been carried out? The scheme
relating to the forces to be maintained in the occupied territories
until the signature of peace provided for the employment of 51 French,
10 British and 10 American divisions. After the frightful losses
suffered by the French nation both materially, financially and in men,
when it still had sufficient
[Page 975]
strength to maintain 51 divisions at the front, was that the moment to
say to the Germans: “If you are not in an accommodating humour, we shall
start fighting again”? The final military conditions to be imposed might
be extremely difficult, and it might be that the enemies, having been
left free to act on the other side of the frontier, a great deal of
blood would have to be shed to conquer them a second time. He thought
that problem had not received sufficient consideration. In his opinion,
it had been presented in too theoretical, too academic a form. But the
fact must be faced that during 4 years of war the countryside of France
had been devastated and subjected to the worst kind of savagery. At the
end of that time, the enemy had been forced to surrender at discretion.
But, left to themselves, the Germans had created order, just as the
Russians had created disorder. The Germans had succeeded in forming a
Government, and the first words spoken in the National Assembly had
been: “Deutsch-land fiber Alles”. The second thing done had been to
place all power in the hands of the accomplices of William II. News had
been received that morning that Scheidemann, one of William’s most
direct agents, was to govern Germany. Could it be imagined that he would
alter his views though he might speak in favour of the League of Nations
and of universal brotherhood? No, he did not think his hearers would
allow themselves to be deceived. Let them read the German newspapers. It
would be seen that they breathed nothing but threats. Ebert had said:
“We will not accept terms which are too hard”. And why was all this
done? To exercise a detrimental influence on our moral[e], to frighten
us, to make us fear that, if the Germans were angered, the war might
begin again. Nobody was less desirous than himself of seeing the war
begin again, but it must not be forgotten that we were still at war. War
continued in the minds of men; the same minds that had made the war of
1914. The German nation had not suffered from invasion, its aggressive
moral[e] had been preserved intact. On the other hand, the Allied
Conference could not have acted differently, nor more quickly, than it
had done. Vital preliminary work had to be done. It had, however, been
accused of impotence by the press, and probably the Germans had come to
think that the Allies were quarreling and that they were incapable of
action. He would implore the Council not to confirm the Germans in that
idea. The Germans must not be allowed to think that they would be able
to face successfully France’s 51 divisions after the Allied troops had
dispersed.
Returning to his starting-point, complaints had been made that the
Germans were not carrying out the armistice terms. But they must be
compelled to carry them out; as to that, all were agreed.
[Page 976]
Then it had been said, (it was
the echo of a sentiment he had read in German newspapers), that there
must be no fresh terms, otherwise, the Germans would get angry, would
start discussions. That argument might hold good if the new conditions
to be imposed were either frivolous or due to the sudden impulse of the
moment. But, in reply, he need only draw attention to the Polish
question, to which Mr. Balfour very rightly attached great importance,
even though it was a new question, only a few days old. Now, provided
the wishes of the Allies were plainly expressed, it would be impossible
for the Germans to rise. Marshal Foch and Marshal Petain would agree
that the Germans could not at the present moment embark on an offensive
against the Allies. Would the Polish question be worth an offensive? He
thought so. But if the Germans were told that an attack on Poland would
be followed by an immediate advance of the Allied troops along the
entire Western front, Germany would at once comply with the Allies’
conditions. He would here recite his mea culpa,
for the matter concerned him directly. He wished to repeat what he had
already said, namely, that the fortune of war had been such that neither
American nor British territories had suffered, whilst the territory of
France had been so ravaged that it would seem as though recovery would
be impossible. The first wish of the French frontier peasants had been
to get back the cattle which had been stolen from them by the hundred
and by the thousand, and which they could watch grazing on the German
side. These peasants kept on saying “We have been victorious, of course,
but could not the Germans be asked to give us back our cattle?” Well
that was not a question of world-wide importance. The world would still
continue to go round, even if the unhappy peasants were not granted the
means of making good—(and in how fragmentary a fashion)—the disasters
caused by the war. Nevertheless Mr. Balfour would not, as a philosopher,
contradict him when he said that there was such a thing as a philosophy
of war, when events accumulated in the human brain and put it out of
gear, destroying the balance of entire nations. The barbarians of whom
history spoke took all that they found in the territories invaded by
them, but destroyed nothing; they settled down to share the common
existence. Now, however, the enemy had systematically destroyed
everything that came in his way. As M. Klotz had said in his report,
nothing had been left standing. France would be unable to compete
against Germany for two years. It had been stated that Germany would be
supplied with raw materials; but the industries of France had been
scientifically destroyed, not for military reasons, but in order to
prevent France from recovering in peace time. That was how matters
stood. It
[Page 977]
was true that Italy
had also suffered a great deal, but no comparison was possible, as it
was the richest districts of France that had been destroyed. France had
lost 3,000,000 men, either killed or mutilated, and it is truly
necessary that some compensation should be obtained.
The Conference had worked conscientiously up to the present and had dealt
with questions of the highest order. The purest idealism had been
represented there, as well as more material interests; but the world was
waiting. The Supreme Council would meet again in a fortnight or three
weeks; by that time no one must be able to say: “The Associated
Governments will not make up their minds to give us that satisfaction to
which we are entitled”.
This state of mind must not be allowed to develop. It could not be said
that the French people were concerned with material interests to the
exclusion of all others. If the French people deserved any reproach it
was rather for erring in the opposite direction; for they are apt to be
carried away by ideas, regardless of terrestrial affairs. But the people
of France were attached to the soil, they were accustomed to work on the
soil, and they now implored the representatives of the Allied and
Associated peoples to consider this aspect of the question. If no heed
were given to such requests, a time would come when small, supposedly
secondary, questions would accumulate and create a state of mind which
would drive the people to insist on their demands with an amount of
energy such as he should not like to see. Indefinite postponements would
appear to the Germans as a proof of weakness. He was aware that
President Wilson considered the Armistice to be a threat continually
hanging over the heads of the Germans. But he (M. Clemenceau) knew the
Germans better, and he would assure the Council that they will not take
it thus. The Germans must, of course, be spoken to with moderation and
equity, but also with firmness and decision; otherwise the Council would
be obliged to meet again in a fortnight’s time under less favourable
conditions.
In speaking at such length—a proceeding justified by the importance of
the question—he had not contradicted any arguments either of President
Wilson or Mr. Balfour. He had merely wished to convey his own opinions
which coincided with those of the entire French nation. France would
suffer most from this indefinite prolongation of the Armistice. He was
continually being assailed with requests for a speedy conclusion of
peace, and that was the reason why he had been somewhat emphatic in his
suggestions. He should like a decision to be reached as soon as
possible. The Germans would be compelled to give satisfaction for the
violation of the Armistice terms, described at length in General
Weygand’s report.
[Page 978]
The Allies should remain firm on these points, including also the terms
rendered necessary by the Polish question and such other questions that
might arise, seeing that, on President Wilson’s own proposal, an
Economic Committee had been attached to Marshal Foch. He urged that the
policy so far followed should be continued. The degree of pressure to be
exerted would be made to fit each case as it arose. But the Germans must
not be told: “Go on, Do as you like, Perhaps we shall some day threaten
to break off relations; but just now we will not be firm”. Germany would
continue her preparations, and after the Allied troops had dispersed,
Marshal Foch might perhaps find himself confronted by more German troops
than might have been anticipated.
In conclusion he wished to apologise for having spoken at such length,
but it was necessary to say these things.
(c) Mr. Balfour’s Resolution To Impose on Germany
Without Delay Final Naval and Military Terms of Peace
Mr. Balfour said that M. Clemenceau had made a
speech which everybody would regard as most impressive, even though it
must inevitably have lost by translation. He thought, however, there was
a real misunderstanding, not on all, but on most of the points raised,
which he hoped to remove. All were agreed that in regard to the past the
Germans must be compelled to carry out the engagements. The wishes of
the Allies in regard to Poland must also be complied with. M. Clemenceau
had, however, been greatly moved (and not unnaturally) by the
declaration made by Marshal Foch’s Committee at the end of their report.
That report had only been distributed in the Council Chamber that
morning; and he himself had not seen it when he had drawn up his
proposals.
M. Clemenceau apparently wished to introduce into the armistice certain
conditions which would compel the Germans to restore cattle, sheep,
etc., which had been stolen from the unhappy peasants in the ravaged
districts of France. In his opinion, that proposal belonged to the
general question of reparations, which would be included in the final
peace terms, and it could not be separated from similar questions, such
as reparations due for the destruction of spindles and weaving
machinery. But even if it were decided that the question should not be
postponed until the general peace treaty came to be drawn up, such
proposals should, he thought, be discussed separately with the Germans,
who should be informed that the supply of raw materials would be made
conditional on the return of the cattle. He need only assure M.
Clemenceau that everybody felt most deeply for the general suffering
which France had had to endure.
The fundamental misunderstanding which existed lay, however, in the fact
that M. Clemenceau believed that the policy suggested was
[Page 979]
one dictated by a desire to
put off a decision and to yield to the Germans until such time as the
British and American troops had been withdrawn from France. That was not
only not the policy proposed, but the whole object of his proposal was
to hasten the time when the Germans would have been compelled to
demobilise their forces to such a degree as to render them helpless.
Speed and thoroughness was what they were aiming at. The long succession
of months spent, not in bringing about a peace, but in settling small
additional conditions to the terms of the armistice, was postponing the
final settlement in a dangerous manner. It was, therefore, with the
object of reaching a complete and a rapid end that his proposals had
been put forward. Consequently when M. Clemenceau pointed to the small
number of American and British troops which would be left when the final
solution would come—that was the very reason why he wished to hasten the
settlement so that demobilisation of the Allied forces could be carried
out without fear and misgiving, after the Germans themselves had been
compelled to demobilise.
His plan might be good or it might be bad, but its object was to get over
the danger which M. Clemenceau foresaw, so that Germany would no longer
be able to resist, and the Allies would then be in a position to exact
those reparations which might be thought to be just.
He wished, therefore, to submit the following resolution for discussion
at the meeting to be held that afternoon. It embodied the general
policy, which he thought did not in reality differ in substance from M.
Clemenceau’s, though differing in form:—
“The Supreme War Council agree that:
- (1)
- The armistice with Germany shall be renewed on the
present terms for an undefined period terminable by the
Allied and Associated Powers at . . . . . days’
notice.
- (2)
- Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions
shall be drawn up at once by a Committee to be presided
over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of
the Supreme War Council: These, when approved, will be
presented for signature to the Germans.
- (3)
- After the signature of these preliminaries of peace
Germany will be permitted to receive such controlled
quantities of food, and raw materials for the
rehabilitation of her industry, as shall be deemed just,
having regard to the prior claims of Allied countries,
especially those on whose industries Germany has
deliberately inflicted damage.
- (4)
- The question of the quantities of food and raw
material to be allowed to Germany after the signature of
the preliminaries of peace shall be referred to the
Economic Council for examination and report.”
(It was agreed to adjourn the discussion until 3.0 p.m. that afternoon.
The technical, Military and Naval Advisers were requested to be in
attendance at 5.0 p.m.).
[Page 980]
Annexure A
Conclusions of Committee Assembled in
accordance with the Decision of Supreme War Council on 10th
February, 1919
The Committee assembled at Marshal Foch’s Headquarters in accordance
with the decisions of the 10th February 1919 of the Supreme War
Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, and consisting of:—
| America |
General Bliss, Mr. Norman Davis. |
| France |
M. Clémentel, General Degoutte. |
| Great Britain |
Lord Robert Cecil, General Thwaites. |
| Italy |
M. Crespi, Brigadier-General Cavallero. |
with whom were associated in accordance with the
decision of the above Council the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied
forces.
- Marshal Pétain.
- General Diaz.
- General McAndrew (representing General Pershing.)
- Admiral Benson.
- Admiral de Bon.
- Admiral Hope.
- Admiral Grassi.
has the honour to submit to the Supreme War Council
the following report:—
I. Infringement by Germany of
Successive Conventions of the Armistice and of the Protocols
Annexed to the Armistice
(1) Repatriation of
Alsatians-Lorrainians still incorporated in the German
Army.
The principle of this repatriation has been formally established by
article 3 of the Convention of the Armistice of November 11,
1918.
But, owing to the sluggishness, the delays and even the refusals
opposed by the German Authorities, it has not been executed. The
Alsatians-Lorrainians incorporated in units stationed in the
interior of the German territory or in those forming part of the
Armies of the East, of Ukraine and of Southern Russia, have not been
repatriated.
Such is the situation de facto, three months
after the signature of the above-mentioned Convention.
It must be further remarked that it has been impossible to obtain
from the Germans any information regarding the number of
Alsatians-Lorrainians remaining incorporated in the German Army.
[Page 981]
The whole of these facts constitutes a violation well characterised
of Article 3 of the Convention of November 11.
Annex No. 1 gives the analysis of the documents concerning this
question.
(1) It should be mentioned, however, that after the present report
was adopted, the following telegram has been received from Spa:—
“German Commission gave this morning intimation that
Alsatians Lorrainians were the first on the list of
repatriation of the German troops of Nikolaiewsk”.
(2) German behaviour in
Poland.
This includes on the one side:
- (a)
- The organisation on the Eastern frontiers of Germany of
two important military groups, one in the region of
Koenigsberg, the other in the province of Posen, under the
command of Field-Marshal Hindenburg.
- (b)
- The obstacles brought about by the German troops returning
from Ukraine against the anti-bolshevist action of the Poles
in the region of Vilna-Pinsk.
This behaviour compelled the Allied and Associated Governments to
send the telegram of February 2 to the German High Command,
announcing the forwarding to Poland of an Inter-Allied Mission, and
advising formally the said Command not to use force against the
Poles.2
The answer of the German Government, formulated by Count von
Brockdorff-Rantzau, states word for word that Germany declines to
execute the order of its adversaries.3
On the other hand, M. Dmowski, representative of the National Polish
Committee, has brought the proof that the German High Command had
signed with the Ukrainian Government a Convention, the clauses of
which are contrary to the engagements taken by the German Government
with the Allied and Associated Powers.
According to this convention, the Germans promise:
- —to forbid the Poles access to the region Brest-Litovsk,
Pinsk, Goloby, Kowel, Vlodava;
- —to hand over this region to the Ukrainians as fast as it
is evacuated by the German troops;
- —not only to make no obstacle to the operations of the
Ukrainians against the Poles in Galicia, but also to cover
these operations;
- —by this convention, the Germans formally recognise the
maintenance of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.
[Page 982]
Although the copy of this document which fell in our hands does not
bear any date of signature, it is nevertheless evident that it
refers to the present time, since the orders mentioned in it are to
be carried out from January 31.
Furthermore the Germans have continued, after November 11 to make
requisitions and to order coercive measures in Poland.
The above-mentioned behaviour and this secret Convention between the
Germans and the Ukrainians constitutes a violation of articles 12,
13, 14, 15 of the Armistice Convention.
(See Annex II, note from Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, and
Germano-Ukrainian Military Convention).
3°) Revictualling of
Poland.
On January 21, 1919, by telegram n° 1740/C. R., the German Government
was advised, through the President of the C. I. P. A.4 of Spa, of the measures taken by the Allied
and Associated Governments to ensure, in accordance with article 16
of the Armistice Convention of November 11, the revictualling in
foodstuffs of Poland.
On February 1st, the German Government gave their answer on the
subject. In this document, they state that they cannot guarantee the
safety of the food transports for Poland; they ask that the
revictualling of the German population of the Eastern Provinces
should begin at least at the same time as the transports of food for
Poland: they propose in addition that the rolling stock necessary
for this transport should be levied on the number of engines and
railway trucks handed over by Germany to the Allies.
This reply is a violation of article 16 of the Convention of November
11, as it refuses to guarantee the safety of the food transports. It
is otherwise a proof, owing to the other questions that it tries to
bring up, (revictualling of Germany and handing over of railway
material), of the ill-will of the German Government to execute the
terms of the Convention that it signed.
(See Annex III, telegrams exchanged with C. I. P. A. and reply of the
German Government concerning the revictualling of Poland).
4°) Repatriation of Russian
Prisoners of War.
Clause 4 of the Convention of Armistice of January 16 is not
executed.
(See Annex IV, telegram from General Nudant.)
5°) Violation of Naval Conditions
of Armistice.
The Germans have failed in the following respects to comply with the
terms of Armistice concluded at Treves on 16 January, 1919:—
[Page 983]
- (a)
- The Germans refuse to provide crews for twenty submarines,
as they say the vessels are not in commission. They state
that they refused to provide crews for these submarines at
Treves on 16 January, 1919. P. A. N. A. C.5 states that the German
refusal regarding these crews was not accepted and that the
Germans signed an engagement to the effect that they would
provide crews.
- (b)
- The Germans have commenced to break up several submarines
instead of surrendering them in accordance with the terms of
the Armistice. The Inspection Sub-Commission are now in
Germany investigating this question, and so far as the
investigation has proceeded it appears that 15 boats have
had their engines removed.
- (c)
- The Germans now say they have insufficient tugs to
transfer 21 submarines from Germany to England by 17th
February, 1919, although they signed an engagement to
transfer the submarines by that date when at Trèves on 16
January, 1919.
(For further details, vide attached Annex
V).
6°) Questions relating to the
surrender of the Mercantile Marine.
While the German authorities have sought to reopen certain questions
for discussion and have interpreted differently from ourselves
certain possibly ambiguous phrases in the agreement, the Committee
cannot say on the evidence now before them that the Germans have yet
committed any act which can be construed as an infringement of their
engagements under the Armistice. They have in fact handed over, or
are about to hand over, a substantial amount both of freight and
passenger tonnage.
7) Financial Clauses.
The German authorities, as set forth below, have not completely
executed certain of their engagements under the Armistice, whether
by reason of their practical difficulties or by wilful default.
- (a)
- Whereas the German Government undertook under the Armistice to
restore immediately all documents, cash and securities taken by
them, they have in fact delivered so far only an insignificant
quantity alleging by way of excuse that the political crisis at
home and transport difficulties have rendered more rapid
compliance impossible.
- (b)
- Whereas under Article 1 of the Financial Protocol concluded in
connection with the Armistice Renewal of December 13th, the
German Government undertook not to grant authorisations for the
export of securities and other valuables without the previous
agreement of the Allies, such securities have in fact been
allowed to leave Germany in certain cases. In justification of
this the German Government plead that under the strict wording
of the agreement they have done nothing contrary to it, in as
much as they did not
[Page 984]
agree to prohibit the export of securities and the mere refusal
to grant authorisations in circumstances where the law requires
no authorisation is naturally not equivalent to prohibition.
This trick was protested against by the Allied Financial
Representatives at the January Conference at Treves and the
German authorities then promised to submit revised proposals.
These revised proposals have just been received but have not yet
been examined.
- (c)
- Under Article IV of the Financial Protocol of Treves of the
13th December the German authorities undertook to examine in
agreement with the Allies the question of what measures could be
taken for the restoration with the least possible delay of
Allied property which had been sequestered. These negotiations
have not yet been initiated and the German authorities have
declared that they propose to discuss at the same time the
question of sequestered property, whether Allied or enemy, in
invaded districts generally.
II. Means of Enforcing
Compliance
As regards the means of enforcing compliance, the Committee has
decided to submit separately to the Supreme War Council the
conclusions of each sub-Committee, military and economic.
(a) conclusions reached by the
economic sub-committee
The Committee, without expressing any opinion as to the desirability
of those methods or their appropriateness to the acts to be
remedied, find that the following are the methods open to the Allied
and Associated Powers of putting pressure upon the German
Authorities in order to compel them to fulfil their engagements
under the Armistice and its renewals:—
1. Economic Methods.
- (i)
- to withhold altogether pending compliance all supplies of food
including those already promised.
- (ii)
- to delay these supplies and proportion their rate of delivery
to the rate at which the conditions so far infringed are
complied with.
- (iii)
- to permit the first consignments of food already promised, but
to intimate that Germany cannot expect any further supplies
unless and until she mends her behaviour.
- (iv)
- to impose, subject to any engagements which may have been
entered into with neutral governments, a strict and absolute
blockade upon trade to and from Germany in the Baltic. But the
Committee doubt if this last method would practically produce
much effect upon Germany. There has been very little relaxation
of the blockade since the Armistice, and to withdraw this small
relaxation would
[Page 985]
not
make the blockade substantially stricter than it is at present
as far as Germany is concerned, while it would produce
considerable hardship on the neutrals.
While the Committee is of opinion that, assuming the conditions in
Germany are as serious as some, but by no means all, observers
think, very considerable and effective pressure could be exerted
upon Germany by withholding supplies of food, they desire to point
out that any proposal to take action on such lines requires careful
consideration in conjunction with its possible reaction on the
internal condition of Germany. The Committee is itself doubtful
whether it would be prudent to make use of this weapon except in the
event of clear, unmistakable and deliberate infringement of the
armistice on points of substance and importance.
(b) conclusions reached by the
military sub-committee
The following measures are submitted for the decision of the Supreme
War Council:—
(1) To impose at once upon Germany fixed conditions as regards a
military and naval status, comprising,
- (a)
- Admiral Benson Declares That He Is
Opposed to the Inclusion in the Armistice of Clauses
Dealing With the Limitation of Naval Forces the
limitation of personnel to a strength of 25 Infantry
Divisions, of which
- 5 for the Eastern front
- 5 for the Western front
- 5 for the Southern front
- 10 in reserve in the interior of Germany
- 5 cavalry divisions.
- (b)
- The limitation of armaments by land, by sea and in the air
and, consequently, the putting out of action of war material
in excess.
- (c)
- The Control of these measures.
- (d)
-
The regulation of the situation in the East of Germany
so as to assure the future destiny of Poland. With this
object in view.
To demand of Germany the cessation of all hostile
movements and to insist that both German and Polish
forces should stop on either side of the line.
(Map to be produced showing above mentioned line).
The dissolution of the groups which have just been formed
in the East against Poland and the limitation of the
forces maintained in these regions and in Eastern
Prussia to a strength of 5 divisions.
The hastening of the evacuation of Polish territory by
German troops coming from the Ukraine, so that such
evacuation shall be completed by the 1st. March.
To occupy and operate the base at Dantzig, and the
railway Dantzig-Mlawa as well as the railway and the
waterway Dantzig-Thorn (application of Article 16 of the
Convention of the 11th. November.)
To transport to Poland the Polish Army in
France.
[Page 986]
If these measures are agreed to by the Allied and
Associated Governments, the following clauses will be the substance
of the Convention the acceptance of which will be demanded of
Germany.
(The draft of this Convention will be printed separately).
If the Germans refuse to accept these conditions, the Allied
plenipotentiaries will declare that negotiations are broken off,
that the armistice is ended and that, in consequence on the
following date . . . . . . . the Allies will reserve to themselves
complete freedom of action.
The Allied and Associated Governments will then take the following
measures.
(i) Economic Measures.
The blockade will be resumed with the greatest severity; therefore
the measures which are now being carried out for the supply of food
to Germany will cease.
(ii) Military Measures.
The Allied High Command will resume the unrestricted use of all its
means of action.
The whole Committee decided at the conclusion of the meeting to add
to their report the following declaration:—
“However, the members of the Committee desire to express
this, their opinion: to obtain as rapidly as possible a
final result and to put a stop to the difficulties which are
constantly renewed by the Germans, the members of the
Committee are of the opinion that Naval and Military terms
of peace should be drawn up immediately by a Commission
appointed for the purpose, and shall be imposed on the
enemy.”
annex i
On the 12th January General Nudant reported bad faith shown by the
German Armistice Commission regarding the repatriation of men of
Alsace-Lorraine.
On the 16th January Marshal Foch sent General Dupont6 a telegram telling him to organise the repatriation
of men of Alsace-Lorraine with the Kriegsministerium and to exact the greatest diligence from
the German Government.
On the 23rd January General Winterfeldt7 declared that on the 8th January fresh
instructions had been sent by the Kriegsministerium to the Army of the East and to the
authorities in the interior, but that a reply had not yet been
received.
[Page 987]
On the 27th January Marshal Foch asked General Nudant to obtain the
repatriation of men of Alsace-Lorraine in Southern Russia, giving
them priority in the repatriation scheme of German elements in that
region.
On the 28th January General Dupont, replying to a question asked by
General Desticker,8 reported that,
in spite of the demands sent twice a day by him to the Kriegsministerium, he could obtain no
information about the men of Alsace-Lorraine to be repatriated,
either in the armies of the East or in the interior. He shows that
it is a case of flagrant bad faith on the part of the Kriegministerium in this matter and considers
that only measures of coercion will obtain the looked for result;
with this intent he proposes to retard the repatriation of the
German prisoners of war.
On the 3rd February the German Commission rejected the proposal to
repatriate the men of Alsace-Lorraine in Russia more rapidly than
other German soldiers “as neither the means of transport nor the
morale of the troops allowed of this being done.”
On the 4th February, Marshal Foch insisted on his injunctions in this
matter and declared that he would suppress the transports supplied
for repatriation if satisfaction was not given.
annex ii
Spa, 10 February, 1919, 1
p.m.
Cypher Telegram, General Nudant,
President C. I. P. A., to Marshal Foch, Paris
No. 367/M
No. 544
The German Commission sent this morning a reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau
to telegram No. 934 Guerre of the 2nd February.9
The Commission sent to Poland by the Associated Powers can only
exercise its functions outside the limits of Germany as shown by the
Convention of the Armistice. The German Government reserves to
itself the formal rights of sovereignty within those limits. Germany
is resolved to keep engagements made with the Poles according to
Wilsonian principles, but will not tolerate such engagements being
forced on them by German subjects of Polish origin.
The German Government reserves to itself the right of intervening in
the case of Polish rebellions in Eastern Prussian provinces as long
as all the Polish armed forces have not left territory actually
[Page 988]
German. The ultimate
nationality of these territories which Marshal Foch calls German
Poland can only be settled at the treaty of Peace. Germany till then
refuses to accept the injunctions of her adversaries on the subject
of the attitude of her authorities in these territories.
Convention With the German General
Command
A large number of German formations are now concentrated within the
sector Goloby-Kovel-Pinsk-Brest-Litowsk-Wlodawa. In order to allow
the German General Command to evacuate without hindrance these
formations to Germany, a measure which will only be possible if the
troops in the Ukraine Republic abstain from taking any action within
the above sector against the Poles and also if the aforesaid sector
does not fall in the course of evacuation into the hands of the
Poles, the German General Command and the Command of the Republican
troops of the Ukraine have agreed to sign the following Convention:—
- (1)
- The German Command assures to the Authorities of the
Assembly military control in this sector and engages itself
not to allow the Poles to enter the said sector until the
end of the evacuation and hands over to the authorities of
the Ukraine the control and the use of the liberated
territories as the German troops leave them.
- (2)
- The operations of our troops against the Poles in the
direction of Wladimir-Wolynsk-Sokal will proceed without
opposition on the part of the Germans, moreover the right
flank of our troops shall be made secure by the Germans
according to the terms of the present Convention, in the
sector occupied by them, against all attacks and surprises
by the Poles.
- (3)
- During the whole duration of the operations in the
direction of Wladimir-Wolynsk-Sokal the right of using the
railway lines Goloby-Kowel-Wladimir-Wolynsk for the purpose
of transporting food and munitions of war is assured to the
troops of the Ukraine.
- (4)
- Free passage in the above mentioned territory as well as
in the west of the Bug River is assured to the citizens of
the Ukrainian Republic on the presentation of certificates
issued by the Ukrainian authorities.
- (5)
- The German and Ukrainian General Commands must from the
31st January issue orders in the sense of the aforesaid
Convention.
- (6)
- The present Convention does not deal with the future of
the territory situated to the East of the River Bug which
according to the terms of the Treaty signed at Brest-Litowsk
on the 9th February 1918 belongs to the jurisdiction of the
Ukrainian Republic of the people. The present Convention
bears the signature of the Command of the 21st Corps,
General Gipseek, for the Germans and is countersigned by the
chief of the military mission., Major Muhlheim.
[Page 989]
annex iii
G.Q.G.A., 20 January,
1919.
Telegram, Field Marshal
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to General Nudant,
President of the Permanent Inter-Allied Armistice Commission,
Spa
No. 1740/C.R.
The Inter-Allied Supply Council is about to send to Dantzig the
necessary provisions to remedy the present critical food situation
in Poland. In accordance with Article 16 of the Armistice Convention
of the 11th November, ask the President of the German Armistice
Commission to make urgent representations to the German Government
to assure the transport of at least 3,000 tons of food-stuffs daily
from Dantzig to the Polish frontier.
The German Government must insure the absolute protection of this
transport, the carrying out of which will be controlled by the
Allied delegates.
Please report with as little delay as possible the measures taken by
the German authorities.
Telegram, General Nudant to Etat-Major
Bacon
No. 496
From Spa, 27 January, 1919.
Reply to Telegram No. 3564/C.R.
- (1)
- The German Government is ready in principle to allow food
destined for Poland (of the Congress) to pass. But it seems
doubtful whether the bad condition of the railways and the great
shortage of rolling stock will permit of the flow of traffic
without hindrance as far as the German-Polish frontier.
- (2)
- Germany asks to be assured that the material supplied for the
transport of these provisions shall be immediately
returned.
- (3)
- The German Commission reserves to itself the right of making
other communications on this subject later on.
Telegram, Field Marshal Commander in-Chief of
Allied Armies (D.G.C.R.A.) to President C.I.P.A.,
Spa
No. 3790/C.R.
G.Q.G.A., 31 January, 1919.
A continuation of telegram No. 3564/C.R. and in reply to telegram 496
of the 27th January.
- First, the arrangements made by the German Government to allow
the passage of food into Poland are noted.
- Secondly, it is noted that the rolling material supplied by
the Germans for the transport of these provisions shall be
immediately returned.
P.O. The Director General of C.R.A.
Payot
Translation
Representative of the German
Government to General Nudant, President of the Inter-Allied
Armistice Commission
In the full séance of the Armistice Commission at Spa on the 21st
January 1919, General Nudant produced a note on the despatch of
provisions to Poland in which the German Government was asked to
ensure the transport of at least 3,000 tons of provision daily from
Dantzig for the Polish frontier. Before the despatch of this note
the representative of the Polish Minister had asked the management
of the Dantzig railways to enter into negotiations with him on this
subject. The management of the Dantzig railways refused to enter
into negotiations, not having the power to do so; at the same time
they accepted the request of the Polish Government. In consequence
the despatch of at least 300 waggons and if possible of 500 waggons
of food per diem had been contemplated (such
food arriving at Dantzig on American ships) from Dantzig to the
frontier station of Illowo and even from that station as far as the
territory of Poland according to the agreement. This transport will
be carried out by the Administration of the Prussian Railways. The
Prussian Minister of Public works informed us of this request made
by the Polish Minister of Communications. At the same time the
Minister of Public Works is not without knowledge that owing to the
difficulties of exploitation, resulting in the first place from the
lack of means of exploitation and from the lack of coal, it was not
possible to furnish the supplementary means for this transport
unless the necessary locomotives and waggons were put at the
disposal of the Prussian railways.
To say nothing of the difficulties regarding the transport it must
also be mentioned that technically it is impossible, considering the
trans-shipment installation at Dantzig and its port (quays,
warehouses, stations etc.) and considering the present labour
situation to trans-ship daily more than from 1000 to 1500 tons from
the ships into the waggons. Even to reach this number special
measures are necessary which have already been arranged for.
As daily discharge of 3000 tons would necessitate the use of 10 extra
waggons and the existing organisation of the port does not allow of
it, as Dantzig, a Baltic port, does not lend itself to the use of
large Atlantic steamers drawing a great deal of water.
[Page 991]
Consequent on the above and in compliance with the orders that I have
received with the knowledge of the Allied Governments I am
instructed also to make it known to the Allied Governments that the
German Government cannot undertake the transport asked for by the
Polish Government. Such transport would necessitate a super-addition
of labour and means of exploitation and an expenditure of coal which
in face of the existing extreme difficulties of exploitation could
not be supplied.
The German Government therefore proposes that the Allies should agree
that the locomotives and trucks required for this transport should
be levied from the number of locomotives and trucks to be
surrendered by the Germans, and should be kept for this purpose
until a convenient date, a date which will be reached after the end
of the carrying out of this transport.
Moreover it may be said that the Poles will not be able to give up
locomotives. If there was no trans-shipment of transport at Illowo
by the Poles, the German Government would be obliged, in view of the
continual intervention by the Poles in the running of the German
railways, above all by the retention of the material for
exportation, to insist in addition that the Polish Government should
supply Germany with a number of locomotives and trucks equal to the
number of those entering Polish territory.
Considering the very difficult situation as regards coal in Germany
the German Government wishes to state that it trusts the Allies will
take into account in case this transport takes place the rise in the
consumption of coal which will result from it, when the time comes
to fix the extent of their demands in coal from Germany, and above
all that they should authorise the transport of coal by sea from the
North Sea Ports and from Stettin to the Baltic ports.
The German Government considers it understood that the expenses of
transport, that is to say the cost of trans-shipment from the ships
to the waggons based on local tariffs will be charged to the Allied
Governments.
General Nudant has emphasised in the note mentioned at the beginning
of this letter, the importance of the German Government guaranteeing
the safety of this transport. Naturally the German Government will
take the necessary measures to guarantee the transport from a
military point of view, but I am instructed to make it known to the
Allied Governments that the President of the Province of Eastern
Prussia has expressed his fears that the population in this province
in their excited state and suffering from hunger, will assume a
hostile attitude in the case of food being transported and destined
for Poland, and that it would not be possible to stop the people
attacking the transports. The German Government therefore asks
[Page 992]
the Allied Government[s]
to consider whether it would not be possible simultaneously with the
transport of food destined for Poland, to commence carrying out the
transport of food for the German population, and particularly for
Dantzig.
Von Haniel
Spa
, 1
February, 1919.
annex iv
Senlis, 11. 2. 19., 2:30
p.m.
General Nudant to Marshal Foch
370/N
Telegram No. 480/P. G. 2
I have received a report from General Dupont of which I consider it
necessary to give the substance:—
- (1)
- The repatriation of Russian prisoners of war which the
German Government promised to stop still continues by
driblets. The greater part of these are enrolled in the
Bolshevik Armies.
- (2)
- The Polish repatriation which had been promised is still
not being carried out.
- (3)
- Russian Bolshevik agents circulate in Eastern Prussia and
encruit [recruit] Russian prisoners
of war on the spot.
- (4)
- The Bolshevik campaign in Russian prisoners of war camps
which General Ewart10 tried to put a stop to, continues with a
tacit agreement of the German authorities. A Russian
Bolshevik Office working in Berlin which General Dupont had
closed carries on a secret activity.
- (5)
- There is no hostility between the Germans and the
Bolsheviks. Numerous and reliable proofs show that these two
parties are accomplices probably with a view to fighting the
Poles.
All the information rests on certain proofs of which some have been
brought to me by Commandant Penaucier proceeding from Berlin to
Paris.
E. M. A.
2nd Bureau.
annex v
German Submarines
A thorough inspection of the submarines in Germany was carried out in
December by a Sub-Commission of the Allied Naval Armistice
[Page 993]
Commission, and as a
result the supplementary clause was inserted in the Agreement for
prolongation of armistice on 16 January, 1919.
On 23 January, 1919 (one week later) Admiral Goette was directed to
report by W/T details of the steps being taken to carry out Article
XXII as amplified.
No reply having been received on 25 January, a minimum performance
expected before a further renewal of the Armistice on 17 February
was telegraphed to Germany. The demand and the German reply
were:—
Demand
- (1)
- 49 to be sent to Harwich forthwith, under their own power or
to be towed.
- 3 Russians—special arrangements will be made.
- Submarine dock and lifting vessels to be sent over
unless required for taking to pieces submarines under
construction.
- (2)
- The hulls of not less than 50 of those under construction to
be broken up.
- (3)
- As regards remainder, all propelling and auxiliary machinery,
motors, torpedo and mine tubes, periscopes, guns and mountings
to be removed.
German reply
24 submarines have been disarmed; of these:—
| 21 |
will be escorted to England, but
shortage of tugs prevents any guarantee that this can be
completed by 17 February. |
| 3 |
too far advanced in disarmament
to be towed. Will be completely dismantled. |
| 24 |
|
Others are accounted for as follows:—
| 24 |
|
| 1 |
in Norway—will probably be
brought over on 1 February. |
| 1 |
in Holland. |
| 5 |
in Spain awaiting diplomatic
negotiations. |
| 10 |
late Mediterranean, transferred
on 12 January. |
| 3 |
late Mediterranean, with engine
defects, will be towed over when tugs are
available. |
| 20 |
newly-built—no crews available—at
disposal of A. N. A. C. |
| 64 |
|
All remaining submarines in Germany will be disabled, and work is in
progress.
Salvage vessels Vulcan and Cyclops cannot be transported during winter months.
Floating docks for submarines are not arranged for oversea
transport. Both salvage vessels and docks at disposal of A. N. A.
C.
[Page 994]
The proposal that the newly-built submarines should be taken to
England by German seamen was refused at Trèves on 16th. January,
1919.
When above has been carried out Germany claims to have fulfilled
terms of Armistice and supplementary conditions.
To this A. N. A. C. telegraphed
further on 3 February:
At Trèves it was pointed out that the number which could proceed
under own power or be towed was 64. Of these 16 have been
surrendered, and the three Russians may be broken up, leaving 45 to
be surrendered.
Germany is required to execute completely the amended Article XXII.
without further discussion and to reassemble those submarines which
have been wilfully rendered unfit for sea and tow them over.
Copy of Telegram to Afloat, Aberdeen, No. 926,
Date 30.1.19. Sent 1845.
926. Following intercepted from Admiral Goette to PANAC 1213 G. M. T.
Reference your query timed 1220 of 23.1.19, the requirements of the
Armistice Treaty and of the Trèves supplements thereto dated January
16 are being carried out as follows:
- (1)
- Of 24 submarines, including submarine cruisers and mine
layers, which have been disarmed, 21 will be escorted to a
harbour to be named by you. No guarantee can be given that
the ferrying over of these vessels can be carried out by
February 17, as only a small number of suitable tugs (?) is
at our disposal. Time and method of bringing over the
individual groups will be reported. A special proposal is to
follow regarding three submarines of this group which are as
yet not ready for towage.
- (2)
- U. 757 (as received) will probably
be brought over from Christiania Fjord on February 1st.
Details will be reported. A special proposal follows
concerning the giving up U. B. 6 from
Holland. As regards the giving up of the five submarines
lying in Spain, the agreement of the Spanish Government has
not yet reached us. From the German point of view there is
nothing against their being handed over.
- (3)
- Ten, formerly Mediterranean submarines, were brought over
on January 12; apart from these, three submarines in an
attempt to bring them over on January 12 developed engine
room defects. These boats will be towed over as soon as tugs
are available. Time will be reported.
- (4)
- 20 newly built boats, which had not yet been put in
commission, are lying in the stocks at your disposal.
- (5)
- All remaining submarines lying in Germany including
submarine cruisers and mine layers, will be disabled. Work
is in progress. [The construction of the salvage vessels Vulcan]11
and
[Page 995]
Cyclops makes it impossible for them
to be transported across the high seas during the winter
months. The floating docks for submarines are not arranged
for overseas transport. Both salvage vessels and submarine
docks are at your disposal.
Copy of Telegram From Admiralty to Coastguard
W/T Rosyth
Repeat C-in-C. G.F. Date 3 February 1919. Sent
1715.
From ANAC to C-in-C, H.S.F., for Admiral Goette.
Reference your 1213 of 30 January12 and 1336 of 1
February,13
the conditions upon which the Armistice was renewed at Treves
demanded the surrender of all submarines which could proceed to sea
or be towed, and it was pointed out that this number was 64.
German protest was not accepted and the document was signed by the
German delegates.
Of these 64, 16 have been surrendered, and the three Russian
submarines may be broken up, leaving 45 to be surrendered.
You are required to completely execute the amended Article 22 of
Armistice without further discussion, and to re-assemble those
submarines which have been wilfully rendered unfit for sea, and to
tow them over.
A report of the distinguishing numbers of the above 45 boats (see my
message 1300 of 25 January) is to be furnished by W/T forthwith. You
will report before midnight 6th/7th February whether you intend to
comply with the above demand. If not, the Allies and United States
will be informed accordingly.
(1715)
Copy of Telegram No. 955
To C-in-C., G. F. Date 1.2.19. Sent 1957
955. From Admiral Goette to PANAC 1336 G. T. In clear German.
Your question concerning W/T 1220 of 23.1.19 is already answered by
W/T 1213 of 28.1.19. On behalf of my Government I reply to your W/T
1300 of 25.1.19 as follows—
- (1)
- My statement of 7.1 that your question of 2.1 concerning
the delivery of submarines could not be replied to without
more explanation has, up to now, been ignored. The German
Government was compelled, therefore, to take the necessary
measures for carrying
[Page 996]
out the new obligations, imposed at
the meeting at Trèves on 16.1.19, with regard to Article 22
of the Armistice conditions, without your explanations. You
have been informed of these measures by my W/T 1213 of
28.1.19.
- (2)
- In the case of the three submarines mentioned in para. 1
of the above-named W/T, for which a special proposal was to
be made, their disarmament has already advanced so far that
it is impossible to fit them up again for towing purposes.
They will be completely dismantled.
- (3)
- All other measures, of which you were informed by W/T 1213
of 28.1.19, cannot possibly be cancelled and are being
carried out. The complete dismantling of the ships which,
according to the agreement at Treves on the 16.1.19 were not
to be handed over, is now proceeding rapidly. It is not
proposed to restore such dismantled ships into a state in
which they could steam or be towed.
- (4)
- The proposal that the newly-built submarines should be
taken across by German seamen was refused at Treves on
16.1.19 in a written protest. As you have already been
informed, there are twenty such submarines on the stocks and
they are at your disposal. A list of them will be
communicated to you.
- (5)
- Time of departure of separate groups will be communicated
to you.
- (6)
- When the measures reported in W/T 1213 of 28.1.19 have
been carried out, Germany will have fulfilled the
obligations contained in the terms of the Armistice and the
supplementary conditions. Confirmation is requested.
Dep. Note. I. D. 25 W/T 1213 of 28.1.19 should read W/T 1213 of
30.1.19.
I. D. 25
From the Allied Naval
Armistice Commission to the Secretary of the Admiralty
Copy.
The attached messages which have passed between the Allied Naval
Armistice Commission and the German Admiral Goette are forwarded for
special perusal.
The Allied Naval Armistice Commission observes a distinct reluctance
on the part of Germany to fulfil Art. XXII of the Terms of Armistice
(re surrender of submarines). Also, they
have been informed that the surrender of German merchant shipping is
proceeding very slowly, if at all, in regard to the large and
important passenger ships.
[Page 997]
The Commission recommends that, before the Armistice is renewed (it
has to be signed by p.m. 16 February), the Supreme War Council may
be pleased to consider what penalty should be imposed for
non-performance in regard to the two points mentioned in para, 2
above.
M. E.
Browning
,
Vice-Admiral.
A.
Grasset
,
Contre-Admiral.
S. S.
Robinson
,
Rear-Admiral.
Extract From Telegram, No. 153, of 5 February,
From Admiralty, London, to Admiralty, Paris
The Board considered that there are no suitable naval penalties that
can be applied to enforce compliance with armistice terms, and that
any penalties applied must be of a military character, and that they
should represent this to the Supreme War Council.
Copy of Telegram From Admiralty to C. G. W/T
Rosyth and C-in-C., G.[F.]
ANAC to C-in-C, German H.S.F. for Admiral Goette.
Report by W/T details steps that are now being taken to carry out
Article XXII. of Terms of Armistice as amended on 16 January.
(1220)
Copy of Telegram
884. From ANAC to C-in-C, H.S.F. for Admiral Goette.
Referring to my 1220 of 23 January, to which no reply has been
received, the following minimum performance is expected before the
Armistice is again renewed on 17 February.
-
Firstly, there is now a total of 49 submarines to be
surrendered, which can proceed to sea under their own power
or be towed (the disposal of the three Russian submarines at
Kiel is under consideration). These 49 are to be sent to
Harwich forthwith, the numbers in each batch sent over being
reported. The submarine dock and lifting vessels are also to
be sent over unless required for the taking to pieces of the
hulls of submarines under construction, in which case they
may be retained for a period which is to be reported.
[Page 998]
Your attention is called to the fact that the Allied Naval
Armistice Sub-Commissions report that some of the submarines
in this category have been rendered unready for sea since
the December inspection. These are to be reconditioned at
once.
The 49 submarines mentioned above are as follows:
Wilhelmshaven one U.C. Bremen Vulcan Yard two U, three U.B.
Vegesack five U. Hamburg Blohm and Voss one U, ten U.C.
Vulcan two U, two U.B. Cuxhaven one U.B. Heligoland two U.C.
Kiel eight U, one U.B., three U.C. Germania Yard five U,
three U.B.
- Secondly, the hulls of not less than fifty submarines of those
under construction either in the water or on the stocks are to
be cut to pieces, those most advanced being selected.
- Thirdly, as regards the remaining submarines, all propelling
and auxiliary machinery, motors, torpedo tubes, mine tubes,
periscopes, guns and mountings are to be removed.
Addressed Coastguard Wireless Rosyth.
Repeated to C-in-C., G.F. 884.
(1300)
Non-compliance on the Part of Germany With the
Terms of Armistice
Naval Clauses Affecting
Submarines
(a) 11
November, 1918. (Original article).
XXII. The surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the
United States of all submarines at present in existence (including
all submarine cruisers and minelayers), with armament and equipment
complete. Those which cannot put to sea shall be denuded of crew and
equipment, and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and
the United States. Submarines ready to put to sea shall be prepared
to leave German ports immediately on receipt of wireless order to
sail to the port of surrender, the remainder to follow as early as
possible. The conditions of this Article shall be completed within
14 days of the signing of the Armistice.
(b) 13
December, 1918.
Breaches Committee
Naval Clauses.
XXII. Submarines U. 80, U. 82, and U.B. 77 have still to be towed to Harwich.
Five submarines in Spain, one in Norway, one in Holland, have still
to be surrendered.
Germany’s Reply
We do not yet know the reason for the non-internment of submarines
U. 80, U. 82, and U.B.
77. Inquiries are being undertaken
[Page 999]
with a view to their immediate surrender. With
regard to the submarines interned in Spain, Norway, and Holland,
Germany has no power to dispose of them. However, Germany will not
put forward any protest on account of violation of neutrality if, on
the demand of the Allies, the submarines interned in Spain, Norway
and Holland, are surrendered to the Entente.
In no case can the fact that the vessels have not been surrendered be
interpreted as an infringement of the Armistice conditions.
(c) 16
January, 1919.
5. Naval Clauses.
Article XXII. of the Armistice Agreement of 11 November, 1918, shall
be supplemented as follows:—
In order to ensure the execution of such clause, the German
authorities shall be bound to carry out the following
conditions, viz.,
All submarines capable of putting to sea or of being towed
shall be handed over immediately and shall make for Allied
ports. Such vessels shall include submarine cruisers,
minelayers, relief ships and submarine docks. All submarines
which cannot be surrendered shall be completely destroyed or
dismantled under the supervision of the Allied
Commissioners.
Submarine construction shall cease immediately, and all
submarines in course of construction shall be destroyed or
dismantled under the supervision of the Allied
Commissioners.
