Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/13
Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d’Orsay, at 11 a.m., January 22, 1919
Present
| United States of America: | President Wilson |
| Mr. Lansing | |
| Mr. Frazier | |
| Mr. Harrison | |
| Col. Grant | |
| British Empire: | Mr. Lloyd George |
| Mr. Balfour | |
| Lt. Col. Hankey | |
| Mr. Norman | |
| Capt. Abraham | |
| France: | M. Clemenceau |
| M. Pichon | |
| M. Dutasta | |
| M. Berthelot | |
| Prince de Beam | |
| Italy: | Baron Sonnino |
| Count Aldrovandi | |
| Captain Jones | |
| Japan: | Baron Makino |
| M. Matsui |
Interpreter: M. Mantoux.
I
At the invitation of the Chairman, Marshal Foch, his aide. General Weygand, and General Radcliffe attended the meeting.
Marshal Foch presented his view that the Polish divisions with the French and Italian Armies should be sent to Poland for the purpose of stiffening Polish resistance against the Bolsheviki. It would be necessary, he said, for those divisions to disembark at Danzig, and to proceed to Warsaw via the Danzig-Thorn Railroad. He pointed out that the Poles, claiming that the Germans would prevent this, had requested that the railroad line should be occupied by Allied troops, which might be done under the terms of the Armistice.
Marshal Foch agreed that the Germans would oppose the transportation of Polish troops across their territory to Poland, unless the Polish question were settled and a precise program imposed on the Poles. They might be required to agree that these troops be used only in Russian-Poland, and not used to seize German territory in advance of the decisions of the Peace Conference. Under the circumstances, [Page 685] he did not think that these troops could be sent to Poland unless: First, a limited political program were imposed on the Poles and accepted by the Germans; and Second, the railway line be held by Allied troops. He thought this could be done with two divisions. The Germans had eighteen divisions in that territory.
The Marshal further thought it would be necessary to re-organize various Allied missions now in Poland. At the present time the Allies are receiving different information and diverse views. The Allies should have the benefit of the opinion of a unified mission as to the necessity of sending troops to Poland.
Mr. Balfour observed that the unification of the Allied missions might take time, and he doubted whether the Allies could afford to delay in this matter, if it be true that the Bolsheviki attack against Warsaw is imminent. He pointed out also that there would be considerable difficulty in getting a restricted program accepted by the Poles, who seemed to be determined to take the present opportunity not only to secure Poland, but to make good their claims on districts outside Russian-Poland, especially in Eastern Galicia, Posen and Danzig.
President Wilson stated that the Marshal’s proposal aroused many doubts in his mind. Should the proposal be accepted, the Allies would, he thought, be involved in an extraordinary step, because they were now at this stage, for a purpose of a different kind, about to decide one of the most difficult questions that had come before the Peace Conference. The Allies would, in fact, be isolating the Polish question from others which were much the same, namely, the Roumanian question, the Serbian question in Montenegro, and the Hungarian question. If we impose a restricted program on Poland, why would it not be wise to do the same to the others?
President Wilson called attention also to the fact that all that Mr. Paderewski had asked for in his letter to Colonel House was to be supplied with German rifles and ammunition with which to equip the 800,000 men he said he had available.
The President asked Marshal Foch whether the Allies possessed a sufficient number of rifles and ammunition to supply these unarmed Poles.
Marshal Foch had nothing to say against the suggestion, but he doubted whether Paderewski’s forces were of much value. Moreover, it really depended upon the Germans whether the arms and ammunition would be permitted to reach the Poles. It was clear that the Germans would object, unless the Allies were in a position to state the exact object for which such armament would be used. He referred again to the desirability of uniting the missions in Poland and obtaining from them precise information on the situation.
[Page 686]Mr. Lloyd George stated he was somewhat shaken by President Wilson’s argument, of which he saw the force, and he agreed that it would be well first to find out exactly what is going on in Poland before sending any troops.
Marshal Foch insisted that the Polish situation is bad from a military standpoint, and observed that by the policy Poland is now pursuing, she is running the risk of being killed before she is born.
M. Clemenceau suggested that Paderewski’s proposal to Colonel House, that the Allies send a mission to Warsaw, be accepted.
Mr. Lloyd George supported this proposal, but thought that the mission should not be purely military, but should have civilians on it, as there would be an important political side to the mission.
Baron Sonnino understood that the mission would propose to the Poles that they defend themselves against the Bolsheviki, and that they do not extend their boundaries.
M. Clemenceau asked whether Japan desired to have representatives on the mission.
Baron Makino replied in the negative.
Mr. Balfour proposed that the United States, England, France and Italy each appoint two representatives, one military and one civilian, and that the mission proceed with its work as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the British Government would study the question of transportation.
Marshal Foch and his aides then withdrew.
II
President Wilson read a draft of a statement prepared by him to be issued to the warring factions in Russia.
It was decided to have the statement translated and considered at the afternoon session.
I
The Chairman opened the afternoon session at 3:00 p.m.
The President’s draft statement was carefully considered, amended in one or two particulars, and accepted by all.
(Copy of the statement is attached hereto.)1
II
Mr. Lloyd George read certain resolutions regarding the League of Nations, and they were accepted with certain amendments proposed by President Wilson. (Copies attached.)2
[Page 687]Baron Makino requested permission to make a statement in regard to the subject of the League of Nations. He desired to point out Japan’s position in this matter. He explained that it was better that he should state this before the proceedings should take a definite form. In the first place, he desired to say that Japan was sincerely desirous of co-operating with the Great Powers in this work, having for its object the future welfare of mankind. However, on account of the great distance and lack of preparation on the part of Japan, he could not give a definite opinion on the binding principles of the League of Nations, without first receiving instructions from his Government. For his part, and he might say also for that of his Government, he expected to have an opportunity to study and understand the new organizations. If, therefore, the underlying principles should go to the committee, not signifying definite settlement, and leave an opportunity and occasion to express final opinions on the part of his Government, this would be acceptable.
President Wilson pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal included nothing that was not in contemplation when the Peace Conference was called, and that the principles of the League of Nations had been accepted at the time the Armistice was made. He therefore asked whether Baron Makino wished it to be understood that the Japanese Government reserved its decision with regard to the bases which other powers had already accepted.
Baron Makino thought that the present proposal was much more concrete.
Mr. Lloyd George asked whether the Japanese Government wished to be represented on the committee.
Baron Makino stated that it did.
The proposal was agreed to by all, and adopted with the reserve stated by Baron Makino.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the Committee consist of two representatives to be appointed by each of the five Great Powers, and two to be nominated by the Great Powers to represent the small powers. He thought it desirable to proceed to name these two and then submit these names to the approval of the small powers at the next plenary session of the Conference, which might be called immediately.
President Wilson observed that as a practical matter he would suggest that an initial draft for the League of Nations be made by a commission appointed by the Great Powers. This draft could then be submitted to a larger commission on which all the small powers would be represented. In a word, the drafting would be done by the Great Powers, and the result submitted to the criticism of the small powers.
[Page 688]Mr. Lloyd George thought that inasmuch as the League of Nations is to be, in fact, a sort of shield of the small powers, they should be represented on the drafting committee. Perhaps it might be better to have the Great Powers nominate their own representatives, and also name the small powers who should likewise have representatives on the commission.
President Wilson stated he would prefer to see a more elastic arrangement, and thought it most desirable that the opinion of the thoughtful men representing the small powers should be sought. Would it not be well to have the commission of ten to be appointed by the Great Powers authorized to call in any one they choose, and discuss with representatives of the small powers those features of the scheme most likely to affect the latter? Moreover, they need not confine themselves to a few. It seemed to him that it was most advisable to proceed in this way. Much more would be gotten out of the small powers, if they were called in as friends and advisors. Furthermore, in that way, the Great Powers would avoid the difficulty of seeming to pick out men whom the small powers should themselves choose.
M. Clemenceau observed that the work was as much for the Great Powers as it was for the small powers. He thought it most desirable that the great and small powers should get together, and that their work should be intimately connected. It was important to let the public feel that their work was connected. He suggested that the Great Powers name two representatives apiece and the small powers name five. He thought they would be only too glad to follow the advice of the representatives of the Great Powers. He proposed that the Bureau ask the small powers to get-together and name five. The responsibility would then be theirs. He spoke, of course, of belligerents only, and not of neutrals. He was most anxious the work should begin as soon as possible, and he hoped the commission would be appointed at once.
Mr. Balfour feared the bureau would get into great trouble if the small powers were asked to vote on the question at the Great Conference.
M. Clemenceau explained that his intention was not to ask them to vote at the Conference, but to ask them to get together and name five representatives.
Baron Sonnino thought there might be some difficulty attending the proposal to ask the small powers to name but five representatives. For instance, Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece and Portugal would each desire to name at least one representative on the committee, and there might be others also. This mode of procedure [Page 689] would place the small powers in a difficult position. It would be more practical, he believed, if the ten representatives appointed by the Great Powers should form the committee, receive a mandate to make proposals, and then invite the representatives of all the smaller powers to discuss these proposals with them.
President Wilson observed that it was impossible to draft an instrument on a large committee. It would be far more practical to appoint a manageable drafting committee, letting this small committee of a few men prepare and submit a draft to the others, and obtain their impressions and opinions.
Mr. Balfour understood it was intended that the committee should from time to time consult the members of the Great Powers.
Mr. Lloyd George thought it well to remember that the small powers were becoming very restive, and felt they had been locked out, so to speak. Why not let President Wilson prepare a draft for immediate consideration by the commission? He did not think it would be impossible to have a commission of fifteen representatives. As to the fear that the assignment of only five to represent all the small powers might cause some embarrassment to their delegates, he saw no reason why the matter should not be put up to them, letting them discuss and fight over the question of who should represent them.
M. Clemenceau repeated that he thought it most necessary that the Great Powers should make the Conference feel that they wanted the smaller powers, and ask all to come in with them.
Mr. Lloyd George stated that it was therefore understood that a plenary conference was to be called to pass upon the principles set forth in the resolution they had just adopted.
President Wilson observed that it had been agreed that there would be no vote. Was it now the suggestion to ask them to vote?
Mr. Lloyd George explained that they would simply be asked to record their objections.
Baron Sonnino inquired what would be done should the representatives of the small powers ask permission to name ten representatives.
Mr. Lloyd George thought the Chairman might say that the Bureau would consider it. His view was that the Great Powers should always reserve the important decisions for themselves.
President Wilson asked whether the resolution was to be given out in the Official Communiqué, to be issued at the close of the meeting.
Mr. Balfour suggested it be stated that the League of Nations had been discussed at the meeting and that it was proposed to bring the matter before the next meeting of the Great Conference.
[Page 690]President Wilson asked whether it would not be desirable to inform the small powers of the decisions of those present, in advance of publicity. Why not inform them that this resolution had been adopted by the Great Powers, and would be submitted for discussion at the Great Conference Saturday next?
Mr. Balfour suggested that perhaps the small powers might prefer to have the resolution sent them in private.
President Wilson observed that they were about to create a precedent, and that it seemed to him that it would be well to decide on a consistent course to be pursued on all occasions.
M. Clemenceau proposed, therefore, that a plenary session of the Conference be called for Saturday next, January 25th; that the resolution containing the principles for the League of Nations be submitted thereat for discussion, and that the small powers be invited to appoint their five delegates. It was suggested that the text of the resolution be not published until Saturday, and that, in the meanwhile, copies be sent to the representatives of the smaller powers for their confidential information.
III
Mr. Lloyd George proposed the appointment of a similar commission to consider the question of reparation and indemnity.
President Wilson suggested it might be well to omit the word “indemnity”.
Baron Sonnino suggested the substitution of “reparation and restitution”.
Mr. Lloyd George stated he was quite prepared to accept the one word “reparation”, provided it was understood that this included “restitution”. He proposed, therefore, that a commission consisting of three representatives apiece for the Great Powers, and two representatives apiece for Belgium and Serbia, be named to examine and report on the amount of the sum that should be paid by Germany, the amount of the sum that Germany is capable of paying, and the form which the payment should take.
M. Pichon observed that Greece would certainly wish to be represented on such a commission.
Mr. Balfour thought that Russian-Poland would also desire to be represented.
President Wilson suggested that, under the circumstances, it would seem desirable to assign two delegates apiece for Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Roumania and Poland.
[Page 691]