Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume III

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/2

BC–A1

[SWC–1]

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay on Sunday, January 12, at 4 p.m.

January 12, 1919, 4 p.m.

• Present
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
    • M. Dutasta.
    • M. Bearn.
    • Capt. Portier.
  • Great Britain
    • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
    • Lt.-col. Sir Maurice Hankey.
  • Italy
    • Signor Orlando
    • Baron Sonnino
    • Count Aldrovandi
    • Major A. Jones.
  • United States
    • President Wilson
    • Mr. R. Lansing
    • Mr. A. H. Frazier

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

(Note: This meeting was a continuation of a meeting of the Supreme War Council commenced earlier in the afternoon, procès-verbal of which has been prepared separately.)

1. The Procedures of the Peace Discussions M. Pichon said the first question to examine was the general procedure in regard to the Peace discussions. The French Government had circulated a proposal on the subject to the Associated Governments (Appendix A). If any other document on the same lines had been prepared, a decision would have to be taken as to which proposal should form the basis of discussion.

President Wilson asked whether this was not a question for discussion at the larger Conference to be held to-morrow.

M. Pichon said that there were many questions in regard to procedure which the larger Conference would have to decide itself. But there were certain subjects which must be discussed before the formal Conference, such as the number of Delegates, and how they were to be summoned, etc.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had studied the French document. He would have some suggestions to make when it was discussed in detail. He considered, however, that the general outlines of the proposal were well arranged, and that it formed a good basis for discussion.

M. Pichon asked whether it was agreed that there should be five Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers.

Mr. Lloyd George said he agreed to this. But he had something to say as regards the next proposal, that there should be three Representatives of each of the smaller belligerent Powers. If this number was decided on, it would involve an enormous gathering. Two would seem quite enough.

President Wilson suggested that one Representative was sufficient for Siam; two for Belgium, Greece, &c.; while Brazil, as a larger country, should have three.

Mr. Lloyd George said that at previous meetings Belgium had always been satisfied with one Representative. If there were more than one apiece, the Conference would become very unwieldly. There was a second point that he would have to press, namely, in regard to the representation of the British self-governing Dominions and India. They would not be present at all the discussions, but in matters which concerned them they ought to be properly represented.

President Wilson asked whether this could not be effected by making the members of the British Delegation interchangeable.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the British Dominions were entirely autonomous, and that the British Government could not have induced them to send a single unit without their own consent. His proposal would be to reduce the representation of the smaller belligerent Powers to two apiece and place the Dominions and India on the same scale, with the sole exception of Newfoundland, which, being a small Dominion, would be content with one Representative.

President Wilson said that this question of representation was largely one of sentiment and psychology. If the Dominions were given this additional representation, the impression amongst those who did not know the full facts would be that they were merely additional British Representatives. This impression would be especially strong among the small Powers. The Great Powers, to put the matter brutally, would appear to be running the Peace Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that they had run the war.

President Wilson said he wished to convey a more comfortable impression. If the British Government could form their Delegation, whatever its size, by including as many of their Dominion Representatives as they liked, they would relieve the difficulty.

Mr. Lloyd George said that one reason for which this plan would not meet the case was owing to questions like that of the Colonies. This question of the Colonies was in some cases of less importance to the British Empire as a whole than to particular Dominions, which had a point of view quite apart from the purely British one. If five of the Dominion Representatives were included in the British Delegation, Great Britain would have no representation at all. In his opinion, the smaller Powers ought to be satisfied with one Representative apiece. In this case, he asked for the same representation for the Dominions and India. Take Australia, for example. They had sent more men to the war than Belgium or Serbia or Roumania. They had proved the most magnificent fighters, and had, he believed actually lost more dead than the United States of America. They said that they were entitled to separate representation. It was no good saying that the British Government represented them, because, in fact, on many questions they could not. He asked, therefore, that they should be on the same footing as the smaller belligerent Powers, that is to say, that they should have the same representation, and should be invited to attend on all questions in which they had a special interest.

President Wilson pointed out that, if the British Delegation did not represent the Dominions, at least they were their friends. Probably they would back them up at the meetings. Consequently, in every question affecting the Dominions which might also affect the rest of the world (and he pointed out that the question of the German Colonies was of interest to the rest of the world as well as to the Dominions), Great Britain and the Dominions between them would have 10 or 12 votes.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that there would be no votes.

M. Clemenceau agreed.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in his view the British Delegation would ask the Representatives of the Dominions and India to present their own case on many points, particularly where they had a special point of view.

Mr. Lansing suggested that there might be five technical delegates of the Dominions.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that, as President Wilson had said, sentiment was of great importance, and this would rule out this proposal.

President Wilson pointed out that Canada had no special interests. For example, they had no special interest in the German Colonies. When we discussed German South-West Africa, there would be, according to his plan, say, four British and one South African Representative.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that in addition to discussions on particular Colonies, there would be general discussions on the disposal of the Colonies. Canada would certainly be interested in these. Canada was also specially interested in President Wilson’s third point dealing with economic questions.

President Wilson said that of course their views would be invited but, according to his idea, this could be done by the adoption of the panel system.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that, apart from the Dominions, India had made very great sacrifices and efforts in the war, and should also be fully represented.

M. Pichon said that if Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal as to numbers were accepted, there was no doubt that there would be great disappointment amongst such Powers as Greece, Serbia, etc., who had taken a considerable part in the War and sustained great losses. But the great objection of those minor belligerent Allies would be that they were placed on the same footing as countries which had declared war without taking any part in hostilities, or had merely broken off diplomatic negotiations [relations?]. He suggested, therefore, that if three Representatives were too many, these Powers should, at any rate, have two Delegates.

M. Sonnino wished to know whether Montenegro was to have two Representatives or one.

M. Pichon said that at present the question as to whether certain categories of Powers were to have one or two or three Representatives, was only being discussed as one of principle.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that there was another method of distinguishing between the status given to the different Powers, namely, the frequency of the occasions on which they would be brought into the discussions. For example, on the question of the League of Nations all the smaller States ought to be consulted, but countries such as Serbia and Belgium, which were concerned in territorial adjustments, would be called in more frequently than others.

Mr. Lansing asked whether the Dominions would be brought into the discussions on the European arrangements.

Mr. Lloyd George said that they had as much right to such representation as any American or extra-European nation. They had sacrificed several hundred thousands of their men in Europe, and were entitled to some say in the arrangements for the future peace of the world.

President Wilson said he had a sentimental feeling as regards Roumania and Serbia. He was quite willing that they should be represented out of proportion to any principle.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the part which they had taken in the struggle should have some influence on the question. The Dominions and India claimed the same representation as Powers which had made the same contribution as they to the victory. He did not mind whether this representation was by one or two members.

President Wilson said he did not see why Siam should be in the list.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed.

M. Pichon suggested that they should examine the various States one by one.

He suggested—

2	for Belgium
2	for Greece
2	for Serbia
1	for Portugal
1	for Siam
2	for Roumania

Mr. Balfour pointed out that Portugal had employed troops in Africa as well as in France, and asked that his dissent from the proposed limitation of Portugal’s representation might be recorded.

M. Pichon urged that Roumania should have two Delegates. She had had a Treaty, and after being forced out of the war had again become an Ally.

Mr. Balfour said he had no objection to Roumania being treated on this footing for purposes of representation, but he did not wish thereby to renew every clause of the treaty which Roumania had broken by going out of the War. He did not wish to put her [in] exactly the same position as she was before she went out of the War.

M. Sonnino said there were two questions:—

1. That of representation. For what Roumania had suffered, and for the part she had taken, she should have proper representation.

2. The question of her Treaty rights. This was a distinct question, which he agreed ought to be reserved.

M. Sonnino’s proposal was accepted.

M. Pichon suggested:

2	representatives for China
2	for Brazil.

These were agreed to.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, as regards the Dominions and India, the only claim which he put in was that they should be called in on questions which affected them, in the same way as Belgium, Serbia, etc. He proposed that each of the Dominions should have two Representatives and Newfoundland one.

President Wilson suggested that other States would have no backers and sponsors like the British Dominions. Great Britain had a full representation as a Great Power. Consequently, the Dominions would be supported by five Representatives in the most powerful section of the Conference. It would be open to misconstruction if the British Government insisted, in addition, on two Representatives of each of the Dominions. He himself was quite willing to concede one.

Mr. Lloyd George said that if there was any reluctance to accept his proposal, he would like to suspend the discussion in order to give him an opportunity of discussing the matter with his colleagues in the Imperial War Cabinet.

President Wilson agreed to this procedure, and said that he hoped Mr. Lloyd George would not leave on the minds of the Dominions Representatives the impression that there was the least jealousy.

(The discussion on the representation of the British Dominions was then adjourned.)

M. Pichon’s proposal that Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State should each have two Representatives was agreed to, as well as the proposal for one Representative each of the small Powers, theoretically belligerent, of those that had broken off diplomatic negotiations, of neutral States, and of States in process of formation.

2. Representation of Montenegro M. Pichon said that the French Government had received communications from Serbia to the effect that Montenegro had become a part of the State under the rule of the Karageorgivich monarchy. At the same time a message had been received from Podgoritza to the effect that a Constituent Assembly had agreed that Montenegro should be absorbed by Serbia. The King of Montenegro, however, stated that the decision of the Constituent Assembly was invalid and negligible; hence it would seem that a decision could not be taken before the Conference met. This was the point of view of the French Government. The question arose in consequence as to whether Montenegro was to be regarded as a separate State entitled to separate representation at the Conference or as part of the Serbian representation.

President Wilson said that the action of Serbia in regard to Montenegro had gone somewhat towards prejudicing him against the Government of Serbia. To act with force like this was contrary to the principle of self-determination. Although he had no precise knowledge, he would not be surprised to learn that the King of Montenegro was right and that the Constituent Assembly at Podgoritza had not been properly constituted. Serbia had had no right to send her troops into Montenegro. The events of the last few months had almost made him a partisan of Montenegro. Hence he was strongly in favour of taking no notice of the Serbian claims and of giving Montenegro separate representation.

Mr. Lloyd George said he was not sure of the facts, but he felt that Montenegro ought to have the right to state her case before its being determined whether she was entitled to separate representation. He was not anti-Serbian in this matter, but he felt that we ought to ascertain the facts.

President Wilson said he was anti-Serbian in this case, because no country had the right to take the self-determination of another country into her own hands. He asked who was to select the Montenegrin Representatives. The de facto Government was clearly under Serbian control, and was not qualified to state the opposite point of view. The King, who was in Paris, could hardly present more than his personal side of the question. Hence, though he was clear that Montenegro ought to be represented, he was not clear how that representation should be settled.

Mr. Balfour said that he had no clear idea as to when and how the invasion of Montenegro had taken place.

M. Sonnino said that it had occurred immediately after the Armistice. The Serbians had penetrated Montenegro and had opposed any contemporaneous action on Italy’s part. In order to avoid fighting between Allies, the Italians had kept away from Cettinje. The movement for inclusion in Serbia was made under Serbian auspices. There was, however, a contrary party which desired to form part of the Yugo-Slav State, but as an autonomous unit in that State. For his part, he could not support a Government which had taken such action. There would always be Representatives of the opposite side in the Serbian delegation, so that if the King of Montenegro nominated Delegates, the other side would nevertheless be fully represented at the Conference. There had been considerable disturbances in Montenegro as a re-action against the Serbian action, and help was being invited. It was a very bad beginning to the new regime to follow the War.

President Wilson suggested that it should be agreed that Montenegro was to have representation, but that no decision should be taken as to how it was to be settled.

M. Pichon asked to whom the invitation to the Conference should be addressed.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that Montenegro should be treated as a State in process of formation. M. Sonnino had presented the case for Montenegro.

(M. Sonnino demurred to this.)

Somebody, Mr. Lloyd George continued, must have presented the case to M. Sonnino. Montenegro ought to be given an opportunity of presenting its case, and it would not be necessary to scrutinise too closely the credentials of the person who represented it.

President Wilson thought it would be important to make sure that the case was represented by somebody who really was entitled to represent Montenegro.

Mr. Balfour suggested that the question ought not to be decided apart from the question of how the Yugo Slav State was to be represented. The two cases were on all fours.

President Wilson pointed out that Montenegro was an older State than Serbia. She could therefore be separate from Yugo-Slavia. Some of the other units of Yugo-Slavia were saying the same thing, namely, that Serbia was trying to put them under her own domination rather than to associate them with her. Since the meetings were not going to take place at once, and events were occurring all the time which might influence the ultimate decision, he thought it would be quite unnecessary to do more than decide in principle that Montenegro was to be represented.

Mr. Lansing said that America recognized the Government of the King of Montenegro.

M. Sonnino said that no one had stated the case to him. What he had said had been from his own knowledge. He pointed out that Montenegro was a very much older State than Serbia. She alone had resisted for centuries the domination of the Turks. She took part in the War in order to help Serbia and to preserve her own future independence. A good many Montenegrins had continued fighting. They had wanted the Italians to form a separate battalion of them, and some had been sent to Salonika for incorporation in Serbian units. He agreed with President Wilson’s view that Montenegro should be represented. He suggested that in the meantime the United States of America should send a representative to discover how things were in that country. No news was allowed to percolate out of Montenegro and no Allied troops were allowed to go there.

M. Clemenceau pointed out that if President Wilson wishes to send someone to enquire, he could do so without any authority from the Powers associated with him.

President Wilson said he was quite willing to send someone, but not an official representative on behalf of this Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George entirely agreed with this view. He pointed out that it would be extremely offensive to an Ally that any nation should give expression at this Conference, formally or informally, that there ought to be any inquiry.

Conclusion:—It was decided in principle that Montenegro should be represented at the Conference, but the decision was left open as to how her Representatives should be chosen.

(The Conference then had a short adjournment.)

After the adjournment:

Renewal of the Armistice with Germany M. Clemenceau raised the question, which had been discussed earlier in the afternoon at the meeting of the Supreme War Council, as to when Marshal Foch was to receive his instructions as to the renewal of the Armistice.

Mr. Lloyd George asked for a list of the questions involved in this discussion.

M. Clemenceau said he could not give a complete list, but among the questions was one relating to coke, another relating to the surrender of Germany’s merchant fleet, and a third relating to the Reichsbank.

After a short discussion it was agreed that technical Representatives of the various Powers should meet in conference at the Quai d’Orsay at 10 A.M. on Monday, the 13th January, in order to prepare decisions for the consideration of the Supreme War Council, which should meet at the Quai d’Orsay at 2:30 on Monday, the 13th January.

M. Clemenceau undertook to give instructions for a list of the questions for consideration to be circulated on the same evening.

M. Sonnino said that the whole question of Bolshevism was involved.

The Representation of Russia at the Conference M. Pichon did not agree. He pointed out that there were various representatives of Russian opinion in Paris—for example, M. Sazonoff,¹ Prince Lvoff² and others, including Socialists, who represented every shade of opinion. These asked to be represented. His opinion was that this could not be done. We should first have to acknowledge the Omsk Government, whom they came to represent. At present it seemed impossible to recognise this Government as the Government of Russia. It was not strong enough to be regarded as representative of Russia as a whole. But this was no reason why these personalities should not be allowed to put their views unofficially. His suggestion, then, was that Russia as a State should have no representation, but that the Conference should be allowed to hear such persons as he had mentioned.

Mr. Lloyd George said that this had to be dealt with in one way or another, because at present the Allies had got themselves in a fix for the reason that they had no definite policy in Russia. They ought to decide whether to withdraw their troops or to reinforce them. Unless reinforced, they were of no use whatsoever. He had nothing to say against these people, Prince Lvoff, &c. We were told they represented every shade of opinion. As a matter of fact, they represented every opinion except the prevalent opinion in Russia.

President Wilson pointed out it was prevalent in some respects.

Mr. Lloyd George said he feared the fact that it was prevalent must be accepted. The peasants accepted Bolshevism for the same reason as the peasants had accepted it in the French Revolution, namely, that it gave them land. The Bolshevists were the de facto Government. We had formally recognised the Czar’s Government, although at the time we knew it to be absolutely rotten. Our reason had been that it was the de facto Government. We recognised the Don Government, the Archangel Government and the Omsk Government, although none of them were good, but we refused to recognise the Bolshevists. To say that we ourselves should pick the representatives of a great people was contrary to every principle for which we had fought. It was possible that the Bolshevists did not represent Russia. But certainly Prince Lvoff did not; neither did Savinkoff,³ although he was a good man. The British Government made exactly the same mistake when they said that the émigrés represented France. This led them into a war which lasted about twenty-five years. The Russian peasants probably felt towards Trotsky⁴ much as the French peasants did towards Robespierre. This question must now be settled. He hoped that the Allies would not separate and announce that they had made perpetual peace when Siberia, which formed about half Asia, and Russia, which formed about half Europe, were still at war. He, himself, would make proposals in due course, but, in the meantime, he wishes to protest against an attempt to select representatives for some hundred million people.

M. Pichon quite agreed that the persons he had named should not be admitted as representatives of Russia. He only wished to take advantage of their presence to hear what they had to bring forward.

Mr. Lloyd George said that to do so would give the public the impression that we considered they represented Russia. The fact that they had been seen by the Conference would be known. If we wished to hear their views, we could obtain a memorandum from them or have a private conversation.

M. Pichon agreed.

Conclusion:—It was agreed that Russia should not be represented at the Conference, but that the persons named by M. Pichon and others could be interviewed personally or asked to supply memoranda.

M. Pichon then read Section II of the French Memorandum, on which no comments were offered.

M. Pichon then commenced to read Section III.

President Wilson said that he did not see how the Allies could work on a programme such as was now proposed. He asked how the Nations could be represented as had been proposed in these discussions. Surely, they must have full representation or none at all. He quoted instances in which Powers which would only be represented part of the time would, in fact, have a great interest in general questions, to the discussion of which they would not normally be invited.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that this system had been adopted with success at the Supreme War Council, when Greece, Serbia, Japan, Belgium and other countries had been invited.

President Wilson pointed out that this was only in the War. The present Conference was to settle the world for a long time to come. He did not like to give even the appearance of only consulting Nations when the Great Powers considered that they were concerned.

Mr. Lloyd George asked if this was not reality. Were not the Great Powers, in fact, settling the questions?

President Wilson said this was why he maintained that we ought to have no formal Conferences, but only conversations. The moment the formal Conferences were entered into these difficulties arose. He felt that this would not satisfy the smaller nations, and satisfaction was an essential part of the Peace settlement.

Mr. Lloyd George said he did not see why they should not be satisfied. The questions to be decided in the War were just as difficult as those to be decided in the Peace.

Mr. Balfour asked why there should not be a number of informal conversations with informal conclusions. These conclusions, labelled as informal and preliminary suggestions, would then be sent to the small Powers for their consideration and returned by them with their remarks, which would be discussed at further informal Conferences.

M. Clemenceau asked whether he was to understand that no decision could be taken without Costa Rica and Honduras being consulted. If so, he could not agree. It was evident that in European questions the danger was not so great for Costa Rica or Nicaragua as for European Powers. But there were many questions of vital importance to the latter. He had always understood that the four Great Powers would meet and settle these questions, admitting the co-operation of the other Powers. They were not bound to decide the question that evening, but there were certain considerations which ought to be taken into account before the decision was taken. There was the great demand for publicity of the proceedings of the Conference, more especially in France. But to solve the questions in private conversation would render any publicity impossible. This would create the utmost disappointment and the belief that things were not right. He insisted that public opinion should be taken into account. He quite agreed in the principle that the small countries were as much concerned as the great, and that nothing ought to be done to wound the susceptibilities of the small countries. But these countries were not in the same position towards the greater problems as the larger Powers. Already Japan had been admitted to the Conference and was to have five delegates, although Japan had not done very much in the War, and what she had done had been mainly in her own interests. He proposed, therefore, that the meeting should adjourn in order to reflect upon the proposals of President Wilson and Mr. Balfour, but that in their reflections all should remember that we must avoid doing anything likely to create distrust in public opinion.

Mr. Balfour asked what were M. Clemenceau’s ideas on the question of publicity.

M. Clemenceau replied that in his scheme there would be partial publicity, according as the Allied Governments may think fit.

President Wilson said that, apart from the Armistice, nothing had been discussed to-day but the question of representation at the Conference. He asked what he should say when approached by the Press. What was the Conference to which the discussions on representation related?

M. Clemenceau said they were the preliminary Peace Conferences which all the world was awaiting. He contemplated two Conferences, a preliminary Conference of the Allied Powers, followed by the regular Peace Congress. There were altogether three kinds of Conferences:—

1. Informal conversations, about which nothing would be announced;

2. The formal preliminary Peace Conference; and

3. The Peace Congress.

(After some discussion, it was agreed that the press should be informed that after a meeting of the Supreme War Council, which had been concerned with questions relating to the renewal of the Armistice, the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries had had an exchange of views as to the method and procedure at the Conference for formulating in a preliminary way the terms of Peace.)

Technical Advisers M. Pichon pointed out that Technical Advisers would be necessary on many questions—for example, on financial questions. He suggested that when required they should take the place of one of the Delegates at the Conference.

President Wilson said he did not require Technical Delegates, but only Technical Advisers.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that Technical Advisers should sit behind their Delegates without being reckoned as additional Delegates. If it was necessary for them to make an explanation on a technical point, the head of the Delegation would ask the President if this could be permitted.

President Wilson suggested that any formal process which was adopted must not exclude any informal process.

Japanese Representation at the Informal Conversations (It was agreed that Technical Advisers should not sit at the table, but should sit behind the Delegates at the Conference.)

(It was agreed that the Japanese Ambassador in Paris should be permitted to attend future conversations.)

Villa Majestic, Paris , January 12, 1919.

Appendix (A) to IC–104 [BC–A1]

(Translation)

Plan of the Preliminary Conversations Between the Allied Ministers

[Here follows text of the plan, printed in volume I, page 386].

1. Sergei D. Sazonoff, Tsarist Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910–1916; Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Volunteer Army of Denikin and later for Kolchak; representative of both governments at Paris.
2. Prince George E. Lvoff, Russian Prime Minister from March to July 1917; at this time head of the Russian Political Bureau in Paris.
3. Boris Savinkoff, Executive Minister of War under Kerensky, August 7 to August 25, 1918; at this time a representative of the Kolchak government at Paris.
4. Leon D. Trotsky, Soviet Commissar for Military Affairs.