File No. 600.119/201

The Danish Minister ( Brun) to the Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary of State: On May 15, I had the honor of addressing to you a note concerning the exports from Denmark before and during the present war,1 with a view especially to correct any misconception of this matter which might possibly have been [Page 1024] created by certain erroneous reports in the newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic.

In my endeavour and anxiety to contribute everything in my power to make the actual situation in Denmark and our point of view clear to you, I cabled at the same time to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, suggesting to him to place at my disposal such full and actual information regarding our position and situation that I could lay it before you with some prospect of serving a useful purpose, as owing to the irregularity of mail-communications during the war and the distance from home, I did not feel that I was fully enlightened myself on the said points or in possession of such complete information that would allow me to set the matter forth to you with the weight which the subject undoubtedly requires.

In reply the Minister has now cabled me what I have stated in the memorandum enclosed herewith, and he has at the same time instructed me to seek an interview with you and to say to you then what I have stated in the memorandum.

I beg that when you have acquainted yourself with the contents of the memorandum, you will be so good as to indicate a day and an hour when it will be convenient for you to see me on this subject.

Yours very sincerely,

C. Brun
[Enclosure]

The Danish Minister ( Brun) to the Secretary of State

Memorandum

In the daily press and in public and private discussions in the United States surprise has repeatedly been expressed when the fact was mentioned that during the present war Denmark has continued its commercial relations with Germany (and Austria), and the suggestion has been made that Denmark should voluntarily cease to trade with the Central powers or by measures taken by the Allies be placed in such a position that it could no longer trade with the Central powers.

The following remarks will to a certain degree make it clear why Denmark could not voluntarily stop the said trade and what the consequences would be if an attempt were made at compelling Denmark to cease all commercial relations with the Central powers:

When one remembers the geographical situation of Denmark and takes into consideration the dependence of the industry of Denmark on importations of raw materials from Germany and the necessity for the Danish farmers of selling their cattle and horses in the [Page 1025] German market, it will be clear at once that it is an absolute political duty for the Danish Government to endeavour to promote good neighbourly relations with Germany, and the necessity of this policy during the present war conditions is surely self-evident. For it must not be overlooked that, whatever may be the outcome of the war, Germany will always remain the nearest neighbour of Denmark and, whether victorious or defeated, will always have a deciding influence on the political and economical life of Denmark.

Therefore, just as it is politically and economically necessary for us to endeavour to continue our exportation to the West, it is also indispensable to maintain our exportation to the South.

Furthermore, any other procedure or tendency on the part of Denmark would be a violation of the determination of the Danish Government declared at the beginning of the war and often repeated since then, to maintain an equal and impartial neutrality towards both of the belligerent groups of countries.

Denmark has thus continued to trade with and to export its own products to both of the belligerent groups, as it was our right and our duty, and Denmark has also in accordance with the fifth Hague Convention impartially and loyally towards both parties carried out such restrictions of free commerce and trade which the Government during the war found it necessary to establish, although in their effect these restrictions, and especially the embargoes, were almost exclusively to the detriment of Germany, which might easily have led to political consequences reaching far beyond their real economical importance.

The Danish embargoes have given to the Allied powers, in connection with their efforts to the effect of blockading Germany, an absolute guarantee that imported articles were not reexported from Denmark, and the United States now also has this guarantee with regard to the export to Denmark of articles necessary for the Danish agriculture, such as for instance feedstuffs and petroleum.

Owing to the measures taken by the belligerents with regard to the final destination of all articles, it became necessary for the Danish Government to delegate the work in connection herewith to the Danish commercial and industrial organizations, and the Danish Government has in every possible way supported these organizations in the task thus undertaken by them.

When owing to the beginning of the submarine war in 1915 and to the British counter-measures the question of provisions became foremost in Germany, the exportation of agricultural products from Denmark to England, which our farmers had conscientiously continued in spite of the low prices in England as compared with the [Page 1026] ever increasing costs of production, was in danger of being stopped by the German naval forces.

For it must in this connection be remembered that the Danish waters are within the sphere of operation of the German Navy and that the German Navy has it in its power to stop our exportation at any moment.

But by negotiations at Berlin the Danish Government obtained that our exportation to England of our agricultural products could be continued, provided that Germany received her part of our agricultural export, and that on the other hand England did not place any obstacles in the way of the importation to Denmark of articles necessary for our agriculture, especially feedstuffs.

This question of importations to Denmark is of all absorbing importance, for it is the argument which on the part of the Danish Government has been successfully used in negotiations with Germany for the purpose of making exportation from Denmark to England possible. If importations are suppressed, no reason remains for Germany to allow exportations to England.

This arrangement which has not assumed a fixed and concrete form, and which here has only been indicated in its great lines, is the main point and turning-point of the political relations between Denmark and the two great adversaries: England and Germany.

The British Government has repeatedly declared in the British Parliament that both the Danish Government and the Danish people had conscientiously and loyally carried out the engagements that had been undertaken. The British Government has evidently also been forced to recognize that the policy followed by the Danish Government was the correct policy, for, in spite of the loud accusations against Denmark by a certain extreme part of the daily press, no demand has ever been made by the Allied powers that Denmark should establish still further restrictions with regard to imported articles to the effect that animal products indirectly produced by such imported articles should only be exported to the Allied powers.

It has indeed been rumored that the Allied powers were now endeavouring to induce the American Government to issue such drastic orders with regard to the use made of feedstuffs, etc., imported into Denmark from the United States.

The Danish Government wishes in these circumstances to again declare that there is absolute security against reexportation from Denmark of the said importations from America, and admits being unable to perceive for what reasons the American Government should contemplate changing their policy towards Denmark (and the other Scandinavian countries) and making exportations conditional upon restrictions with regard to the use of the exported articles, [Page 1027] such as the British Government on its own behalf and on behalf of the Allied Governments after three years’ warfare has not considered it expedient to demand.

It is believed that too much importance is attached to the export from Denmark to Germany, which however is insignificant as compared with the population of Germany of about seventy millions, and surely can have no influence on the progress of the war.

All that would be accomplished by a policy of such drastic nature would be, that Germany would cut all exportation off from Denmark to England, a situation which would lead to the economical ruin of Denmark and create serious political difficulties for us in our relations with Germany. Such a policy would consequently not in any way do harm to Germany. It has invariably been the case during the present war with every encroachment from one or the other side of the belligerents, and it would be the case again here, that the real loser would be Denmark, not the other belligerent.

A policy of this extreme nature would finally not be in accordance with the policy which the American Government championed so valiantly, while as a neutral it had to defend the rights and duties of neutrals and thereby vigorously assisted the small nations in their struggle to preserve the rights of the neutrals as recognized by international law.

This being so, and the British Government not having thought it wise or expedient to change their blockade policy towards the neutrals in the direction under discussion, it would seem that there would be so much the more occasion for the Government of the United States to consider, whether it would be politically wise for them to do, what the other Allied powers from political motives have hereunto abstained from doing, because they recognized the weight and correctness of the arguments here set forth and explained.

C. Brun

  1. Not printed.