File No. 600.119/201
In my endeavour and anxiety to contribute everything in my power to
make the actual situation in Denmark and our point of view clear to
you, I cabled at the same time to the Danish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, suggesting to him to place at my disposal such full and
actual information regarding our position and situation that I could
lay it before you with some prospect of serving a useful purpose, as
owing to the irregularity of mail-communications during the war and
the distance from home, I did not feel that I was fully enlightened
myself on the said points or in possession of such complete
information that would allow me to set the matter forth to you with
the weight which the subject undoubtedly requires.
In reply the Minister has now cabled me what I have stated in the
memorandum enclosed herewith, and he has at the same time instructed
me to seek an interview with you and to say to you then what I have
stated in the memorandum.
I beg that when you have acquainted yourself with the contents of the
memorandum, you will be so good as to indicate a day and an hour
when it will be convenient for you to see me on this subject.
[Enclosure]
The Danish Minister (
Brun) to
the Secretary of State
Memorandum
In the daily press and in public and private discussions in the
United States surprise has repeatedly been expressed when the
fact was mentioned that during the present war Denmark has
continued its commercial relations with Germany (and Austria),
and the suggestion has been made that Denmark should voluntarily
cease to trade with the Central powers or by measures taken by
the Allies be placed in such a position that it could no longer
trade with the Central powers.
The following remarks will to a certain degree make it clear why
Denmark could not voluntarily stop the said trade and what the
consequences would be if an attempt were made at compelling
Denmark to cease all commercial relations with the Central
powers:
When one remembers the geographical situation of Denmark and
takes into consideration the dependence of the industry of
Denmark on importations of raw materials from Germany and the
necessity for the Danish farmers of selling their cattle and
horses in the [Page 1025] German
market, it will be clear at once that it is an absolute
political duty for the Danish Government to endeavour to promote
good neighbourly relations with Germany, and the necessity of
this policy during the present war conditions is surely
self-evident. For it must not be overlooked that, whatever may
be the outcome of the war, Germany will always remain the
nearest neighbour of Denmark and, whether victorious or
defeated, will always have a deciding influence on the political
and economical life of Denmark.
Therefore, just as it is politically and economically necessary
for us to endeavour to continue our exportation to the West, it
is also indispensable to maintain our exportation to the
South.
Furthermore, any other procedure or tendency on the part of
Denmark would be a violation of the determination of the Danish
Government declared at the beginning of the war and often
repeated since then, to maintain an equal and impartial
neutrality towards both of the belligerent groups of
countries.
Denmark has thus continued to trade with and to export its own
products to both of the belligerent groups, as it was our right
and our duty, and Denmark has also in accordance with the fifth
Hague Convention impartially and loyally towards both parties
carried out such restrictions of free commerce and trade which
the Government during the war found it necessary to establish,
although in their effect these restrictions, and especially the
embargoes, were almost exclusively to the detriment of Germany,
which might easily have led to political consequences reaching
far beyond their real economical importance.
The Danish embargoes have given to the Allied powers, in
connection with their efforts to the effect of blockading
Germany, an absolute guarantee that imported articles were not
reexported from Denmark, and the United States now also has this
guarantee with regard to the export to Denmark of articles
necessary for the Danish agriculture, such as for instance
feedstuffs and petroleum.
Owing to the measures taken by the belligerents with regard to
the final destination of all articles, it became necessary for
the Danish Government to delegate the work in connection
herewith to the Danish commercial and industrial organizations,
and the Danish Government has in every possible way supported
these organizations in the task thus undertaken by them.
When owing to the beginning of the submarine war in 1915 and to
the British counter-measures the question of provisions became
foremost in Germany, the exportation of agricultural products
from Denmark to England, which our farmers had conscientiously
continued in spite of the low prices in England as compared with
the [Page 1026] ever increasing
costs of production, was in danger of being stopped by the
German naval forces.
For it must in this connection be remembered that the Danish
waters are within the sphere of operation of the German Navy and
that the German Navy has it in its power to stop our exportation
at any moment.
But by negotiations at Berlin the Danish Government obtained that
our exportation to England of our agricultural products could be
continued, provided that Germany received her part of our
agricultural export, and that on the other hand England did not
place any obstacles in the way of the importation to Denmark of
articles necessary for our agriculture, especially
feedstuffs.
This question of importations to Denmark is of all absorbing
importance, for it is the argument which on the part of the
Danish Government has been successfully used in negotiations
with Germany for the purpose of making exportation from Denmark
to England possible. If importations are suppressed, no reason
remains for Germany to allow exportations to England.
This arrangement which has not assumed a fixed and concrete form,
and which here has only been indicated in its great lines, is
the main point and turning-point of the political relations
between Denmark and the two great adversaries: England and
Germany.
The British Government has repeatedly declared in the British
Parliament that both the Danish Government and the Danish people
had conscientiously and loyally carried out the engagements that
had been undertaken. The British Government has evidently also
been forced to recognize that the policy followed by the Danish
Government was the correct policy, for, in spite of the loud
accusations against Denmark by a certain extreme part of the
daily press, no demand has ever been made by the Allied powers
that Denmark should establish still further restrictions with
regard to imported articles to the effect that animal products
indirectly produced by such imported articles should only be
exported to the Allied powers.
It has indeed been rumored that the Allied powers were now
endeavouring to induce the American Government to issue such
drastic orders with regard to the use made of feedstuffs, etc.,
imported into Denmark from the United States.
The Danish Government wishes in these circumstances to again
declare that there is absolute security against reexportation
from Denmark of the said importations from America, and admits
being unable to perceive for what reasons the American
Government should contemplate changing their policy towards
Denmark (and the other Scandinavian countries) and making
exportations conditional upon restrictions with regard to the
use of the exported articles, [Page 1027] such as the British Government on its own
behalf and on behalf of the Allied Governments after three
years’ warfare has not considered it expedient to demand.
It is believed that too much importance is attached to the export
from Denmark to Germany, which however is insignificant as
compared with the population of Germany of about seventy
millions, and surely can have no influence on the progress of
the war.
All that would be accomplished by a policy of such drastic nature
would be, that Germany would cut all exportation off from
Denmark to England, a situation which would lead to the
economical ruin of Denmark and create serious political
difficulties for us in our relations with Germany. Such a policy
would consequently not in any way do harm to Germany. It has
invariably been the case during the present war with every
encroachment from one or the other side of the belligerents, and
it would be the case again here, that the real loser would be
Denmark, not the other belligerent.
A policy of this extreme nature would finally not be in
accordance with the policy which the American Government
championed so valiantly, while as a neutral it had to defend the
rights and duties of neutrals and thereby vigorously assisted
the small nations in their struggle to preserve the rights of
the neutrals as recognized by international law.
This being so, and the British Government not having thought it
wise or expedient to change their blockade policy towards the
neutrals in the direction under discussion, it would seem that
there would be so much the more occasion for the Government of
the United States to consider, whether it would be politically
wise for them to do, what the other Allied powers from political
motives have hereunto abstained from doing, because they
recognized the weight and correctness of the arguments here set
forth and explained.
C. Brun
Washington
, June 26,
1917.