Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 1, The World War

File No. 763.72/5170

The Minister in China ( Reinsch) to the Secretary of State

No. 1490

Peking, May 10, 1917.
[Received June 6.]

Sir: In continuation of my despatch No. 1449 of April 13, 1917,¹ I have the honor to report on the further development of the diplomatic situation in connection with the question as to whether China is to declare war against Germany. I am also enclosing newspaper articles containing reports and discussions in connection with this matter.²

On April 18, when I was calling upon him, Doctor Wu broached the question of financial assistance to China by the United States in the event of China declaring war upon Germany. Doctor Wu made some inquiries in connection with the bill for financial assistance to the Allies, and asked me whether China would be included in this assistance. I stated that I had no instructions but that I could say, as a matter of personal opinion, that if China were to cooperate with the United States she would be given as favorable treatment as other associated powers. Doctor Wu then asked me as to what amount of assistance China might expect and mentioned the figure of $100,000,000. I stated that I could offer no estimate as to the probable amount of such assistance, that, however, plainly, the European belligerents who had made enormous sacrifices and who were in the thick of the battle would require particular attention. Doctor Wu then asked me whether I would wire to my Government for information. I stated that I could do this but that it was not likely that the matter of assistance to China could be formally considered until China had actually entered the war.

On the same day I had a long conversation with the Premier. The Premier proceeded on the assumption that the United States had joined the Entente; he said he had been so informed by the Japanese and French Ministers; he also stated that he had no apprehensions of any danger with respect to the attempted control of the Chinese military establishment by Japan because he had received assurances on that point from the Japanese. He gave the impression of continuing in his purpose to enter the war. He also gave the impression, at the time, of relying a good deal on Japanese assurances. In this and subsequent conversations, I tried to make the Premier understand that the United States is not interested in the special European war aims of the Allies, but cooperated with them independently for the purpose of strengthening international law and the security of the community of nations; also that with respect to the war the position of China was very similar to that of the United States.

After the conversation I intimated to Mr. C. C. Wu, who had been interpreting for the Premier, that the latter gave the impression of having rather completely committed himself to Japanese guidance.

On April 21, when I saw the Premier again, he gave me a different impression. He informed me at this time that the Japanese Minister had made inquiries as to whether a contract had been concluded in connection with the Shanghai arsenal. The Premier, as is his usual attitude, seemed again to be most desirous of keeping closely associated with the United States. In talking with him at this time, and with the President on the same day a little later, concerning possible financial assistance from the United States, I stated, having in mind the information meanwhile received from you on this matter, that the language of the bill providing for financial assistance would include China were China a belligerent at the time the bill should become a law, and that China could, therefore, look forward to a favorable consideration of her needs in the event of participating in the war. I made this as a statement of fact and made it plain that the United States was not bidding or holding out an inducement for China’s entry into the war, but would act in accordance with the requirements of the case and the traditional American friendship with China.

On April 23 I had a long conversation with the Premier. He stated that China was ready to do her part in the war, that she could furnish a force of 100,000 or 200,000 men, or a million or even more, if only the armament could be provided. He implied, that the efficiency of her action would depend to a large extent upon the financial assistance she could receive for making the necessary preparations. The Premier was at this time much concerned about reports from Russia, particularly regarding the danger of a separate peace; I stated that a strong movement for a separate peace would not be likely in Russia unless after a radical change in the Germaa form of government.

During all this and the subsequent time discussions were going on between the Chinese Government and the different ministers. The Entente powers could not reach a common basis of action, particularly on account of the opposition of the Japanese to an increase of the Chinese tariff to an effective 5 per cent. In conversation with, me the Russian Minister also stated that it would seem unjust to ask Russia to postpone all her Boxer indemnity because, in this way, Russia would be giving up much more than the other powers. I did not ask him an obvious question at this point.

The Premier, in order to strengthen himself in his war decision, had called a conference of all the military governors. Nine governors general came to Peking for this conference, including the Governors of Chihli, Hunan, Hupeh, Shantung, Kiangsi, and Fu-kien; all the other provinces were represented by delegates. The conference has held a number of meetings and by April 28 had come to the decision to support the war policy.

On April 29 I entertained the members of the conference at my house. In conversation with the governors general the war situation was discussed. It was interesting to see how these men, who had formerly been so pro-German, now viewed the probabilities of war.

On May 2 the representatives of the Allied powers again made an inquiry as to whether China would not now decide to enter the war. The position they had now for some time taken was that China, should not attempt to get definite assurances but should take action friendly to the powers who would then reciprocate in the same spirit. On the day subsequent, as I have been informed in strict confidence, the Japanese Minister called upon President Li and assured him that it was in the interest of China to enter the war, and that should any local disturbances happen in China in consequence of such a step the Japanese Government would immediately come to the assistance of China. The President did not consider this information very appropriate.

The decision of the Chinese Government to enter the war had now matured; backed by the united action of the military governors, the Cabinet (i. e., in this case the Premier) submitted to the President and to Parliament the decision to enter the war. The policy of the Premier is set forth in the article upon the Chinese foreign policy by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, copy of which is herewith enclosed.¹

The decision of this momentous question is now before Parliament. The complicated character of the situation is indicated in the article on “The War and Political Parties” from the Peking Gazette of May 10 which is herewith enclosed.¹ The leaders of the different parties in Parliament have assured me that as to the policy of entering the war the majority in both Houses are favorably disposed. The opposition party, which has the majority in Parliament, is, however, not willing to authorize a declaration of war unless unmistakable assurances are given that the war power will not be used by the men who surround General Tuan, and who inspire his action, for the purpose of overriding Parliament. They fear that the extraordinary war powers and the extraordinary war funds will be used to the disadvantage of the majority party in Parliament and, possibly, for the purpose of suppressing Parliament entirely. They, therefore, insist that before a decision is taken the Cabinet should be reconstructed in such a manner as to give assurance that the entourage of General Tuan can not dominate the situation.

The entourage spoken of is composed of three elements: First, the military element which endeavors to control the entire military party in behalf of General Tuan; the chief representative of the Premier on the military side is General Hsu Shih-chang. Secondly, the leaders of the Chinputang party, particularly Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsiung Hsi-ling, and Tang Hua-lung. As this party helped Yuan Shih-kai to overthrow Parliament in 1913, so the Kuomintang fear that they may again assist in the destruction of Parliament in order to increase their own power. Thirdly, the narrower pro-Japanese ring, headed by Ts’ao Ju-lin and Lu Tsung-yu.

The Kuomintang (party) fear that the combination of the Chinputang (party) with the military element would in the event of war be strong enough to oust their opponents from public life. The Premier has already hinted that if Parliament does not approve the war policy it will be dissolved. The President shares the apprehensions of the Parliamentarians and desires a reconstruction of the Cabinet.

The Cabinet itself is in a pitiful condition. The position of Doctor Ch’en Chin-tao has been filled through the appointment of Li Ching-hsi, the nephew of Li Hung-chang; but Li will not assume office until the present problems have been solved. It is possible that the President might wish to appoint him Premier of a reconstructed Cabinet, leaving General Tuan in the position of Minister of War. This would be acceptable to the Parliamentarians. They would be willing to forego having a Cabinet composed of their partisans as long as representative and reputable public men were selected. The Ministry of Communications has been vacated; the Minister of Education, also acting Minister of the Interior, is seriously ill; the Ministers of Justice and of Agriculture and Commerce have lost their influence with their party in Parliament—the Kuomintang.

On May 8 I had a conversation with President Li. He is favorable to a declaration of war provided it can be obtained without doing violence to Parliament. On May 9 I had a long conversation with the Premier in which he expressed himself on many important matters. A memorandum of this conversation is herewith enclosed.

I have [etc.]

Paul S. Reinsch

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of the Minister in China ( Reinsch) of a Conversation with the Premier ( Tuan), May 9, 1917

The American Minister spoke to the Premier in connection with the proposed first bond issue on the railway undertaken by the Siems-Carey Company.¹ He pointed out that delay in this matter was dangerous because conditions in New York might change at any time so as to cause the revocation of the authority now in the hands of Mr. Carey to conclude the loan. The Premier agreed and promised to give instructions to the Acting Vice Minister of Communications to complete the transactions without delay.

The Premier then went on to discuss the existing political situation. He stated that Parliament was indeed opposed to a declaration of war, but that the policy would be carried through regardless of this opposition. He stated that if Parliament were obstinate it would be dissolved. The American Minister expressed surprise at this statement as well as his hope that the question might be settled without resorting to such methods, as it would make a very bad impression in the United States and other Western countries if Parliament were overridden in so important a matter, and that it would accordingly be difficult for the United States to be of assistance to China should such a situation come about.

The Premier stated that the opposition of Parliament was dis-regardful of national interests, and based merely upon a desire to secure partisan advantage; he stated that the national need for war action had been fully explained to Parliament and opposition could only have a selfish motive. The Minister stated that should rash action be taken against Parliament it would probably precipitate internal trouble and would bring on the danger of foreign intervention. The Premier replied that he was confident that any local opposition could be handled by the Government.

Going on to discuss the attitude of Japan, the Premier said that the Japanese Minister had assured him that if he should follow a strong policy he could count on Japanese support, that in fact Japan would support the party which showed itself the strongest; he said that circumstances forced the Chinese Government to take an attitude friendly to Japan, but that it was his policy not to give up any valuable rights, and also to strengthen China in every way so that resistance might be offered to any attempted injustice. He asked whether we could have confidence in the Southern leaders of the Kuomintang; he had proof that both Sun Yat-sen and Tsen Liang-kuang had given written assurances to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai that were either of them to be made President of China they would conclude a treaty with Japan granting to the latter rights of supervision of military and administrative affairs, more extensive than those asked for in Group V of the “Twenty-one Demands.”¹ The Premier asked whether such men and those whom they controlled could be considered safe leaders.

The Premier also stated that it was his policy to resist every attempt made by an outside power to gain control over the military establishment of China, but that he believed it dangerous to give a formal assurance to this effect to the American Government at this time, because it would be interpreted as an act of hostility by the Japanese Government. Such a thing could not be kept confidential, as is shown by the manner in which negotiations in connection with the Rosseter contract leaked out.

Reverting to the Parliamentary situation, the American Minister stated that it was his impression that the leaders of the younger elements among the Parliamentarians trusted the Premier and would be glad to associate themselves with him were they at all encouraged. He expressed his opinion that dangerous dissension could be avoided and national unity established on a firm basis if Parliament were won over instead of being antagonized. He again emphasized the fact that it would be difficult for the United States to be helpful should reactionary methods be applied.

From the foregoing it is evident that the Premier relies to some extent on Japanese assistance, hoping, however, to maintain his independence of action; he is irremediably opposed to the majority party in Parliament; he believes that by strong action against Parliament the authority of the Government can be vindicated; he counts on the united support of the military party. He was most frank in his expressions, stating that he spoke as a friend without reserve.

In the course of the conversation the bill now before Parliament to reserve iron deposits for development by Chinese who have sufficient capital was touched upon. The Premier stated that a member of Parliament had already made an agreement with Japanese capitalists to turn over to them the mines in Hunan Province, while a Cantonese agent was buying up claims in Anhui for the Japanese. While this [was] done without authority it leads to claims which are only got rid of with great difficulty.

[For correspondence relating to the political disturbances in China, May-August, 1917, in which the question of participation in the war was involved, see Foreign Relations, 1917, pages 46–98.]

1. Ante, p. 441.
2. Not printed.
1. Not printed.
1. Not printed.
1. See Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 179 et seq.
1. See Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 93–97.