File No. 763.72/3852
The Minister in China ( Reinsch ) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 16.]
Sir: In continuation of my No. 1407 of March 1 last,2 and with reference to your telegraphic instructions of March 2, 5 p.m.,3 I have the honor further to report on the Chinese protest against the German policy of submarine warfare.
The Chinese Government has been subjected to persistent pressure on the part of Japan, exercised personally by Viscount Motono on the Chinese Minister at Tokyo, with a view to inducing China to follow the lead of Japan in joining the Entente Allies.
This pressure was accompanied with expressions of resentment because in the previous instance the Chinese Government had not consulted with Japan. Joint action with Japan was made attractive by the offer of financial assistance on easy terms.
On Saturday, March 3, the Cabinet, after long continued daily deliberation, decided that it was necessary to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. It was also agreed upon that this decision should be communicated to the Japanese Government by telegraph, [Page 428] together with the further statement that the Chinese Government was willing to consider entering the war upon receiving specific assurances upon the matter of the postponement of the Boxer indemnity payments, the increase of the customs tariffs, and the revision of the protocol of 1901.
On March 4 a meeting of the Cabinet took place in the palace of the President, at which the latter expressed dissent from the policy of informing the Japanese Government of the steps to be taken before the policy had been passed on by Parliament. The Premier insisted that the sending of the telegram to the Chinese Minister at Tokyo was a purely administrative matter which was within the proper functions of the Cabinet. As the President did not agree, the Premier stated that under the circumstances it would be impossible for him to continue at the head of the Government. He ordered a special train and proceeded directly to the railway station. Before he could leave, the Vice President went to the station and attempted to persuade the Premier not to leave, but the latter persisted.
Such was the situation which I had to meet in endeavoring to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram of March 2.1 As Dr. Wu Ting-fang, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was still incapacitated through his illness, I communicated with the Minister of Finance, in order to get a clearer view of the situation than could be gathered from the confused reports current at the time. Dr. Ch’en stated that it had not been the intention of the Cabinet to commit itself to any joint action or consultation with Japan, to the exclusion of other powers. He admitted, however, that it had seemed necessary to do something to give the Japanese Government “face,” because of the resentment felt by the Japanese, their insistent pressure, and the consequences which were feared should they be antagonized. He stated that the Cabinet had been discouraged by failure to receive from me any clear indication as to the policy of the American Government; and he proceeded to say that the confidence of the Chinese in Americans had been most seriously shaken by the manner in which the American International Corporation had betrayed the interests of China to Japan in the Shantung canal matter.2 Those skeptical of American courage and backbone were many, on account of this regrettable move, he said, and they argued that as America was so weak as to run to Japan with matters entrusted specifically to Americans, it might after all be better for the Chinese to deal directly with Japan. Dr. Ch’en stated that this was by no means his opinion or that of the majority of the leaders, but [Page 429] that it was (difficult to meet unfavorable statements, such as above outlined.
From other sources I learned that those men who are Committed to the support of Japanese policy in China had been very active during the preceding weeks, as indeed I had many opportunities for observing before the decision of the Cabinet was taken. …
To resume the recital of the events of the last few days: On March 5 I had a full discussion of the political situation with the President, in which he explained his position as based upon the belief that notice of an impending breach of diplomatic relations with Germany should not be given to any power before Parliament had acted. I acquainted His Excellency with the purport of your instructions of the 2d instant,1 and he stated that he was fully agreed as to the wisdom of carefully considering every step and of not, in taking any one step, unnecessarily committing the Government to further action. On the same day I also informed Dr. Wu, who was able to receive me, of the views of the Department as contained in the above instructions.
On March 6 the Vice President proceeded to Tientsin, in order to induce the Premier to return to his post. The Vice President succeeded in his errand, and General Tuan returned to Peking the same night. I made an engagement to see him, and on the evening of March 7 had a long and serious conversation with him. The Premier stated to me that because of the failure of the German Government to give any assurances in the matter of submarine warfare, and of the fact that in the sinking of the Athos several hundred Chinese laborers had lost their lives, it had appeared necessary to the Cabinet to decide upon an early severance of diplomatic relations. I expressed to the Premier the opinion that if the decision as stated by him was considered necessary, it would appear to be a safe course of action for the Chinese Government, in taking the step decided upon, to keep itself entirely free as to any further measures to be taken and also that it would not in the course of the negotiations entangle itself with any particular power. I stated my opinion to the effect that for the time being China could not reasonably be urged to go beyond the decision as indicated. This action would constitute the strongest possible condemnation of the German policy of submarine warfare; it left the Chinese Government free in the future to take such further action as conditions might require. Thus, for instance, privileges still enjoyed by German residents in China could be withdrawn by way of reprisal should German action become particularly injurious to China. The Chinese Government could also show its friendly attitude for the belligerent Allies in facilitating [Page 430] the export of laborers and needed merchandise; and it would hold in reserve a declaration of war, to be used only when such a course of action would appear to be absolutely demanded by new facts, and would be made safe by proper assurances. The Premier expressed complete agreement with these views; he stated that he hoped to keep the hands of the Government free. He intimated, however, that the strongest kind of pressure was being exerted by Japan to force China into the Alliance. Throughout this conversation, in which I communicated to General Tuan the tenor of your instructions of March 2, I took care to give my remarks the character of information as to the attitude of the American Government and of a forecast of the probable results of any action taken by the Chinese Government without seeming to press upon the latter any particular course of action.
I am now informed that the wording of the telegram to be despatched to the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, for the information of the Japanese Government, has been modified so as to make it purely a matter of information and to eliminate any expressions which might be interpreted as an admission of the Japanese claim that the Chinese Government should consult particularly with Japan in this matter. The proposed action is to be reported to Parliament to-morrow. My information is that the members of Parliament are overwhelmingly in favor of breaking off relations with Germany. …
I have [etc.]