Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

158. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 12, 1972

SUBJECT

• USIA Film on Chinese Communist Subjugation of Tibet

You will recall that last August USIA Director Shakespeare wanted to release for worldwide distribution a documentary film on the Chinese Communist subjugation of Tibet,² and that we asked for an indefinite postponement of this action.³ Our reasoning was that the film might affect adversely the President’s visit to the PRC.

At Tab A⁴ is a memorandum to you from Mr. Shakespeare saying that—“just to keep you informed”—the documentary on Tibet has been submitted to the Academy of Motion Pictures, Arts and Sciences for consideration as an Academy Award nominee. In checking up on the background of Mr. Shakespeare’s move, we discovered that he acted unilaterally and without reference to anyone else in USIA except the producer of the documentary. As we understand it, the procedure now will be as follows: there will be a screening in the first part of February by Academy representatives to determine the documentary’s acceptability for a nomination. If nominated, there will be a further screening by a jury in the first part of March to judge the merits of the film against the other contenders; and finally, if it makes the grade thus far, a final showing along with the other contestants sometime in May.

Theoretically, there should be little or no publicity concerning the documentary on Tibet in relation to the President’s visit, in view of the fact that the initial screening in February will not be public. However, there is a good chance that the news of the screening would nevertheless leak out, since the deferral of the film’s release by USIA has already been mentioned in a New York Times article on USIA’s role in this Administration.⁵ I doubt that at this stage there would be any problems in connection with the President’s visit, but it would be embarrassing for the differences of opinion over the screening of this film to become a matter of widespread public knowledge.

On balance, U.S. interests would probably best be served if the film can be withheld at least until after the President’s visit to the PRC. On the other hand, even an attempt to defer the screening by Academy personnel could create problems if the New York Times or other papers became aware of this. Your guidance would be appreciated.

Have General Haig call Shakespeare⁶

I will call Shakespeare

Holdridge to discuss matter with USIA personnel below the Director/Deputy Director level

Let screening proceed

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. IV—1972 [Jan–Oct 1972] [2 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action. Haig initialed the right-hand corner of the memorandum. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote “Gen Haig” with an arrow pointing toward it. Haig sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a March 14 covering note, writing: “Henry: I told Shakespeare to hold up on release until after Moscow Summit. In this way, we will avoid interference of U.S. anti-PRC attitudes which could lessen Soviet concerns.” At the bottom of the covering note, Kissinger wrote: “Do memo for Pres. I see no point in this film.” Haig wrote Holdridge’s name above Kissinger’s handwritten note and drew an arrow from it to the note. (Ibid.) For the memorandum to the President, see Document 169.
2. See the attachment to Document 147.
3. See Document 147.
4. Not attached.
5. Presumable reference to Benjamin Welles, “U.S. Said to Delay Film About Tibet: Reported Curb Tied to Fear of Friction With Peking,” New York Times, December 26, 1971, p. 21. Welles noted: “Both Mr. Loomis and Mr. Herschensohn insisted that the White House had made no decision to ban the picture. They conceded, however, that six months had passed since the documentary’s completion and that there was little, if any, likelihood that it would be released for distribution through theaters and television stations abroad in the foreseeable future.” (Ibid.)
6. Kissinger initialed his approval. Below the four recommendations, he wrote: “I guess we’ll have to proceed—but this is unacceptable. See whether there is a chance of turning it off.” Next to this notation, Haig wrote: “I’ve talked to Shakespeare—he’ll reluctantly hold until after Moscow Summit. Other [unclear—exercise?] damage already done. Al.”