Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

147. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 17, 1971

SUBJECT

• USIA Film on Chinese Subjugation of Tibet

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Frank Shakespeare reporting that USIA plans to release in about three weeks a film on Chinese subjugation of Tibet despite a recommendation from me and from Ambassador Brown of State² that the film should not be released in view of the forthcoming Peking meeting.

Mr. Shakespeare takes the view that Peking’s radio and newspaper services have continued to attack the Nixon administration and its policies with “unabated intensity” since the announcement of the proposed meeting, and therefore it makes “little sense for us to refrain from focusing the attention of the world’s peoples on the nature and historical acts of the men in power in Peking.”

Mr. Shakespeare does not mention that the one point which Ambassador Brown and I focused on as the primary reason for not issuing the USIA film at this time was that there have been virtually no references to Tibet in USIA output for some years. We had no objection to keeping up the regular USIA output on Communist China, but considered that something new such as the USIA film—which, incidentally, is a very effective presentation—would be raising the decibel count considerably in our propaganda exchanges with Peking. The use made of the film by USIA Public Affairs Officers could, in fact, amount to a very high profile action on our part.

With respect to the issue of Peking’s propaganda, at Tab B³ is a copy of a memorandum to the President from Frank Shakespeare which points out that there has been a distinct absence of Chinese Communist attacks on the President personally in recent weeks, even though the standard Peking line on “U.S. imperialism and aggression” has continued. It seems obvious that the Chinese are making some effort to improve the climate for the President’s visit, and I believe that any significant new step by us in our informational output regarding the PRC should be judged in this context.

Recommendation:

That you telephone Mr. Shakespeare to suggest that issuance of the USIA film on Tibet be deferred at least until after the President’s visit and we have a better idea of where next we want to go in our relations with Peking.⁴

Tab A

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)⁵

Washington, August 12, 1971

John Holdridge of NSC and Win Brown of State have seen and commented on our film on Chinese subjugation of Tibet, entitled “Man from a Missing Country.” We are making a few small changes including a title change to “Man from a Missing Land,” the latter because the United States did not diplomatically recognize Tibet as an independent nation.

We plan to release this film on a world-wide basis as soon as the changes are completed, which should be in about three weeks. Our Public Affairs Officers in each country will follow the usual practice of making individual determinations as to the most suitable exposure of the program . . . including television, theatres, direct projection for small groups, use in seminars, private screenings for civic and media leaders, etc.

Holdridge and Brown felt the film should not be released in view of the forthcoming Peking meeting. Our judgment is different. Peking’s radio and newspaper services have continued to attack the Nixon administration and policies of the United States with unabated intensity since the announcement of the proposed meeting.⁶

Item: James Reston in the New York Times reference Peking:

“You live [here] in an atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda . . . President Nixon’s visit is not discussed in the press or on the radio, both of which relentlessly characterize the American Government as the ‘arch-criminal’ of the world. The U.S., they insist, has been ‘beaten black and blue’ in Vietnam, but still goes on backing a ‘fascist clique’ in Vietnam, and is reviving ‘Japanese militarism’ and plotting new wars in Korea and the rest of Asia.”⁷

In view of this, it makes little sense for the United States to refrain from attempting to focus the attention of the world’s peoples on the nature and historical acts of the men in power in Peking. If the Peking Government continues to believe that it is to their advantage to have talks with our leaders, they will do so. If they should decide that it is not to their advantage, we may be sure they will not lack for a pretext to suspend the talks.

Frank Shakespeare⁸

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [1 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action. Haig initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, as did Janka, Saunders, and Sonnenfeldt. Kissinger wrote “Al—call USIA & follow up with directive. HK” at the top of the first page of the memorandum. Haig wrote “THRU HAIG (FOR ACTION—CALL) and drew an arrow from it to Holdridge’s name in the “from” line. In an August 24 typewritten note to Kissinger, Haig indicated: “I have spoken to Frank Shakespeare about the Tibet film. He will not release it, of course, without our approval. On the other hand, I agree with him that we should not refuse the use of it without having the opportunity to at least review it.” He continued: “Rather than open you and the staff to charges of overkill, I have agreed with Frank to view the film when it is completed and to withhold final judgment until that time. In the interim Frank will make no plans or undertake any steps to release the film which is just about completed. It would be inappropriate to cancel what remains to be done on the film since the bulk of the costs have already been incurred.” Kissinger initialed his approval of Haig’s recommendation. (Ibid.)
2. For Brown’s recommendation to USIA, see Document 143.
3. Not found attached.
4. Kissinger initialed his approval of this recommendation.
5. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Holdridge and Brown. All brackets are in the original.
6. The President made this announcement in a July 15 television and radio address to the nation, broadcast live beginning at 7:31 p.m.; see footnote 2, Document 143.
7. See James Reston, “Letters From China: III,” New York Times, August 4, 1971, p. 33.
8. Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature.