Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

152. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency (Jenkins) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 7, 1971

SUBJECT

• The President’s Trip to the Soviet Union

Just prior to his departure for Europe, Frank Shakespeare requested that I forward to you immediately this summary of our tentative planning for the President’s visit to the USSR in May, paralleling Secretary Rogers’ November 10 memorandum to the President.²

There are already some tentative indications that Soviet anti-American propaganda is toning down as the influence of the impending visit begins to be felt. There is every reason to assume that this process will accelerate and Soviet media will become increasingly less objectionable in their treatment of the United States—up to a point. While state-to-state relations can ebb and flow, Soviet propaganda dogma dictates that the ideological struggle must go on. This same principle is reiterated even in today’s gradually improving atmosphere. While occasionally irritating, it is in our judgment a pragmatic approach to which we also subscribe in our own fashion.

1) U.S. Government media treatment of the Soviet Union—The Voice of America, as the official United States Government radio, pursues all reasonably attractive opportunities to expose Soviet perfidy, consistent with the requirements of dignity and the official responsibility of the Voice. Our broadcasts, of course, reflect the trend of substantive developments in our relations. As these improve and are improving, so the substance of our broadcasts will inevitably become less objectionable to Soviet authorities.

2) Jamming—A major bone of contention between ourselves and the Soviets in this field since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has been jamming of the Voice of America.³ This effort has now reached an all-out level in terms of volume. Soviet transmitters are engaged in jamming our Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian broadcasts.

Jamming, in fact, is only partially effective. In major municipal centers where a heavy jamming effort is mounted, effectiveness is up to 80%. It is virtually completely ineffective in the countryside and even in suburbs of cities like Moscow and Leningrad.

The Soviets ceased jamming VOA in 1963 consistent with efforts to generate a détente. They resumed with the entrance of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. They might well terminate jamming as an act of goodwill prior to the President’s visit. There are many arguments against jamming. The Soviets are embarrassed by public discussion of the fact that they jam; jamming is only partially effective; it is expensive in terms of technical resources. However, if they have not terminated jamming prior to the visit, it certainly is an irritant we would hope would be raised during the visit. We will provide a detailed briefing paper on this topic as the visit draws near.

3) Radio Free Europe—Radio Liberty—While defensive about their own jamming, the Soviets can be expected to be quite offensive about Radio Liberty broadcasts to the Soviet Union. From our point of view, we would strongly oppose terminating broadcast activities of Radio Liberty (and RFE) as long as what the Soviets describe as the “ideological struggle” goes on.

4) The President’s Impact within the USSR

a) We agree with Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that we should seek air and TV time for the President to address the Soviet people.⁴ We are not so sanguine that “the Soviet Government could not refuse your request,” but agree that there is a very good possibility that it might be granted. For this occasion we would suggest that we request the Soviets to invite the President to speak to the student body of Moscow University. Such an event would provide a dramatic platform and be guaranteed to attract worldwide media coverage. He, of course, was permitted to speak directly to the Soviet people on TV in July, 1959⁵ and the Soviet press carried verbatim his airport arrival statement and his speech at the opening of the U.S. exhibit and the famous kitchen debate with Khrushchev which followed.⁶ Similar treatment was accorded to British Prime Minister Macmillan in 1961. These unusual TV appearances and texts, together with a later similar Kennedy interview in Izvestiya⁷ to this day are referred to by Soviet citizens as of great importance. We, of course, would offer to promote the publication of similar Soviet statements in the U.S. press. (In 1961 the New York Times printed an interview with Khrushchev⁸ as part of the Kennedy-Izvestiya bargain.)

b) We endorse Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that the President consider opening our Consulate General in Leningrad.⁹ We intend to provide an outstanding art exhibit for the public floor in the Consulate building together with a Russian-language, illustrated color brochure on the collection for the occasion of the opening.

c) A major U.S. exhibit, Research and Development-USA is scheduled to open in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) in May. The exhibit is unusually attractive and will feature twenty young fluent Russian-speaking American guides. You will recall President Nixon visited our Industrial Design–USA exhibit in 1967 in Moscow. This, together with his historic association with our National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, would make a visit to the exhibit in Volgograd even more appropriate. This might also be particularly attractive to the Soviets in view of their national pride in the role of Stalingrad in the war against Nazi Germany.

5) America Illustrated—Our quality monthly magazine, Amerika, 60,000 copies of which are distributed in the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity under the Exchanges Agreement, will feature a cover photograph of the President and Mrs. Nixon and an interview on US-Soviet relations. We are planning a special overrun of 100,000 copies to be distributed through the American exhibit while he is in the USSR.

While the familiarity with the magazine which we find among Soviet citizens even in the provinces gives evidence that America Illustrated does, indeed, get around, we are not in a position to ascertain that the entire 60,000 copies are distributed. A Presidential reference to the magazine, perhaps in the context of a published statement or TV appearance, would enhance the possibility of honest distribution.

6) We heartily endorse Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that a stop in Poland after the USSR be considered.¹⁰ We can imagine no visit which would be a more sure-fire public relations success.

Kempton B. Jenkins¹¹

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 28, 1972 OGA—President’s Moscow Trip. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins on December 6; concurred in by Shakespeare and Loomis. Copies were sent to Shakespeare, Loomis, and Towery. Draft copies were sent to Reed, Dickson, and Drechsler. In a January 6, 1972, memorandum to Shakespeare, Kissinger responded: “I appreciate your suggestions concerning the President’s activities when he visits the USSR next May. We will keep your suggestions in mind as the planning progresses. It is still somewhat early to decide his schedule in any detail.” (Ibid.)
2. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 11.
3. See footnote 3, Document 1.
4. In the November 10 memorandum (see footnote 2, above), Rogers stated: “The most effective means for direct communication with the Soviet people would be nationwide radio and television appearances. Your 1959 Moscow speech had a great and lasting impact on Soviet popular attitudes toward the U.S., even though it was not carried nationwide. President Eisenhower was to have made a nationwide TV speech during his visit to the USSR in 1960, just as Khrushchev had done in the US. The Soviet Government could not refuse your request for air time, and you could quite properly set forth your concept of a generation of peace in the context of improving US-Soviet relations. The novelty of hearing the American viewpoint directly and fully would help reinforce the development of Soviet attitudes in this direction.”
5. Presumable reference to then-Vice President Nixon’s August 1, 1959, televised address to the Soviet public, made at the conclusion of his trip to the Soviet Union in order to open the American National Exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow. For the text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 887–894.
6. The text of Nixon’s July 24 speech is ibid., pp. 881–886. During a tour of the exhibit that day, Nixon and Khrushchev came to a model American home and stopped in the kitchen. While there, they engaged in an argument about the relative merits of capitalism and Communism. The argument became known as the “kitchen debate.”
7. Presumable reference to Izvesita Editor-in-Chief Aleksei Adzhubei’s November 25, 1961, interview of President Kennedy at the President’s residence in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. An English-language translation of the interview is printed in Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 741–752, and in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Soviet Union, Document 134. A transcript is also in the National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW–142, Box 7, Government Agencies—White House 1961 September–December. Additional documentation on the interview is in Foreign Relations, 1917–1972, vol. VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963.
8. Presumable reference to foreign affairs columnist C.L. Sulzberger’s September 1961 interview with Khrushchev. See “Excerpts From Transcript of Khrushchev Interview on Berlin and Other Issues,” New York Times, September 8, 1961, p. 11. See also Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Soviet Union, Document 118.
9. In the November 10 memorandum (see footnote 2, above), Rogers suggested: “Another possible opportunity for a public statement with good media appeal in the USSR and abroad would be the formal opening of our Consulate General in Leningrad. Your endorsement in 1959 of the idea of exchanging consulates makes it fitting that you should preside at a ceremony, which would symbolize a milestone in the implementation of the US-Soviet Consular Convention and a significant step in our political relations.”
10. According to Rogers (see footnote 2, above), “To help dispel any appearance of ‘superpower condominium’ and to counteract Soviet pretentions to hegemony in Eastern Europe, you may wish to consider two stopovers on your return from Moscow. One would be your appearance at a NATO session in Brussels, the other a visit to Poland.”
11. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.