151. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all Principal USIS Posts1
SUBJECT
- The Larger Picture
Most officers overseas and many in Washington tend to develop a limited focus. They concentrate on the local situation or on what is [Page 394] news today. They are sensitive to the foreign audiences’ interests; and in their dialogues they tend to introduce only those subjects which are of immediate or foremost concern to their audiences.
These tendencies in many respects are praiseworthy. They can increase the effectiveness of the Agency’s communication effort. But too narrow focus and an over-concentration on what is locally relevant can diminish our effectiveness. Our audiences’ memories are short. Modern communication, dense and rapid, often presents news in isolated fragments. Agency officers in Washington and in posts abroad should try to show our audiences patterns of development and relate news items to these patterns.
To perform these tasks requires constant awareness by all officers of the needs and resources of all the principal Agency elements and the USIS posts. Each of us has his own job, but each should also contribute to the Agency’s task worldwide. Impact in one place or at one time is not enough. The most effective exploitation of news and presentation of our opinions can only be achieved by the use of all appropriate Agency resources, by thinking in global, strategic terms, and—especially to younger audiences—by cumulative reporting which gives historical perspective to developments in the 1970s.
Illustrative Cases
In recent months Agency treatment of some high priority subjects would have benefitted from greater coordination of effort. In some cases coordination was good in output to some parts of the world but not to others. We review a few of these cases and offer suggestions for continuing treatment of current priorities in the paragraphs below. Comments on the general problem of coordination of media resources and on these specific subjects are solicited.
1. Refugees from Communism. Wherever communist regimes are in control they have erected administrative and physical barriers against flight from their territories. This is a fact of twentieth century life. It is, perhaps, the single starkest admission of communist weakness and the most telling definition of the difference between us and them. It is a fact which most of the non-communist world has gotten used to, or is used to overlooking. From time to time, however, attempts to escape from communist nation-prisons increase or are particularly dramatic; and the cruel fact cannot be ignored. In the spring of 1971 escape attempts from mainland China to Hong Kong rose markedly, and in the summer of 1971 there was a significant increase in escape attempts from East Germany. In both instances the Agency was slow to report and to cross-report the developments. Inadequate exploitation of this subject is especially regrettable, since such territorial jails are observable in many parts of the world (Europe, Asia, Cuba).
[Page 395]2. Viet-Nam. Over the last two years, in consonance with the overall U.S. policy of Vietnamization, JUSPAO, Agency media and USIS posts have ceased acting on behalf of the GVN Ministry of Information in telling its story to foreign audiences. The United States, of course, continues to have a strong interest in seeing South Viet-Nam’s independence maintained. In most areas of the world today Viet-Nam is not a prime concern to our audiences. However, in the context of the Nixon Doctrine,2 our audiences in many countries may view South Viet-Nam as a test case for U.S. foreign policy commitments. Agency media and USIS posts should not talk about Viet-Nam for the general purpose of making conversation. But whenever the news permits, media and posts should be alert to opportunities to use the example of Viet-Nam (and those of Korea and Berlin) to remind our audiences that those who refuse subjugation can—with strength, determination, and the help of allies—successfully resist it.
3. Communist Espionage. A large number of official representatives of communist states abroad are intelligence agents. At times, in different countries, their activities become so blatant and harmful to the security of host nations that the agents are expelled. The expulsions and reasons for them are usually well publicized for a brief time, until a newer sensational development takes over the headlines. Usually, as in the recent Mexican and United Kingdom cases, foreign media or a foreign government take the lead in publicizing the communist subversive apparatus. Such events offer us important opportunities to heighten awareness of the communist record worldwide by aggregating case histories of communist espionage and deliberate violations of diplomatic practice.
4. Castro and Allende. The cases of Cuba under Castro and Chile under Allende are distinct in many respects; but both cases in varying degrees show repression of free expression, regimentation of economic life, and attacks by Marxists-in-power on the independence of the universities and the judiciary. Since the early 1960s Cuba under Castro has been an Agency priority subject. Since late 1970 the Agency has used factual, non-polemical cross-reporting and cross-play of comment throughout Latin America to increase knowledge of developments in Chile under Allende. A series of reports on Chile has gone to other parts of the world as well. Agency output on Cuba and Chile may be made more relevant if Washington media and USIS posts place developments in these countries in the context of the general pattern of events wherever Marxists achieve control. An important element in the Cuban story—which may also become manifest in the Chilean [Page 396] case—is the diminution of a nation’s political independence as a result of over-dependence on aid from communist states. Illustrations of this phenomenon can be drawn from many parts of the world. In Agency media output and USIS posts’ treatment of Cuba, Chile, and similar situations, we should recognize that certain aspects of the Castro and Allende programs are attractive to intellectuals and laborers in developing areas. Media output and posts’ presentations gain in credibility to developing countries’ audiences when they feature accounts by citizens of developing countries who have experienced the effects of communist rule or too close relations with communist states.
5. U.S. Strength and the Overall Balance. Military analysts and such authoritative publications as Jane’s and the reports of the Institute of Strategic Studies in recent months have stated that the USSR is overtaking the U.S. in particular categories of armament and defense investment. It is important to keep our audiences aware that the U.S. maintains an edge in strategic weapons delivery systems and that, overall, the U.S. military posture is sufficient to our defense tasks. We must avoid poor-mouthing our military capacity and thereby undermining confidence in our strength and reliability. U.S. strength is an advantage to both our allies and the non-aligned. Wherever the forces of the U.S. directly confront those of the USSR, nations in the area of confrontation are significantly affected. It is not our desire to invite confrontation, nor do we wish big power differences to intrude on the peaceful development of nations in-between. It is, however, fitting for us quietly to emphasize the advantages to all non-communist nations which derive from U.S. strength, to bring to the attention of all non-communist audiences the proven benefits of collective security (including United Nations security forces actions), and to impress upon them the dangers of too intimate military involvement with communist powers. Here again, examples abound around the world.
6. Economic Interdependence. This subject has dominated international relations since mid-summer. Our foreign economic policy has come in for much criticism. While some of this results from expected hard bargaining positions of our trading partners and specific export interest groups abroad, part of the criticism stems from a lack of information. The Agency is publicizing facts of everyday economic life (e.g., comparative prices of consumer goods after payment of duties in different countries). International fair-sharing is not yet universally recognized as a useful principle, either by governments or by interest groups within nations. We must hope that more information will lead to greater appreciation of the U.S. position. In economic information the Agency works on the two levels of sophisticated arguments for [Page 397] experts and popular appeals to foreign consumers. Far more coordination of Agency resources is needed; IOP is seeking to provide that. The Agency should also review basic policy regarding its activities on behalf of U.S. commercial interests abroad. Among governments’ foreign information programs, ours is unique in not devoting significant resources to export and tourism promotion.
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 21, PPL—General 1971. Confidential. Drafted by Hoffman on November 30; cleared by Shakespeare, Dillon, McGinley, Gildner, Lee, Pistor, Jenkins, and Southard; approved by Towery. Hoffman initialed for the clearing officials. Loomis also initialed his clearance. Sent via pouch.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 65.↩