Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

149. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Southard) to the Director (Shakespeare)¹

Washington, November 23, 1971

SUBJECT

• Overseas Chinese Attitudes

Attachment “A” is an analysis of overseas Chinese attitudes in SE Asia, based on responses to PAO Letter #40, Attachment “B”.² The predominant mood is apolitical, seeking to be neutral, and concerned with economic and trade problems rather than strong ideological convictions. But there are variables within this attitude, depending in varying degrees on host government’s foreign policy, on Peking’s attitudes, and on age groups.

Although the overseas Chinese appear proud of the achievements of Peking, they are reluctant to accept communist political and economic models. Because of their control of much of the trade and commerce in the region, their role in the life and stability of SE Asia is important—and they often influence political decisions. Thus, we are compelled to take a very close look at the overseas Chinese as a USIS audience.

To this end, on December 2, we will hold a working session on this subject. Dr. Lea Williams of Brown University, considered to be an authority on overseas Chinese, and several government experts will join us in discussing the impact on recent developments. From this session we hope to shed light on the role of USIA in this rapidly changing situation.

Attachment A

Report Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency³

Washington, undated

“OVERSEAS CHINESE ATTITUDES”

This report on overseas Chinese political and attitudinal issues is based primarily on responses of USIS posts to PAO Letter #40 (attached),⁴ in which the PAOs in countries where there is a sizable Chinese population were asked to assess overseas Chinese attitudes as a result of the evolving US-China relations and recent developments on the Chinese mainland. Following are the highlights:

In countries where Peking does not have diplomatic ties and where there is a significant Chinese population, such as Malaysia (4 million), Singapore (2 million) and Indonesia (3–4 million), the general overseas Chinese attitude toward the recent thaw in US-China relations is enthusiastic, and in some cases even euphoric. The Singapore PAO described the pro-Peking atmosphere as overwhelming and pervasive, with some pro-Taiwan elements rapidly moving toward the left.

It is apparent that the emotional pull of China (but not necessarily the ideological one) has had a direct effect on overseas Chinese communities, more so now than 5 or 10 years ago. Many now express a sense of pride in Peking’s accomplishments and view US-China contacts and President Nixon’s planned visit to Peking⁵ as a plus for the PRC. Inasmuch as there is a strong emotional attachment to what they consider their “homeland,” a disproportionately large number of overseas Chinese feel proud that China is finally emerging into the world as a great power. It should be noted that the younger Chinese do not have a strongly sentimental attachment, as do the old, for China, but there is still pride in being Chinese, and in what they see as the accomplishments of Peking.

This growing attitude has provoked increasing host government concern over the growth of Chinese chauvinism. While increasing PRC influence in the region is a growing possibility, host governments—e.g. Thailand—feel that such an influence would foster a potential subversive threat to their security.

Although some progress has been made toward developing a multi-racial society and nationhood in Thailand and Malaysia, Chinese allegiance to their adopted countries in some cases is still questionable. One indication is their continued preference for the Chinese language and culture.

In Singapore and Malaysia, a vast system of Chinese schools still exists. The majority of Chinese in these countries, whether they are called Singaporeans or Malaysians, continue to receive their primary education predominantly in Chinese Mandarin. A large, if somewhat timid, Chinese-language press continues to flourish in all SEAsian countries, except Burma.

In contrast to the above, a segment of the overseas Chinese communities remains rabidly anti-communist and still maintains close ties with the Kuumintang⁶ and the government on Taiwan. This segment, as illustrated by the expressions of Chinese editors and publishers at the recent Chinese Language Press Institute meeting in San Francisco, showed bitterness and resentment toward U.S. policy, which in their minds had caused GRC’s present predicament.

There is a certain ambivalence in attitude among the overseas Chinese, especially among the younger Chinese, toward mainland China. While they seem proud of what Mao has accomplished on the mainland and of what they view as the resurgence of China as a major world power, they would not want to live in China because of the difficult economic conditions and the regimented nature of life. The communist prescription for government and economic organization, which envisaged a high level of regimentation, does not seem to fit into the freer environment to which overseas Chinese are now accustomed.

Overseas Chinese attitudes toward the mainland, especially in countries with a neutral orientation, will depend to some extent on Peking’s attitude toward them. In recent months, Peking appeared to be more interested in establishing bilateral government relations than in cultivation of the overseas Chinese.

For example, Chou En-lai, in his interview with the Malaysian trade delegation, reportedly denigrated the local Chinese and indicated that they should make more of an effort to fit in with the local culture.

In the near future, normalization of relations between the PRC and several neutral-type countries in SEAsia will depend on PRC agreement to and adherence of the principle of scrupulous non-interference in internal affairs. If state-to-state relations could be normalized, it is expected that increased contact between Peking and the overseas Chinese would ensue, and that expansion of Peking’s influence in the Chinese communities might result. With lingering anxiety and suspicion, the host governments will not tolerate PRC exploitation of the overseas Chinese for political purposes.

Meanwhile, Peking conducts its diplomacy at several levels—(1) to reach accommodation with and (2) to influence various SEAsian governments, and (3) to continue hostile propaganda via PRC-supported clandestine radio broadcasts to Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, etc., which provide moral and ideological support for the CTO and/or indigenous insurgent elements. In recent months, while official Peking media have taken a more conciliatory attitude toward SEAsian governments, Peking continues to support rebel propaganda efforts through its “unofficial” mouthpieces.

In some countries, especially anti-communist countries, there is little outward, concrete evidence of substantial changes in overseas Chinese attitudes resulting from either recent U.S. initiatives toward the PRC or recent UN actions,⁷ genuine sentiment is difficult to show because of host government surveillance. In general, they approach China questions cautiously, watching which way the wind will blow. In Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, etc. a large number of the overseas Chinese have a Peking rather than Taipei orientation. But the local governments have made it clear that they will not tolerate resurgence of banned pro-Chicom organizations.

In countries where the PRC maintains diplomatic relations, Peking appears to have taken a more active role vis-a-vis the overseas Chinese. In Vientiane, for example, the PAO reports that PRC Embassy officials have been noticeably more outgoing and genial in recent weeks, and that they have increased contact work among the local Chinese, who now accept such contacts and visit the PRC Embassy more freely than before. The Peking Embassy invites the Chinese to weekly film showings, audiences for which have increased from average of about 50 last year to over 300 currently. In Burma, the Embassy also has taken up a more active role in the Chinese community.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 22, REA—Public Opinion Research 1971. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to Loomis, Towery, and Roberts.
2. Attached but not printed is PAO Letter #40, October 1. In it, Southard requested that PAOs report any “significant changes in attitudes of the overseas Chinese” in their respective countries “if any, which have resulted from recent developments.” He concluded: “It would be useful to point out whether Peking is making any deliberate effort to influence the overseas Chinese and what, if anything, the Agency (or USIS Hong Kong) should do.”
3. Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the report.
4. See footnote 2, above.
5. See Document 146.
6. Nationalist Party, also called the Guomindang (GMD).
7. In August 1971, Rogers indicated that the United States would no longer oppose the seating of the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations. In circular telegram 139511 to multiple posts, August 1, Rogers requested that the Chiefs of Mission transmit a message to the respective Foreign Ministers regarding UN representation. He stated that “at a press conference to be held in Washington probably on August 2 or 3, I plan to announce that the United States will support action at the General Assembly to seat the People’s Republic of China and at the same time will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or to otherwise deprive it of representation at the UN. I will go on to say that our consultations have indicated that the question of China’s seat on the SC is a matter which many nations may wish to address and that we are prepared to have this question resolved on the basis of a decision of the members of the UN.” The telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. V, United Nations, 1969–1972, Document 387. On October 25, the United Nations expelled the Republic of China (ROC); see ibid., Document 429. See also Congress and the Nation, vol. III, 1969–1972, pp. 875–876.