Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

99. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to All USIA Media Elements¹

Washington, October 28, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Information Policy Guidance on Cuba (Worldwide Output)

This instruction supersedes the guidance issued October 22, 1962,² and is binding on all elements of the U.S. Information Agency and all other media and information outlets controlled by the U.S. Government.

OBJECTIVES

1. Obtain recognition of the fact that the Cuban crisis of the past week is not over until the Soviet offensive missile bases are actually dismantled and removed, as Khrushchev promised.³

2. Make clear to the world that the USSR and the Castro regime bear the entire responsibility for the crisis growing out of the secret Soviet military buildup in Cuba, and that only the Soviets could end the crisis by withdrawing their weapons. Thus American insistence on removal of the missile bases was the major factor in preserving the peace now.

3. Make clear to the world that there is no cause for complacency or gloating while other urgent problems—among them Berlin, proliferation of nuclear weapons, a nuclear test ban treaty, disarmament, Chinese aggression in India, Viet-Nam—remain with us.

4. Make clear that the withdrawal of Soviet missile bases does not solve the Western Hemisphere’s problem of the presence in Cuba of a foreign-controlled Communist dictatorship or the related problem of the use of Cuba as a base for subversion and aggression in the Hemisphere.

SPECIAL GUIDANCE

1. We should avoid any tone of gloating, any reference to the Soviet promise of missile withdrawal as “capitulation.”

2. For your information, the “gridiron” carried on the October 28 Wireless File⁴ was based on a background briefing given by Secretary Rusk. Our story was cleared by the State Department.

3. We should avoid, to the extent consistent with credibility, any comment not consistent with the lines set forth in the President’s October 28 letter to Khrushchev,⁵ the “gridiron” on Mr. Rusk’s briefing, and this instruction.

THEMES

Pending further guidance, output should emphasize the obvious themes stemming from the above objectives, particularly those derived from the President’s letter and Mr. Rusk’s briefing. Other themes:

1. The crisis has demonstrated anew that firmness in the face of intimidation is the surest deterrent to aggression and the most effective guardian of peace.

2. The events of the past week, particularly the role played by Khrushchev, make it clear that this was a confrontation of the U.S. and the USSR, not the U.S. and Cuba.

3. Khrushchev’s admission that the Soviet Union totally controls the missile bases in Cuba reveals that it has been the USSR, not the United States, which has infringed on the sovereignty of Cuba.

4. The important role played by the Organization of American States demonstrates the significance of defensive regional alliances.

5. Khrushchev’s October 28 letter contains an apparent acceptance of the principle of verification as an element in international agreements, which the U.S. has long held to be essential.

Thomas C. Sorensen⁶

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 315, Cuba (one 1960) 1962–1965. Confidential. Copies were sent to all area directors and to IOC.
2. The guidance, “Information Policy Guidance on Cuba (Worldwide Output),” is ibid.
3. In an October 27 message to Kennedy, Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union would be “willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey.” (Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 91) Khrushchev, in an October 28 message to Kennedy, stated that “the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.” (Ibid., Document 102)
4. A copy of the “Gridiron,” dated October 28, is in the National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 151, Box 289, Cuba—October 1962 Crisis.
5. The Department sent the President’s October 28 reply to Khrushchev’s October 28 message (see footnote 3, above) in telegram 1020 to Moscow, October 28. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 104. It was released by the White House that day. In Potomac Cable No. 247—The Tasks Ahead, sent via the Wireless File on October 28, USIA summarized the President’s October 28 letter, noting that the President had referenced both short-run and long-range problems facing the United States and the Soviet Union, concluding: “To free the world from the fear of war, and to get on with these unfinished tasks, remain the great challenges to mankind in the 1960s.” (National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 315, Cuba (one 1960) 1962–1965)
6. Sorensen initialed “TCS” above his typed signature.