Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

42. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Heads of All USIA Elements and All USIS Posts¹

Washington, July 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Special Program Emphasis

Until further notice, Washington media and field posts will focus attention on, and give special emphasis to, persuading our audiences that:

1. Despite Soviet intransigeance, the United States is doing everything in its power to obtain a treaty banning nuclear testing,² the first, vital step toward general disarmament. (TEST BAN)

2. Soviet efforts to abrogate their agreements and deprive West Berliners of their freedom threaten the security and freedom of people everywhere. Under no circumstances, therefore, will the U.S. abandon Free Berlin.³ (BERLIN)

3. An effective United Nations which has sufficient authority to act in crisis situations is indispensable to the security of small nations. Knowing this, the Soviets are seeking to paralyze the U.N. Secretariat with an unworkable “troika” arrangement.⁴ (UNITED NATIONS)

4. The Sino-Soviet Bloc, despite lip-service support to emerging nationalism, is implacably opposed to independent nationalist movements and genuine neutrality. Man’s best hope is in “a world of free choice” such as sought by the U.S., not a “world of coercion” as favored by the Communists.⁵ (FREE CHOICE)

5. Modernization of newly-developing nations can best be achieved through democratic, pragmatic political and economic development consistent with the traditions, character and aspirations of a people. (MODERNIZATION)

These areas of emphasis are not intended to supplant all other Agency output. We simply are seeking to focus adequate media and field attention for a period of time on subjects currently of overriding importance. I have been specifically charged by the President with the task of undertaking major efforts on items (1) and (2).

The duration of these efforts will vary. There cannot be universal and equal emphasis, either by all media or in all countries. I will expect IOP (in the person of Mr. Brooke, Director of Media Content), working with the Area offices and the media, to develop appropriate emphasis and application of these efforts in the various countries in which we operate, along the lines set forth in my memorandum to the Staff of April 22.⁶ IOP will provide detailed policy guidances to the media and to the field in support of these efforts.

I ask your full cooperation and support.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 382, Box 117, Master Copies—July–Dec 1961. Official Use Only. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 129. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, the copy of the memorandum printed ibid. indicates that it was drafted by Brooke. The United States Information Agency sent the text of the memorandum to all USIS posts in circular airgram CA–234, July 27. In it, Murrow stated: “We look as well to other elements of the Federal community and of American diplomatic missions to support this major, concerted information effort. Inevitably, however, you and your staff will be serving as its spearhead. Therefore I solicit the most earnest and imaginative application of your persuasive skills to the success of our collective endeavor.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 382, Box 117, Master Copies—July–Dec 1961)
2. U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty had begun in March in Geneva. For documentation on the U.S. efforts to obtain an agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VII, Arms Control and Disarmament.
3. NASAM No. 62, signed by Bundy on July 24 and addressed to Rusk, Dillon, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Bell, McCone, and Murrow, outlined U.S. efforts in response to the situation in Berlin. The NSAM indicated that the President had assigned to Murrow “the responsibility for coordinating the information activities of the U.S. Government capable of advancing international understanding of the U.S. position on Berlin.” For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Document 80.
4. Reference is to the Soviet proposal to replace UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld with three Secretaries-General representing the Western states, the Communist states, and the uncommitted states. In a July 14 statement, which Cleveland read to news correspondents, Rusk asserted: “The so-called ‘troika’ proposal flies in the face of everything we know about effective administration. But the real point of it is that a majority of the members of the United Nations—countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—would have a total of one vote among them in the executive direction of the U.N.—and that vote could be nullified by a veto. The United Nations would be powerless to act on any proposal that did not suit the purposes of the Soviet Union.” (Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1961, p. 183)
5. See Document 40.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 121.