Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

114. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, February 12, 1963.

We have just assembled information on Western European reaction to the U.S. domestic political controversy.

In summary, concern with the Administration’s domestic predicaments as related to foreign affairs was generally restricted to elite media. Editorial comment was sparse ranging from fairly heavy in Britain to practically none in Italy. Available comment indicated awareness of the various aspects and factors impinging on the position of the Administration and general sympathy for it. Nowhere were charges of immaturity levelled against the Administration; however, there was some criticism of the Administration for heavy-handedness in dealing with allies. Such dealings were often said to be based too much on cold logic devoid of regard for human factors. Most media related the present domestic hassle over Cuba to Republican pressures which were often either obliquely or directly castigated. In some instances, however, it was pointed out that individual members of the Administration were partially responsible for conflicting views on the status of the Cuba situation. Doubts were also expressed in several cases as to the accuracy of intelligence information made available by the Administration. Its specific measures taken at this time against Cuba were widely regarded as temporizing and even ineffective, but there was no indication that the bulk of European opinion would favor stronger measures against Castro. Rather, the moderation of the Administration was welcomed, although in some as yet isolated cases it was held that the President had lost the initiative in the Cuban situation.

Conservative Le Figaro, Paris, probably spoke for much of public opinion in Western Europe, when it stated “it must be hoped that Kennedy will succeed in extricating himself from the maze of difficulties and disillusionment into which recent events seemed to have plunged him.” Some of the difficulties alluded to were seen by the more critical commentators as caused by the Administration’s handling of the European and Canadian rather than the Cuban crisis. Resentment still lingers over lack of prior consultation in the October crisis and was fanned in France, Belgium and occasionally West Germany by the EEC crisis.² More recently, some British papers took offense at the alleged interference of the State Department in Canadian affairs.³ A commentator in the left-wing New Statesman summed up these feelings when he wrote: “If there is a common theme, it is the consistent American underestimation of passionate nationalism in countries that feel threatened by Yankee dictation.” Other comment censored the reputed high-handedness of the Administration in dealing with its allies rather than reserving this kind of treatment for their enemies. Some British and French dailies pointed to a deficiency of “cultural empathy” on the highest level of the Administration.

More specifically, individual members of the Administration were charged with either precipitating in part the present domestic crisis or not succeeding in convincing their opponents. Attorney-General Kennedy’s testimony on the Bay of Pigs invasion⁴ was blamed in several instances for “clumsiness” and confusing the issues. But even in this instance there was no single reference to immaturity or even youthfulness. Secretary McNamara was depicted by influential independent Le Monde, Paris, as not having convinced large segments of public opinion and the Congress despite his TV statements.⁵ Some doubts were cast on the accuracy of intelligence reports. Financial Boersen, Copenhagen, remarked “if the President bases his evaluation on CIA reports, it must be remembered that they were wrong in 1960.” The independent London Economist commented along similar lines that American intelligence could be slipping this time and pointed out that it was Senator Keating who first suggested publicly last fall that there were Soviet missile bases in Cuba.⁶

The same periodical thought, as did many other media, that the Republicans had eagerly seized the opportunity to harass the Administration. In a number of instances, sharp criticism was voiced at such opportunism. Independent Sunday Times, London, spoke of the “drum-fire of irresponsible Republican voices,” independent Le Monde, Paris, of an “alarmist campaign,” while the liberal Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm, went so far as to assert that the “Republicans do not want to be convinced that the Cuba threat has been removed as they need it as a club to hold over the Kennedy regime. They cannot permit the undisturbed harvest of political gain from the increased prestige (of the President).” In a few cases, such as that of left-center Suddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, it was contended that the Administration anticipated a Cuba campaign on the part of the opposition.

The measures currently taken by the Administration in regard to Cuba, such as the most recent penalties placed on ships carrying cargo there,⁷ was generally seen as an attempt to reduce domestic pressures rather than to increase those on Cuba. The London Times remarked with evident disdain for these pressures “that something like this (additional boycott) has become a domestic necessity—it cannot be put higher than that—is a pity.” There was consensus that such actions would do little to further embarrass Castro and even less to conciliate domestic opposition to the Administration. Yet little as these measures might do to heighten tensions in the Caribbean, anxieties were already expressed in the form of hopes that Washington would “not feel compelled to take more far-reaching measures.” (Liberal Allgemeen Handelsblad, Amsterdam)

Opinion was agreed that the Cuban situation remained potentially dangerous and that Cuba continued to constitute a Communist springboard for operations, political rather than military. The Administration was seen as marking time in order to avoid a new upsurge of tension, but in so doing some papers thought it possible that the “Kennedy government could lose face on the domestic scene” (right-center Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung).

Edward R. Murrow⁸

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 19, USIA, 1/63–9/63. No classification marking. According to a time stamp in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, it was received in the White House on February 12 at 3:53 p.m.
2. Reference is to the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis and France’s refusal to accept the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community.
3. On January 30, the Department of State issued a statement on the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Canada on the issue of provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. The statement reads, in part: “These discussions have been exploratory in nature; the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense.” For the full text of the statement, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, Document 444. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker charged the Department of State with an “unwarranted intrusion in Canadian affairs.” (Raymond Daniell, “Canadian Denounce U.S. on Defense ‘Interference,’” The New York Times, February 1, 1963, p. 1)
4. Not found and not further identified.
5. McNamara held a televised news conference on February 6 during which he asserted that the Soviet arms in Cuba had been removed. (“Public Report Answering Public Charges of Military Buildup in Cuba,” The Washington Post, February 7, 1963, p. A22)
6. Presumable reference to the remarks made by Senator Keating on the floor of the Senate on August 31, 1962. For the text, see Congressional Record, August 31, 1962, pp. 18359–18361.
7. On February 6, the White House announced that U.S. Government-financed cargoes could not be shipped from the United States on foreign-flagged vessels: “concerned departments and agencies of the Government have been directed not to permit shipment of any such cargoes on vessels that have called at a Cuban port since January 31, 1963.” (Department of State Bulletin, February 15, 1963, p. 283)
8. Murrow signed “E.R. Murrow” above his typed signature.