After exhibiting the patience of Job, the United States now proposes to take
a somewhat harder line in Laos. The attached cable, which has already been
called to the attention of appropriate policy and media personnel, outlines
general approaches which the Department is suggesting the Embassy in
Vientiane pursue with respect to the various factions in Laos.
Although it remains to be seen if much good will come of this, it is
encouraging that at last we are prepared to take a somewhat firmer stand. It
would appear that FE proposes, as Governor
Harriman suggested IAF do, “to put all (its) energies and
imagination into waging the political battle.”2
Attachment
Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in Laos3
Washington, February 5, 1963, 8:04 p.m..
776. Your reports over past several weeks indicate that we are facing
stepped-up PL offensive against US
operations and presence in Laos. This heightened pressure, although not
at all unexpected, suggests time may have arrived for US to begin swinging back more sharply in
Laos and to indicate publicly that US
patience with PL obstructionism running short. Our purpose in doing so
would be to deter PL from its more flagrant tactics, to bring
developments in Laos to world attention and to force the “troika”4 back into balance. We
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would hope to arouse our allies to more
intensive efforts and to rally non-communist Lao, particularly so-called
conservative wing, to more active defense of their position. Since all
of the many extremely complex issues and problems we face in Laos are
subjects of almost daily exchanges between Embassy and Dept following
lines of action are set forth in broad outline. Intention is to suggest
some concepts of “style” rather than propose individual moves. Dept
would appreciate your comments.
1. With Phoumi
We have been surprised at how few times Phoumi and other conservatives have apparently used
their veto to block unfavorable actions within RLG. Recognize, of course, that there are occasions where
conservatives have moved quietly to head off PL initiatives which do not
come to public attention, but it seems rare for conservatives to come
out openly and strongly against a particular PL action. This may be due
to emphasis we have placed in our dealings with Phoumi on importance of supporting
Souvanna which has come to mean in most cases not rpt not opposing those
PL moves to which Souvanna is willing agree. However, since Souvanna
apparently inclined follow lines of least resistance we believe PL will
hold initiative on major problems such as air supply, international
relations and freedom of movement until Phoumi starts pressing back.
We would like to see Phoumi make
some public gestures which in effect would veto the PL veto, e.g. insist
that there is no rpt no agreement among Lao re air supply and that
therefore PL cannot oppose. Admittedly such gestures could not change
actual situation or stop PL obstructionism but they could serve to blur
PL propaganda, show that conservatives are still active and establish a
strong non-Communist Lao position which US could support.
Another area in which we feel conservatives should be more vocal is in
attacking Chicoms and DRV for their
violations of Agreements5 and their threats to Lao neutrality
and independence. Impression here is that the only Lao propaganda
receiving international attention is that directed against US by PL while at same time public
criticism of communist signatories comes only from US or other non-Lao sources; Phoumi’s attitude toward Chicom road
building very much case in point.
Finally we wish allude again to necessity of Phoumi using his control of Vientiane and its facilities
to force bargains from PL on such matters as air supply. In our view as
long as PL deny access by either
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neutralists or conservatives to PL areas Phoumi can be tougher in extracting quid pro quos for privileges he allows PL in areas he
controls.
Request Emb’s interpretation whether Phoumi’s attitude can be explained as a tactic to
extract some commitment of special US
support for conservative faction.
2. Souvanna
Our general criticism of Souvanna as we have expressed in our messages
recently is that he fails to take position of his own on issues where
his leadership could be decisive factor. He apparently fails understand
that the row of a neutralist is at least as hard to hoe as that of an
aligned country. Neutralization does not exempt a country or govt from
the necessity to struggle for independence and neutrality is not
identical with a supine posture. Souvanna’s attitude may be matter of
temperament and character and therefore not particularly amenable to our
influence. Recognize also that repeated showdowns with PL on all issues
would soon result in complete breakdown of national union govt and that
Souvanna must postpone collision on some issues temporarily in order
maintain framework his govt. Our problem, therefore, is to identify
those issues where slippage would seriously endanger him and convince
Souvanna that he must take stand in his own interest or lose out
entirely.
How to bring him to save himself is primarily tactical matter of which
you are of course best judge. However, thought has occurred to us that
perhaps Souvanna has come to accept our unfailing support as matter of
course whereas he feels that he must placate communists to earn theirs,
(e.g. Embtel 10536 where Souvanna fusses about size
USAID staff while conveniently
ignoring several thousand Chicoms and Viet Minh working on roads). It
might be useful administer dash of cold water in form of reminders that
we can support him only so long as he follows truly neutral path and
that certainly we would not accept his back-tracking on understandings
with us (e.g. Embtel 1095)7 without some public
reaction. Admittedly it would be hard to get across without discouraging
him too greatly but suggest Souvanna should be made to feel he must work
for our support also.
3. With communist side
Essence of foregoing is that we should consider generally raising
temperature in Vientiane by encouraging stronger public stands by
Phoumi and Souvanna while
toughening our own public posture. This
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may mean in turn our taking gloves off when
dealing with individual Lao such as Quinim and Phoumi Vongvichit and challenging them
directly and publicly when they criticize us. It is hard to imagine that
we can run into much more trouble with these two than they now give us
and it may be that by showing our irritation with them we can encourage
reaction against them by Lao themselves.
4. With French
While we obviously would not rpt not wish place final control of our
assistance to Kong Le in French
hands we see merit in allowing French take lead publicly whenever their
and our objectives coincide. Our primary objective after all is to
strengthen Kong Le against PL and
if French can facilitate this by diverting PL criticism so much the
better. Of course this would necessitate closest possible liaison
between French and ourselves to ensure that present trend towards
rapprochement between KL and Meo/FAR is not interrupted and that matériel
we supply is actually used to KL’s
advantage. This may also mean that we should press for changes in FMM personnel connected with PDJ operations if there are any who are
uncooperative or working against our objectives with Kong Le.
