You may be familiar with all of the events set forth in the enclosed
memorandum. I find the developments disturbing, and it appears that the
situation may continue to deteriorate.
Enclosure
Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director, Far
East, United States Information Agency (Moore) to the Director (Murrow)3
Washington, December 13, 1962
SUBJECT
- Communists in Laos Continue Pressures on the U.S.
An intelligence report4
reveals that Laos’ communist Minister of Information, Phoumi Vongvichit, wrote a letter to
the leftward leaning “neutralist” Minister of Foreign Affairs, Quinim
Pholsena, on November 29 stating that the U.S. proposal to establish a
troika committee, with an American observer, to supervise output of the
USAID-supported Lao Photo
Press is “flagrant interference in Lao internal affairs and constitutes
unacceptable conditions.” Vongvichit added that, if the U.S. proposes to
give the printing plant to the Lao Government as aid, there should be an
official turnover; if, on the other hand, the U.S. “insists on keeping
this establishment as its property, this should be clearly understood so
that the Information Ministry can take appropriate measures at the
appropriate time.”
Phoumi Vongvichit started his move
to gain control of U.S.-supplied radio and press facilities two months
ago. On October 11 Vongvichit had Premier Souvanna Phouma write a letter
to our ambassador5 charging that the Lao Photo Press (built by USAID and editorially supervised by
USIS) was being run by USIS, and demanding that the plant either
be turned over entirely to the communist-controlled Ministry of
Information or retained entirely by the U.S. Government for its use. The
ambassador countered with a proposal to Souvanna that a tri-partite
editorial board representing the three Lao factions be formed to pass on
output, and that an American observer work with the board. The
alternative would have been to turn the printing facility over to the
communist minister, which Souvanna indicated he didn’t want any more
than we did.
Although the principal output of the Lao Photo Press, a weekly pictorial
newspaper published in the name of the Ministry of Information, has
followed a strictly neutral line, this has not satisfied Phoumi
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Vongvichit. He wants the plant
for himself. There are as yet no reports of another official demarche
from the Lao regarding the printing plant, but it can be expected in the
near future.
Phoumi Vongvichit already has
rather effective control of the Lao Government’s mimeographed daily
newspaper and the Lao National Radio facilities in Vientiane, but is so
far using them with some caution and not employing them for blatant
pro-communist propaganda. The radio stations in Luang Prabang,
Savannakhet and Pakse are still in the hands of right-wing supporters of
General Phoumi Nosavan, and are
following a very moderate line. Radio Pathet Lao, located in the
northeastern province of Sam Neua, of course, continues to broadcast the
communist line and is violently anti-American. The “Radio of the Laotian
Kingdom,” located in Souvanna’s former headquarters at Khang Khay in
Xieng Khouang Province, is supposed to be under Souvanna’s control, but
has usually been far more left than neutral. The Lao Government has just
signed an agreement with the USSR
under which the Soviets are to provide a 50 KW radio station to
Laos.
If pressures regarding the Lao Photo Press become too strong, there may
be no alternative but to turn it over to the Lao Government. However, in
planning for this contingency USIS and
USAID in Vientiane have
already arranged to keep a minimum of supplies on hand. Therefore, a
cutoff of supplies and a withdrawal of American and Filipino technicians
who have been operating the plant could virtually immobilize it in short
order.
Communist pressures are also increasing in the field of U.S. aid. The
communists, after repeated stalling on approval of the new U.S. proposal
to channel most of our aid through a “commodity import program,”6 have now launched a campaign to have all foreign aid funneled through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (i.e., through Minister of Foreign Affairs Quinim
Pholsena, a “neutralist” who is completely under control of the
communists), rather than through the various pertinent ministries, as in
the past. Communist pressures have even brought Souvanna Phouma to the
point of asking our ambassador if we could change the name of our AID mission. What’s more, our ambassador
is even considering doing so. What the communists are really after is to
make it impossible for the U.S. to give aid to the coalition government,
thereby making it dependent almost entirely upon bloc countries for
economic support.
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The communist members of the Lao troika are in the driver’s seat,7 at least in part
because nobody else has indicated a capacity to take the reins. The
communists have so far usually employed peaceful methods to gain
control, and seem to be doing quite well at it. They will of course use
force if they deem it necessary. As things are going now, they will get
the country by default.
The U.S. put its money on Souvanna Phouma as the only hope for a
coalition government. As a result:
a) The U.S. has withdrawn its military advisory group and has virtually
terminated military assistance, but the Viet Minh forces remain.
b) Communist pressures, plus Souvanna’s weakness, have kept discussions
of a U.S.-financed commodity import program bogged down for several
months, and the Lao Government has gotten little else but a $2 million
cash grant from the U.S. since the coalition was formed (we formerly
provided a monthly cash grant of $2 to $3
million).
c) The communists are progressively gaining control of the country’s
information media.
Somehow, Czechoslovakia keeps coming to mind.
