867.00/798½
The Ambassador in Turkey (Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 12, 1916.]
My Dear Mr. Lansing: In August 1914, when the general war broke out, this country was in a most unprepared condition. The Treasury was empty and the salaries of the officials were in arrears for three to four months. Notwithstanding this, the authorities immediately commenced to mobilize and did so with great energy and determination, requisitioning all the material they needed for the army without paying for same. The British, French and Russian diplomatic representatives in Constantinople were making every effort and all kinds of promises to induce Turkey to remain neutral; while the German Ambassador was answering all arguments advanced by the Entente and urging the Turks to join them in the conflict. He made particularly good use of the fact that the English had deprived Turkey of her two great ships. As the money to pay for the same had been secured through the most extraordinary efforts and deprivations of the Turkish community, it was easy to encourage anti-English feeling. The stronger and more determined the Entente Powers were in their requests for Turkey to remain neutral, the more convinced the Turks became that the Germans were right in saying that the Entente nations were afraid of them.
Up to the end of October, the majority of the Cabinet were opposed to war; but Talaat and Enver had committed the nation to espouse the cause of the Germans. There is no doubt that when Admiral Souchon of the Goeben bombarded Odessa, only Talaat and Enver of the Cabinet knew what was going to happen. Almost all the prominent Turks felt that their country had not yet sufficiently recovered from the losses of her last two wars to enter into another one; but I believe that many of the prominent Turkish [Page 767] officials felt that if they did not thoroughly prepare themselves, they would be made the scapegoat of the contest and would be divided up amongst the various countries. Unfortunately England, France, Russia and Italy had already selected the portions of the Empire which they expected to acquire or control; while Germany appeared disinterested and had, by a fictitious sale, put the Goeben and the Breslau at the disposal of the Turks and promised to assist them to reconquer Egypt and make a loan to enable them to meet their expenses, if they joined forces with them.
Shortly after Turkey entered the War, Enver went to the Caucasus and took command of the army. As you know, he was defeated by the Russians and the loss of the Turks were [was] enormous. This was greatly due to the assistance rendered to the Russians by the Armenian volunteers who also caused the failure of the Turkish expedition in Azerbaijan. This made a deep impression upon Enver and Talaat and produced in them a great enmity against the Armenians.
For the first days after his return to Constantinople, Enver was greatly depressed and very retiring, until he saw that his defeat was not held up against him. He returned just at a time when the entire population, and a great many of the officials, were very much alarmed at the possible forcing of the Dardanelles by the combined fleets. They had already made all arrangements for leaving the Capital and, as I informed the Department at that time, trains were kept ready at the stations to move the Sultan and the Ambassadors of their Allies and other members of the Porte to Esgui Shehir, where two hundred buildings had been requisitioned for their occupation. All the men who were to go had already received their tickets. Enver took advantage of their depression and conferred with Liman von Sanders and determined that they would concentrate their entire forces in the defense of the Dardanelles. He reassured the doubting ones and gave positive orders that the Government should not be removed from Constantinople. As the Sultan and also the German and Austrian Ambassadors had also opposed the removal, Enver’s action promptly rehabilitated him; and when they successfully repulsed their enemies at the straits early in the spring, their courage arose, and the crowd—that was trembling with fear and had practically abandoned all hopes of retaining Constantinople and had even pleaded for safety zones which should be exempted from bombardment when the fleet would enter the harbor,— gradually dropped its terror and changed into a self-reliant, and later on defiant, nation. It is almost impossible, without going into details, to portray the contrast between the fear stricken, almost discouraged set of men that were trying to govern here in the spring [Page 768] of 1914, with an empty treasury, and restricted by the Capitulations to an 11% duty, with post offices in the hands of foreigners, their navy under the control of the British naval mission, their army in such a chaotic state that they were urging the Germans to send them a military mission to whip them into shape, Foreign Inspectors General arriving to supervise the Armenian districts in order to satisfy demands made by outside people on behalf of the Armenians,—and the same set of men now thoroughly entrenched in the important posts of the Government, feeling that they are absolutely in control, and that they have successfully prevented their enemies from invading their large seaport towns and have almost succeeded to secure for their country recognition that they are still an important Power.
These men are absolutely intoxicated with their apparent success and are already beginning to completely underestimate the assistance that the Germans have rendered them. They are very touchy on that point and want no one to give the Germans any credit for the defense of the Dardanelles. There has already developed considerable feeling between the Turks and the Germans. The diplomatic corps of the Germans and Austrians are extremely cautious not to offend the Turks and really fear that if they went too far with any demands, it might create trouble between them. All the prominent Turkish officials emphatically object to Germany’s bringing an army into Turkey. They do not say so openly but I know that they fear that if the Germans ever come here, they will not leave the country again. As it is, the Germans are now gradually making a bloodless occupation of this country. For the last three months, almost every day, 30 to 40 German soldiers or ammunition manufacturers, engineers, etc. have been arriving here. Many of them are being sent further inland. I have been reliably informed by one of the members of the German Embassy that all the military stations south of Aleppo are under control of the Germans.
It was after the futile attempt of the English and French to force the Dardanelles on March 18th, that the Turkish authorities became convinced of the almost impregnability of the Dardanelles and began to develop the plan of exterminating the Armenians to punish them for their alleged perfidy towards the Turks in November and December 1914 at the Caucasus boundary. And as they could not reach the guilty ones, they punished all those that were left, irrespective of age or sex; and as Enver put it, they had no time to discriminate and settle this matter, while war was pending, in a “platonic” way, but had to resort to drastic measures, no matter who might be hurt thereby.
Enver has told me repeatedly that he warned the Armenian Patriarch that if the Armenians made any attack on the Turks or rendered [Page 769] any assistance to the Russians while this war was pending, he will be compelled to use extreme measures against them. Quite recently, when I was discussing the Armenian Question with Halil Bey, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, he told me that he had warned the Armenian deputy Vartkes that if the Dashnaguist Committee would take any independent action and attack the Turkish troops, then, in self-defense, the Ottoman Commander would not only dispose of the Armenians on the frontier but of all that were on the rear of the army. Halil Bey deplored the tragic results as well as the excesses and violations committed in the matter, and said that he desired to tell me the point of view of the Sublime Porte not as a justification of those results, but as an explanation which any one who would judge this matter should take into consideration as attenuating [extenuating] circumstances of the action of the Ottoman Government.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
With my kindest personal regards [etc.]