763.72/2652½
Memorandum by The Secretary of State of a Conversation With the German Ambassador (Bernstorff), April 20, 1916
L Good morning.
B Good morning, Sir. You handed me a copy of the note yesterday,46 and in the present state of affairs of course my chief object is to find a way how this break can be avoided, because I hope it can be avoided. My idea is to find a way out of it, but of course I had to telegraph my Government that this Government seemed to offer little opportunity for settlement. If it means the entire stopping of the use of submarines, I am afraid that it cannot be arranged.
L You will recall that we said in the first Lusitania note47 that we thought it was impossible to use submarines in a really humane way and that later, in our note of July 21,48 we said that the way submarine warfare had been conducted for the past two months showed that it was possible and therefore we hoped that course would be pursued. Then we had the sinking of the Arabic right on top of that, which was another great disaster. Our position is that, if submarine warfare had been conducted in that way, that possibly there would have been no further question raised. But it has not. It has been conducted in the most indiscriminate way and we cannot help but believe that it is ruthless. In those conditions submarine warfare should stop against commercial vessels, unless visit and search is observed.
B That, of course, is impossible. Germany cannot abandon submarine warfare. No government could come out and say—“We give up the use of submarines.” They would have to resign.
L What possible methods in the use of submarines, that are effective from a belligerent standpoint, can be suggested which will comply with the law?
[Page 556]B I had always supposed that warning was to be given.
L We do not consider that the people on board—the non-combatants on board the vessels—are in a place of safety when put into an open boat a hundred miles from land. It might be calm there, but in the two days it would take them to reach land there might be a severe storm. That is one of the grounds of complaint.
B That, of course, speaking of neutral vessels—
L The fact that we do not have Americans on these vessels does not remove the menace to American lives. The sinking of neutral vessels shows that Americans cannot travel with safety on neutral vessels even. That is the serious part of it and I do not know how your Government can modify submarine warfare and make it effective and at the same time obey the law and the dictates of humanity.
B Humanity. Of course war is never humane.
L “Humanity” is a relative expression when used with “war” but the whole tendency in the growth of international law in regard to warfare in the past 125 years has been to relieve non-combatants of needless suffering.
B Of course I think it would be an ideal state of affairs, but our enemies violate all the rules and you insist on their being applied to Germany.
L One deals with life; the other with property.
B Yes.
L The German method seems reckless to me. It is as if a man who has a very dim vision should go out on the street with a revolver in search of an enemy and should see the outline of a figure and should immediately fire on him and injure him seriously and then go up and apologize and say he made a mistake. I do not think that would excuse him. That seems to be the course pursued by your submarine commanders—they fire first and inquire afterwards.
B I myself cannot at all explain how it comes that so many neutral vessels have been attacked. I have not the slightest evidence. I do not know anything about it from our communications.
L Of course we are gradually collecting the evidence. We have not in all the cases but we have in certain ones. The Tubantia, for example, seems to have been torpedoed by a German torpedo—a Schwartzkopf.
B She was at anchor.
L No. I do not think she had let her anchor down but she was preparing to anchor. She was at rest.
B Yes, I know. And then there was a Spanish vessel which—
L Of course there is this, Mr. Ambassador, that any discussion
of the submarine and its present method of attack cannot go on
indefinitely.
[Page 557]B What was your idea to prevent the break—that we should for the time being stop?
L I think the only way is to declare an abandonment and then if the German Government desires to discuss a method of renewal—
B An absolute abandonment, to my mind, is impossible. It might be possible to announce stopping for a time for discussion and giving the reason plainly for the purpose of quieting our public opinion, that might be possible.
L I understand that you are speaking entirely without instructions.
B I am not at all instructed. I am speaking to you purely from my desire to prevent a break.
L In view of our note I would not want to say that that would be satisfactory, but if it was made—
B I am only trying to see what can be done because a declaration to my Government to absolutely abandon submarine warfare would make a break absolutely necessary. To abandon it would mean the overthrow of the Chancellor.
L Probably you would get a more radical man. I realize that.
B So the question is what we can do.
L There would have to be a complete abandonment first and then if the German Government desires to discuss the matter—
B I want to do what I can, because I am perfectly convinced they do not want to break; quite apart from the sentimental side I think they do not want a break. A break would prolong the war. It would last for years.
L We do not any of us want to prolong the war.
B That is exactly why I want to get out of this present difficulty. From the present state of affairs it looks as if the end is coming and if now there was a break and the United States was brought into the war it would prolong it. It would cause new complications.
L New complications?
B New economic difficulties.
L I think that would be Germany’s problem. The only possible course is an abandonment of submarine warfare, whether limited or not would depend on the terms. I would want to see an abandonment first and then possibly a discussion could follow as to how submarine warfare can be conducted within the rules of international law and entire safety of noncombatants, because, of course, in my viewpoint that is the chief question of international law in regard to attacks by belligerents on enemy’s commerce.
B Then I am to understand that you do not recognize the law of retaliation?
L We do not recognize retaliation when it affects the rights of neutrals.
[Page 558]B The British retaliate by stopping all commerce to Germany.
L It is a very different thing. The right to life is an inherent right, which man has from birth; the right of property is a purely legal right.
B Only in this case, England’s methods affect the lives of non-combatants of Germany.
L Not neutrals.
B No, but it affects non-combatants.
L Does it affect their lives? I thought from the statements which have been made that Germany was not suffering from want of food.
B But they are trying to starve them. You do not stop England but insist we must stop our retaliation.
L But you must appreciate that we care more for the lives of our people than we do for the property.
B We have the same difficulty—our people are getting to care more for lives. That is the whole difficulty—we are dealing with a warlike population.
L I realize that. I appreciate that you have great difficulty with your public.
B If you and I were to have the say in settling the case it would be an easy matter, because one can discuss the matter without heat.
L I realize that. It makes it very difficult, but I do not think there is any other course. That certainly may be an impossible course for your Government to pursue, yet I see no other way, and I think I am as anxious to preserve peace as anyone.
B I wanted to find out what I could do, because I do not see how they can do it though they might do it temporarily. I am sure that in the first place they would say they believed in the submarine entirely and that secondly the rules of international law must be modified by conditions. Your idea is that the submarine cannot be used if it does comply with the rules.
L That is true. My view is that certain instruments of war are not proper to use under certain conditions, and that is the viewpoint that has largely been held in regard to the submarine as a commerce destroyer. You can not and do not know the nationality of the boat attacking. It attacks without being seen and so avoid[s] responsibility. It gives every opportunity to kill indiscriminately and recklessly.
B I perfectly agree with you that sinking without warning would have to stop entirely, sinking without warning is an international offense, and that is why I thought possibly my Government might give up the retaliation, but I do not think it would be possible to say we would give up submarine warfare. I do not think we would do it.
[Page 559]L And if they should now sink another vessel it would be very serious—that is the way I look at the situation.
B And if they continue the submarine warfare and an instance should happen directly after the break of diplomatic relations, if that should come, it would be still more serious.
L That is logical.
B That is why I look at it so seriously.
L I do not feel that breaking off of diplomatic relations necessarily means war.
B I do not say it myself but I do not see how it can be avoided. If we refuse it will be because we are to continue submarine warfare and then something might happen which would mean war. I came to see if something could not be done.
L I am very much obliged to you for coming in, Sir.
B Good bye, Mr. Secretary.
L Good bye.
- Note of Apr. 18, 1916, on the Sussex case, Foreign Relations, 1916, supp., p. 232.↩
- Note of May 13, 1915, ibid., 1915, supp., p. 393.↩
- Ibid., p. 480.↩