[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a
Conference With the German Ambassador (Bernstorff), January 25, 1916
I said to the Ambassador that I had considered very carefully the two
memoranda which he had sent me Saturday night, and that I regretted
to say that neither of them was at all satisfactory; that I could
not see any material change from the memorandum which he had
previously submitted on the subject. He replied that he thought they
differed in the fact that they left out the portion which related to
a warning of American citizens. I told him I considered that
non-essential; that the essential omission was the frank admission
on the part of Germany that the sinking of the Lusitania, being an act of reprisal, was an illegal act;
and that while it might be justified in regard to enemies, it could
not be justified in regard to neutrals; that their rights were
violated and that the violation of rights imposed upon the German
Government the liability of which the outward manifestation was the
payment of a reasonable indemnity.
The Ambassador said that they had offered to pay the indemnity and he
thought it might be concluded from that that they recognized that a
right had been invaded, and that, therefore, there was
liability.
I told him I did not read the memoranda in that way; that the
language indicated that the payment of an indemnity would be an
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act of grace on the part
of Germany, growing out of her desire to preserve the friendship of
the United States; that when Italians were massacred by a mob in New
Orleans the United States had paid a considerable indemnity but had
denied obligation to do so and, therefore, had denied liability for
the wrong.3
The Ambassador asked me what I desired him to do. I said that in view
of the circumstances I could see no good reason for continuing our
informal conversations on the subject, unless his Government frankly
admitted the illegality of the submarine commander’s conduct and
also admitted liability for the American lives lost. He replied that
he was convinced his Government would not be willing to consent to
such admissions in view of the fact that it would be turning black
into white, as they had always denied the wrong and the liability. I
answered him that he evidently, then, had reached the same
conclusion—that further informal negotiations would be useless.
The Ambassador seemed greatly perturbed and sat for several moments
considering the situation. He finally said:—“And what would be your
course in case my Government will not accede to these terms, which
seem harsh?”
I replied:—“I see no other course, Mr. Ambassador, except to break
off diplomatic relations.”
The Ambassador said:—“I do not see how the matter could stop with the
breaking off of diplomatic relations. It would go further than
that.”
I replied:—“Doubtless you are correct in this view. I have given the
matter most earnest consideration and have discussed it with the
President, and I can assure you we do not hesitate to assume
responsibility for what may occur in case your Government refuses to
accede to our just demands. You know that we have striven to arrange
this controversy amicably and for that reason I submitted to you a
formula which I thought would, to an extent at least, harmonize the
attitude of your Government with mine. I feel that we have gone as
far as we can in accordance with the dignity and honor of the United
States.”
The Ambassador took the copies of the memorandum which he had been
holding in his hand and started to make certain changes in them. I
said to him that I thought it would be as well if he would take them
to the Embassy and prepare a memorandum meeting our views, with the
understanding that it might be possible to induce his Government to
adopt it, and that I would see him tomorrow morning at 11:45. He
replied that he would do so, but that he doubted very
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much if his Government
could be induced to admit the wrong conduct of the submarine
commander; or that it was liable for the death of the Americans on
board the Lusitania.
