763.72/2270½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

My Dear Mr. President: I am afraid that we are coming to an impasse in the matter of the Lusitania. Day before yesterday I had a conversation with the German Ambassador and submitted to him [Page 492] the possible formula which his Government might employ. He said that he would send it to his Government as his instructions were not broad enough to assent or dissent, but that he was doubtful of his Government admitting any liability for the lives of Americans lost on board of a British vessel.

Of course, if Germany takes this position and we do not recede from our position, which we cannot do, there is a deadlock which no further diplomatic exchanges would affect, exchanges which, in my opinion, it would be unwise and improper to continue.

From two or three sources, which have been heretofore reliable, I have reports that the German Ambassador has indicated that it is his plan or that of his Government to prolong discussion of the question until the American people had forgotten it and this Government had let it drop.

Whether these reports are true or not I think that delay would cause wide criticism of the Administration as being supine and ready to go any lengths in order to avoid a direct issue with Germany.

Assuming that Germany fails to act promptly on the formula which we have suggested or refuses to acknowledge liability for the loss of American lives on the Lusitania, I believe that a situation will arise which will call for definite and firm action on our part and that action should be taken without delay. In order to do this our policy should be determined in advance. It seems to me that we have two courses to pursue. First. To sever diplomatic relations by withdrawing Gerard and by handing Bernstorff his passports. Second. By laying the facts before Congress and stating that, as further negotiations will be useless, it will be necessary to act, and that, as the action which may be necessary may be of nature involving the question of war or peace, the matter is laid before the branch of the Government charged with power to declare war.

Probably the first method is the simplest and less liable to commit the Government to drastic action. On the other hand the second method would impress the public, I believe, with the fact that the Administration desired the representatives, supposed to be nearest the people, to determine a question which may precipitate war.

From the selfish standpoint of politics I think that the people generally are very much dissatisfied with a continuance of negotiations, that, if our demands are not acceded to, they desire action in asserting our rights, and that if there is further delay, they will turn against the Administration. I believe the pro-German vote in this country is irrevocably lost to us and that, no matter what we do now, we can never win back any part of it. If this view is correct, we ought not from the political standpoint lose the support of the Americans hostile to Germany. And I am afraid that we will do so if we [Page 493] are not rigid in our attitude on the Lusitania case. The people have, I think, been patient and considerate in view of the fact that nearly seven months have passed since the vessel was torpedoed. They do not reason out the causes which compelled delay and I doubt if it could be explained satisfactorily to them. At any rate I notice a growing spirit of complaint at what they consider inaction by the Government. The country newspapers as well as letters coming in voice this increasing dissatisfaction.

I should like, therefore, an indication of your views on this subject in order that I may regulate my conversations with Count von Bernstorff accordingly and may be prepared to act promptly if action becomes necessary.

Faithfully yours,

Robert Lansing