841.857 Ar 1/91½a
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: Count Bernstorff at my request called upon me this morning. I informed him that I wished to see him about the proposed wireless code message which he desired us to send for him to his Government.44 I pointed out to him the objectionable feature of making any reference to the Arabic in connection with negotiations; that the Arabic could not be considered in the same way as the Lusitania in view of what had passed between the Governments since the latter vessel was sunk; that he must appreciate, that the torpedoing of the Arabic might interrupt further negotiations, since a condition of their continuance was the cessation of destroying [Page 472] passenger vessels without warning and opportunity to reach a place of safety.
The Ambassador replied that he realized the situation had changed and that he would take the proposed wireless message and rewrite it. As soon as he sends it to me in revised form I will send it to you.
I then asked the Ambassador what the statement of his Government, which he had telegraphed to me and had made public,45 meant in regard to instructions to submarine officers, that I would like to know what those instructions are.
He replied that he had not been told but supposed they referred to warnings and opportunities to leave ships attacked.
I asked him, if such instructions had been given, how there could be any doubt about their violation in the case of the Arabic?
He said that the facts seemed uncertain and he hoped to have an explanation from his Government.
To this I answered that we had received evidence from Americans on board the Arabic showing the vessel was torpedoed and that a German submarine had shelled the Dunsley and was seen by the survivors of that vessel after the Arabic foundered, and that there was practically no doubt at all but that the vessel was intentionally attacked without warning. I said to him that to advance any excuse of mistake by the submarine commander would be absurd and would irritate rather than relieve the situation.
He asked me if we were willing to await a report of the affair from Berlin, because he felt sure there was some explanation.
I replied that I could not see how any explanation could be given which would be satisfactory and that our experience in awaiting reports of submarine attacks was not encouraging. I then pointed out the case of the Orduna, in which we had waited for a report for a month without reply. The Ambassador seemed greatly surprised and said that he could not understand it.
I said that any considerable delay could not be thought of, that, while the public feeling here was less demonstrative than it had been after the sinking of the Lusitania, I believed it to be far more intense.
He said that he realized this, but hoped that some time would be given so that his Government might have opportunity to make reparation if its officer was at fault.
This was the substance of our conversation.
The Ambassador seemed to be worried over the situation and was, for him, in a very serious mood. He is, however, optimistic that the affair can be amicably arranged. I did not indicate to him that I shared his optimism but rather tried to give him the impression that I considered the situation most critical and that Germany would [Page 473] have to act quickly to avoid the consequences of the torpedoing of the Arabic, even if it were possible to do so.
Faithfully yours,