841.857 Ar 1/89a
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: The torpedoing of the Arabic43 has created a crisis of the most serious nature. The vessel was outward bound from Liverpool. There could, therefore, be no pretext that the cargo consisted of munitions of war, which was so strongly urged in the case of the Lusitania. From our advices up to the present time the submarine attacked without warning. There were from fifteen to twenty Americans on board. Whether any of these were lost is still uncertain. I do not see, however, that that materially affects the case. From the official accounts received the attack seems to have been wanton and from a military point of view needless.
In the newspaper accounts there are two facts stated, which, if true, may have some bearing on the case.
First, the Arabic was under convoy up to a few moments before she was attacked. Of course it is not required to visit a ship under convoy. If the convoying vessels were still near enough to offer protection the question arises as to whether the submarine was legally bound to visit the Arabic, that is, compel her to stop and give time for the persons on board to reach a place of safety. This is discounted, however, by the official statement that rescue ships did not arrive for four hours.
Second, in one statement by a survivor it appears that the persons On the Arabic were, at the time when the torpedo struck, watching another vessel, the Dunsley, which was evidently being attacked by a submarine as her boats were being launched. The important part of the statement is that “the Arabic was making toward the Dunsley when the streak of a torpedo” was seen. The point is just this Can the Germans claim, with any show of reason, that they feared that the Arabic intended to ram the submarine or drive it away? I don’t think that it is a very strong argument but it may be raised in defense of the attack without warning.
Until we have full reports I do not wish to express any opinion, but it seems to me that it would be well to have some plan of action in mind in case no real excuse can be urged and the act of the submarine is shown to have been wanton and inhuman.
I proceed on the assumption that we do not want to enter the war, and that the American people do not wish it but are greatly incensed over this last submarine outrage. Outside of the newspapers everybody I have met, official and civilian alike, take the position that the declarations in our notes are so strong that we must act, that otherwise [Page 468] it will be said that our words have been mere “bluff”, and that it would place the United States in a humiliating position to temporize.
It is the attitude of the public mind which makes the situation especially difficult, but I do not think that it can be ignored without inviting widespread criticism. To satisfy public opinion something must be done at once to show the intense earnestness of the Government to maintain the rights of Americans and to show that we view the situation as most grave and critical. Probably the easiest way to do this would be to send out notice for an immediate meeting of the Cabinet and to let it be known that the cabinet is summoned to consider this case. I believe that would convey to the public the impression desired, and would not have a bad effect on the German Government.
Meanwhile the possible course of action could be carefully considered and a definite policy determined in case the official reports confirm the newspaper accounts.
Faithfully yours,