462.11 T 41/9½
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: In leaving with you the tentative draft prepared by Mr. Lansing21 I stated that I would submit a note on the subject. I have been considering the questions involved and find that the facts are so incomplete as to make it impossible to reach a satisfactory conclusion as to the representations that should be made.
We do not know yet whether the merchant vessel was armed, or whether, if not armed the fact that the vessel was unarmed was known to the commander of the submarine.
We are informed that Great Britain has permitted the arming of some of her merchant vessels and we have received a note from the British Ambassador saying that if her vessels are permitted to arm it is because of the action of the German submarines. The German government seems to assume that British merchantmen are armed, [Page 375] and gives that as a reason why her submarines cannot insure the rescue of crew and passengers.
The facts, when fully disclosed, may enable us to make a claim without announcing the position on the entire question. While, however, we are waiting for the facts we can be revolving in our minds the various propositions that may be involved:
First: The use of submarines in attacking merchant vessels;
Second: The right of merchant vessels to arm themselves to resist the submarine; and
Third: The effect of such arming on the rules that govern the conduct of the submarine as to the rescue of passengers. Does the arming of a merchant vessel so change the character of the vessel as to increase the risks of passengers and crew?
It seems to me that the third question may become a very important one and I shall confer with Mr. Lansing in regard to the authorities on this subject.
If the arming of a merchant vessel so changes its character as to affect the rights of those who travel on it, the risks assumed by an American passenger would necessarily be greatly increased and he might occupy the position of a foreigner who goes into a fortified city, or exposes himself when a battle is on.
I feel that this is the most delicate question we have had to meet—not only because it involves the loss of a human life, but because we are dealing with a nation whose people have been made sensitive by the course we have pursued in the matter of the export of arms—a course not only entirely consistent with neutrality, but a course compelled by neutrality. We are aware, however, that a large element of our population, influenced by sympathy with the German side, has criticised us violently, and this criticism has been communicated to the other side until there is widespread evidence of unfriendliness. Whatever we do in the Thrasher case will be viewed with suspicion and we must, therefore, be the more careful to take a position which will be not only defensible but, if possible, so obviously defensible as to appeal to the judgment of the entire country.
I am sure that the almost unanimous desire of our country is that we shall not become involved in this war and I cannot help feeling that it would be a sacrifice of the interests of all the people to allow one man, acting purely for himself and his own interests, and without consulting his government, to involve the entire nation in difficulty when he had ample warning of the risks which he assumed. The world has notice of the bitterness of the struggle in which the belligerents are engaged, and each side has issued warning. While we may regard the belief that both sides have overstepped their international rights, the citizens of our country ought to allow the questions [Page 376] to be decided by governmental action and not attempt to decide the questions themselves.
I hope that by the time action is necessary a course may be found which will satisfy the requirements of the case, without increasing the tension already sufficient to cause anxiety.
With assurances [etc.]