Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume I

763.72111/1074½

The Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) to President Wilson

Washington, December 9, 1914.

Dear Mr. President: I have, in compliance with the request in your letter of the 1st instant, prepared and enclose herewith a memorandum on a letter of Professor Münsterberg, dated November 19th.¹³

I regret that the memorandum is so long, but to controvert charges such as these requires argument based on a statement of facts. They cannot be met by denials alone. The memorandum is also unsatisfactory to me because I have been compelled to work on it at odd moments and have not had time to give it uninterrupted consideration.

It seems to me that the falsity of these charges, which are being so widely published and are arousing so much criticism of the Administration among the German element in this country, should certainly be exposed, but I am not convinced that the wisest way to do this is by an answer to Professor Münsterberg’s letter. As I point out in the first comment in the memorandum, he is a German subject, in fact an agent of the German Government. I cannot feel that our foreign policy or its political effect upon the American people is a proper subject of discussion with a foreigner, who has not even the excuse of being accredited to this government as a diplomatic representative.

I appreciate that my opinion was not asked as to this matter and I have offered it on that account with some hesitation; but, without considering the proprieties, I think that the activities of these foreigners in our political affairs ought to be brought to the attention of the American people, and that would be difficult to do in a private letter to one of them.

It would seem as if some other channel of publicity could be found which would be more effective, less objectionable and give opportunity to discuss alien interference in the party politics of the United States.

I herewith return Professor Münsterberg’s letter.

Very sincerely yours,

Robert Lansing

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) on Professor Hugo Münsterberg’s Letter to President Wilson of November 19, 1914

Preliminary Comments

i. interference of aliens of belligerent nationality in the political affairs of the united states

Regard for the following facts are [is] essential in dealing with a communication of this sort:

Professor Hugo Münsterberg is a German subject. Dr. Bernhard Dernburg is not only a German subject, but is probably (though the evidence at hand is not conclusive) a paid agent of the German Government sent to the United States to create sentiment in favor of Germany. These two are the principal leaders in arousing antagonism in this country to the policy of the Administration in its relations to the belligerent nations.

These two foreign writers have severely criticised this Government’s conduct of its foreign affairs, have made charges unfounded in fact or in law, have distorted the truth, and have bitterly assailed the President and the Department of State for alleged injustice to Germany and undue friendliness for the cause of the Allies. In pursuing this campaign of misrepresentation and vilification they have done so by means of addresses and publications which have been widely circulated throughout the country relying upon the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed to the people by the Constitution. If such criticisms and attacks by aliens had been made in Germany upon the German Government even in time of peace, they would undoubtedly have been summarily suppressed. The impropriety of such attempts by foreigners to influence citizens of the United States in their attitude toward the established Government is manifest.

Open participation in the discussion of our domestic politics and of our foreign policies by agents of a European monarchy, whether they are official or self-appointed, cannot but arouse antagonism to a power who will permit its subjects to forget their obligations as alien visitors owing a temporary allegiance to the United States and to seek openly to create political opposition to the Government.

The American people never have and never will brook foreign interference in their public affairs. They resent, and properly resent, foreign support or opposition when a policy of this Government is at issue. The people of this country are capable of managing their own affairs without the advice of aliens, who are seeking the interests of their own government and not the interests of the United States.

The object of Professor Münsterberg and Dr. Dernburg and other German subjects, engaged in the present pro-German propaganda in this country, appears to be two-fold.

Primarily it is to separate American citizens of German nativity or descent from the general body of the American people, to impress upon them that they are a distinct group of society, which on account of their blood are viewed with suspicion, if not with dislike, by their fellow countrymen, and to make them feel that they are first of all Germans.

Secondly their object is by means of this aroused spirit of racial allegiance to use this great body of citizens of German origin as a political machine, with which to threaten the Administration into showing special favors to Germany and Austria in the performance of the neutral duties of this Government. The menace of political opposition, if the present policy of the Government is continued, is openly proclaimed by aliens, who are devoting themselves to this propaganda and who by education and birth are out of all sympathy with American institutions, interests and ideals.

If the American people as a whole realize that these foreigners are attempting to direct our domestic affairs and are seeking to influence political action in this country to obtain special privileges for their own government, the propaganda, which is being carried on under the leadership of Professor Münsterberg and Dr. Dernburg, will awaken a resentment which will more than counteract the activities of these men and their followers.

ii. the policy of the government of the united states in its relations with the belligerents

There are two general reasons controlling the policy of the Government of the United States in relation to the observance of neutrality during the present war:

First, the duty which the United States as a neutral nation owes to all the belligerents, based upon the legal obligation which is imposed by international law and treaty stipulations.

Second, the desirability to avoid exciting bitter feeling between groups of the American people, whose sympathies are divided because of the composite character of our citizenship. This reason is a matter of domestic policy and expediency.

In addition to these two political reasons is the humanitarian one of preserving impartial friendship toward all the belligerent powers in order that this Government at the proper time may exercise its influence for the restoration of peace.

Neutral duty, which is defined by the established rules of international usage, by conventional agreements and by municipal statutes, is enforceable by the Executive operating under enacted law and the treaties in force. Beyond such legal authority the Executive possesses no power to compel obedience. Law is the sole measure of neutrality and of the government’s duty to preserve it.

The second reason, based on expediency, has no legal authority to support it. No power is conferred upon the Executive to compel submission to the policy adopted, but the Government may by the exercise of its influence induce popular acceptance of such policy.

This Government may justly be held responsible for failure to enforce the legal rules of neutrality, but it is not bound to impose restrictions greater than those included in such rules. If the Government, as a matter of policy, advocates neutrality beyond the legal requirements, it cannot rightfully be called to account for infractions of these extra-legal restrictions, since it has no power to prevent or to punish their violation.

iii. presumptive equality of belligerents essential to strict neutrality

In the enforcement of the laws of neutrality and in advocating an extension of neutral obligations, which domestic interests make expedient, this Government cannot take into account the advantage or disadvantage which may result to any of the belligerents through the enforcement of neutral duties. If one belligerent has by good fortune a superiority in the matter of geographical location or of military or naval power, the rules of neutral conduct cannot be varied so as to favor the less fortunate combatant. To change such rules because of the relative strength of the belligerents and in order to equalize their opportunities would be in itself an unneutral act, of which the stronger might justly complain.

This Government, in the enforcement of the laws of neutrality and in exercising its influence over the people as to their conduct toward the belligerents, must consider the hostile nations to be upon equal footing and to possess equal opportunities in the conduct of the war. Any other course would make the rules of neutrality a fluctuating standard which would result in constant confusion and in innumerable charges of partiality. Whether one belligerent or the other is successful, is not a matter of concern to a neutral government, and it cannot vary its rules or change its policy because of a particular triumph or defeat by either during the progress of the war. It must hold strictly to its obligations and to its general policy, however they may benefit one belligerent or injure another.

Note 1. The Three Principal Complaints (Münsterberg letter, pages 2–3)¹⁴

“First, all cables sent by and received by wire pass uncensored, while all wireless news is censored. This reacts against Germany, because England sends all her news by cable, whereas Germany alone uses the wireless. The matter is of grave importance.”

The reason that wireless messages and cable messages require different treatment by a neutral government is as follows:

Communications by wireless cannot be interrupted by a belligerent. No physical power to interrupt exists except at the wireless stations. If one station is in neutral territory and another beyond danger in an enemy’s country, a belligerent, however superior on the sea, cannot benefit by his superiority, but is powerless to prevent messages from passing unmolested, even though they convey information which materially affects his naval operations. Manifestly a neutral has no right to deprive a belligerent of one of the principal benefits of supremacy on the high seas. With a submarine cable it is otherwise. The possibility of cutting the cable exists, and if a belligerent possesses naval superiority, the cable is cut, as was the German cable near the Azores by one of Germany’s enemies, and as was the British cable near Fanning Island by a German naval force. Since a cable is subject to hostile attack, the responsibility falls upon the belligerent and not upon the neutral to prevent cable communication.

A more important reason however, at least from the point of view of a neutral government, is that messages sent out from a wireless station in neutral territory may be received by belligerent warships on the high seas. If these messages, whether plain or in cipher, direct the movements of warships or convey to them information as to the location of an enemy’s public or private vessels, the neutral territory becomes a base of naval operations, to permit which would be essentially unneutral.

As a wireless message can be received by all stations and vessels within a given radius, every message in cipher, whatever its intended destination, must be censored; otherwise military information may be sent to warships off the coast of a neutral. It is manifest that a submarine cable is incapable of becoming a means of direct communication with a warship on the high seas; hence its use cannot make neutral territory a base for the direction of naval operations.

“Second, the policy of the administration with regard to the holding up, detaining and searching of Germans and Austrians from neutral and American vessels is a reversal of the American policy established in 1812. It has excited no end of bitterness.”

So far as this Government has been advised, no Germans or Austrians on an American vessel on the high seas, with two exceptions, have been detained or searched by belligerent warships. One of the exceptions to which reference is made is now the subject of a rigid investigation, and if the facts as alleged are established, vigorous representations will be made to the offending government. The other exception where certain German passengers were made to sign a promise not to take part in the war, has been brought to the attention of the offending government with a declaration that such procedure, if true, is an unwarranted exercise of jurisdiction over American vessels in which this Government will not acquiesce.

An American private vessel entering voluntarily the territorial waters of a belligerent becomes subject to its municipal laws, as do the persons on board the vessel.

There has been no reversal of the century-old American policy, which related to the removal of alleged American citizens and their impressment by Great Britain. It is in no way involved in the present case.

“Third, the United States permitted the violation by England of the Hague Convention and international law in connection with conditional and unconditional contraband. The United States, for instance, has not protested against the transference of copper from the conditional to the absolute list, although on former occasions the United States has taken a spirited stand against onesided interpretations of international agreements. In 1812, in the Russian Japanese War, and in the Boer War the United States insisted that a neutral nation has the right to send conditional as well as unconditional contraband to neutral nations without permitting an inquiry into its ultimate destination. She insisted that the consignee must be accepted in good faith. The United States, moreover, insisted that conditional contraband can be sent in neutral or in American bottoms even to belligerent nations, provided it was not consigned to the government, the military or naval authorities or to any contractors known to represent the belligerent government. By permitting this new interpretation the United States practically supports the starving out policy of the Allies. The nation by reversing its own policy thus seriously handicaps Germany and Austria in their fight for existence.”

There is no Hague Convention which deals with absolute or conditional contraband, and, as the Declaration of London is not in force, the rules of international law only apply. As to the articles to be regarded as contraband there is no general agreement. It is the practice of a country, either in time of peace or upon the outbreak of war, to declare what articles it will consider as absolute or conditional contraband. It is true that a neutral government is seriously affected by this declaration, as the rights of its subjects or citizens are impaired. The right of the neutral, however, seems to be that of protest.

The record of the United States in the past is not free from criticism. When neutrals, we have stood for the most restricted lists of absolute and conditional contraband. As a belligerent, we have extended the lists of both according to our conception of the necessities of the case.

The United States has now under consideration the question of the right of a belligerent to include “copper unwrought” in its list of absolute contraband instead of in its list of conditional contraband. As the Government of the United States has in the past placed “all articles from which ammunition is manufactured” in its contraband list, and has declared copper to be among such materials, it necessarily finds some embarrassment in dealing with the subject. The doctrine of “ultimate destination” and of “continuous voyage” to which reference is made in the foregoing complaint but which is not specifically stated, is an American doctrine supported by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Against the rule of “continuous voyage” this Government has never in the past protested, nor can it consistently do so now, in view of the fact that, when it was a belligerent, it not only asserted but extended the rule and enforced it in its tribunals.

As no American vessel so far as known has attempted to carry conditional contraband to Germany or Austria, no ground of complaint has arisen out of the seizure or condemnation by Great Britain of an American vessel with a belligerent destination. Until a case arises and the Government has taken action upon it, criticism is premature and unwarranted.

The United States has made earnest representations to Great Britain in regard to the seizure and detention by the British authorities of all American ships or cargoes destined to neutral ports, on the ground that such seizures and detentions were contrary to the existing rules of international law, but our American doctrines have been such that we are seriously handicapped in urging our protests.

We have not accepted the principle that delivery to specific consignees in a neutral port settled the question of ultimate destination. We have claimed and exercised the right to determine from the circumstances whether the ostensible was the real destination. We have also held that the shipment of articles of contraband to a neutral port “to order,” from which, as a matter of fact, cargoes had been transshipped to the enemy, is corroborative evidence that the cargo is really destined to the enemy, instead of to the neutral port of delivery. We have also held that a cargo of contraband shipped from one neutral port to another will be presumed to be meant for the enemy if destined to a port contiguous to enemy territory. It is thus seen that the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals at the present time are analogous to or outgrowths from policies adopted by the United States when it was a belligerent.

Note 2. The “Fatherland’s” Complaints (Pages 3–4 of Münsterberg’s letter)

“We permit English warships to nose about in our harbors; we permit them to search our ships. In 1812 we went to war for smaller reasons.”

The complaint is unjustified from the fact that representations were made to the British Government that the presence of war vessels in the vicinity of New York Harbor was offensive to this Government and a similar complaint was made to the Japanese Government as to one of its cruisers in the vicinity of the port of Honolulu. In both cases the warships were withdrawn.

It will be recalled that in 1863 the Department took the position that captures made by its vessels after hovering about neutral ports would not be regarded as valid. In the Franco-Prussian war President Grant issued a proclamation warning belligerent warships against hovering in the vicinity of American ports for purposes of observation or hostile acts. The same policy has been maintained in the present war, and in all of the recent proclamations of neutrality the President states that such practice by belligerent warships is “unfriendly and offensive.”

“We raise no protest when England contemptuously disregards our citizenship papers.”

American citizenship papers have been disregarded in a comparatively few instances by Great Britain, but the same is true of Germany. Bearers of American passports have been arrested in both countries. In all such cases the United States Government has entered vigorous protests with request for release. The Department does not know of any cases, except one or two which are still under investigation, in which naturalized Germans have not been released upon representations by this Government. There have, however, come to the Department’s notice authentic cases in which American passports have been fraudulently obtained by certain German subjects. Such fraudulent use of passports by Germans themselves can have no other effect than to cast suspicion upon American passports in general.

“We even permit her to seize our cargoes of copper in her hope of monopolizing eventually our entire copper trade.”

There is no question of the United States “permitting” Great Britain to seize copper shipments. In every case in which it has been done vigorous representations have been made to the British Government and our representatives have pressed for the release of the shipments.

“She permits us to export dynamite, but she does not permit us to export oil, even to neutral nations.”

Petrol and other petroleum products have been proclaimed by Great Britain as contraband of war. In view of the absolute necessity of such products to the use of submarines, aeroplanes and motors, the United States Government has not yet reached the conclusion that they are improperly included in a list of contraband. Military operations to-day are largely a question of motive power through mechanical devices. It is therefore difficult to argue successfully against the inclusion of petroleum among the articles of contraband. As to the detention of cargoes of petroleum oil to neutral countries, this Government has, thus far successfully, obtained the release in every case of detention or seizure which has been brought to its attention.

“In other words England, while fighting Germany on the field of battle, is waging war on the United States commercially. She makes it impossible for us to profit by the war for she strangles our trade, except for such contraband as she and her allies need. It is time to reassert our declaration of independence.”

The fact that the commerce of the United States is interrupted by Great Britain is consequent upon the superiority of her navy on the high seas. If Germany possessed that superiority, it may be confidently assumed that our trade with Great Britain and France would be interrupted and that no articles useful to those countries in the prosecution of the war would reach their ports from this country.

The above quotation should be read with that in Note 3 below. The one complains of the loss of profit in trade which must mean trade in contraband with Germany and the other demands the prohibition of trade in contraband which of course refers to trade with the Allies. The inconsistency is obvious.

“German-American citizens feel, rightly or wrongly, that the administration is hostile to them, because its interpretation of neutrality has been at all points disadvantageous to Germany.”

It is not unnatural that American citizens who are partisans of Germany should feel that the Administration is hostile not “to them” but to Germany. This feeling results from the fact that the German naval power is inferior to the British. It is the duty of a belligerent to prevent contraband from reaching an enemy. It is not the duty of a neutral. The partisans of Germany in this country appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this Government in the performance of its neutral duty to prevent all trade in contraband. No such obligation exists, and it would be an unneutral act of partiality on its part to take such action.

Note 3. Trade in Contraband and War Loans (Letter page 4)

“Many of the complaints refer more to the unfriendly spirit than to the actual violation of the law. Here above all belongs the unlimited sale of ammunition to the belligerents. The administration originally advised Mr. Morgan that the making of loans to the nations at war would not be looked upon with favor by the President, and Mr. Morgan cancelled the plans. This attitude has been given up the State Department has emphasized that money and arms may be sold to the belligerents, while evidently the friends of peace had firmly hoped that the President would denounce the sale of ammunition or any other sale which would be likely to prolong the war.”

There is no power in the Executive to prevent the sale of ammunition to the belligerents.

Trade in munitions of war has never been restricted by international law or by municipal statute. It has never been the policy of this Government to prevent the shipment of arms or ammunition into belligerent territory, except in the case of neighboring American republics, and then only when civil strife prevailed. Even to this extent the European governments have never so far as I know limited the sale of munitions of war. It is only necessary to point to the enormous quantities of arms and ammunition furnished by German manufacturers to the belligerents in the Russo-Japanese war and in the recent Balkan wars. No country has been able to compete with Germany in the manufacture and sale of arms and ammunition.

Furthermore, one of the compensations for the disorganization of neutral commerce and the restriction of markets has been the sale of contraband to the warring nations. Such trade has been recognized as a proper substitute for the loss sustained by neutrals as a direct result of war. The lack of profit from trade is complained of in Professor Münsterberg’s letter.

The reason why the influence of the Government is not exerted to prevent the sale of contraband to belligerents while such influence has been exerted in preventing the flotation of war loans in this country is this: a war loan, if offered for popular subscription in the United States, would be taken up by those who are in sympathy with the belligerent seeking the loan. The result would be that great numbers of our people would become more earnest partisans, having material interest in the success of the belligerent, whose bonds they hold. This would not be confined to a few, but would spread generally throughout our country, so that our people would be divided into groups of partisans, which would be, in the views of the Government, most unfortunate and might cause a serious condition of affairs. On the other hand, contracts for and sales of contraband are mere matters of trade. The manufacturer, unless peculiarly sentimental, would sell to one belligerent as readily as he would to another. No general spirit of partisanship would be aroused—no sympathies excited. The whole transaction would be merely a matter of business.

This Government has not been advised that any general loans have been made by foreign governments in this country since the President expressed his wish that loans of this character should not be made.

Note No. 4. Complaints in private letter quoted on pages 5 and 6 of Münsterberg’s letter

It is unnecessary to quote the language of the writer of the letter which Professor Münsterberg furnishes. It is manifestly difficult to answer charges of so general a nature as the writer makes. The general charge as to the arrest of American-born citizens on board neutral vessels and in British ports, the ignoring of their passports, and their confinement in jails, requires evidence to support it. That there have been cases of injustice of this sort is unquestionably true, but Americans in Germany have suffered in this way as Americans have in Great Britain. This Government has considered that the majority of these cases resulted from over-zealousness on the part of subordinate officials. Every case which has been brought to the attention of the Department of State has been promptly investigated, and, if the facts warranted, a demand for release has been made.

As to the censorship of mails, Germany as well as Great Britain has pursued this course in regard to private letters falling into their hands. The unquestioned right to adopt a measure of this sort makes objection to it inadvisable. As to the detention of non-combatants confined in concentration camps, all the belligerents, with perhaps the exception of Servia and Russia, have made similar complaints and those for whom this Government is acting have asked investigations, which representatives of this Government have made impartially. Their reports have shown that the treatment of prisoners is generally as good as possible under the conditions in all countries, and that there is no more reason to say they are “languishing” in one country than in another country or that this country has manifested a “supreme indifference” in the matter. As Department’s efforts at investigations seemed to develop bitterness between the countries, the Department on November 20 sent a circular instruction to its representatives not to undertake further investigations of concentration camps.¹⁵

The representations to the Turkish Government relative to its threatening attitude toward the English, Russians and French and their consular officers were made upon the request of the Governments interested and pressed upon their suggestion.

Note no. 5. Complaint as to destruction of American mail (Letter page 6)

No evidence has been filed with this Government, and no representations have been made that American mail on board of Dutch steamers has been “repeatedly destroyed”. Until such a case is presented in concrete form, this Government would not be justified in presenting the matter to the offending belligerent. Complaints have come to the Department that mail on board neutral steamers has been opened and detained but there seem to be but few cases where the mail from neutral countries has not been finally delivered. When mail is sent to belligerent countries open and is of neutral and private character it has not been molested.

Note 6. Transshipment of troops and war material across American territory (Letter page 7)

The Department has had no specific case of the shipment of convoys of troops across American territory brought to its notice. There have been reports to this effect but no actual facts have been presented. The transshipment of reservists of all belligerents including Austria, who have requested the privilege, has been permitted on condition that they travel as individuals and not as organized, uniformed or armed bodies. The German Embassy has advised the Department that it would not be likely to avail itself of the privilege.

Only two cases of the transit of war material across United States territory have come to Department’s notice. One case was a request for shipment of Government arms and equipment across Alaska which was refused. Another was in regard to shipment of horses and mules on the Canadian Pacific Railway, to which Department replied that a commercial shipment not in the nature of a convoy of the Government such as is prohibited under Article 2 of Hague Convention No. 5, 1907,¹⁶ was allowable.

As this Government is not now interested in the adoption of the Declaration of London by the belligerents, the modifications of the belligerents in that code of naval warfare are of no concern to it except in so far as they affect its rights and those of its citizens under international law. Insofar as these rights have been affected the Department has made every effort to obtain redress for violations suffered.

Note No. 7. The Honolulu Incident (Letter page 7)

It is assumed that reference is made to the internment of H. M. S. Geier and the German steamer Locksun. The Geier entered Honolulu on October 15th in an unseaworthy condition. The Captain reported the necessity of extensive repairs which would require an indefinite period for completion. The vessel was allowed the generous period of three weeks to November 7th to make repairs and leave the port or be interned; but a longer period was concluded to be out of the question, as a vessel could not claim time in which to repair a generally run down condition due to long sea service. A Japanese cruiser soon appeared off the port of Honolulu and the Geier chose internment rather than departure from the harbor. On October 30th the Department advised the German Ambassador of the proposed internment.¹⁷

The arrival of the Geier was followed soon after by that of the steamer Locksun which, it was found had delivered coal to the Geier en route and accompanied her toward Honolulu. As she had thus constituted herself a tender to the Geier she was accorded the same treatment and interned on November 7th.

Note No. 8. Coaling of warships in Panama Canal Zone (Letter page 7)

By Proclamation of November 13, 1914,¹⁸ certain special instructions [sic] were placed on the coaling of warships or their tenders or colliers in the Canal Zone. These regulations were framed through the collaboration of the State, Navy and War Departments and without the slightest reference to favoritism to the belligerents. Before these regulations were proclaimed war vessels could procure coal of the Panama Railway in the Zone ports but no belligerent vessels are known to have done so. Under the Proclamation fuel may be taken on by belligerent warships only with the consent of the Canal authorities, and in such amounts as will enable them to reach the nearest accessible neutral port; and the amount so taken on shall be deducted from the amount procurable in United States ports within three months thereafter. Now it is charged the United States has shown partiality, because Great Britain and not Germany happens to have colonies in the near vicinity where British ships may coal while Germany has no such coaling facilities. Again it is intimated the United States should balance the inequalities of geographical position by refusal to allow any warships of belligerents to coal in the Canal until the war is over.

Note No. 9. German complaint against British changes in Declaration of London (Letter page 7)

October 10 the German Foreign Office presented to the diplomats in Berlin a memorandum, calling attention to violations of, and changes in, the Declaration of London by the British Government and inquiring as to the attitude of the United States toward such action on the part of the Allies.¹⁹ The substance of the memorandum was telegraphed to the Department October 22,²⁰ and was replied to shortly thereafter to the effect that the United States had withdrawn its suggestion made early in the war, for the adoption, for the sake of uniformity, of the Declaration of London as a temporary code of naval warfare during the present war, owing to the unwillingness of some of the belligerents to accept the Declaration without changes and modifications, and that thenceforth the United States would insist that the rights of the United States and its citizens in the war should be governed by the existing rules of international law.

Robert Lansing

13. Professor Münsterberg’s letter printed supra.
14. The original of Professor Münsterberg’s letter was returned to the President. The file copy does not retain the pagination of the original.
15. Foreign Relations, 1914, supp., p. 754.
16. Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 2290.
17. Foreign Relations, 1914, supp., p. 584.
18. Ibid., p. 552.
19. For memorandum of the German Foreign Office, see ibid., p. 263; for text of the Declaration of London, see ibid., 1909, p. 318.
20. See ibid., 1914, supp., p. 259, footnote 3.