[Untitled]
Washington , May 31, 1907 .
To Messrs. Joseph H. Choate, Horace Porter, Uriah M. Rose, David Jayne Hill, George B. Davis, Charles S. Sperry, and William I. Buchanan.
Gentlemen: You have been appointed delegates plenipotentiary to represent the United States at a Second Peace Conference which is to meet at The Hague on the 15th of June, 1907.
The need of such a conference was suggested to the powers signatory to the acts of The Hague Conference of 1899 by President Roosevelt in a circular note by my predecessor, Mr. Hay, dated October 21, 1904, and the project met with a general expression of assent and sympathy from the powers; but its realization was postponed because of the then existing war between Japan and Russia. The conclusion of the peace which ended that war presenting a favorable moment for further developing and systematizing the work of the First Conference, the initiative was appropriately transferred to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia as initiator of the First Conference. The Russian Government proposed that the programme of the contemplated meeting should include the following topics:
1. Improvements to be made in the provisions of the convention relative to the peaceful settlement of international disputes as regards the court of arbitration and the international commissions of inquiry.
2. Additions to be made to the provisions of the convention of 1899 relative to the laws and customs of war on land—among others, those concerning the opening of hostilities, the rights of neutrals on land, etc. Declarations of 1899. One of these having expired, question of its being revived.
3. Framing of a convention relative to the laws and customs of maritime warfare, concerning—
The special operations of maritime warfare, such as the bombardment of ports, cities, and villages by a naval force; the laying of torpedoes, etc.
The transformation of merchant vessels into war ships.
The private property of belligerents at sea.
The length of time to be granted to merchant ships for their departure from ports of neutrals or of the enemy after the opening of hostilities.
The rights and duties of neutrals at sea; among others, the questions of contraband, the rules applicable to belligerent vessels in neutral ports; destruction, in cases of vis major, of neutral merchant vessels captured as prizes.
In the said convention to be drafted, there would be introduced the provisions relative to war on land that would also be applicable to maritime warfare.
4. Additions to be made to the convention of 1899 for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864.
[Page 1129]We are advised by the ambassador of Russia, in a note dated March 22/April 4, 1907, that all of the powers have declared their adhesion to this tentative programme. The following remarks, however, have been made in respect thereof:
The Government of the United States has reserved to itself the liberty of submitting to the conference two additional questions, viz, the reduction or limitation of armaments and the attainment of an agreement to observe some limitations upon the use of force for the collection of ordinary public debts arising out of contracts.
The Spanish Government has expressed a desire to discuss the limitation of armaments.
The British Government has given notice that it attaches great importance to having the question of expenditures for armament discussed at the conference, and has reserved to itself the right of raising it.
The Governments of Bolivia, Denmark, Greece, and the Netherlands have reserved to themselves, in a general way, the right to submit to the consideration of the conference subjects not specially enumerated in the programme.
Several governments have reserved the right to take no part in any discussion which may appear unlikely to produce any useful result.
The Russian note proposing the programme declared that the deliberations of the contemplated meetings should not deal with the political relations of the different States, or the condition of things established by treaties; and that neither the solution of the questions brought up for discussion, nor the order of their discussion, nor the form to be given to the decisions reached, should be determined in advance of the conference. We understand this view to have been accepted.
In regard to the two questions which were not included in the proposed programme, but which the United States has reserved the right to present to the conference, we understand that notice of the reservation has been communicated to all the powers by note similar to that from the Russian ambassador dated March 22/April 4, 1907; so that each power has had full opportunity to instruct its delegates in respect thereof. The United States understands that as to the topics included in the programme the acceptance of the programme involves a determination that such topics shall be considered by the conference, subject to the reserved rights of particular powers to refrain from discussion of any topic as to which it deems that discussion will not be useful; but that as to the two topics which we have reserved the right to present, there has been no determination one way or the other, the question whether they shall be considered by the conference remaining for the determination of the conference itself in case they shall be presented.
It is not expedient that you should be limited by too rigid instructions upon the various questions which are to be discussed, for such a course, if pursued generally with all the delegates, would make the discussion useless and the conference a mere formality. You will, however, keep in mind the following observations regarding the general policy of the United States upon these questions:
1. In the discussions upon every question it is important to remember that the object of the conference is agreement, and not compulsion. If such conferences are to be made occasions for trying to [Page 1130] force nations into positions which they consider against their interests, the powers can not be expected to send representatives to them. It is important also that the agreements reached shall be genuine and not reluctant. Otherwise they will inevitably fail to receive approval when submitted for the ratification of the powers represented. Comparison of views and frank and considerate explanation and discussion may frequently resolve doubts, obviate difficulties, and lead to real agreement upon matters which at the outset have appeared insurmountable. It is not wise, however, to carry this process to the point of irritation. After reasonable discussion, if no agreement is reached, it is better to lay the subject aside, or refer it to some future conference in the hope that intermediate consideration may dispose of the objections. Upon some questions where an agreement by only a part of the powers represented would in itself be useful, such an agreement may be made, but it should always be with the most unreserved recognition that the other powers withhold their concurrence with equal propriety and right.
The immediate results of such a conference must always be limited to a small part of the field which the more sanguine have hoped to see covered; but each successive conference will make the positions reached in the preceding conference its point of departure, and will bring to the consideration of further advances toward international agreement opinions affected by the acceptance and application of the previous agreements. Each conference will inevitably make further progress and, by successive steps, results may be accomplished which have formerly appeared impossible.
You should keep always in mind the promotion of this continuous process through which the progressive development of international justice and peace may be carried on; and you should regard the work of the Second Conference, not merely with reference to the definite results to be reached in that conference, but also with reference to the foundations which may be laid for further results in future conferences. It may well be that among the most valuable services rendered to civilization by this Second Conference will be found the progress made in matters upon which the delegates reach no definite agreement.
With this view you will favor the adoption of a resolution by the conference providing for the holding of further conferences within fixed periods and arranging the machinery by which such conferences may be called and the terms of the programme may be arranged, without awaiting any new and specific initiative on the part of the powers or any one of them.
Encouragement for such a course is to be found in the successful working of a similar arrangement for international conferences of the American Republics. The Second American Conference, held in Mexico in 1901–2, adopted a resolution providing that a third conference should meet within five years and committed the time and place and the programme and necessary details to the Department of State and representatives of the American States in Washington. Under this authority the Third Conference was called and held in Rio de Janeiro in the summer of 1906 and accomplished results of substantial value. That conference adopted the following resolution:
The governing board of the International Bureau of American Republics (composed of the same official representatives in Washington) is authorized to [Page 1131] designate the place at which the Fourth International Conference shall meet, which meeting shall be within the next five years; to provide for the drafting of the programme and regulations and to take into consideration all other necessary details; and to set another date in case the meeting of the said conference can not take place within the prescribed limit of time.
There is no apparent reason to doubt that a similar arrangement for successive general international conferences of all the civilized powers would prove as practicable and as useful as in the case of the twenty-one American States.
2. The policy of the United States to avoid entangling alliances and to refrain from any interference or participation in the political affairs of Europe must be kept in mind, and may impose upon you some degree of reserve in respect of some of the questions which are discussed by the conference.
In the First Conference the American delegates accompanied their vote upon the report of the committee regarding the limitation of armaments by the following declaration:
That the United States, in so doing, does not express any opinion as to the course to be taken by the States of Europe. This declaration is not meant to indicate mere indifference to a difficult problem, because it does not affect the United States immediately, but expresses a determination to refrain from enunciating opinions upon matters into which, as concerning Europe alone, the United States has no claim to enter. The words drawn up by M. Bourgeois, and adopted by the first commission, received also the cordial interest and sympathy with which the United States, while carefully abstaining from anything that might resemble interference, regards all movements that are thought to tend to the welfare of Europe.
Before signing the arbitration convention of the First Conference the delegates of the United States put upon record the following declaration:
Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign State; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.
These declarations have received the approval of this Government, and they should be regarded by you as illustrating the caution which you are to exercise in preventing our participation in matters of general and world-wide concern from drawing us into the political affairs of Europe.
3. The attitude of the United States as to consideration of the subject of limiting armaments was stated in a letter from the Secretary of State to the Russian ambassador dated June 7, 1906.a That letter, after expressing assent to the enumeration of topics in the Russian programme, proceeded to say:
The Government of the United States is, however, so deeply in sympathy with the noble and humanitarian views which moved His Imperial Majesty to the calling of the First Peace Conference that it would greatly regret to see those views excluded from the consideration of the Second Conference. [Quoting from the call for the First Conference.]
The truth and value of the sentiments thus expressed are surely independent of the special conditions and obstacles to their realization by which they may be confronted at any particular time. It is true that the First Conference at The Hague did not find it practicable to give them effect, but long-continued and [Page 1132] patient effort has always been found necessary to bring mankind into conformity with great ideals. It would be a misfortune if that effort, so happily and magnanimously inaugurated by His Imperial Majesty, were to be abandoned.
This Government is not unmindful of the fact that the people of the United States dwell in comparative security, partly by reason of their isolation and partly because they have never become involved in the numerous questions to which many centuries of close neighborhood have given rise in Europe. They are, therefore, free from the apprehensions of attack which are to so great an extent the cause of great armaments, and it would ill become them to be insistent or forward in a matter so much more vital to the nations of Europe than to them. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that the very absence of a special interest in a subject enables a nation to make suggestions and urge considerations which a more deeply interested nation might hesitate to present. The Government of the United States, therefore, feels it to be its duty to reserve for itself the liberty to propose to the Second Peace Conference, as one of the subjects of consideration, the reduction or limitation of armaments, in the hope that, if nothing further can be accomplished, some slight advance may be made toward the realization of the lofty conception which actuated the Emperor of Russia in calling the First Conference.
The First Conference adopted the following resolutions:
The conference is of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind.
The conference expresses the wish that the Governments, taking into consideration the proposals made at the conference, may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea and of war budgets.
Under these circumstances this Government has been and still is of the opinion that this subject should be regarded as unfinished business, and that the Second Conference should ascertain and give full consideration to the results of such examination as the Governments may have given to the possibility of an agreement pursuant to the wish expressed by the First Conference. We think that there should be a sincere effort to learn whether, by conference and discussion, some practicable formula may not be worked out which would have the effect of limiting or retarding the increase of armaments.
There is, however, reason to believe not only that there has been the examination by the respective Governments for which the First Conference expressed a wish, but that the discussion of its results has been forestalled by a process of direct communication between a majority of the Governments having the greatest immediate interest in the subject. These communications have been going on actively among the different Governments for nearly a year, and as a result at least four of the European powers have announced their unwillingness to continue the discussion in the conference. We regret that the discussion should have taken place in this way rather than at the conference, for we are satisfied that a discussion at the conference would have afforded a greater probability of progress toward the desired result. The fact, however, can not be ignored.
If any European power proposes consideration of the subject, you will vote in favor of consideration and do everything you properly can to promote it. If, on the other hand, no European power proposes consideration of the subject, and no new and affirmative evidence is presented to satisfy you that a useful purpose would be subserved by your making such a proposal, you may assume that the limitations above stated by way of guidance to your action preclude you from asking the conference to consider the subject.
[Page 1133]4. The other subject which the United States specifically reserved the right to propose for consideration is the attainment of an agreement to observe some limitation upon the use of force for the collection of ordinary public debts arising out of contract.
It has long been the established policy of the United States not to use its army and navy for the collection of ordinary contract debts due to its citizens by other governments. This Government has not considered the use of force for such a purpose consistent with that respect for the independent sovereignty of other members of the family of nations which is the most important principle of international law and the chief protection of weak nations against the oppression of the strong. It seems to us that the practice is injurious in its general effect upon the relation of nations and upon the welfare of weak and disordered States, whose development ought to be encouraged in the interests of civilization; that it offers frequent temptation to bullying and oppression and to unnecessary and unjustifiable warfare. It is doubtless true that, the nonpayment of such debts may be accompanied by such circumstances of fraud and wrongdoing or violation of treaties as to justify the use of force; but we should be glad to see an international consideration of this subject which would discriminate between such cases and the simple nonperformance of a contract with a private person, and a resolution in favor of reliance upon peaceful means in cases of the latter class.
The Third International Conference of the American States, held at Rio de Janeiro in August, 1906, resolved:
To recommend to the Governments therein that they consider the point of inviting the Second Peace Conference at The Hague to examine the question of the compulsory collection of public debts, and, in general, means tending to diminish between nations conflicts having a peculiarly pecuniary origin.
You will ask for the consideration of this subject by the conference. It is not probable that in the first instance all the nations represented at the conference will be willing to go as far in the establishment of limitations upon the use of force in the collection of this class of debts as the United States would like to have them go, and there may be serious objection to the consideration of the subject as a separate and independent topic. If you find such objections insurmountable, you will urge the adoption of provisions under the head of arbitration looking to the establishment of such limitations. The adoption of some such provision as the following may be suggested, and, if no better solution seems practicable, should be urged:
The use of force for the collection of a contract debt alleged to be due by the Government of any country to a citizen of any other country is not permissible until after—
- 1.
- The justice and amount of the debt shall have been determined by arbitration, if demanded by the alleged debtor.
- 2.
- The time and manner of payment, and the security, if any, to be given pending payment, shall have been fixed by arbitration, if demanded by the alleged debtor.
5. In the general field of arbitration two lines of advance are clearly indicated. The first is to provide for obligatory arbitration as broad in scope as now appears to be practicable, and the second is to increase the effectiveness of the system so that nations may more readily have recourse to it voluntarily.
[Page 1134]You are familiar with the numerous expressions in favor of the settlement of international disputes by arbitration on the part both of the Congress and of the Executive of the United States.
So many separate treaties of arbitration have been made between individual countries that there is little cause to doubt that the time is now ripe for a decided advance in this direction. This condition, which brings the subject of a general treaty for obligatory arbitration into the field of practical discussion, is undoubtedly largely due to the fact that the powers generally in the First Hague Conference committed themselves to the principle of the pacific settlement of international questions in the admirable convention for voluntary arbitration then adopted.
The Rio Conference of last summer provided for the arbitration of all pecuniary claims among the American States. This convention has been ratified by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
In December, 1904, and January, 1905, my predecessor, Mr. Hay, concluded separate arbitration treaties between the United States and Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Sweden and Norway, and Mexico. On the 11th of February, 1905, the Senate advised and consented to the ratification of these treaties, with an amendment which has had the effect of preventing the exchange of ratifications. The amendment, however, did not relate to the scope or character of the arbitration to which the President had agreed and the Senate consented. You will be justified, therefore, in assuming that a general treaty of arbitration in the terms, or substantially in the terms, of the series of treaties which I have mentioned will meet the approval of the Government of the United States. The first article of each of these treaties was as follows:
Differences which may arise of a legal nature, or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two contracting parties, and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the permanent court of arbitration established at The Hague by the convention of the 29th July, 1899, provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting States, and do not concern the interests of third parties.
To this extent you may go in agreeing to a general treaty of arbitration, and to secure such a treaty you should use your best and most earnest efforts.
Such a general treaty of arbitration necessarily leaves to be determined in each particular case what the questions at issue between the two Governments are, and whether those questions come within the scope of the treaty or within the exceptions, and what shall be the scope of the powers of the arbitrators. The Senate amendment which prevented the ratification of each of these treaties applied only to another article of the treaty which provided for special agreements in regard to these matters and involved only the question who should act for the United States in making such special agreements. To avoid having the same question arise regarding any general treaty of arbitration which you may sign at The Hague, your signature should be accompanied by an explanation substantially as follows:
In signing the general arbitration treaty the delegates of the United States desire to have it understood that the special agreements provided for in article—of said treaty will be subject to submission to the Senate of the United States.
The method in which arbitration can be made more effective, so that nations may be more ready to have recourse to it voluntarily and to enter into treaties by which they bind themselves to submit to it, is indicated by observation of the weakness of the system now apparent. There can be no doubt that the principal objection to arbitration rests not upon the unwillingness of nations to submit their controversies to impartial arbitration, but upon an apprehension that the arbitrations to which they submit may not be impartial. It has been a very general practice for arbitrators to act, not as judges deciding questions of fact and law upon the record before them under a sense of judicial responsibility, but as negotiators effecting settlements of the questions brought before them in accordance with the traditions and usages and subject to all the considerations and influences which affect diplomatic agents. The two methods are radically different, proceed upon different standards of honorable obligation, and frequently lead to widely differing results. It very frequently happens that a nation which would be very willing to submit its differences to an impartial judicial determination is unwilling to subject them to this kind of diplomatic process. If there could be a tribunal which would pass upon questions between nations with the same impartial and impersonal judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States gives to questions arising between citizens of the different States, or between foreign citizens and the citizens of the United States, there can be no doubt that nations would be much more ready to submit their controversies to its decision than they are now to take the chances of arbitration. It should be your effort to bring about in the Second Conference a development of The Hague Tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility. These judges should be so selected from the different countries that the different systems of law and procedure and the principal languages shall be fairly represented. The court should be made of such dignity, consideration, and rank that the best and ablest jurists will accept appointment to it, and that the whole world will have absolute confidence in its judgments.
The arbitration convention signed at the First Hague Conference contained no authority for the adherence of nonsignatory powers, but provided:
The conditions on which the powers who were not represented at the International Peace Conference can adhere to the present convention shall form the subject of a separate agreement among the contracting powers.
This left all the Central and South American States outside of the treaty. The United States has from time to time endeavored to secure an opportunity for them to adhere, and it has now been arranged that this shall be accomplished as a necessary preliminary to their taking part in the Second Conference. The method arranged is that on the day before the opening of the conference a protocol [Page 1136] shall be signed by the representatives of all the Powers signatory to the treaty substantially as follows:
The representatives at the Second Peace Conference of the States signatories of the convention of 1899 relative to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, duly authorized to that effect, have agreed that in case the States that were not represented at the First Peace Conference, but have been convoked to the present conference, should notify the Government of the Netherlands of their adhesion to the above-mentioned convention they shall be forthwith considered as having acceded thereto.
It is understood that substantially all the Central and South American States have notified the Government of the Netherlands of their adherence to the convention, and upon the signing of this protocol their notices will immediately take effect and they will become parties competent to take part in the discussions of the Second Conference looking toward the amendment and extension of the arbitration convention. You will sign the protocol in behalf of the United States pursuant to the full powers already given you.
6. You will maintain the traditional policy of the United States regarding the immunity of private property of belligerents at sea.
On the 28th of April, 1904, the Congress of the United States adopted the following resolution:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of the Congress of the United States that it is desirable, in the interest of uniformity of action by the maritime states of the world in time of war, that the President endeavor to bring about an understanding among the principal maritime powers with a view of incorporating into the permanent law of civilized nations, the principle of the exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or destruction by belligerents. Approved April 28, 1904.
This resolution is an expression of the view taken by the United States during its entire history. Such a provision was incorporated in the treaty of 1775 with Prussia, signed by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams, and it was proposed by the United States as an amendment to be added to the privateering clause of the Declaration of Paris in 1856. The refusal of the other powers to accompany prohibition of privateering by such a provision caused the Government of the United States to refuse its adherence to the declaration.
The Congressional resolution was in response to the recommendation of President Roosevelt’s message to Congress in December, 1903, quoting and enforcing a previous message by President McKinley in December, 1898, which said:
The United States Government has for many years advocated this humane and beneficent principle, and is now in a position to recommend it to other powers without the imputation of selfish motives.
Whatever may be the apparent specific interest of this or any other country at the moment, the principle thus declared is of such permanent and universal importance that no balancing of the chances of probable loss or gain in the immediate future on the part of any nation should be permitted to outweigh the considerations of common benefit to civilization which call for the adoption of such an agreement.
In the First Peace Conference the subject of the immunity of private property at sea was not included in the programme. Consideration of it was urged by the delegates of the United States and was [Page 1137] supported by an able presentation on the part of Mr. Andrew D. White. The representatives of several of the great powers declared, however, that in the absence of instructions from their Governments they could not vote upon the subject; and, under the circumstances, we must consider that gratifying progress was made when there was included in the final act of the conference a resolution expressing—
The wish that the proposal which contemplates the declaration of the inviolability, of private property in naval warfare may be referred to a subsequent conference for consideration.
The subject has accordingly been included in the present programme and the way is open for its consideration.
It will be appropriate for you to advocate the proposition formulated and presented by the American delegates to the First Conference, as follows:
The private property of all citizens or subjects of the signatory powers, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas, or elsewhere by the armed vessels or by the military forces of any of the said signatory powers. But nothing herein contained shall extend exemption from seizure to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of any of the said powers.
7. Since the code of rules for the government of military operations on land was adopted by the First Peace Conference there have been occasions for its application under very severe conditions, notably in the South African war and the war between Japan and Russia. Doubtless the powers involved in those conflicts have had occasion to observe many particulars in which useful additions or improvements might be made. You will consider their suggestions with a view to reducing, so far as is practicable, the evils of war and protecting the rights of neutrals.
As to the framing of a convention relative to the customs of maritime warfare, you are referred to the naval war code promulgated in General Orders 551 of the Navy Department of June 27, 1900, which has met with general commendation by naval authorities throughout the civilized world, and which, in general, expresses the views of the United States, subject to a few specific amendments suggested in the volume of international-law discussions of the Naval War College of the year 1903, pages 91 to 97. The order putting this code into force was revoked by the Navy Department in 1904, not because of any change of views as to the rules which it contained, but because many of those rules, being imposed upon the forces of the United States by the order, would have put our naval forces at a disadvantage as against the forces of other powers, upon whom the rules were not binding. The whole discussion of these rules contained in the volume to which I have referred is commended to your careful study.
You will urge upon the Peace Conference the formulation of international rules for war at sea and will offer the Naval War Code of 1900, with the suggested changes and such further changes as may be made necessary by other agreements reached at the conference, as a tentative formulation of the rules which should be considered.
8. The clause of the programme relating to the rights and duties of neutrals is of very great importance and in itself would furnish matter for useful discussion sufficient to occupy the time and justify the labors of the conference.
[Page 1138]The various subjects which the conference may be called upon to consider are likely to bring out proposals which should be considered in their relation to each other, as standing in the following order of substantial importance:
- (1)
- Provisions tending to prevent disagreements between nations.
- (2)
- Provisions tending to dispose of disagreements without war.
- (3)
- Provisions tending to preserve the rights and interests of neutrals.
- (4)
- Provisions tending to mitigate the evils of war to belligerents.
The relative importance of these classes of provisions should always be kept in mind. No rules should be adopted for the purpose of mitigating the evils of war to belligerents which will tend strongly to destroy the right of neutrals, and no rules should be adopted regarding the rights of neutrals which will tend strongly to bring about war. It is of the highest importance that not only the rights but the duties of neutrals shall be most clearly and distinctly defined and understood, not only because the evils which belligerent nations bring upon themselves ought not to be allowed to spread to their peaceful neighbors and inflict unnecessary injury upon the rest of mankind, but because misunderstandings regarding the rights and duties of neutrals constantly tend to involve them in controversy with one or the other belligerent.
For both of these reasons, special consideration should be given to an agreement upon what shall be deemed to constitute contraband of war. There has been a recent tendency to extend widely the list of articles to be treated as contraband; and it is probable that if the belligerents themselves are to determine at the beginning of a war what shall be contraband, this tendency will continue until the list of contraband is made to include a large proportion of all the articles which are the subject of commerce, upon the ground that they will be useful to the enemy. When this result is reached, especially if the doctrine of continuous voyages is applied at the same time, the doctrine that free ships make free goods and the doctrine that blockades in order to be binding must be effective, as well as any rule giving immunity to the property of belligerents at sea, will be deprived of a large part of their effect, and we shall find ourselves going backward instead of forward in the effort to prevent every war from becoming universally disastrous. The exception of contraband of war in the Declaration of Paris will be so expanded as to very largely destroy the effect of the declaration. On the other hand, resistance to this tendency toward the expansion of the list of contraband ought not to be left to the neutrals affected by it at the very moment when war exists, because that is the process by which neutrals become themselves involved in war. You should do all in your power to bring about an agreement upon what is to constitute contraband; and it is very desirable that the list should be limited as narrowly as possible.
With these instructions there will be furnished to you copies of the diplomatic correspondence relating to the conference, the instructions to the delegates to the First Conference which are in all respects reaffirmed and their report, the international law discussions of the Naval War College of 1903, the report of the American delegates to the conference of the American Republics at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and [Page 1139] the report of the American delegates to the Geneva Conference of 1906 for the revision of the Red Cross Convention of 1864.
Following the precedent established by the commission to the First Conference, all your reports and communications to this Government will be made to the Department of State for proper consideration and eventual preservation in the archives. The records of your commission will be kept by your secretary, Mr. Chandler Hale. Should you be in doubt at any time regarding the meaning or effect of these instructions, or should you consider at any time that there is occasion for special instructions, you will communicate freely with the Department of State by telegraph. It is the President’s earnest wish that you may contribute materially to the effective work of the conference and that its deliberations may result in making international justice more certain and international peace more secure.
I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,