File No. 1166/259–267.

Chargé Dodge to the Secretary of State.

[Extract]
No. 417.]

Sir: I inclose a summary from the Japan Times of to-day of a speech delivered by Marquis Ito at a banquet given to him by the House of Peers. The text of this speech has not been published. It will be noted that Marquis Ito lays stress on the clanger of coercing the Koreans and on the importance of reconciling them to the Japanese régime if possible. He denies all intention of annexation.

The new ordinance altering the constitution of the imperial residency-general at Seoul has been published to-day in the Official Gazette. I annex a translation which I have had made.a Owing to the closing of the mail, however, it has been impossible to examine the effect of the new ordinance, which must be left to the next post. The text of the original ordinance was inclosed in Mr. Wilson’s dispatch No. 363, of January 2, 1906.

I have, etc.,

H. Percival Dodge.

[Inclosure 1.]

marquis ito and korea—absurdity of annexation talk.

The Nichi Nichi publishes what purports to be a summary of Marquis Ito’s speech at the recent banquet given in his honor by the members of the House of Peers. Below is our translation of the same:

“The marquis was emphatic in pronouncing all annexation talk as absurd. He thought it not unnatural for the leaders of thought in Korea to be secretly displeased with the new agreement. But forces had combined in a definite direction and nothing could avert it. The new agreement furnished, however, a streak of hope, and led by it he was striving for the permanency of the Yi dynasty and the preservation of Korea, together with rescuing its people from their miserable lot. For this purpose he was unremitting in his exertions to effect comprehensive administrative reform under Japan’s guidance. In these [Page 775] circumstances, should the strained application of force and coercion be resorted to, the result might be to press the Koreans to suspect the real intention to be annexation. Such a turn of affairs would be tantamount to driving them to desperation and self-abandonment, which would only tend to increase the sources of trouble and occasion a serious denouement. The situation called, therefore, for extreme caution. It was but an easy job to stamp out the riotous risings in the different parts of the country by the aid of a powerful army. But these insurgents were the dupes of outside instigators, at whose beck and call they were making disturbances.

“His excellency then went on to give specific instances to illustrate how skillfully the instigations were being worked. In view of this he was having recourse to nothing else but dealing with the natives sincerely and with genuine solicitude. He was racking his brain how to effectively make them see their own blunder of being misguided by those inciting them to rebellion and bring them round so as to reconcile them to the Japanese régime. There were, perhaps, some who would accuse the marquis of too much leniency and dilatoriness, but he, on his part, firmly believed it to be the best plan, in the present state of affairs, to exercise power and kindness side by side and avoid forcing the Koreans to self-abandonment.

“One thing that greatly disturbed the resident-general’s mind was the fear that, as the result of the risings, the season’s crops might be a total failure. For the riot reports would show that the farmers of the different localities, armed with their spades and hoes, were helping the agitators, while entirely neglecting the tilling of their soil. The result might not be a total failure of crops, but would inevitably lead to enormous reduction. This would have serious effect on the revenues of the Korean Government; not only that, but it would also affect considerably the progress of Japan’s administrative plans. The prospect could not but be a source of great anxiety.”

  1. Not printed.