Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902, Whaling and Sealing Claims Against Russia, On Account of Arrest and Seizure of the American Vessels “Cape Horn Pigeon,” “James Hamilton Lewis,” “C. H. White,” and “Kate and Anna,” Appendix I

EXHIBIT C C.

[St. Petersburg, April 6/18, 1893]

Note of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Sir Robert Morier, Ambassador of England at St. Petersburg, dated April 6, 1893, No. 1188.

In reply to my note of February 12 (24) your excellency had the goodness to send me a copy of Lord Roseberry’s dispatch, dated March 17, by which the British Government proposes to establish immediately a “modus vivendi” on the following basis:

1. The British Government to interdict its subjects from sealing within the zones of 30 and 10 miles, and to offer the cooperation of its cruisers for the execution of this measure. The Imperial Government to engage itself to deliver to the English cruisers or to the nearest British authority the English ships captured outside of territorial waters within the above-mentioned zones, while the English cruisers shall reciprocally deliver the captured Russian ships under similar conditions.

2. The Imperial Government to limit to a fixed number the quantity of seals which are to be killed on the islands.

3. The Imperial Government to authorize an agent of the British Government to go to the islands to confer with the local authorities as to the working and result of the arrangement.

4. It is to be understood that the arrangement shall in no wise affect the privilege hitherto accorded to English ships of refuge, repairs, or provisioning in Russian ports.

5. The arrangement to have no retroactive force—more particularly as regards English ships captured during the past year.

I could not enter on the subject, Mr. Ambassador, without previously having called your attention to the fact that my note of February 12 (24) was intended to notify the British Government of certain measures of legitimate defense made provisionally necessary by exceptional circumstances and not to propose a basis for a “modus vivendi,” properly so-called; that is to say, for a dual agreement susceptible of being prolonged until the question should be definitely settled.

It is simply a question of the minimum of protective measures necessary to prevent the extinction of the object of the discussion even before the opening of negotiations on the subject.

In view of the proximity of the sealing season, now already opened, the Imperial Government estimated that on the date of my note there would not be time to consider and draw up a “modus vivendi” which must necessarily touch not only upon questions of interest but also on questions of principle.

If it had intended to propose a basis for such a “modus vivendi,” the Imperial Government would not have failed to maintain that a restriction of territorial rights—that is to say, the engagement to limit the number of seals to be killed on land—ought equitably to have as corollary the complete suspension of pelagic hunting on the open sea. It would, above all, have believed it indispensable to make reserves as regards the definite settlement of the question of the seals for the purpose of safeguarding its entire liberty of estimating the measures necessary for the preservation of the seals, either by the prohibition or regulation of hunting on the open seas or by the extension of special rights of protection of the species outside of the various distances commonly designated as the limit of territorial waters.

However, having made these observations, I am authorized, Mr. Ambassador, to inform your excellency that the Imperial Government, being desirous of meeting any conciliatory proposition of the British Government, is prepared to accept that which is made in Lord Roseberry’s dispatch, except for some modifications of the first point.

Thus the Imperial Government would be disposed to limit for the current year the number of seals to be killed on the islands to 30,000, thus reducing by 20,000 the average number of 50,000, provided for in its contract with the industrial company.

It would not object to an agent of the British Government going to the islands to interview the local authorities and to gather from them information as to the operation and results of the arrangement. The time and place of this visit should naturally be previously fixed.

There would not be, of course, any modification of the facilities enjoyed by English ships of refuge, repair or provisioning in Russian ports.

The arrangement agreed on would have no retroactive force, since the different cases of capture made during the past year have already been examined by a commission ad hoc on the basis of the general principles of international law.

Finally, as for the first point of the proposition contained in Lord Roseberry’s dispatch, the Imperial Government is of the opinion that it would hardly be possible to apply it in its entirety, at least under the conditions named for the present hunting season, notably as to the engagement to deliver to English cruisers or to the nearest English authority the English ships taken in contravention outside of territorial waters within the prohibited zones of 30 and 10 miles.

It might be possible later to find a ground of mutual agreement to meet the practical objections which such an arrangement presents; but at the moment it is beyond a doubt that it would completely paralyze the action of the cruisers of the Imperial navy and render futile the supervision which they must exercise along the coast and around the islands.

In fact every Russian cruiser which might capture an English ship would be confronted with the alternative of either to hunt for an English cruiser, which might take a long time, in view of the extent of coast, or to undertake a voyage of 3,000 miles to conduct the captured vessel to the nearest port, that of Victoria in Columbia.

The Russian cruisers would thus be exclusively occupied in hunting for the English cruisers or in making the voyage to the port of Victoria and return during the entire sealing season, and the “cooperation” of the cruisers of the two nations would become only nominal.

In this condition of affairs, and not pausing for the moment on another essential point—that of absolute want of reciprocity in the British proposition, in view of the fact that there are not and could not be vessels under the Russian flag engaged in sealing—the Imperial Government deems that for the current year it will be simpler and more practical to leave the newly prohibited zones, as in the case of territorial waters, to the exclusive supervision of the cruiser of the Imperial navy, which will continue, until a final arrangement is arrived at, to conduct all vessels arrested in contravention to Petropavlorsk.

In accepting four out of five points of the English proposition, and in only objecting to the full and immediate application of the fifth, the Imperial Government believes that it has proved its sincere desire to see the pending pourparlers result in an agreement sufficiently for its partial objection, based on purely geographical considerations, not to be interpreted as an act of distrust.

If the British Government on its part accepts, as I confidently hope it will, the proposal of a “modus agendi” set forth above, one could consider all eventual complications for the current sealing season as being disposed of, and, furthermore, the necessary time for agreeing upon a more definite “modus vivendi” would be gained.

Please to accept, etc.,

de Giers.