No. 43.
Statement of A. P.
Peterson.
His Excellency J. H.
Blount,
Commissioner,
etc.:
Sir: The causes which, led to and the motives which actuated the trouble in Hawaii are varied. In the first place the passage of the McKinley bill and the consequences resulting led to a feeling of dissatisfaction among the merchants of Honolulu and the planters generally. This feeling of dissatisfaction has also led to a feeling in favor of annexation with the United States among a few, and that feeling caused them to assist in the background the Ashford and Wilcox rebellion in the spring of 1892. And when that failed through the arrest and trial of the leaders, even although they were not found out and arrested, the same feeling of dissatisfaction still led them to look about for any pretext to carry out their ideas and by this means serve their pecuniary interests.
If the price of sugar had been higher we would have had no revolution. Another cause was the feeling of the Missionary or Reform party that they and they only possessed the divine right to rule, to rule at all hazards, if not in one way then in another. They could not forget the long years when they had had complete control of the Government, when their word had been law with the Kings of Hawaii, and which rule had been wrested from them by a movement which had joined together the natives, disgusted with missionary rule, and the mechanics, discouraged at the hordes of Chinese and other Asiatic labor brought into the country by that rule, which uprising in 1890 had wrested from them their power. This feeling of desire to rule can best be illustrated by Mr. Thurston’s statement, made at a public meeting in Honolulu during an election campaign in 1892, when he said: “That to carry out their object they would join hands with the devil if necessary.”
This statement coming from Mr. Thurston thoroughly illustrates the idea of rule or ruin policy which has been adopted by the Missionary party of which he is the leader. This idea led that party in the last Legislature to adopt a course which they did. Having been elected practically upon a joint platform with the National Reform party, the party which in that Legislature adopted a conservative course, and were naturally in sympathy with the best people and the best interests of the country, they, the Missionary or Reform party, took the first opportunity to break loose from their natural ally, the National Reform party, and to join with the common enemy whom then had opposed during the election, what was known as the Ashford and Bush wing of the Liberal party, simply for the reason that upon the overturn of the Wideman cabinet, whom all, parties had agreed should go out, they, the Missionary party, had not the appointment of the cabinet to follow. This joining with the common enemy naturally estranged the members of the National Reform party and forced them into an alliance [Page 933] with the more conservative wing of the Liberal or native party, as no party in the Legislature had a working majority.
After the overthrow of the Wideman cabinet the opposition, headed by Mr. Thurston, took a position in favor of what they called the constitutional principle, that the Queen should call a leading member of the opposition to form a cabinet. The Queen did so, and called me. I being a member of the National Reform party and not their choice, they objected to my forming a cabinet because I had stated to them my determination not to enter such cabinet. But they decided to waive that point if I would name or form such cabinet as they should nominate and select in caucus. This I declined to do and notified the Queen that I could not form a cabinet. She then called upon Hon. E. C. Macfarlane, another leading member of the opposition, who formed what is known as the Macfarlane cabinet. This was still not satisfactory to them, as they claimed, because they had been told that every member of the cabinet had not been Mr. Macfarlane’s own selection, but in reality because Mr. Macfarlane and the majority of the cabinet selected were not from their party.
They immediately attempted to oust them, upon the sole ground that the constitutional principle, as they claimed, had not been adhered to. They failed upon the first attempt, but later, having thoroughly organized and appointed a committee which had no name, but which can only be called a corruption committee, they succeeded, by the use of a large amount of money, in finally ousting the cabinet, having won over, through these peculiar and almost unheard of means in Hawaii, sufficient natives to carry their vote. The Corn well cabinet which followed, and which was the personal choice of the Queen, was within a few hours summarily dealt with by this combination of the missionary and the devil and put out in a few hours. This was followed by a cabinet which was formed by the Hon. Cecil Brown, who was not a member of the Legislature and was in no sense a leading member of the opposition, and who but a few weeks before had been defeated for a seat in the house, but, getting together a number of members from the Reform party, he satisfied the desire of that party in his choice.
Although they had sworn to stand by the constitutional principle before spoken of, as soon as a cabinet was formed satisfactory in its personnel to this party which lacked by a considerable number a majority in the Legislature, they were perfectly willing to abandon their constitutional principle and stand and support a cabinet composed of their own members. When this cabinet, which they had sacrificed so much principle for, was voted out for purely political reasons, they realized that their hold upon the politics of the country was forever gone unless they could by some grand coup regain their power by overturning representative government. In this connection it may be said that the charge made by the insurgents who formed the Provisional Government, in their proclamation of corruption in the late Legislature, was to a certain extent true. But it is no valid reason for their action, as the Reform Party, representing as they did the planters and therefore a large part of the wealth of the country, were the people who paid the money and caused the corruption and should be blamed very much more than the Hawaiians who took their money.
All these causes combined bound together a few hundred people in Honolulu, dissatisfied malcontents, either because they were not making as much money as formerly, or because they had not the control of the Government, who were only too glad to take advantage of the attempt of the Queen to promulgate a new constitution, especially [Page 934] backed as they were, or as they claimed to be and as after events showed were true, by the assurances of Mr. Stevens, the American Minister.
It is not necessary for me to go into the details of the revolt here, as the most of it has already been told by me in a number of affidavits already on file, and I shall confine myself to mentioning only a few facts, which, if stated at all, have been misrepresented.
On Saturday afternoon, after the prorogation, and after the Queen had declined to promulgate a new constitution, a meeting was held at the office of W. O. Smith and over seventy of the prominent citizens of Honolulu, most of whom were afterwards actively engaged in the movement to dethrone the Queen, signed a document agreeing to support the cabinet of which I was a member in the stand they had taken against such promulgation, and promise that that support should exist so long as the cabinet stood by their position. In less than three hours the meeting which formed the Committee of Safety was held at Mr. Thurston’s house, and they were determined to break their pledge unless the cabinet would agree to dethrone the Queen and form a Provisional Government. This breaking of their pledge did not surprise the cabinet, as they could expect nothing but such a failure to keep their word from the men who were engaged in It.
This action of the Queen in attempting to promulgate a new constitution, although it was petitioned for and desired by ninety-nine one-hundredths of her native subjects, was deprecated by her cabinet and was entirely new to them, although statements have been made to the contrary, and by their efforts solely the danger was averted. Upon the promise of the citizens who had signed the agreement to support the cabinet, they acted and advised the Queen that it was necessary for her to issue a proclamation stating the circumstances under which the attempt to promulgate a new constitution was made, and assuring the foreign representative and the people that she recognized her mistake and that no attempt hereafter would be made to alter the existing constitution except as provided therein. This proclamation was issued and signed by the Queen and cabinet and assurances were also sent to the representatives of foreign Governments that such was the Queen’s intention.
This proclamation, and especially the assurances to foreign representatives, which was looked upon as a treaty with the foreign powers and at any time could have been treated as such, was deemed satisfactory by the majority of the prominent and wealthy merchants of the city. The mass meeting which had been called by the insurgents and the counter mass meeting called by the opposition were both attempted to be stopped, but the committee of safety felt that they had gone so far that a meeting should be held denouncing the action of the Queen in order to avert further possible harm, it being understood among the leaders of that party that that was the extent to which their meeting should go. At their meeting on Monday afternoon they had less than 700 people present by actual count. The resolution presented at that meeting was confined entirely to the action which had been proposed, except the ending clause, which was slyly introduced by the most fiery members of the committee of safety, giving that committee liberty to act in any emergency which might arise. If the action which the committee saw fit to take within one hour under that resolution had been for one moment thought of by that meeting they would not have been able to carry their resolution.
The counter mass meeting was attended by more than six times as many people as attended the other, and understanding that the critical situation had ended by mutual consent, the meeting was conducted in [Page 935] a peaceful and quiet manner. After the meetings the people dispersed to their homes and matters were quieter than they had been for many a day, until shortly after 4 o’clock word was heralded about the town that the United States troops from the Boston had landed at the request of the committee of safety. On Tuesday the Government was ready to meet any emergency, which fact Mr. Stevens, the American minister, was notified of, and were prepared to keep peace at all hazards, and at any time could have arrested and dispersed the insurgents, most of whom joined them only on the promise that the United States was behind them and would protect them. The Government had well armed and equipped more than ten men to one insurgent. Nothing was done by the Government except to keep in readiness, as they desired to first find out Mr. Stevens position in the matter, which he had indicated in his conversation with myself and Mr. Parker on Sunday afternoon, but which was not absolutely certain.
After our conversation with Mr. Stevens, Tuesday afternoon, which has been detailed fully in our affidavits, and which was ended at a little after 2 o’clock in the afternoon and before the proclamation by the Provisional Government was issued, the cabinet came to the conclusion that it was absurd to think of resisting the United States, and waited only until Mr. Stevens formally notified them of his recognition of the Provisional Government, which he sent us in answer to a letter from us. This letter in answer to ours reached us before 4 o’clock and less than an hour after the issuing of the proclamation by the Provisional Government. After receiving his notification that he had recognized and would support the Provisional Government we entered into negotiations with the Provisional Government, and upon their promising certain matters in connection with the Queen’s protest, which by the way they afterwards failed to carry out, we delivered up the station house, which was then, and always has been in time of trouble here, the headquarters of the Government, the barracks, and palace, under the protest which has been published and which explicitly says that we yielded to the superior force of the United States troops.
This ended the affair as far as the Hawaiians are concerned, who, acting upon the advice of their leaders, determined to leave their case to the justice of the American people in dealing with the protest of their Queen. Since that time the only danger which has menaced the community has been that caused by the presence of the troops of a foreign nation guarding the sacred halls of their chiefs, and the still greater menace of the vagabonds which the Provisional Government called in to their assistance and organized into what they term a Provisional army. These facts show that Mr. Thurston’s statement that Mr. Stevens didn’t recognize them until after the surrender is false, and also show that the whole affair was premeditated and thoroughly understood between Mr. Stevens and a few of the citizens of Honolulu.
It has been stated by the supporters of the Provisional Government that the main reasons for the movement they undertook were the passage of the opium and lottery bills at the close of the Legislature. To show the untruthfulness of these statements it is only necessary to call attention to the fact that the opium bill was passed by an overwhelming majority at the desire of nearly all classes in the community, and was supported by two members of the administration, which they have repeatedly stated was entirely satisfactory—Mr. Robinson, minister of foreign affairs, and Mr. Brown, attorney-general.
As to the lottery bill, from its first mention it was supported by the Hawaiians generally, by the mechanics almost to a man, and by a majority of the storekeepers, smaller merchants, and clerks. It was [Page 936] opposed by the banks and the larger wholesale merchants, who gave as their reason for such opposition that it was not wise to place such political power as the bill proposed, or which might be taken under it, in the hands of a single corporation. The argument used in favor of the passage of the bill was that times were hard; that there seemed no immediate prospect of better times coming; that the poor man and the small dealer would be forced to the wall unless some relief was had; that while they did not believe in lotteries generally, it was the only tangible relief in sight and as such was grasped at. In fact, the arguments were exactly such as the same men use now in favor of annexation to the United States—anything to better our financial condition. To show the public feeling on the question of the lottery it is only necessary to refer to the special election held in Honolulu last October for the election of two nobles for the island of Oahu, when almost entirely upon the issue of the lottery Hopkins and Maile were elected by a large majority; they supporting the lottery, as against Mr. Brown and Mr. Robinson, afterwards called into the Wilcox cabinet, and Mr. H. Waterhouse, a member of the provisional council.
The cabinet of which I was a member have been accused publicly and privately of having favored the purpose of the Queen to promulgate a new constitution, and in support of that it has been said that Her Majesty told me, at the meeting in the palace, that I had had the constitution in my pocket for a month. What she did say was, in answer to a remark by Mr. Parker, that we didn’t know what the constitution contained; that I—Mr. Peterson—had had it in my possession for several weeks. The explanation of that remark is this: During the early part of the session of the Legislature, some three or four months before the prorogation, the Queen sent for me one day and handed me a roll wrapped in newspaper, and, without saying what it was, asked me to look it over and see if I could propose any changes. I carried it home and looked at it and found it to be a draft of a constitution. I did not read it through, and can not say whether or not it was the same as was afterwards shown to us in the palace. I thought nothing of the matter at the time, as the subject of a new constitution was then before the Legislature in the shape of a bill providing for the in calling of a constitutional convention; but as I was opposed to the measure, and shortly afterwards voted against it in the house, I was not desirous of assisting in the project, as I supposed this to be, and so did not look at it again after the first day. Some two or three weeks after the Queen sent Mr. Robertson for the package, which I returned exactly as I received it, having looked at it but once, and having made no changes.
The course the cabinet pursued during the revolution has been much criticised, but it must be remembered that the cabinet had only been in office but a day or two, that the most of them were green in their positions, and felt that the wisest course for them to pursue was to be guided by the advice of more experienced men in public affairs. They accordingly took no important step without consulting either with the diplomatic corps or a number of prominent citizens who kindly assisted Her Majesty’s Government, among whom were J. O. Carter, Paul Neumann, and E. C. Macfarlane. These gentlemen, after learning Mr. Stevens’s attitude, were convinced, and so advised the Queen and cabinet, that the best course to pursue was what was finally done, to yield to the superior force of the United States.
I remain, your obedient servant,