Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix II, Affairs in Hawaii

No. 39.
Interview with Samuel Parker, Honolulu, Thursday afternoon, April 6, 1893.

Mr. Blount. Mr. Parker, you are a Royalist, I suppose?

Mr. Parker. I am.

Mr. Blount. Will you be kind enough to give me your views of the causes which led up to the establishment of the present Government?

Mr. Parker. My honest opinion is this: I think it never would have taken place if the Reform ministry had not been put out. When the Wilcox ministry went in the Reform party controlled the Government. I mean by this what they called the Reform ministers. The cabinet council consisted of four ministers and the sovereign—the Queen. That is my reason for saying when that ministry went in that that meant the Government.

Mr. Blount. In other words the action of the Queen was controlled by the ministry?

Mr. Parker. Yes; by the ministry.

Mr. Blount. Now, why did the removal of the Reform ministry lead to the deposition of the Queen as you understand it?

Mr. Parker. The four ministers that came in were not Reform ministers, but were what might be called a fair ministry, being comprised of two Hawaiians and two Americans. There was the opium bill and the lottery bill—both helped the downfall. They were passed through the house during the Wilcox ministry, which was called the Reform administration. This opium bill and lottery bill had passed the Legislature. When we went in we advised the Queen to sign the opium bill and the lottery bill. The Queen signed it, and it was countersigned by the minister of the interior, and became a law.

Mr. Blount. What were the reasons for passing the lottery bill?

Mr. Parker. The same reasons that there were for passing the opium bill. There was a money franchise of $500,000 to be paid the Government every year. Out of that $500,000 certain amounts were to be given to different public institutions. It was to be divided up into parts—to the leper hospital so much; I do not remember the sum. A proportion was for a telegraphic cable between the United States and the Islands. It was to be divided up in that way. We thought it would be a benefit to the country.

Mr. Blount. In the way of revenue for the purposes to which it was to be appropriated?

Mr. Parker. Yes; it was in the bill. Out of the $500,000 there must be so much to this institution and so much to that: so much for a railroad, etc. I do not remember the sums.

Mr. Blount. Who was this franchise voted to?

Mr. Parker. It was given to four or five men—people living on these Islands. The franchise was in their name. It was reported to us that it would go to the Louisiana Lottery people, but that was not known in the franchise. It was the supposition it was to go to the Louisiana Lottery people, or to some syndicate in the United States.

Mr. Blount. What were the reasons for the opium bill?

Mr. Parker. The opium bill was for giving a revenue. Now, as there is no license, there is a certain amount of opium being smuggled into the Islands. We do not have force to protect our shores. We have no revenue cutters as you have in California, and we thought that as opium was coming into the country all the time, it would be better for the Government to derive some benefit from it; to have the license put up at public auction and sold to the highest bidder. It would be estimated at from $100,000 to $200,000 a year. It was discussed thoroughly by the Legislature and carried by a big majority. The Reform ministry was divided on that—two in favor and two against it. It passed the house by a big majority.

Mr. Blount. Is it your opinion that this movement would have occurred if there had been no effort to proclaim a new constitution?

Mr. Parker. I think it would.

Mr. Blount. Why do you think so?

Mr. Parker. A majority of the capitalists of the town had no confidence in our ministry. I think it would have come about any way.

Mr. Blount. Come about soon?

Mr. Parker. It would have come about, because even when this attempt of promulgation of the new constitution was made, we were told that they would support us for what we had, done—for holding out against the Queen in requesting us to sign the new constitution. This was said to us at that time—at the time when the Queen was asking us to sign it. During the day they had a meeting of the citizens. I mean such men as Thurston, Hartwell, and leaders of the Provisional Government. They told us they would back us up. They admired us for our pluck in holding out against the Queen’s wish.

Mr. Blount. Would this imply a disposition to take action towards dethronement?

Mr. Parker. I think it came from the McKinley bill—the first action was on account of the McKinley bill.

Mr. Blount. What do you mean by action?

Mr. Parker. They said that unless something is done—closer relations with the United States—we are bankrupt. That was long before the Legislature came in session. When I first went into the cabinet.

Mr. Blount. Who do you mean said this?

Mr. Parker. A majority of the sugar men. Those now at the head of the Provisional Government—capitalists and planters. They said that something must be done to get closer relations with the United States to hold us up; with sugar down to $45 and $50 a ton, something ought to be done; a commercial treaty or something ought to be negotiated with the American people.

Mr. Blount. The question of annexation was not presented then, was it?

Mr. Parker. No; the question was how could we get any commercial treaty with the McKinley bill in force. That was the talk of a commercial treaty with the United States to benefit these islands.

First the opium bill; then came the lottery; then came the promulgation of the new constitution. That, perhaps, hurried matters. I was the trusted party on one side, and it was never broached to me in that way. I suppose those causes brought it about. You see our Queen had already issued a proclamation, countersigned by our ministry, that she would never do anything.

Mr. Blount. Of what sort?

Mr. Parker. Of bringing about a new constitution. This was on Saturday or Sunday morning.

Mr. Parker here presented this memorandum of Mr. Peterson:

On Sunday evening, January 15, 1893, at 6:30 o’clock, Mr. L. A. Thurston came to my house in company with J. F. Holburn, minister of the interior. He said he wished to have a talk with me. He said the committee on safety had had a meeting the night before and had come to the conclusion that things could not go on as at present, and that the committee had decided that the Queen should be dethroned and a provisional government established. He said that Mr. Stevens would land his troops and support the movement, if a proclamation to that effect was issued from any building in town. He then asked Mr. Colbert and me if we would, without consulting with our colleagues, take control of the situation, and in our own names ask the American minister to assist in carrying out their proclamation. We declined.

Mr. Parker. In the memorandum of the meeting I omitted the statement he (Mr. Colbourn) made about “Parker being a treacherous liar, etc.” Did not want to think we were trying to take advantage. I told them not to put that in the memorandum.

Mr. Blount. Was there any movement, any effort on the part of the Queen or her ministers or friends to induce Mr. Stevens to take action in the interest of her Government?

Mr. Parker. Yes; Mr. Peterson and myself called on Mr. Stevens. As to what occurred in this connection this memorandum discloses:

On Sunday evening, January 15, at half past 7 o’clock Mr. Samuel Parker, Her Majesty’s minister of foreign affairs, and myself, as attorney-general, called upon J. L. Stevens, American minister, at his residence, to talk over the situation and to obtain, if possible, from Mr. Stevens the stand he, on behalf of his Government, would take in the event of an armed insurrection against the Queen’s Government, at the same time informing him that Her Majesty’s Government were perfectly capable of dealing with the situation. Mr. Stevens stated that he desired to protect the Government, and advised Her Majesty’s Government not to resign, but said, in answer to a direct question put to him by me, that in case the Government called upon him for assistance he did not see how he could assist them as long as C. R. Wilson remained marshal of the Kingdom, terming Mr. Wilson a scoundrel.

The only reason given by Mr. Stevens for this position taken by him was that Mr. Wilson had caused the arrest of his (Mr. Stevens’s) Chinese coachman for carrying concealed weapons, although Mr. Stevens stated that he had other matters against Mr. Wilson which he did not state. After which Mr. Parker and myself left.

On Tuesday afternoon, January 17, at 2 o’clock, Mr. Parker and myself again called upon Mr. Stevens at his residence in Nuuanu Valley to learn if possible the truth of the statements made publicly by the leading members of the so-called committee of safety to the effect that Mr. Stevens had promised that if a proclamation declaring a provisional government was issued he (Mr. Stevens), on behalf of his Government, would immediately recognize such Government and support it with the United States forces at his command. I asked Mr. Stevens what action would be taken by him (Mr. Stevens) in case the insurgents attacked Her Majesty’s Government and the Government called upon him for assistance.

Mr. Stevens replied that in that case he could not come to the assistance of the Government. I then asked Mr. Stevens what his action would be in case Her Majesty’s Government should treat the insurgents as rebels and attack them and arrest them. Mr. Stevens replied that in that case he should feel it his duty to interfere with the force at his command. Mr. Stevens further said that he had made up his mind that if any number of what he considered responsible citizens should ask his assistance in establishing a provisional government he should grant that assistance and should recognize them as such and support them. Mr. Stevens, during this conversation, was lying on a sofa in his private office and spoke with difficulty, as if in a weak and exhausted state. At 2:30 o’clock Mr. Parker and I left Mr. Stevens and proceeded to the station house, the headquarters of Her Majesty’s cabinet and Government.

A. P. Peterson.

Mr. Parker. At 5 o’clock Monday the troops were landed. When I found out they were on shore I went up to the club and found the governor.

Mr. Blount. Who was the governor?

Mr. Parker. Mr. Cleghorn. There was a little complication in our military law. We were really both at the head of the military.

Mr. Blount. You were secretary of state?

Mr. Parker. I was secretary of the foreign office—what we called minister of foreign affairs. I was responsible for all money paid out to the military, but the governor was supposed to be commander in chief. Our military laws are complicated in that way.

Mr. Blount. You went up to protest against the landing of the troops to Mr. Stevens. What did Mr. Stevens say?

Mr. Parker. I said: “What does this all mean?” He said: “I gave orders.”

Mr. Blount. The next thing was your formal protest, and that you will hand us.

Mr. Parker. I do not know whether I can do it.

Mr. Blount. What was the substance of it?

Mr. Parker. The substance was that he ought to have notified us in accordance with international law. Hastings wrote it. I got the governor to make a protest, too, so that he could not say he got authority. This was on Monday evening.

Mr. Blount. What day was the Provisional Government proclaimed?

Mr. Parker. On Tuesday.

Mr. Blount. At what hour.

Mr. Parker. About 4 o’clock, I think.

Mr. Blount. When that was done, what action was taken by the Queen—when the troops were landed?

Mr. Parker. The troops were landed on Monday and the protest was made on Tuesday, and on Tuesday I had a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps. I invited them to come. There was Mr. Woodhouse, the British minister; Mr. Carnavara, the Portuguese minister; Mr. Vizavona, the French minister, and Mr. Fugii, the Japanese minister, present. We asked their advice on the subject. The advice from them was to offer no resistance. Mr. Stevens did not come. He sent word that he was not well enough.

Mr. Blount. Was that after the proclamation?

Mr. Parker. No; before.

Mr. Blount. In this consultation it was assumed that the Provisional Government would be proclaimed and you were advised to offer no resistance.

Mr. Parker. I think that was it. We had heard there was going to be trouble.

Mr. Blount. You said the Diplomatic Corps advised no resistance.

Mr. Parker. Yes; not to have any bloodshed, because they all knew we had a big force. We had seen Mr. Stevens before. Mr. Stevens had told us that they would not assist us.

Mr. Blount. Did he say who he would assist?

Mr. Parker. I think that will appear in our memorandum. He considered the committee of safety represented the capitalists—represented the people—the responsible people.

Mr. Blount. Does that appear in your paper?

Mr. Parker. I think so.

Mr. Blount. Won’t you please state the circumstances attending the conference between the cabinet and the Queen about signing the new constitution?

Mr. Parker. Before the Legislature met that Saturday morning we were asked to come there and meet her, in the first part of the day.

Mr. Blount. You had met her in the morning?

Mr. Parker. No; this was the day when the Legislature was prorogued. In the morning she asked us to come there to talk about this situation. I arrived there first, but my colleagues were late. I waited for them. Nine o’clock or ten, I do not remember exactly, was the hour for the Legislature to meet at Legislature Hall. When my colleagues arrived we had to go right out without having a meeting. In the meantime she had stated that she wanted us to come there in order to sign the new constitution. I said: “Your Majesty, we have not seen the new constitution.” It will be time enough, she said, when you come here. I will show it to you and your colleagues. She asked me to be there soon after the prorogation of the Legislature. Just then my colleagues came up to the palace. I said: “Your Majesty, we have no time. We have to be at the Legislature now.” I told my colleagues we had to go right over to the hall. We left her.

On the way, I told them that the Queen was requesting us to be there at such and such a time for the promulgation of the new constitution; I said I had not seen it and that I had told her we could not do anything until we first read it. That was what I told my colleagues. After the Legislature was prorogued someone said to me that the diplomatic corps would like to meet the cabinet before they went over. Of course, I did not know what was up. It seemed that a rumor had got down town that the Queen was going to promulgate a new constitution. Rumors got out, and the diplomatic corps wanted to ask me if it was so. I said it was a fact. I had not seen the constitution, but the Queen had requested me to be there with my colleagues. I told them I had not seen the constitution and had no idea what kind of document it was. We all assured them that we would not consent to sign the constitution and then we went over to the palace.

We went into the blue room. She said “I sent for you gentlemen; I was requested by my people to promulgate a new constitution. I want you gentlemen to sign it or to consent to it.” They all looked to me. I said: “Your Majesty, we have not read the constitution, but before we read it, you must know it is a revolutionary act. It can not be done.” She said: “Read it; see what it is.” On that point we said, after we had read it: “We advise you to give it up—not to think any more about it.” By that time she got pretty well excited, and some of my colleagues said: “If you insist upon it, we will resign.” I said: “Now, gentlemen, if you will walk out into the next room, I will have a few words with her Majesty.” They went out. I talked to her, but of course she said that it was her people’s wish, and so many thousand signatures had been sent in. She said: “I have thought over the matter carefully, and think that I ought to give them a new constitution.”

I told her I would not and my colleagues would not agree to it. There were a good many words passed between us. She said: “Why don’t you resign.” I said I would not resign unless it was according to law. When I. got down to Government house there was Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hart well, and Mr. Smith, the attorney-general there, and a great many others for consultation in regard to this. They all complimented us; said they would give us all assistance, etc. I told my colleagues they might as well go over with me. They went over and persuaded her (the Queen) to give it up.

Mr. Blount. Was this Monday?

Mr. Parker. This was Saturday.

Mr. Blount. She agreed to give it up that night?

Mr. Parker. Yes; that day. I do not know exactly the words she used. On Sunday we called on some influential people around town, Mr. Damon, vice-president of the Provisionial Government, and half a dozen other prominent men. We knew they were friends of the Queen and friends of the people, and they thought if the Queen would come with some proclamation of some kind and assure the people that she would give up all idea of the promulgation of a new constitution that they thought the people would be satisfied. That was on Sunday afternoon. Some thought we ought to have the committee of thirteen arrested, but I thought it was not necessary.

On Sunday night we prepared a document for her to sign, and Monday morning I went there about half past 8. She was at breakfast. I showed her this document. I said I wanted her to sign; the cabinet advised her to sign the proclamation, and I would have it brought up. I had had it set up at the printing office, so that it would be ready to be struck off by thousands. The copy was made out at my office. She signed it and it was given out to the public and a copy sent to the diplomatic corps. A little later on they thought that we ought to have sent a special one to the diplomatic corps. So we got up another in a little different wording and sent them to the diplomatic corps addressed to them.

Mr. Blount; When was the Provisional Government determined on?

Mr. Parker. I do not think it was given out to the public. There was nothing spoken of in public about the Provisional Government. That was kept secret. They had a meeting on Saturday night. We got hold of it that they were talking about this dethronement, and on Sunday it was substantiated. I for one have talked to the people and have also advised the Queen not to make any demonstrations whatever against the Provisional Government, as it was understood that it was only to be a temporary government until the matter was settled by the United States. If it was permanent I do not think it will work.

Mr. Blount. Why?

Mr. Parker. The head is all right, but it does not go to prove that what they do will be heeded by him. Now, the parties that consist of that Provisional Government outside of Damon, Dole, and Allen, and one or two others, are not men of standing, men of such stamp as would not carry weight in any country. That is the kind of men who are making our laws. I do not think the representative men here would want to live under such a government, with such men at the helm, if it was permanent. I was a member of the board of health. I would not take the oath to support this Provisional Government. I was minister under the Queen. I was using all my influence among my people to keep quiet, to keep the peace, and to assist all we can in keeping everything quiet until it is settled for annexation, protectorate, or whatever the case may be.

Mr. Blount. What is the feeling of the majority of the people here?

Mr. Parker. Among the Hawaiians it is for the restoration of the Queen. That is my own feeling, and I think I speak for the people, too.

Mr. Blount. You have a table of the registered native voters for 1890. What is the total vote there?

Mr. Parker. About 9,000 voteis in all. Out of that I will say if it was secured—a valid vote—out of 9,000 there would be 8,000 in favor of restoration.

Mr. Blount. Native population?

Mr. Parker. Yes.

Mr. Blount. How would you class all other voters besides those you have named?

Mr. Parker. Foreign voters. I think they would be divided. I would not want to express my opinion. The majority would be for annexation. That is my opinion—among foreign voters.

Mr. Blount. What would be your opinion as to the majority, if the 13,000 votes were all polled; how many of them would be for royalty, and how many against?

Mr. Parker. I say in regard to royalty—I suppose out of 13,000, I would put it 10,000 for restoration.

Mr. Blount. Suppose you take a little time and make some figures.

Mr. Parker. There are 9,000 native voters. When I speak of natives I know, but when I talk of foreigners I am at a loss. I know most are for annexation, except perhaps a few English and other nationalities. The Englishmen are naturally prejudiced. I can speak for Hawaiians, but would not want to give my opinion on foreigners.” I would put it, out of 9,554 native voters 8,500 would be in favor of it (royalty) and 1,000 against it, among Hawaiians. One-fourth of the foreigners would be for the restoration of the Queen, I think, but it might not be as much as that.

Mr. Blount. You wanted to qualify a while ago in what you said about the restoration of the Queen.

Mr. Parker. The restoration of the Queen under an American protectorate would be a more stable government than the old regime. There is a feeling that unless we are under some country like the United States it would be the same old revolutionary trouble coming up all the time. I do not think it would be a very stable government. There is a certain class of people here—a certain class like the Germans and Portuguese. They say, “Give us a revolution and it will give us something to do—give us a dollar and a half or two dollars a day.” I understand the Provisional Government is paying $40 a month and found. That class of people would sooner have a revolution night in and night out. So that I say I do not think it will ever be a stable government unless we are under a protectorate. If we are under a protectorate I say let it be the United States. I do not say this because you are the American Commissioner.

Mr. Blount. Your idea is that a majority of the people are for the Queen, but that if the Queen were reinstated she would not be able to maintain permanent order here without the sanction of her authority by a protectorate, say, of the United States?

Mr. Parker. That is what I think. I have not talked with the Queen on the subject; that would be my advice to her. I would not accept the same position I had before the revolution unless there was a protectorate. If she said; “I want you to be in the same position you held before this revolution took place—minister of foreign affairs,” I would say, “no; unless you have it under a protectorate.” It is no use looking to England, Japan, France, or Germany. All our benefits are derived from the United States.

Mr. Blount. What is the feeling of your people on the question of their right of suffrage?

Mr. Parker. The right of suffrage means of course a great deal to the Hawaiian people. If they were admitted as the District of Columbia, which has no vote, the natives would not like it. It would be an eyesore to them. They want suffrage.

Mr. Blount. Is there any apprehension in their minds about the question of suffrage?

Mr. Parker. Yes; they are very well posted on that.

Mr. Blount. Is there any apprehension that the friends of the Provisional Government contemplate any deprivation of the right of suffrage?

Mr. Parker. Yes; it was given out that the natives could not be trusted and it was out in native papers just as quick as it was in other papers. There was a howl when they heard that; when young men, nursed by Hawaiian women, as they said, would ever live to work against the interests of Hawaiian people. I said to the people that we could not expect to be under a monarchical government all the time; a change is bound to come some day. Every day this thing becomes more apparent. The native race is decreasing every year.

Mr. Blount. Would you please state the cause of that?

Mr. Parker. That has been brought up in the legislature year after year, and all the conclusions we could come to was that we are like all dark races—that they go out when the white man comes in. It is a problem why we should die out. I have eight children, and many others have as many. If all other Kanakas should have two children each we should increase very much. I can not account for the decrease.

Mr. Blount. Is it a fact that they do not have so many children as other people here?

Mr. Parker. Oh no; I can show you a dozen of my stamp. I have eight children, another five, and so on. I am seven-eighths native; my wife is seven-eighths. That is nearly all Hawaiian, with little foreign blood in it.

Mr. Blount. Children are born, but not raised?

Mr. Parker. Yes; they are careless. It is a customary thing for Hawaiian women to give birth to a child this morning and then ride out horseback in the afternoon. The better class, though, go under proper treatment. I have been married twenty-one years. With our first child my wife was in bed nine days. My aunt said, why should she lie in bed so long? When she gave birth to her first child she was out the next day.

The Hawaiians are good breeders, but they are careless. When the children get fevers they give them cold baths. When the smallpox was here, about 1881, some 400 or 500 natives died. Other nationalities very few. Natives will sit in draft or jump into a bath if they are fevered. They are very careless in that way.

Mr. Blount. You said awhile ago that the native vote, as expressed in secret ballot, would not show the same opinion as if they were asked to sign a petition.

Mr. Parker. It would never be the same.

Mr. Blount. Why?

Mr. Parker. You take the plantations. Every plantation has more or less men under them. They look up to the owner of an estate as to a little king, or as their guardian, and they would sign any petition that he wanted them to do. Mr. Spreckles has 300 native laborers. They would all favor the side he did. Mr. Rentre was in favor of restoring the Queen. Everyone of the people on his plantation signed a petition for restoration. They worshiped him. If I was for annexation, every one of the people in my employ would sign it. All laborers would do exactly as the overseers wanted. They say the Queen is our Queen. But supposing they had to do it in secret ballot; they would say, we want restoration. The Wilder Steamship Company, rank annexationists, employ natives. They could intimidate these natives. If you gave them a secret ballot they would vote as they felt.

I have carefully read the foregoing and find it to be a correct report of my interview with Col. Blount.

After the troops were landed I met Mr. Thurston, and laughing at me, he said, “Who ordered those troops ashore?” I replied, “I don’t know. I suppose your committee of safety had it done.”

My impression was that they were landed in the interest of the movement of the committee of safety.

Samuel Parker.

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, June 15, 1893.