No. 35.
Interview with Curtis J. Lyons, assistant an, Government survey, Honolulu, Wednesday, April 12, 1893.

Mr. Blount. Mr. Lyons, I ask you to give me what you conceive to be the causes of the revolution—the causes of the dethronement of the Queen and the establishment of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Lyons. The revolution of 1887 was the spontaneous rising of the better elements here against the ultramonarehical government of Kalakaua.

Q. Let me interrupt you here. What do you mean by the better element of the people?

A. By the better element I mean the leading element in society and in business.

Q. And what nationalities would cover that?

A. Americans, English, and Germans.

Q. Please proceed.

A. The influence of the King over the Legislature was one of the grievances, and the meddling of Kalakaua unnecessarily with foreign matters in the Pacific, which would naturally lead us into trouble.

Q. What foreign matters?

A. Samoan matters. Then the taking of a large bribe from the Chinese for art opium license was especially aggravating. To illustrate the meddling of the sovereign in the Legislature. At a previous Legislature I have seen—

Q. Previous Legislature to what?

A. Previous to 1887—I have seen the King in the noon interim for lunch go with a body of legislators to the house of Mr. J. E. Bush, then minister of the interior, to arrange things for the afternoon session. It was the acknowledged object of their meeting there. The feeling in; 1887 became very great. A body of volunteer riflemen was drilled.

Q. By whom?

A. By one of the Ashfords.

Q. They were not organized by the Government?

A. They were organized under the volunteer act; that is, volunteer companies were allowed, and under that act this volunteer company was drilled. Clubs for rifle practice were formed. The revolution was accomplished by means of a mass meeting which included the larger part of the foreign population of Honolulu. The rifle company was called out ostensibly to preserve order.

Q. By whom?

A. As I understand it, Antone Rosa, the attorney-general. He was requested to order it out. I do not know the details. At that time I was in charge of the survey office. I did not deem it honorable to join the movement, although my sympathy was with it. The rifle company came over to the Government building ostensibly to protect the life of William M. Gibson. A committee was sent to Kalakaua.

Q. Who was William M. Gibson?

A. He was then premier, minister of foreign affairs. The committee went to the King with demands, the main feature of which was the appointment of a new ministry which should prepare a new constitution. The ministry was appointed and the constitution promulgated in one week. This constitution had three notable features of reform. The first, that no executive officer of the Government should be elected [Page 880] to the Legislature nor any member of the Legislature appointed to executive office during the biennial period for which he held office. That the nobles in the Legislature who had previously been appointed by the King should be appointed by a restricted vote having a property qualification.

Q. What was the property qualification?

A. It was a yearly income of $600, or property of $3,000 in real estate. The third important feature: the King was not to dismiss a ministry without a legislative vote of want of confidence. The vote for representatives which had been previously enjoyed was untouched. The vote for nobles was an entirely new feature which had never been enjoyed by any one previously. After this revolution—the Reform party which sustained it——

Q. Will you wait one moment? With a property qualification of $3,000 or an income of $600 to vote, how would the number of native voters compare with the number of white voters?

A. That could be settled by reference to the great register. My impression is that about 25 per cent of the voters would be Hawaiians.

Q. And the balance would be whites?

A. That is my impression.

Q. The result of that would have been to have given—if the whites were united—the election of nobles to them?

A. If they had been united it would.

Q. Was that the object of the change in that particular?

A. The object of the change from the King’s appointment to the electoral appointment was to limit the power of the King.

Q. The effect would be the disqualification of the mass of the native population, so that there would not be more than 25 per cent of them having the right to vote as against 75 per cent of the whites. So that the proportion was fixed in order to give the white element the greatest power in the selection of the body of natives [nobles]?

A. It was not done with any reference to whites or Hawaiians. It was simply on the general principle of giving to those who had sufficient intelligence to earn $600 per year the predominating influence.

Q. Conceding that principle, was it not expected that the principle applied would result in the whites having the power to select the body of nobles?

A. I can not say that was the exact intention as between the whites and the Hawaiians.

Q. Was it the expectation of the intelligent people on the islands that the application of this principle would mark out somewhat about what you have stated—25 per cent of the votes for the nobles by Hawaiians and the remainder by the whites—was that in the minds of the ruling class here then?

A. Any reflecting person of that class would see that that would be the consequence.

Q. Please resume.

A. After the successful ending of that revolution, matters went on well for some months, but there gradually developed a disruption.

Q. Of what?

A. The elements that carried the revolution through. What was called the National Reform party originated in opposition to what was called the Reform party. It gathered to itself a large element of the Hawaiian strength. It didn’t sympathize with the main movement, and the Legislature of 1890 secured the ministry of that party.

Q. What party?

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A. The National Reform party as opposed to the original Reform party. It is hard to define the elements of party in this little community. There was more or less complaint about the constitution of 1887.

Q. In what way—the matter of the election of nobles?

A. Principally in regard to the election of nobles.

Q. What was the exact point of complaint?

A. That the property qualification was too high. The Reform party claimed that the Hawaiias, the complaining party, had never had the privilege of voting for nobles anyway. Therefore they were not deprived of anything. The Legislature of 1892 may be characterized largely as a struggle for the possession of the ministry for the Government. It revealed, too, to thinking people the weakness of the system. I mean the ministerial system.

Q. What weakness did it reveal?

A. The change of government being placed so entirely in the hands of the Legislature it became a temptation to gain possession of the Government by manipulation.

Q. On the line of vote of confidence or want of confidence?

A. Yes. That Legislature lasted about seven months. The community generally became weary of the long struggle.

Q. Do you mean all classes and all races?

A. Yes. Several critical measures were hanging over the community. One was for unlimited paper currency—a paper currency based upon real estate, and practically unredeemable.

Q. What became of that currency bill?

A. It was defeated.

Q. By what vote?

A. I do not remember. I think it was not a very large majority.

A. (Continuing.) There was a bill for legalizing a lottery scheme which was favored very largely by the Hawaiians in the community as well as in the legislature. There was also a bill for renewing the opium license. Later in the session, about four months after the beginning of the session, a ministry was secured which commanded the respect of the business part of the community. Later on in the session there were attempts made to oust this ministry. The party which may be characterized as the reform party opposed this. They said that such a measure would tend to weaken the whole system of government, and it might perhaps bring on a crisis.

Q. In the form of debates in the legislature?

A. No; as outside advice. There was a feeling that if the Government didn’t maintain its superiority that foreign interference might take place. The advice of these people who were in favor of what afterwards became the annexation movement, was to retain that ministry, and my opinion is that if it had been retained the Queen would have been on her throne to-day.

Q. Do you mean by that that the condition of that ministry would have been in accord with the views and feelings of the Reform party?

A. No, sir; but the displacement of that ministry produced alarm and resentment. It produced a feeling that the Government was unreliable. There was a withdrawal of business confidence. With reference to annexation ideas at that time, I would say that the general feeling as understood among planters and others was against it for this reason, that contract-labor system, which has been considered almost essential, would doubtless be broken up; and in the second place the United States tariff coming into effect here would affect business unfavorably in many [Page 882] respects; in the third place there was little confidence that the sugar bounty would be continued and in the fourth place it was persistently said that the United States would not take us. I have favored annexation in a quiet way, so far as it was courteous for a person in my position, for a great many years. One attempt was made to oust the ministry, which is known as the George Wilcox ministry, which might be characterized as the Reform ministry which failed. Later on the lottery bill was passed by a, very small majority, only one white man, as I remember, voting for it. I myself remonstrated with one of the members of the Legislature against making that a race issue, as the Hawaiians appeared to be making it so.

Q. Will you explain to me what you mean by making it a race issue as the Hawaiians appeared to be doing?

A. They seemed to regard it as somehow intended to benefit them.

Q. What was the exact idea they had as to how it would benefit them?

A. I do not know. I do not comprehend, myself. There is an instinctive tendency on the part of the Hawaiians to take the crown side upon questions of this sort. On one occasion in the Legislature the argument was seriously brought forward in favor of a bill that the Queen favored it. I forget what bill it was.

Q. Brought forward by some man making a speech?

A. Yes. (Continuing.) The lottery bill passed and there was a doubt in the minds of its supporters whether the ministry would carry it out. They took occasion of that to oust the ministry. That was the day before the closing of the Legislature.

Q. This was the 13th of January, the Legislature adjourned on the 14th.

A. Yes; the lottery bill passed on Wednesday the 11th. The vote of want of confidence in the cabinet passed on the 12th, 25 to 16. On the 13th, in the afternoon, the new ministry took their seats. There was an unusual amount of enthusiasm in the audience at the time this ministry was voted out.

Q. The Wilcox ministry?

A. Yes; I noted the enthusiasm among the Hawaiians with great concern.

Q. What was the occasion of your concern; what disturbed you?

A. I felt that the Hawaiian element had taken advantage of its majority and its ability to coalesce with other parties, and had taken the weak and vicious side—that it would bring trouble.

Q. What sort of trouble?

A. Indefinite. I could hardly say what. I thought that they would become bankrupt—not have money to carry on the Government, possibly.

Q. Did you think of it possibly creating a revolution?

A. No; I did not, because there was no intention of a revolution at that time. To put it plainly, we expected to grin and bear it until something turned up. On Saturday morning it was known generally that the lottery and opium bill had been signed by the Queen. The prorogation of the Legislature was set for noon. My own statement of the case was that it was time for the Hawaiians themselves to step down and rut. I have always been a friend to the Hawaiians and tried to do what I could for them always. I have felt that they were wrecking their own Government, as a man might steer a ship to destruction. Nothing was generally known at the prorogation of a new constitution. There had been some abortive attempts to secure a constitutional convention in the Legislature. It resulted in nothing.

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Q. Any petition to the Legislature on the subject of the constitution?

A. There had been many petitions.

Q. What was the substance of the petitions; what was wanted by the petitioners?

A. A large reduction in the property qualification or abolition of it. My recollection is that there were other important changes wanted to which I paid little attention.

Q. Where did these petitions come from?

A. The natives.

Q. From all the islands?

A. I can hardly say. It was deemed that the oath to support the constitution among legislators preclude a constitutional convention.

Q. The opposition to the constitutional convention was placed by the opponents on the ground that there was no authority to call a convention?

A. Yes; that there was only one way—to amend it—and that was specified in the constitution itself.

Q. And that was by a vote of two successive legislatures?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you familiar with the affairs of Saturday afternoon?

A. I was simply a spectator. I left my office half an hour after the legislature closed, rather wondering why the band continued playing at the palace. I passed legislature hall. I saw men talking. I said to myself the circus has begun. I saw soldiers drawn up in line from the palace gate.

Q. How many of them?

A. I should say 75, or about that number. The palace yard was full of natives waiting on the grass, and many out in the street. I saw a small flag held at the foot of the palace stairs.

Q. What kind of flag?

A. A small Hawaiian flag. The flag of the Hui Kalaiaina (the last word means statesmanship). A man met me at the palace gate. He said the ministers had just resigned. In fact, that they had just fled from the palace over to the Government building.

Q. How do you know they had fled?

A. I do not personally know. That was what was always stated and never contradicted.

Q. Do you mean that somebody was trying to arrest them, or that they went away from the Queen because they were unwilling to cooperate with her in this movement?

A. The general statement made was that they were intimidated; that there were threats made in case they did not yield to the command of the Queen to assent to the constitution.

Q. What sort of threats?

A. That they would be placed under arrest, and there was an opinion that the natives might use mob violence.

Q. Whose opinion?

A. That was understood to be the fear of the ministers then.

Q. Do you know of any of them having said so?

A. I do not know. I should say, from their general demeanor that afternoon, they were very much perturbed. They appeared like men who were afraid. I went immediately down town. The news was just spreading that the crisis was taking place at the palace. Citizens came up to the Government building to see what was going on.

Q. Do you mean by citizens white people?

A. Yes. I saw Mr. Corn well, Mr. Peterson, and Mr. Colburn. I [Page 884] believe Mr. Parker remained at the palace. I returned to the Government building to watch the progress of events. I was there when the Queen’s messenger, Col. Richardson, came over and commanded the ministers to go back and wait upon the Queen.

Q. What was the form of the command? Do you know whether it was a command or an invitation?

A. I called it a command because that is the term usually applied to the Queen’s orders to her ministers.

Q. It is an official phrase?

A. Yes. I stood at the front door of the Government building when Mr. Thurston stood there. He said: “This thing must not be repeated.” He intimated—though I can not say what words he used—that it would continually be repeated under the present state of things. After some time we saw the society of the Hui Kalaiaina file out from the palace. The leader threw out his hands to intimate that they had not obtained what they wanted.

Q. What time in the day was this?

A. About 3 o’clock.

Q. How many were there of that organization present?

A. I should say about thirty in uniforms—in black with dress hats—carrying a flag at their head.

Q. Was it a committee from that society?

A. I do not know how they were appointed.

Q. That did not cover the number of that political organization in the islands?

A. It had been a large organization. It was first organized by Dan Lyons, who edited a paper a year or two previous. His main idea was to make public officers elective, but it had become entirely independent of his management and control. The size of the organization at that time I know nothing about.

Q. Would you suppose there were more than thirty persons in the islands connected with it?

A. I have no means of forming an opinion. I paid little attention to the society, thinking it amounted to nothing. They first formed in the front of the palace, until the Queen came out on the upper balcony and made a speech to them.

Q. Did you hear the speech?

A. I did not; I was too far off. I also saw at the same time a Hawaiian, who I was told was White, of Lahaina, come to the front steps and begin to speak in an excited manner. He was led back into the palace.

Q. By whom?

A. I think by Col. James Boyd. The soldiers then broke up and the audience gradually dispersed. There was great excitement among the foreign lookers on. I quietly went home myself.

Q. You were not at the meeting at Mr. Smith’s house Saturday?

A. I was not. I met a prominent citizen Sunday noon. I said: “I believe annexation is the only thing to cure this.” He said to me: “I believe a great many are now coming to feel that way.” I had said two weeks before in a private conversation with Judge Judd that I believed annexation was the only cure for this. He shook his head. He said: “I do not know.” About this same Sunday he acknowledged to me that I was right.

Q. Who did?

A. Judge Judd. It was about that time. I will not be sure whether it was Sunday or Monday. The Boston came into port on Saturday [Page 885] morning from Hilo. Monday morning after reading the paper and noting the call for the two mass meetings in the afternoon, I said to my wife: “The situation is very serious indeed. It is more serious than it was in 1887. That with the arms and men at the disposal of the Queen they might use force to put down the other mass meeting or there might be a riot between the two elements outside of that.” I also said—not knowing about any plans—that it would be wise for the Boston to land her troops to preserve order.

I went down to my office. I heard of the manifesto of the Queen disavowing her conduct of Saturday. About half past 9 a messenger from Mr. Colburn’s office came to our office with the orders that if any trouble ensued that the staff of the survey office should report to the station house for service. Our names were taken down. I went over to the minister’s office. I simply said to him, “I am not in a state of health for active service.” His ‘reply was, “We shall expect a very good excuse if you are not there.” I left him, saying that perhaps I should be there. I attended the mass meeting at the armory or skating rink. It was very crowded. I felt it was a very critical moment. It would seem as if the Government forces might at any time be sent to disperse the meeting. The speakers all carried the main idea that the community must not again be exposed to this continual danger of revolution; that something must be done to put a stop to events which would lead at any time to revolution. This state of things kept our families in a state of alarm, injured business, and could not be endured longer. Nothing was said about annexation.

Q. Anything said about dethronement?

A. Nothing, directly. The speeches are reported, and correctly, in the papers of the succeeding day.

Q. So that was the spirit of the meeting?

A. Dethronement?

Q. Yes.

A. It was not so stated. It was to denounce the Queen’s action; that steps must be taken to prevent any recurrence of that state of things.

Q. What sort of steps were in the minds of the speakers and audience?

A. There was evidence of very intense feeling and determination.

Q. To do what?

A. The vote was to sustain the committee of safety.

Q. In what?

A. In such steps as they might see fit to take. The meeting ad journed quietly and the history of the landing of the troops is well known.

Q. Now I will ask you on another branch; if the matter of the support of the Provisional Government was left to the people who had the privilege of voting under the constitution of 1887 on the question of sustaining the Provisional Government, what would be the result under the Australian ballot system?

A. I am inclined to think it would be against it.

Q. How much?

A. I can not say. I know there has been a growth of annexation feeling among the Hawaiian population.

Q. I simply want to know, taking the test by popular vote, what would be the results?

A. So far as I could judge I should say it would be against them judging from my general acquaintance with the population.

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I have carefully read through the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

Curtis J. Lyons.