No. 12.
Interview with Crlster Bolte, of
Honolulu, May 5, 1893.
Mr. Blount. What is your occupation, Mr. Bolte?
Mr. Bolte. I am a merchant in the corporation of Grinbaum & Co.
Q. Are you connected with the Planters’Labor and Supply Assosociation?
A. I am.
Q. Are you a stockholder in sugar plantations?
A. I am.
Q. Is the Planters’Labor and Supply Association made up of persons interested in planting, either directly or by owning stock?
A. Yes; it is made up of persons owning stock in plantations and plantations themselves. There is hardly any person of property in this country who is not an owner of some sugar stocks.
Q. Are the members of this Planters’ Labor and Supply Company all owners of sugar stocks?
A. I believe so.
Q. Were you here on the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of January, 1893?
A. Yes.
Q. Please tell me what you know about the occurrences during that time?
A. Previous to the 14th of January we had a cabinet consisting of Wilcox, P. C. Jones, Cecil Brown, and Mark Bobinson. These were all people of intelligence, integrity, and property. They commanded the confidence of the whole community. Various attempts had been made by the legislature to get rid of them. Finally, on the 13th of January, they did oust them.
The cabinet, consisting of Sam Parker, Billy Cornwell, John Colburn, and Peterson, was appointed by the Queen, and on the 14th of January the legislature was prorogued. These people did not command the confidence of the business community. Sam Parker has squandered away all his money. He is considered a big boy; no stability in him. Billy Cornwell is of the same character also; has no property. John Colburn is a man of property, but of very doubtful character—not considered honest and straightforward. Peterson is an able lawyer. He has had the best of chances here to be a respectable man, but he seems naturally inclined towards associating with a class of people who have no respectability to them.
Q. What do you mean by the word “respectability?”
A. A man who leads a pure family life, pays his bills, keeps his word, and various other ways.
Q. What is his business?
A. He is a lawyer. He goes off on carousals. Does not go home at night. There is trouble in his family. Now to proceed: The legislature was prorogued on the 14th at 12 o’clock, and before that time news [Page 716] came down town that the Queen was going to proclaim a new constitution and abrogate the old’one. The business men down town came together and talked matters over.
Q. At what place?
A. W. O. Smith’s office. They came to the conclusion that if tbe Queen can alter the constitution to suit herself she might as well alter any other law to suit herself. Anyway through altering the constitution alone she would get perfect centrol of the affairs of the country, because, in this constitution it says—as Minister Colburn told us at this meeting—that she intended to appoint the nobles, which is one-half of the legislative body. We decided to let things go on for a while to see how it would end up. At 4 o’clock we had another meeting, which was largely attended.
Q. At the same place?
A. At the same place. It was then stated by Minister Colburn and Minister Peterson that she had not proclaimed a new constitution; had told the people to go home, abide their time, be of good cheer, and she would give them a new constitution anyhow. At the first meeting Paul Neumann was present and said the Queen was going to proclaim a new constitution. At this last meeting it was decided that the people who were there could not be satisfied with the Queen just withdrawing from this as if nothing had happened, and they came to the conclusion that the people must have guarantees for the future, and appointed a committee of thirteen people, of which I was a member, to devise ways and means by which such guarantees could be gotten.
This committee met several times at various places, and decided that the only perfect safeguard against future occurrences of this kind would lie in annexation to the United States, or in a protectorate, or in anything of that kind, but that we could not go on with the form of government as it was then. They decided to call a mass meeting of citizens on Monday afternoon at 2 o’clock, and see what people there would say about it. At this meeting were various speakers, some of the committee of thirteen and also others. The people were asked by the speakers if they were satisfied with the promises the Queen had made and let the matter drop—let everything go on as it was before, or if they wanted a change and guarantees for the future. They desired guarantees for the future, and appointed the committee of thirteen—or rather continued the committee—to take such further steps as might be necessary.
Q. Let me ask you what you meant and what people meant by say-iug they wanted guarantees?
A. I meant a change of government. What the people meant I can not say, but I am fully convinced that they meant the same as it has been very often spoken of during the last few years.
Q. What has been spoken of so often?
A. Annexation to the United States has been advocated publicly in the papers—I meant change of government.
Q. Why didn’t you use language that conveyed distinctly the idea—dethronement of the Queen and annexation to the United States?
A. The Hawaiian Government, as it was then, was still in existence, and in stating there publicly we wanted to dethrone the Queen and have a government of our own with an intention of being annexed to the United States, might be going a little too far.
Q. You mean making you liable to interference on the part of the local authorities?
A. Yes.
[Page 717]Q. And that you were trying to avoid at that time?
A. Yes, especially for this reason. We did not know whether the action of the committee would be indorsed by this large majority of the people at the mass meeting. We thought it would.
Q. Was there any expression in that meeting asking for guarantees for the future in a shape of a vote?
A. Yes; the resolution was all prepared.
Q. It was a resolution indorsing the report of the Committee of Safety?
A. Yes. The meeting dispersed, and the committee of safety went back to W. O. Smith’s office to talk matters over.
Q. What time in the day was that?
A. About half past 3. After talking matters over and seeing that the Queen had concentrated her forces—meaning thereby that the soldiers were all in the barracks—the palace barricaded with sand bags and the station house barricaded——
Q. How about the Government house?
A. I didn’t notice anything going on there. The station house has always been considered the stronghold of the Government. It looked as if there might be trouble. So we came to the conclusion to ask Mr. Stevens if he would protect the life and property of the citizens by sending some soldiers ashore, stating that we considered the situation very grave—even dangerous. After a short while Mr. Stevens sent his answer that he would.
Q. Sent it to the meeting?
A. Yes; sent it to the meeting, and then at 5 o’clock the soldiers came ashore. They were quartered at various places. That same evening, Monday, January 16, the Committee of Safety had another meeting.
Q. Where?
A. At Mr. Henry Waterhouse’s house. They called in, besides the Committee of Safety, a few other gentlemen.
Q. Who were they?
A. Mr. Young, Fred Wundenburg, Cecil Brown, and John H. Soper. We talked matters over to see what would be best to do, and came to the conclusion we would form a Provisional Government and ask Mr. Dole if he would be the President, and that this Provisional. Government should try to get annexation with the United States, because so far as we could make out at that time that was the only solid basis on which we could safely rely. Mr. Dole was not at the meeting. I had my horse with me. I was detailed to speak to Mr. Dole. I arrived at his house about half past 8, I think.
I told him what decision we had come to, and asked him if he would accept such an office. He was utterly surprised at it. He had had nothing to do with the affair before, only had been at second meeting at W. O. Smith’s. He said he could not then quite see that the view we had was quite correct, but still he had not given the matter much consideration. After a lengthy discussion I induced him to go along to the meeting, so that he could hear what they had to say. After everything at the meeting had been thoroughly explained to him and discussed with him he said that he felt it was his duty, as well as the duty of any other citizen of these islands, to do all they could to get pure and stable government, but he was not quite convinced thenthat it was necessary to take so radical a step as to overthrow the old Government. Later on, at about 12 o’clock that night, he had come to the conclusion we could not go on the way we were, but whether he would [Page 718] become President or not lie would not say until 10 o’clock the next morning.
The next morning at 10 o’clock we met at W. O. Smith’s office, and he said he had resigned his position as judge and would do what he was requested to do by us. We then proceeded to form the Government. It took us up to about 12 o’clock. We made all the necessary arrangements and adjourned to meet again at half past 1. At half past 1 we talked all matters over again for a little while and went to the Government house and took possession of it. At the Government house there was nobody, no armed men, supporters of the Queen, except Charles McCarty, who was doing some clerical work for the lately adjourned legislature. He said he was waiting for somebody to come to help him defend the Government house.
Q. To you?
A. No.
Q. You don’t know that he said it?
A. Only from friends who told me.
Q. Who did he tell?
A. I think Andrew Brown.
Q. What does he do?
A. He is a coppersmith. He worked in the Honolulu Iron Works. Lately became superintendent of the water works. At 2 o’clock when we arrived at the Government house there came our supporters—brought their rifles and pistols with them.
Q. Do you mean at the same time, or do you mean that they got there a little before or a little after you?
A. There was preconcerted action. We told them we would go to the Government house at 2 o’clock.
Q. Had you commenced to read the proclamation before your troops got on the ground?
A. I do not recollect distinctly. They were there before we finished reading the proclamation. The chief clerks at the different departments were called in to confer with the newly-appointed ministers, among them Mr. Hassenger and Mr. Hastings. They were told to go right on with their work. Letters were written at once to the representatives of foreign countries informing them that the Provisional Government was now the Government of the Hawaiian Islands. After a short time they answered, recognizing this Government.
Q. That same day?
A. Mostly the same day. When we arrived at the Government house the ministers were not there. Mr. Hassenger, chief clerk of the interior department, said he believed they had gone over to the palace. He telephoned for them, but he got no answer, or they answered they were not there. Later on in the afternoon—I should think abput 4 o’clock—Deputy Marshal Mherton came to the Government house to ask some question of Mr. Dole. I forget now what the question was. He then said, incidentally, that the ministers were at the station house, and he was handed a copy of the proclamation to give it to the old ministers. They had not been officially informed of anything, because we could not find them. Also a verbal invitation was sent to them to come over to the Government house to talk. Sam Parker came over to the Government house. He said in effect this: “You have possession now. We can not do anything.” He was asked to get his colleagues. He said they did not like to come, but would some of us come to the station house and talk there?
Q. Had you then been recognized by the United States minister?
[Page 719]A. No. We had not been recognized by anybody at that time. Sam Damon and I were appointed and we went there to talk with them.
Q. To try to induce them to give up?
A. Yes.
Q. What reason did you give them?
A. That we had possession of the Government house now and that it would be useless shedding of blood if we got into a fight over this thing.
Q. Did you give any other reason?
A. No; only just stuck to facts.
Q. Any mention of United States troops on your part or the part of anybody during that conversation? A. No; I did not say anything about it.
Q. Did anybody?
A. I can not say whether Sam Damon said anything.
Q. Did they say anything to anybody in your presence?
A. No.
Q. How did they answer you? Did you have no discussion.?
A. Not there. We invited them to come to the Government house and talk with Mr. Dole.
Q. Did they make any agreement with you, or did they postpone it and go to the Government house?
A. Peterson said if we would guarantee him his liberty——
Q. Safe-conduct?
A. Yes. We promised him that and all went together to the Government house.
Q. What time of day was this?
A. About 5 o’clock.
Q. What time is it dark at that season of the year?
A. Between 6 and 6:30. At the station house was Ned Macfarlane. He said to me that he thought the old government would give up or the Queen would give up if we would accept a protest of her. He said, “I know such a protest does not amount to anything, but still she wants it and so you had better accept it.” I told him that so far as I was concerned in the matter they could put all the protests they wanted.
Q. Was this conversation at the barracks or Government house?
A. At the station house. The four ministers, Sam Damon, and I took two hacks and went to the Government house. All said about the same thing, that they would have to give up, but they wanted to enter a protest. Then Sam Damon went with the ministers to the Queen. He reported after he came back that the Queen had said in substance the same thing.
Q. What time was it when they came back?
A. Fully 6 o’clock.
Q. About quarter of an hour before sunset?
A. Yes. Very soon after Billy Cornwell came over bringing the protest that you know of. Mr. Dole acknowledged the receipt of the protest on the back of it, stating the hour, and he then said the Queen would send orders to the station house that her people should vacate the premises. Very soon after that Captain Zeigler with a number of our men went to the station house and took possession, and the others went away leaving their arms.
Q. Who was in command of the station house?
A. Charles B. Wilson, marshal.
[Page 720]Q. What do you mean by very soon after? What time was the station house given up?
A. About five minutes after Billy Cornwell delivered the protest.
Q. How do you know that? Were you at the station house?
A. No.
Q. You did not know then what time it was given up?
A. We heard immediately. They telephoned from there.
Q. How long after?
A. I an not say. It was all done in a short time. I went home and got dinner. I was home about 7 o’clock.
Q. You said that same day Mr. Stevens and all the foreign governments recognized your Government. At what time in the day did they recognize you?
A. First came Mr. Woodhouse and Mr. Fuji.
Q. What time was that?
A. Four o’clock.
Q. What time in the day did Mr. Stevens send his recognition?
A. I can not say.
Q. Won’t you try to approximate?
A. I can not.
Q. Had the sun set or not?
A. If Mr. Pringle brought the letter then the sun had set, and I think he was the one to bring the letter.
Q. When did you learn of the recognition? How long before you went home?
A. Just before I went honie. That was what I was waiting for.
Q. How did you learn that?
A. By letter being read aloud.
Q. Who had the letter?
A. Mr. Dole.
Q. Do you know how long he had that letter?
A. He did not have it until—I think—Mr. Pringle brought it in.
Q. Are you sure about that?
A. I am not positive about that.
Q. You do not know that Pringle brought that letter at all?
A. No; but I am under that impression. I believe he delivered the letter, but I did not see him hand it over.
Q. Now will you say how long before you went home before you heard of that letter?
A. I was waiting for that letter to go home.
Q. You do not know who brought the letter?
A. I think Mr. Pringle.
Q. You do not know but what that letter was there half an hour before that?
A. I did not see the letter unless it was Pringle who brought it.
Q. You do not know but what that recognition was delivered to Mr. Dole sometime before you knew of it?
A. No; but I have reason to believe not, because some way or other I know that they said we can not be recognized as fully in possession of the Government until we had the station house and barracks in our possession. We were among ourselves wondering why Mr. Stevens did not send his recognition. This was what my friends said.
Q. What friends? Mr. Dole didn’t say that—Mr. W. O. Smith didn’t?
A. He may; I don’t know who.
Q. Did Mr. Thurston tell you anything of that sort?
[Page 721]A. It is impossible to tell you what individuals said. There were so many there; it was not like a regular well conducted quiet meeting.
Q. How many attempts were made to oust the Wilcox cabinet before it was voted out?
A. Only one definite attempt.
Q. You were speaking of the character of members of the last cabinet of Liliuokalani. What do you say as to Mr. Parker’s character for truth and veracity?
A. I do not know. I have never had dealings with him.
Q. What is his reputation?
A. I do not know. Nobody expects very much out of him. They look upon him as an overgrown boy.
Q. What do you say as to Mr. Peterson’s reputation for truthfulness?
A. I would say myself that I do not believe he is a truthful man.
Q. What is his general reputation in that way?
A. That question I do not like to answer. I would rather state from personal knowledge.
Q. What about Mr. Colburn? What is his reputation for truth?
A. His truthfulness and honesty is very poor, I know.
Q. What is Corn well’s reputation for truth and veracity?
A. The same as Sam Parker’s. He is considered a boy. With regard to truthfulness I can not say.
Q. How many persons were present in Mr. Smith’s office at Saturday’s first meeting?
A. Perhaps thirty.
Q. How many at the second meeting?
A. More than one hundred. People standing out in the street. Could not get in there.
Q. You talked of annexation to the United States in there, did you or did you not, on Saturday?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you think of annexation to the Uuited States; was there a disposition of that sort in the country?
A. Yes; it has been discussed openly in newspapers over the signature or name of various people, among them, Hart well, Sereno Bishop, and others.
Q. Was that the general disposition amongst the whites in this country?
A. It is.
Q. Was it at that time?
A. It was.
Q. So you felt sure of that on that day—Saturday?
A. We knew that was the feeling of all who were at the two meet ings on Saturday, as well as the large meeting in the skating rink.
Q. Before that, was it the general inclination of the whites in the Hawaiian Islands?
A. Yes; I should consider it so.
Q. You had a meeting on Monday about 3 o’clock of the committee of safety, after the mass meeting?
A. Yes; about half-past three.
Q. You were present?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time how many arms did you have?
A. They were not collected, but they were all over town. I had seen some of my friends on Saturday, and at one house they told me that they had between 50 and 60 men armed.
[Page 722]Q. Of course yon made some estimate of your arms. How many men do you think you had and how many guns do you think you had?
A. I can say what I thought myself. My own opinion was that we could liave three or four hundred easily.
Q. You appointed a committee to wait on Mr. Stevens and ask that troops be brought on shore?
A. Yes.
Q. Who carried that communication to Mr. Stevens?
A. I am not sure. I think Thurston and Waterhouse. I am not sure. It may have been somebody entirely different.
Q. Did you see Mr. Stevens that day?
A. No.
Q. Who reported Mr. Stevens’ reply about troops?
A. The same committee.
Q. What did they say?
A. They said that Mr. Stevens had heard their request and con versed with them about matters, and he considered that the situation was sufficiently dangerousto send troops ashore.
Q. Was he informed of the purposes of the mass meeting?
A. He did know about it. Everybody in town knew.
Q. And knew of the purposes of the movement?
A. I cannot say.
Q. You say everybody in town knew?
A. That we desired annexation had not been said by us at the mass meeting. We said we wanted stable government. The committee was to devise ways and means to get stable government.
Q. Was it known that one of the methods of getting it was to get rid of the Queen? Was that the impression of the meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. That meeting was composed of a large class of whites, and it is a fair inference that the white people here knew what it meant?
A. Yes; I think so.
Q. The meeting that called for troops—they determined then and there to dethrone the Queen—the meeting after the mass meeting?
A. After the mass meeting we said we have to decide what to do about this, and the first thing we have to do is to get things into safety, and it was only in the evening on Monday, the 16th of January, at Henry Waterhouse’s house, that we definitely made up our minds which course to pursue.
Q. What course?
A. The course we have pur sued—dethroning the Queen and forming the Provisional Government.
Q. Your committee that met after the mass meeting were all in favor individually of dethroning the Queen?
A. Yes, individually.
Q. Why did not you determine to do it then instead of postponing it until night?
A. Because we wanted to go home to get our dinner and come back after dinner.
Q. Then, the night meeting was a continuation of the discussion which began after the mass meeting, and concluded with the determination to dethrone the Queen and establish the Provisional Government?
A. The night meeting was an adjourned meeting of the 3 o’clock meeting.
Q. What did you do at the 3 o’clock meeting?
A. We said we are a committee of safety. We must get things safe [Page 723] first. We will appoint a committee to wait upon Mr. Stevens and ask him to send soldiers ashore.
Q. And having done that you adjourned?
A. We waited until the committee came back. The committee said Mr. Stevens was willing—the soldiers would come ashore at 5 o’clock. Then we adjourned to meet in the evening.
Q. Was there any communication between any of the gentlemen who met at Mr. Waterhouse’s house that night and Mr. Stevens?
A. None to my knowledge.
Q. No committee went to see him?
A. No.
Q. Why did you want thctroops to come on shore? What was the idea of the committee?
A. The idea of the committee was this: The natives were armed—at least the soldiers and friends of the Queen were all armed—that evening. We didn’t have any armed forces in readiness. Each individual had his own arms, but we had no organized forces; so in case of a row we would not be able to resist anything.
Q. Suppose they had made an attack on the committee of safety, what would you have done?
A. We could not have done anything. They would simply have caught us. We had our men out watching. We were afraid of an attack.
Q. By the government troops?
A. No, by the natives, because there were some among the natives who had been preaching for them to set houses on fire.
Q. You wanted troops to keep them from setting houses on fire?
A. Yes; as soon as the natives in this country know that there is a strong force anywhere which they can not subdue or will show real fight it is then their character to be very quiet and keep still.
Q. If the troops had not been landed you would not have been safe?
A. We would not have considered ourselves safe.
Q. If you had not gotten a favorable answer from Mr. Stevens about the landing of the troops, what would you have done then?
A. That is impossible to answer, because we had not made any plans.
Q. You were not willing to do anything until you got the answer.
A. That is a question I can hot give an answer to. We did not decide about it.
Q. You said you met to do one thing—to ask for troops and to stay there until you got Mr. Stevens’s answer, and then you adjourned. Is that correct.
A. Yes.
Q. Having gotten that answer and the troops on shore you assembled at night, and at that night session you determined to dethrone the Queen and establish the Provisional Government?
A. Yes.
Q. You never took up that subject until you got the troops on shore?
A. At previous meetings. Saturday afternoon we were appointed. Sunday we had a meeting. At this meeting we talked over matters. The general feeling was that annexation to the United States would be the best solution of the whole question, and this, of course, would necessitate the overthrow of the Queen’s Government.
Q. That was known at Saturday’s meeting and at Sunday’s meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have any meeting before the mass meeting on Monday?
A. We had another meeting on Monday morning.
[Page 724]Q. And still the same feeling?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there anything said in this meeting with reference to the use of troops?
A. No; although I can not state so positively.
Q. Was anything said on Sunday about the use of troops?
A. Only that we expressed the wish that we could get the troops to make things safe.
Q. Then on Monday before the meeting, was there anything mentioned about the troops?
A. It was still said if we could get annexation to the United States and have United States troops on shore there would be no trouble.
Q. You thought if you got troops on shore everything would be quiet?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you think it at the mass meeting?
A. Yes; still thought the same thing.
Q. And you thought at night when you assembled and determined on dethroning the Queen that you would have no trouble, the troops being on shore?
A. Exactly so.
Q. You thought the presence of United States troops—an organized armed body of men—would prevent any hostile movement on the part of the government forces?
A. Not of the forces, but of an excited mob.
Q. You went up to the government building—the troops were near by. Did you still feel that the presence of those troops would likely restrain hostilities?
A. No; I can hardly say that. I expected that there would be somebody in the Government building—that there might be some formalities.
Q. What sort of formalities?
A. The same formalities as we have had before at the 1887 revolution. They trotted out with their guns and talked.
Q. You expected there would be a talk and they would surrender?
A. Yes.
Q. The opinion you have expressed about the presence of troops—was that the general opinion in the meeting of the committee of safety?
A. The committee of safety thought that as soon as the United States troops were on shore the property of everybody would be safe—no house-firing; no plunder.
Q. When the troops came on shore what did you expect of them in the event of a conflict between the Provisional Government forces and the Queen’s Government?
A. We did not expect them to do anything.
Q. Just to stand and see the fight?
A. I do not know. My opinion is that they came on shore to protect life and property. Their presence would avoid any attack upon property or life.
Q. How would they accomplish it? You are proposing to depose the Queen; she has armed forces. Suppose those forces had gotten into battle. What did you expect the United States troops to do in the way of protection of person and property during the battle?
A. This is a peaceable country. We only scare one another. No blood shedding happens here. This is the third revolution since I am here. At the first revolution not a shot was fired. At the second [Page 725] there were two or three young native men who had had a military training in Europe. They fired a lew guns that they had. There were seven or eight native people killed—wounded and killed. As soon as these people had been wounded and killed the rest of the natives ran away. Hid away in the house in the palace yard—the bungalow it is called. During the whole afternoon was kept up a fusillade from both sides. Nobody was hurt. In this instance I personally expected there would be something similar to either the first or second revolution.
Q. What were the deliberations of the committee of safety in that meeting?
A. No further than this: We must get the soldiers on shore. Their very presence on shore without doing the least thing will make life and property safe. We die not expect any resistance, because we had as many men as they, or more. But their being there, there would not be any trouble at all. But even without them we did not expect any trouble.
Q. Then why did you determine to try to get them there before you determined to dethrone the Queen?
A. Because we wanted to protect property.
Q. What need had you of the protection of property if you did not expect the people to fight? Suppose the troops had not been on shore, what danger was there to property? You just expected to march up and take the Government building without fighting?
A. Yes; but we wanted to have the troops.
Q. And you determined to ascertain whether you could get the troops before you went further. Is not that true?
A. Yes; if we could not get them we must make our own arrangements.
Q. Do you mean to say that if Mr. Stevens had said you should not have the troops you had determined to go on anyway?
A. We didn’t come as far as that, we were waiting for Mr. Stevens’s answer before we decided anything further.
Q. If you did not think the natives would fight, whether the troops were on shore or off shore, why did you need the United States troops to prevent the burning of houses and other riotous acts?
A. We wanted them to stay over night, because things of that nature are generally done at night.
Q. Was it your idea that those troops were just to protect you that night?
A. No; it was our idea to have them on shore and keep them on shore as long as possible, until everything was quiet again.
Q. Now let me ask you, did the committee or not, in their deliberations, consider the presence of those troops on shore as important to your success in the effort to dethrone the Queen and set up a new government?
A. When we asked for them we had not made up our minds to dethrone the Queen. We had not made up our minds to anything definite. A change of government was to come, but we had not decided as to what means should be taken.
Q. They had to be quartered somewhere. You had to have a large house. What did you do?
A. Arion Hall was vacant. It was the handiest place and we chose it.
Q. Did you all think that was the best place?
A. Yes.
Q. To whom does it belong?
[Page 726]A. Arion Hall belongs to Mr. Waller.
Q. And in the meeting after the mass meeting you concluded that was the best place to put them?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you all think that the natives and the Queen and her followers would think that those troops were in sympathy with your movement?
A. I do not know what was in their minds.
Q. You said the meeting of the committee of safety in the afternoon of Monday was assembled to do its first work, to wit, to ask for troops.
A. Yes.
Q. Was it not the idea in the minds of you gentlemen at that time to do away with the royal government?
A. Why certainly. It has been in our minds for many years.
Q. Did it show itself in your discussions?
A. At the very first meeting at W. O. Smith’s office they talked about such things.
Q. I invite your attention to the meeting of the committee of safety at half past 3 o’clock on Monday afternoon. In the interchange of views that took place there was there an expression in favor of the landing of the troops, and of taking up in the night session the question of dethroning the Queen?
A. What is our first duty? It is to make things safe. For that purpose we must ask Mr. Stevens to let us have his soldiers. The committee came back and said the soldiers would be on shore at 5 o’clock.
Q. Was not anything said in that meeting about taking steps towards dethroning the Queen at the night session?
A. Not by me or to me, nothing definitely said, but it was the prevailing idea since the first meeting.
Q. It was in the minds of the mass meeting and in the minds of the committee of safety at the time that call took place, so that there was no occasion to interchange any opinion on that subject at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. So, understanding each other, your object was first to get the troops on shore. Is that true?
A. Yes; to get things safe. I say that the intention of getting troops on shore that afternoon was only considered from a standpoint of safety.
Q. And that consisted in the fact that you thought the presence of the troops would prevent the burning of houses.
A. Or any disturbances of any kind.
Q. Suppose the Queen’s troops should have been ordered to arrest people, what would you expect?
A. We knew most likely they would not be ordered to arrest anybody.
Q. But suppose they had commenced to make arrests of the committee of safety and other persons, or commenced to fight against the followers of the committee of safety, what did you expect the troops to do at such a moment?
A. Nothing. I fully understand the situation. These people did not come to prevent anything by the existing Government, but knowing the character of the Hawaiian people so well there was small risk that we took.
Q. What time did the committee of safety adjourn on Monday afternoon?
[Page 727]A. I think about half-past 4 or quarter to 5 something like that.
Q. What time did it assemble in the evening?
A. Half-past seven, about.
Q. In your evening session after the troops were landed, did you take up the question of dethroning the Queen?
A. We did.
Q. And determined to dethrone her, and determined on a Provisional Government for the purpose of annexation?
A. We did then definitely determine these things, and more especially decide upon the manner in which it should be done, but about annexation was spoken at the first meeting at W. O. Smith’s.
Q. At whose house was this meeting?
A. Henry Waterhouse’s.
Q. How far is that from the American minister’s house?
A. Next door.
Q. What is the distance between the houses?
A. Twenty yards—maybe thirty yards.
Q. Were many Americans in this movement in the mass meeting?
A. People of all nationalities.
Q. Which nationality had the largest number there?
A. I believe Americans.
Q. How many Americans do you think were there?
A. It is impossible to say.
Q. Would you say that the great body of Americans in Honolulu were there—all the men?
A. I believe so—lean not say. It is impossible to recognize each person. I will say that I saw many Americans, many Germans, many English, and some Portuguese.
Q. How many Portuguese.
A. I took a Portuguese friend of mine, Mr. Mendonga. There were not many Portuguese. Some of them do not understand English very good. There was a large crowd of people, which has been estimated by different people at different numbers. I estimated it at 1,200. Others claimed there were more, How they were divided I do not know.
Q. Did you ask any other power to send troops on shore?
A. No.
Q. Anything said about it in the meeting of the committee of safety?
A. Nothing that I know of. There were no other warships anyway.
Q. Well, you had troops on shore on Monday night, and your idea was to prevent the burning and destruction of property that night?
A. For the future. Not only for that night, but until things were settled.
Q. Do you mean until you could organize the affairs of government?
A. Yes.
(Mr. Bolte was at this point shown the letter from the committee of safety to Mr. Stevens—dated January 16, 1893—and asked in regard to the nationality of the signers thereof.)
Q. What nationality is Mr. Cooper?
A. American.
Q. Mr. McChesney?
A. American.
Q. Mr. Wilder.
A. American.
Q. Mr. Bolte?
A. German.
[Page 728]Q. Mr. Brown?
A. American.
Q. Mr. W. O. Smith?
A. Hawaiian.
Q. Mr. Waterhouse?
A. Hawaiian.
Q. Mr. Lansing?
A. American.
Q. Mr. Suhr?
A. German.
Q. Mr. Thurston?
A. Hawaiian.
Q. Mr. Emmeluth?
A. American.
Q. Mr. Castle?
A. Hawaiian.
Q. Mr. McCandless?
A. American.
Q. Do they all vote here?
A. Yes: they all vote here.
Q. This was a call, then, from Germans. Hawaiians, and American citizens for troops, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And they were landed to protect all classes?
A, Yes.
Q. Who drew up the application to the American minister?
A. Either Mr. Thurston or Mr. Smith.
Q. In this paper you set out your reasons for your application?
A. Yes.
A. With a requirement that each elector shall be able to read and write could you have stable government on these Islands?
A. What language?
Q. Either Hawaiian or English.
A. We could not.
Q. Tell me why.
A. Because the Hiwaiians are indolent people. They do not want to do any work to earn money. They prefer easy jobs, such as Government offices of any kind—either as clerks in the Government house, as judges, sheriffs, policemen, poundkeepers, or anything of that nature. That gives them a living and also a sort of authority—a sort of power of domineering over others—which they iike immensely. They know that they can get this power only by keeping together and getting a government of Hawaiians—whether they be brown-skinned or white-skinned—I mean with Hawaiian sentiment. They want to domineer over people who have some property. They let their horses go into the sugar cane of others, let their cattle run on the pasture of others, and various things of that sort. You cannot get justice when they are brought into court. Hawaiian judges will let them go, or fine them such a small amount that property holders do not care to go into court. You cannot get justice in jury cases with Hawaiian jurymen. They never convict anybody on testimony. They judge by sentiment.
Q. Do you think you could have and maintain an independent government here with the population you have without aid from outside power?
A. I do not think so.
Q. Why?
[Page 729]A. Ever since 1887 there have been attempts at revolution from the native Hawaiian side. One real outbreak occurred in 1889—the Wilcox insurrection. At that time the people who were implicated in this revolution were found not guilty in court by a jury of their own countrymen, and only one man of the revolutionists, who was a Belgian or German, I do not remember now, was found guilty by a white jury and punished. You will see anywhere and on all occasions that the native element runs together like mercury to confront anything that comes from the side of the white people.
Q. You mean in politics?
A. In anything, and it is a very strange thing to see that the half-whites almost invariably go with the natives.
Q. Do you ever have any white men of intelligence and courage and ambition for place—without property—who will go with them and lead them?
A. We have men of ambition, intelligence, courage, and no property. The last point I can not say, but the first three applies to V. V. Ashford. There are others. I could give you a whole string.
Q. I only wanted to know if the native population could get and accept that class of white men as leaders of their race and party?
A. They would, because they have done so already.
Q. Have you been troubled much with this class of men?
A. Yery much indeed.
Q. For how long?
A. Ever since I have been in the country—since 1879.
Q. And for these causes you have felt that to have stable government you have to look to some power outside the islands?
A. Yes.
Q. You still feel that way?
A. I do.
Q. Now, without indicating anything by my question as to the disposition of the United States (for I have no right to do so), suppose you should undertake annexation to the United States, what form of government would you think necessary in order to maintain order, security, life, and property in these islands?
A. I should prefer personally an oligarchy—submitting my interests to the judgment of respectable men.
Q. Appointed how?
A. I suppose after we were annexed the President of the United States would appoint a governor, and let this governor or the President of the Unites States appoint three or four secretaries and let them appoint advisory boards, but I do not think that would satisfy the people.
Q. What property qualification would you consider sufficient for a voter?
A. I think a man ought to earn $2 or $2.50 a day.
Q. That would be about how hiuch in the course of a year?
A. Between $600 and $750 a year.
Q. Would that disqualify enough of the natives to give you political power?
A. I think if it was about $2.50 a day that it would, because people who earn $2.50 day are mechanics, and people who earn less than that are mostly laborers. Mechanics are naturally of a higher class than laborers.
Q. Are there many mechanics among the natives?
A. Yery few in proportion to their large number.
[Page 730]Q. What proportion of them would you sav are mechanics—one in fifty?
A. No; one in twenty-five.
Q. What would be your idea about the American notion of not allowing anybody to hire labor from abroad?
A. I want stable government first. Annexation to the United States in any way, and I will take my chances as to the rest.
Q. Suppose you were not allowed to send agents abroad and the individual citizen was not allowed to send abroad to bring laborers to the sugar plantations, what would be the result on the value of the product and the value of the property?
A. The United States laws permit a board of immigration ro make known in other countries how things are there with reference to laborers, what wages they may expect, and how much work there is. The laws also permit that people may come as free immigrants; also, that personal Mends and relatives may assist their friends and relatives to come to this country, and I know a good many people among the laboring classes here who are willing and ready to do so. I think there are a great many among the Japanese as well as the Portuguese, who are most desirable classes, who would assist their friends to come here, but it will be necessary that these people should he entitled to a small piece of land after theyhavebeen in the country for a certain number of years; say three or five years. They do not require much.
A Portuguese family would be satisfied with a piece of three acres. We would establish villages all over the country in the neighborhood of plantations. The men and boys would go down to the plantation to work, and the women and children stay at home to look after the garden, etc. The men go home from their work at 5 o’clock, so there are almost two hours of daylight. They can do whatever hard work there is after that time.
I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Colonel Blount.
Honolulu, June 10, 1893.
C. Bolte.
(This page was handed in by Mr. Bolte June 21, 1893):
The answers which I have given to Mr. Blount’s questions, “When was for the first time anything said about deposing or dethroning the Queen,” might lead to misunderstandings in reading this report. I desire, therefore, to hereby declare as follows: Words to the effect that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not uttered to my knowledge at any meeting of the committee of safety until Monday evening, January 16, 1893; but at the very first meeting of citizens at W. O. Smith’s office, on Saturday, January 14, at about 2 p.m., or even before this meeting had come to order, Paul Neumann informed the arriving people that the Queen was about to promulgate a new constitution. The answer then given him by Mr. W. C. Wilder, by me, and by others was: That is a very good thing and a splendid opportunity to get rid of the whole old rotten Government concern, and now to get annexation to the United States. Paul Neumann thought that that might be going a little too far. At the second meeting at W. O. Smith’s, between 3 and 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon, January 14, 1893, when the committee of safety was appointed, sentiments of the same nature, that this is a splendicl opportunity to get rid of the old regime, and strong demands for annexation, or any kind of stable government under the supervision of the United States, were expressed.
[Page 731]Therefore, even if the words that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not spoken, surely the sentiment that this must be done prevailed at or even before the very first meeting, on January 14, 1893.