No. 9.
Interview with Sereno E. Bishop,
Honolulu, Tuesday, April 11.
Mr. Blount. Mr. Bishop, will you be kind enough to tell me—be cause I know you are a thoughtful man—the causes immediate and remote which led to the recent revolution?
Mr. Bishop. The immediate cause was a succession of aggressions upon liberty and good government by the Queen, and the final act of attempting to overthrow the existing constitution by violence.
Q. Will you be kind enough to refer to these acts specifically?
A. The first definite act was the refusal of the Queen to appoint a cabinet in accordance with the choice of the legislature.
Q. What day was that?
A. I can not give you the precise date. There was; a series of these proceedings from, I think, August to November, during which time the legislature rejected, successively, three Cabinets which she had appointed by vote of want of confidence, she persisting in sending in again and again men that the legislature considered unfit for the office.
Q. You mean by that that the individual members of a cabinet were repeatedly rechosen and rejected?
A. In some cases the same individuals were rechosen, but generally not more than one at a time. Other men equally objectionable were substituted in their places. They were men in whom the business [Page 692] community had no confidence. The next act of distinct importance was the manifest collusion of the Queen with the lottery ring. It finally appeared that the passage of the lottery bill was a definite part of her policy by which to render herself independent of the business people by means of a subsidy of $500,000, which that lottery paid to the government.
Q. How would that render her independent?
A. It would furnish a means of revenue of such an amount that she hoped to be able to dispense with the support of the banks.
Q. Get along without taxation of other property?
A. No; not get along without taxation, but to get along without the support of the business men, which was necessary to supply money in case of stringency, which has often arisen here.
Q. Well, please proceed on that line.
A. The matter culminated during the absence of the American Minister and the ship-of-war Boston by the passage of the lottery bill, driven through the House in the absence of several of the best members, and especially by the removal of the excellent Cabinet, in which all had great confidence, and which had restored financial confidence in the government and business prosperity. They were removed by a vote of confidence, the vote of the same men who passed the lottery bill. The Queen proceeded immediately to appoint another cabinet composed of the worst elements of previous cabinets which had been successively rejected by the House.
Q. Can I interrupt you here? Who were the members of that objectionable cabinet?
A. They were four men—Parker, Colburn, Cornwell, and Peterson; every one of which men, I am compelled to say this—
Q. I want to know the truth.
A. Not one of these men possessed any confidence of the public. They were men of notorious character in some respects, especially as to their business reliability. Not one of them could by any means at his command have raised $10,000 for his own use, owing to his personal deterioration of character and failure in business. That was the general character of them.
Q. Were they truthful men in their ordinary relations?
A. I should speak differently about different ones. I should say that Mr. Parker might be regarded, for anything I know, as an honorable man in his ordinary relations, but a prodigal man. Mr. Colburn, the minister of the interior, was notably a falsifier in business matters, so that he would not be trusted in any business matter.
Q. What do you mean by falsifier?
A. He would give false weights and measures.
Q. What was his business?
A. He was a feed dealer. The next man was Cornwell, minister of finance; I should say that he was a wreck financially and morally in every way. As to his character for truthfulness, I do not know.
Q. What do you mean by a wreck morally?
A. I mean that he was so far degraded in his personal character as to licentiousness and gambling that he had lost the ordinary shame which men possess. I am sorry to speak in that way, but you wish to be answered truthfully.
Q. I do. I want to see the situation. I don’t care what it is. I want to see it.
A. He was in possession of large property which he has wasted. He has to my knowledge—not to my personal observation, but to my [Page 693] knowledge—displayed himself in public matters in a very gross way personally—particularly in connection with Hula dances.
Q. You mean going to see Hula dances?
A. No; but in cheering and publicly commending the vilest portions of it before the people present. Licentiousness is a common practice in a country where most of the women are weak, but he carried it to an excess of grossness. He has run through his property, so that he has hardly anything left.
Q. And the next man?
A. The fourth man, Peterson, is of very old family—a native of the island, I believe. He was one of bur promising lads, but when he came back here from the United States he fell into association with the lottery and opium rings, and he lost character and lost ground.
Q. On that account?
A. On that account mainly. I do not know of any individual transactions of his. I never heard of any that indicated dishonesty, but he was associated with them in their proceedings and he was supposed to have dealings with them in opium smuggling. I do not know what the facts are about that. He was intimately associated with them, especially with Paul Neumann, who was the reputed chief of that company and has been for a long time. Paul Neumann was for many years the chief adviser of the King. He was a back stair adviser—a private counsellor of King Kalakaua in all his arbitrary proceedings toward the establishment of arbitrary power. It is unpleasant for me to speak evil of men. I said before, the culminating act was one which took the public by surprise. It was the drawing up of the household troops in line in front of the palace, which I personally witnessed, and the attempt to promulgate an entirely new constitution by arbitrary means.
Q. What do you mean by attempt to promulgate a constitution by unlawful means?
A. I mean that she presented such a constitution to her ministers and they demurred. She used violent language toward them. They fled, and after several hours of contest with them she finally yielded so far as to give an announcement to the natives that she would not promulgate it—to her intense regret. She added it was her intention to promulgate that constitution in a short time. She gave the people hopes that she would do it. That act of the Queen put her in a position which practically wrecked her Government; that is, no further confidence or reliance could in any way be placed in her or her administration from that time on. It was felt by the whole intelligent community to have gone to pieces. There was an absolute necessity for substituting some other government in its place. I became informed of an element in the Queen’s proceedings which awakened an apprehension in my mind of some fanatical excitement. I heard that she was under the influence of Kahunas; that she had been for two weeks in consultation with Kahunas before her endeavor to submit the constitution, and that on that very day she was conducting sacrificial worship.
Q. How did you get that?
A. I do not remember how the information came to me now. There was a good deal of excitement about the idolatrous doings in the palace. I was going on to say that my alarm was excited, that I handed in a note to Mr. Stevens on Sunday expressing my sense of the probable need of protection from the American forces for fear of some kind of a fanatical uprising among the natives. I never heard from Mr. Stevens on the subject. I do not know what he thought of it or what influence it had upon him. I was only speaking of my own apprehensions. I [Page 694] would say that it had been the custom on previous occasions to have the American forces landed for protection and public safety. On two previous instances, in 1887 and 1889, American forces were landed by the American Minister.
There was a determined resistance of every effort to remove the marshal (who has the reputation of being her present favorite), Marshal Wilson, and this opposition was led more by John E. Bush than any other person in the legislature. A majority of the legislature was insisting upon it. It was one of their grounds for voting out ministers—because she would not agree to remove Wilson.
Q. What was their objection to Wilson?
A. It was not so much that he was her personal favorite, but that he was obnoxious to them, especially to Wilcox. He had been active in the arrest of Wilcox for conspiracy. I do not know whether the grounds of opposition were sound or not. I know Mr. Thurston was not very ardent in the matter of having him removed. It was John E. Bush and Wilcox. John E. Bush was in the habit of calling her all kinds of foul names.
Q. What is your opinion of the credibility of Bush?
A. He has no character for veracity or morality of any kind. It is as bad as it can be. I have known his record for a long period. He has about as bad a record as anybody in these islands in every respect. I will say about Bush that his earlier progress in public life was owing to the fact that his wife was at the King’s service entirely. That was the secret of his success. It was a notorious fact.
Q. What country was she from?
A. She was a native.
Q. Dead?
A. Yes. When she died his influence with the King somewhat declined. In reference to this matter of the marshal it should be added that the Queen declared publicly to a committee sent to ask her to keep Wilson in office that he should be kept in office. It was an unconstitutional declaration. I give this as one of her unconstitutional acts.
Q. The Provisional Government was established on the 17th?
A. The 17th.
Q. Three days, then, afterwards it was the avowed purpose to seek annexation with the United States? A. Yes; that is a matter of record.
Q. Out of what did that declaration in favor of annexation come? Did it come out of the moment, or had there been a progress of opinion for years on the line of connecting this country with the Government of the United States?
A. There had been a progress of opinion growing for a good many years in favor of annexation to the United States, and looking to it as a certain event of the future. I would say that the royalist paper “Bulletin” distinctly avowed that as a certainty in a year—either last year or the year before.
Q. Now, was there a feeling in the mind of the people in that meeting reaching back through a period of months, looking forward to some opportunity of connection with the Government of the United States?
A. There was nothing said about annexation in that meeting.
Q. I do not know that I gave you my idea.
A. As to what feeling existed among individuals or among leaders in that meeting—I suppose that is what you wish to know—it would be a matter of opinion with me. I should say that at that meeting there was no definite thought about annexation among the people; that that [Page 695] was an afterthought which grew up perhaps during the next day—that is, of actually proposing annexation as an immediate thing. I know that it was not in my own mind. I was not thinking about that. I was thinking about what kind of a government would be put up. It was quite evident there was going to be a change. Annexation might or might not come. People had to act and think rapidly. We had had some training in the revolution of 1887. That had been an education to our leading men.
Q. What do you mean by education? In what particular?
A. An education in planning for a form of government. An education in prompt action of the right kind.
Q. What do you mean by prompt action of the right kind?
A. I mean such action as was actually taken. Experience had taught the people that no confidence was to be placed in any royal promise; that there was only one thing to be done—to make clean work and sweep the monarchy away. The people here had a very distinct education in what may be termed the strategy of a revolution.
Q. Do you mean that the white element here had learned what they could accomplish by courage and organization?
A. Yes; exactly. I would add to that also that the native population got an education in the impossibility of resistance to a determined action on the part of the whites.
Q. Now, Mr. Bishop, was this change of Government brought about by any action from the other islands—or was it done entirely on this island?
A. Entirely. There was no time to communicate with the other islands. The white population of the other islands were as thoroughly in sympathy as the white population of Honolulu.
Q. Did they have any knowledge of it?
A. None.
Q. Did the native population on the other islands know anything of the movement?
A. I think they knew of the movement to proclaim a new constitution.
Q. That is not what I mean—
A. Well, they could not. The whole thing was done so rapidly. There was no vessel going up to the other islands during those days. I think no vessel went up during that period.
Q. In the education you say the whites received here and the natives received in connection with revolutions, was there in the minds of the whites to enable them to succeed, and in the minds of the natives to induce them to submit, any calculation as to the aid of the forces of any foreign government?
A. I should say there was none whatever. I was myself fairly intimate with the public sentiment in that matter, and I am certain that there was no calculation of any such aid. There was a calculation on the maintenance of the usual practice of landing troops to maintain order against mob violence, and to protect the property of citizens. There was an expectation of that.
Q. How was that force to be applied? The Queen’s Government was in existence up to the time of your recognition?
A. It may be said to have had no manner of existence. It had no real existence. It was wrecked by the panic produced by the unconstitutional acts of the Queen. Ali persons had ceased to look to it; at least, all owners of property and intelligent people.
Q. Then you did not expect the use of troops to enforce or sustain any action on the part of the Queen?
[Page 696]A. We did not expect they would. We did not regard the Queen’s Government as a source of order. The attitude of the Queen herself, as shown on the morning of that Monday, the 16th, in this terrified proclamation, showed that they themselves were in a state of panic.
Q. The people then did not expect that in the use of foreign troops that the Queen’s Government would derive any support from that quarter.
A. No; they did not. Mr. Stevens’ sympathies were well known by various manifestations. They were known to be in favor of the progress of constitutional government. He had so declared himself on public occasions like the 4th of July.
Q. What do you mean by that. Please be more specific.
A. I mean that on at least two public occasions—one of which was the 4th of July—Mr. Stevens had made addresses in which he spoke of the necessity of the Hawaiian monarchy conforming itself to constitutional progress.
Q. How did that apply to any condition of things here?
A. It applied because Kalakaua’s Government and the Queen’s Government were manifestly seeking to establish absolutism.
Q. And the condition of things here induced the interpretation of these two speeches to mean that——
A. He was heartily in sympathy with the movement of constitutional government. He was going to show himself as a good American. It was kindness in him to exercise his influence as the American representative.
Q. You did not think the forces were going to be used when they came on shore in the interest of protecting the property and persons of American citizens in connection with the Queen’s government, or in support of it.
A. I was well satisfied they would not be used to support that government.
Q. Did you think that the new government was likely to be recognized and that in the protection of person and property the troops would likely act on a line in harmony with the new government?
A. I did not suppose—I had some indications that led me to believe that the troops would not be used in any way to assist in establishing the Provisional Government. They would be left entirely to their prowess or strength to accomplish the end.
Q. Were the troops landed before that government was recognized?
A. They were landed before the government was formed. They were landed on the evening of the 16th. The government was not formed until the morning of the 17th.
Q. Now, suppose disorders had broken out in that condition of things—in executing the power—the purpose of protecting persons and property here—what was expected as to the tendency of the action of these troops—that it would be with the white population or with the native element—with the new political movement or with the Queen’s Government?
A. Well, it was expected that they would repress any mob violence whatever—that they would assist in preventing any incendiarism in town, or attacks upon private property.
Q. Suppose there had been a conflict on the streets—a battle on the streets—what side do you suppose the United States would have taken?
A. My belief was at that time that the United States would have remained entirely neutral. I have no doubt of that. I had no doubt then.
[Page 697]Q. Bid you look for any trouble at the time these troops were put on shore?
A. We were apprehensive at that time of secret disturbance—attempts to create insurrection and disturbances. We were apprehensive about incendiarism.
Q. Insurrection against what?
A. Attempt on the part of the natives to injure the whites.
Q. You mean race conflict rather than insurrection?
A. Well, I do not mean any organized insurrection—we were afraid of local disturbances in town. We were in a state of uncertainty and apprehension. We felt we needed protection. We had not organized Government forces.
Q. You wanted these forces here to preserve order until you had organized?
A. And after that if they chose. We were accustomed to have such forces landed—Mr. Merrill had had such forces.
Q. I am not questioning the propriety of it, but I am trying to find out the public mind in this situation.
A. I understand. Now I am expressing what my own view is as an intelligent person, knowing what the customs and proprieties of things would be internationally. I am only giving you my opinion.
Q. I am only asking your opinion. I am inquiring from you because you have the reputation of being an intelligent man, a man of character. These troops were landed at the instance of whom?
A. I understand that they were landed at the request of the committee of public safety—organized before the Provisional Government was organized. It was felt that the community was in great danger, and it was necessary to take immediate steps.
Q. The protectorate was established to continue during the progress of negotiations, was it not?
A. So far as it was a protectorate. I do not know how far it was entitled to be called a protectorate. I think the proclamation of Mr. Stevens settles that matter. I do not know anything outside of that. I think it was pending orders from the United States Government.
Q. Was there a fear here that were the troops aboard, the government would not be able to protect property—the Provisional Government?
A. The troops had been on shore all the time to assist in maintaining order. They took no active part then and were always confined to their barracks.
Q. Do you think that during all that period and up to the establishment of the protectorate that these troops were necessary on shore in order that order might be preserved?
A. Well, it is hard to say. I cannot judge. I will say this: I know from my personal knowledge of volunteers of the force that they considered themselves very hard worked in controlling the town, and while they encountered hardly any signs or disposition to make disturbance they had a sense of insecurity. They were called off from their business to a degree that was a great trial to them, and the putting up of the American flag enabled martial law to be dispensed with and gave a feeling of general confidence and security which was agreeable to us all.
Q. Martial law and the United States troops you felt necessary to give adequate protection and restore confidence here. Is that true or not?
A. I should not say that the presence of the United States troops [Page 698] was a necessity. It was very desirable. I think that the Provisional Government could have maintained our security without them.
Q. Mr. Bishop, there has been a controversy (if I am not correct you can correct me) for a good many years on the part of the people of the white race here and the native race in the matter of governing the country. Is that true or not?
A. It is true.
Q. Have the political alignments here been as a general rule racial—white race against other races?
A. Not until recently.
Q. How recently?
A. My first recollections of any indications of such an alignment I should say were early in the reign of Kalakaua, about eighteen or twenty years ago.
Q. And did it take shape in the form of questions of taxation, or what form did it take?
A. In the shape of appointments to public office. They claimed that natives should hold a larger proportion of public office than they had been accustomed to.
Q. And the other side did not like it?
A. The other side did not feel that the natives were fit for office. They were notoriously incompetent. The first indication I remember of such a feeling was one day seeing Samuel Parker—then a young man—landing at Lahaina from a vessel from Honolulu and proclaiming loudly that Kalakaua was going to do the right thing by the Hawaiians—give them a proper hare in the Government.
Q. What had been the share before this announcement of Parker?
A. It had been customary to have one or two natives or half whites in the King’s cabinet of four.
Q. How about the court?
A. The supreme court?
Q. Yes.
A. It has always been customary to have three white judges.
Q. Because they were learned in the law?
A. Yes; the natives were incapable of being learned in law.
Q. That had for some time been accepted as proper?
A. It has ever since it has been the rule. It has never been changed.
Q. How are your judges selected?
A. Appointed by the Sovereign with the advice of the cabinet. There has been a very satisfactory administration of law and justice.
Q. How about your foreign ministers—any rule obtained?
A. They were always white men.
Q. And appointed by the Crown?
A. Yes.
Q. On confirmation by anybody else?
A. The cabinet, I think.
Q. Not confirmed by the legislative body?
A. No; a large part of the offices sought to be occupied by natives were subordinate civil offices.
Q. Was that what Parker had in mind, or did he want to enlarge it?
A. He wanted to enlarge it, to have more natives in the cabinet.
Q. In the constitution of 1887 did the qualifications of electors leave the whites in the majority in the election of nobles, or the natives?
A. The whites in the majority; that is, a majority of nobles.
Q. The constitution allowed citizens or other countries who were living [Page 699] here at that time to vote, not thereby forfeiting their citizenship in other countries. Was that intended to strengthen the white vote?
A. It was intended to strengthen the white vote by enabling them to vote, as they were not willing to renounce their citizenship.
Q. With a view of giving the white element strength in political controversies?
A. Yes; to give them adequate representation in the legislature, so that they should not be entirely overridden by the native representatives.
Q. This constitution was extorted from Kalakaua by a mass meeting?
A. Yes; by force of public sentiment manifested through a mass meeting. That demonstration of the determination and unity of the white citizens so terrified him that he was ready to do what he was wanted to do.
Q. Now, is it to be inferred from transactions like that that the intelligent people here are of the opinion that the native population as a mass are qualified for government, capable of carrying on a government?
A. I should say quite the contrary.
Q. Referring to the mass meeting which extorted the constitution from Kalakaua and to the recent mass meeting which brought about the change here—are we to believe from these that the intelligent classes in this community—the whites—do not believe that the mass of the native population are capable of self-government?
A. Not without assistance.
Q. What is your view about that? I do not know these people at all. I am trying to get at the inside facts of the case.
A. My view is that, while the native people here are lacking in adequate intelligence and force of purpose to conduct self-government long, they are so well disposed that with a sufficient power of white guidance—white cooperation—and the removal of racial contention, which has been sedulously cultivated by the late dynasty, they will usefully coöperate in republican government. They possess sufficient intelligence and good disposition so to do.
Q. On that point of being led by the white element, and easily in the absence of attempts to excite racial feelings, could you trust to universal suffrage?
A. Without limitations we could not.
Q. What limitations could you trust to in the matter of suffrage?
A. I think the limitations would have to be quite high, as to education and property qualifications.
Q. What would you put them at?
A. As to education, I should require a good knowledge of the English language—sufficient to enable the voter to read and understand the Constitution of the United States.
Q. In regard to property qualifications?
A. I think it should be made so high as to exclude unskilled laborers.
Q. You have about 9,000 voters among the native population—how many would that exclude?
A. The educational qualification would exclude two-thirds—the number qualified would rapidly increase.
Q. What property qualification?
A. The same property qualification as now required of voters for nobles—$600 income. That would exclude unskilled laborers.
Q. How many skilled laborers do you think would vote?
A. I do not know. There has been very great carelessness in admitting [Page 700] such voters. I think the number of such voters having that property qualification would be about one-fifth.
Q. That is your opinion?
A. Yes; my private opinion.
Q. What would you think would be the opinion of the intelligent people here on this question?
A. I think they would generally agree with it, except as they are governed by a strong American prejudice of universal suffrage.
Q. A majority of the whites, would they adopt your opinion or the manhood suffrage idea?
A. I think the great majority of the whites would adopt my idea as a matter of necessity, although contrary to their theoretical principles. They would sacrifice their theory for obvious necessity.
Q. Mr. Bishop, what would be the effect on values here if you were to go into the United States—property values?
A. I think there would be an appreciation of most property values within two years of at least 50 per cent.
Q. Why do you think that?
A. On account of the immediate restoration of financial confidence. It would put into operation at once a great variety of new enterprises, such as the proposed railroad around Oahu, which is now waiting for the result of the present negotiations.
Q. Anything else?
A. Yes; there are other causes. The rapid immigration here of energetic whites from America, from the United States, which would follow annexation.
Q. What would bring them?
A. The sense that they were going to be in the United States, that they were coming to their own country—the protection of the American flag.
Q. They have that already there. I mean what would bring them here?
A. Attractions of land. Opening to enterprise. They are deterred from doing so now by the political uncertainty of the country.
Q. Any other causes?
A. I think those are the main causes.
Q. The sugar bounty—has it had any influence at all in the matter?
A. In promoting annexation?
Q. Yes.
A. Ever since the bounty has been put on it has increased, I think, the desire for annexation, but at the same time there was an apprehension that the bounty would soon be removed, so that it was not a very powerful influence.
Q. What would be the effect on your labor here?
A. Very unfavorable to sugar-planters. It is apprehended it would be. I think it would be. I think the planters would suffer a good deal in reference to their contract labor.
Q. Suppose they had no contract labor, could not they bring Japanese here and Portuguese in sufficient quantities to supply plantations?
A. Their passage would have to be paid by the planters.
Q. You think they would not do that unless there was a contract?
A. No; they could not get their money back unless they were bound.
Q. That would seem so to me. I saw a statement from Mr. Paul Neumann, in which he took a different view, but did not give his reasons for it.
A. Paul Neumann would say anything that would suit the occasion.
[Page 701]Q. You think the contract labor system would be done away with if there was annexation?
A. It is so understood.
Q. When these contracts are out do the laborers leave the country?
A. Not necessarily.
Q. Some of them—the Chinese—would have to go back, would not they, under your last legislation?
A. I am not very familiar with the last legislation. My attention has been taken up with other political aspects.
Q. Do you think the Chinese would remain here?
A. They have remained here in very large numbers. There has been a very large decline in Chinese population.
Q. Would you expect the United States Government to permit the Chinese population to remain here in the event of annexation?
A. Just as they permit the Chinese population to remain in the United States. I suppose on the same terms.
Q. The Japanese population—would you expect them to remain mostly when their term of service was out?
A. I believe the Japanese are under some obligation to their own Government in the matter, which may constrain them.
Q. Do you think if that is not true that they would like to remain—most of them?
A. I think they would.
Q. Well, the Portuguese element—is that permanent here?
A. I think it is—unless they are compelled to leave here for want of employment.
Q. Now, taking your native population—the Portuguese population and the Japanese population that remain here—it would be overwhelming in point of numbers against the white element?
A. The Portuguese we count as whites. They are whites. They are whites in intelligence when they receive education.
Q. I do not care whether you call them whites or not.
A. I am disposed to insist that they are whites. They have the European Christian ethics. They belong to Christian civilization by inheritance.
Q. With the Japanese population living here, and the Portuguese population here, and the white population here, what would you do with the question of suffrage? Would you be inclined to the lines you have already indicated in that condition of things?
A. Well, it would establish English as an absolute condition of suffrage.
Q. And the property qualification?
A. Yes; but the English would exclude the ignorant Portuguese, and exclude the Japanese and Chinese almost entirely.
Q. You mean the qualifications for reading English would exclude most of the Portuguese and most of the Japanese?
A. Yes; it would exclude Portuguese who were not educated. I was going to say that it is my opinion that there should be an exception made from the educational qualification in reference to all persons who had voted hitherto for a considerable number of years—say fifteen. It would be an Injustice to a large class of intelligent and excellent natives not to let them exercise suffrage.
Q. You desired to express some views a while ago on some subject?
A. On the question of the expectation of intelligent people here in respect to the action of the troops of the Boston. On the Sunday following the establishment of the Provisional Government Mr. P. C. Jones, [Page 702] the minister of finance, and myself held a conversation on the steps of the Stone church, where we were about to conduct Bible classes. Mr. Jones expressed himself confidentially to me about his feelings on the occasion of assuming office. He stated to me that he thought he had never had such a sense in his life of personal peril he felt at the time when he and the other members of the Provisional Government left Fort street to proceed to the Government house for the purpose of seizing the Government. From that I am convinced that the members of the Provisional Government expected no assistance whatever from the United States forces.
Q. What day was this?
A. It was the Sunday following the day they took the Government—was Tuesday, the 17th. It was the 22d of January.
Q. The American flag was then up?
A. No; the American flag was not put up for two weeks afterwards.
Q. Were the troops on shore all the while.
A. Yes; they were on shore all the time. They were out of sight mostly on the premises which they occupied. My son-in-law, Jonathan Shaw, was active as a volunteer from the moment of the assumption of power by the Provisional Government. He has always spoken to me of experiencing a great sense of danger at the time that he took up arms to assist the Provisional Government in occupying the government house. He had no expectation of support at that time from the United States troops. He is a bookkeeper and general business man of intelligence. I would urge the point that the proclamation made by the Queen and her cabinet on Monday morning, the 16th, demonstrated a condition of panic on the part of the Queen’s Government, It was a most humiliating proclamation for her to make. It proves that the Government had practically gone to pieces—and this supports the theory that the reason why not the slightest opposition was offered by the large force assembled and armed on the Queen’s side to the Provisional Government. It was due entirely to a state of panic on the part of the natives.
Q. The natives here in the city of Honolulu?
A. The organized native forces. They could not possibly have been brought up to face the whites. This feeling was enhanced by actual experience they had had of being shot down by the whites in the insurrection of 1889, in which no white man was wounded. Twelve natives were shot down.
Q. Was that the Wilcox insurrection?
A. Yes.
Q. Now let me ask you there, was that an insurrection against Kalakaua?
A. It is hard to say what the inside intention of the revolution was, but my opinion is that Kalakaua was privy to it. It was purely an attempt to restore the old constitution in the interests of absolutism.
Q. Where was he at the time; was he at the palace?
A. No; he was not at the palace; he was at his house on the beach, and at an early hour he went on board the American ship-of-war, which was in port.
Q. For what purpose?
A. For safety.
Q. From whom?
A. I do not know. His royal guard in the palace was instructed to keep Wilcox and his men out of the palace so as to save the palace from injury. Wilcox made no attempt to gain possession of the palace, [Page 703] although, he went to the barracks, in the rear of the palace, and obtained all the rifles and cannon he could use. They were freely given to him by the King’s forces in the barracks.
Q. Now, did the whites suppress the insurrection?
A. Yes; it was done entirely by the whites. It was done by authority of the Thurston cabinet. The King’s own cabinet suppressed the insurrection as being an insurrection against the King. They understood it very well that the King was conniving at it. It was also stated that Liliuokalani aimed to destroy the King and put herself on the throne.
Q. How much was that believed here among the white people?
A. I think the general concensus of opinion was in favor of the former theory that the King was privy to the whole thing.
Q. Now, you say that the shooting down of the natives on the part of the whites in the Wilcox insurrection was probably the cause of the panic in the royal troops in the late movement?
A. I think it contributed to it. No native would face a combination of white volunteers. The men who shot down the natives were volunteers—not organized, but riflemen gathered for the moment.
Q. Mr. Bishop, I notice in correspondence between the minister here and the State Department a letter in which he speaks of arms being landed here from San Francisco for the whites in connection with the movement of 1887?
A. Yes; there was. That was an organized movement.
Q. What became of those arms? I do not want you to answer it unless you feel perfectly free about it. Were they retained by private citizens?
A. My impression is that they were retained by private citizens. I think they were owned by private citizens.
Q. Is it true or not that the white people here with a view to their own security keep themselves supplied with arms in their houses? I mean as a general rule?
A. I think it is quite extensive, but I do not think it is universal.
Q. That would indicate a feeling on the part of the whites that it was necessary for them to be in a condition always to protect themselves by force, although they might never have it to do?
A. That is the feeling undoubtedly.
Q. I was led to ask you that question by a man named Lillie. He spoke of keeping arms in his house.
A. I would say that apprehension is felt solely in regard to the adherents of royalty. There is no fear from other sources.
I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.