Mr. Dim to Mr.
Gresham.
No. 99.]
Legation of the
United States,
Tokyo,
Japan, February 4, 1895. (Received March
1.)
Sir: Mr. Hayashi, vice-minister for foreign
affairs, visited me at this legation yesterday morning and informed me he
had received a telegram from Viscount Mutsu, at Hiroshima, stating that at a
meeting, on the 1st instant, of the Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries
appointed by the two powers to negotiate terms of peace, the credentials, or
powers, of the Chinese plenipotentiaries having been submitted to the
Japanese plenipotentiaries, Count Ito and Viscount Mutsu, were found by them
to be defective and unsatisfactory, and, in consequence, the Chinese
plenipotentiaries were informed, at a second meeting on 2d instant, that the
Japanese plenipotentiaries must decline to continue the negotiations. They
were, however, assured by Count Ito, minister president of state, that
should China send properly qualified plenipotentiaries to Japan with full
powers to conclude peace the Japanese Government would receive them and
reopen negotiations.
The Chinese envoys leave Hiroshima to-day for Nagasaki and from thence to
China by the first steamer for Shanghai.
I have the honor to inclose herewith translation copy of the credentials
submitted by the Chinese plenipotentiaries, as telegraphed by Viscount Mutsu
to Mr. Hayashi and handed to me by the latter. From
[Page 98]
this translation it would seem that no power or
authority whatever was conferred upon the Chinese plenipotentiaries to
conclude or sign anything, they being required to submit all questions that
arose during the negotiations to the Tsung-li-Yamên for determination.
In this connection I have the honor to inclose herewith an editorial clipped
from the Japan Mail of to-day’s date, entitled “Failure of the peace
embassy.”
I had the honor to inform you yesterday by telegraph that the peace
negotiations had been broken off. I also telegraphed the same information to
Minister Denby, at Peking.
I have, etc.,
[Inclosure 1 in No. 99.]
Literal translation of authority of Chinese
plenipotentiaries.
By decree we do appoint [names and rank of Chinese plenipotentiaries] to
meet and negotiate the matter with plenipotentiaries appointed by Japan.
You will, however, telegraph to Tsung-li-Yamên for the purpose of
obtaining our command, by which you will abide. Members of your mission
are placed under your control. You will carry out your mission in
faithful and diligent manner, and will fulfill trust we have reposed in
you. Respect this seal.
[Inclosure 2 in No. 99.—The Japan Daily
Mail, February 4, 1895.]
failure of the peace embassy.
The hopes of peace that were based on the coming of the Chinese envoys
have proved abortive. On the 1st instant the envoys met the Japanese
plenipotentiaries in the conference chamber of the Hiroshima prefectural
offices, and the credentials of each side were/submitted. Subsequently
the powers of the Chinese embassy were examined, when it was found that
they were signally defective. In the first place, no mention whatever
was made about the object of the mission; in the second, the envoys were
not given power to conclude any arrangement, and in the third they were
distinctly instructed simply to act as conveyers of messages between the
Japanese Government and the Tsung-li-Yamên.
Under these circumstances, it is plain that to open negotiations was out
of the question. The Japanese plenipotentiaries therefore invited the
Chinese envoys to another conference on the following day. At 4.40 p.m.
their excellencies Chang and Shao arrived at the council chamber, where
Count Ito and Viscount Mutsu were already waiting. Some questions were
addressed to the envoys with reference to their credentials, and finally
Count Ito informed them that as their powers were quite inadequate, the
Japanese plenipotentiaries must decline to confer with them. His
excellency added, however, that Japan would be willing to receive any
plenipotentiaries coming duly accredited.
China’s conduct in this matter seems open to one interpretation only; she
is not in earnest. Yet even that explanation is insufficient. It is
inconceivable that she can have expected to betray Japan into the
flagrant blunder of negotiating with envoys of such a character. She had
received ample warning that the question of credentials would be
carefully scrutinized. Communications on that very subject had passed
between Pekin and Tokyo, their issue being an emphatic assurance from
the Chinese Government that its envoys were invested with due
plenipotentiary authority. It follows, therefore, that China took the
trouble of sending a peace embassy with full knowledge that it must fail
on the threshold; fail, not because of Japan’s greed, but because of
“China’s deliberate neglect of essential technicalities. We say nothing
of the insulting triviality of her assurances to Japan. That phase of
the affair need not be discussed here. The perplexing point is that
China should have put herself so palpably in the wrong. Her diplomacy is
even worse than her military display. Those that did not believe in the
integrity of her peaceful purpose—and we confess that we were among the
number—imagined that she was merely playing to the European gallery. Her
last resource lay in Western intervention. Could she have successfully
posed as anxious for peace herself, while forcing Japan into the
position of unjustly prosecuting the war, she would have established a
strong claim upon the active sympathy of States already most desirous of
seeing the sword sheathed.
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She
might, perhaps, have managed to contrive such a situation. We do not
think that she could, for we know well how reasonable is the mood of the
statesmen now directing Japan’s affairs. Still, the effort was worth
making, and it was in pursuit of such an object, as we imagined, that
she deputed their excellencies Chang and Shao to come and talk peace at
Hiroshima. But how could she hope for the smallest scintilla of success
when she intrusted the unhappy envoys with credentials obviously
farcical? To choose men of comparatively insignificant rank was an
intelligible part of the play, but to invest them with the functions of
mere telegraph clerks was to reduce the whole business to the level of
light comedy.
We can scarcely imagine that the Chinese Government aspires to be pitied
for ignorance of the alphabet of international etiquette. But what is
its ambition? We can not tell. The incident must be added to the
catalogue of incomprehensible items constituting the history of the
present war. Infinitely regrettable, however, is this new obstacle
needlessly thrust into the path to peace. Count Ito and Viscount Mutsu
acted wisely in assuring China, that despite the unpleasant necessity
imposed on them by her conduct in connection with this embassy, Japan
would always be ready to receive duly accredited envoys. But even that
assurance will not appreciably lessen the greatly increased reluctance
that China must feel to figure again as a suppliant.
