Mr. Gresham to Mr. Bayard.
Washington, July 20, 1894.
Sir: I regret that the situation in Korea and the relations between China and Japan have not improved since the Department’s instruction of the 7th instant was sent to Mr. Dun, the text of which was cabled to you on the 14th. War between Japan and China, with its attendant misery in Korea, seems not improbable. The following statement will enable you to understand more clearly what has occurred here and the extent to which this Government has exercised its good offices in the interest of peace:
The Government of Korea, through its minister at this capital, having represented that its independence was seriously menaced by the [Page 37] presence within its borders of large bodies of Japanese and Chinese troops; that it was unable to defend itself, and that in its great peril it desired the disinterested advice and friendly intervention of this Government, an instruction was cabled to Mr. Sill, our minister to Seoul, on the 22d ultimo, directing him to exert such influence as he possibly and fairly could to avert the Korean Government’s apprehended danger. Two days later Mr. Sill replied that the revolution which for some time had existed in Korea had been suppressed by that Government, but that thousands of Chinese and Japanese troops still occupied the country; that their presence was a serious menace to Korean integrity; that China favored the simultaneous withdrawal of both armies, but Japan, seemingly meditating war, refused, and that Korea earnestly desired the United States should intervene for her protection.
On the 28th ultimo the Korean minister again appeared at the Department, and imparted the information that the Japanese minister at Seoul had called at the palace and requested that political changes be made in the Korean Government, at the same time stating that Japan would not withdraw her troops until such changes had been made; that, being unable to resist Japan, Korea relied on the, disinterested friendship of the United States, and that he was instructed to explain to this Government the importance of a conference of neutral powers to adjust the pending difficulties and avert war. A few days later the minister made a third visit to the Department, by direction of his Government, and requested that the representatives of the United States in China, Japan, and Korea be instructed to exert themselves in the interest of peace in Korea, and to ask that the Japanese troops be speedily withdrawn from that country. At these interviews I informed the minister that while the United States sympathized with his Government and desired to see its sovereignty respected, we must maintain toward it and the other powers an attitude of impartial neutrality; that our influence could be exerted with Japan only in a friendly way, and that in no event could we intervene jointly with other powers.
On the 28th ultimo our minister at Tokyo telegraphed that the situation in Korea and the relations between the Governments of Japan and China were very critical, but that Japan expected an amicable adjustment, and the day following Mr. Dun again telegraphed asking if the United States would use their good offices to protect the Japanese archives and subjects in China, in case Japan withdrew her minister from Peking. Mr. Dun was promptly instructed that if the Japanese Government should take the step indicated the request would receive the President’s friendly consideration, but it could not be granted without the assent of China.
At the conclusion of a brief conversation with the Japanese minister a few days later on another subject, I referred to the unfortunate situation in Korea, as I understood it, and informed the minister of the earnest desire of that Government that the United States should make an effort to induce Japan and China to withdraw their troops from Korean territory. The minister replied that the rebellion in Korea was caused by maladministration and official corruption, and that his Government would not withdraw its troops until needed reforms in the domestic administration of Korea had been made. I remarked that in view of the exceptionally cordial relations which for many years had existed between our Governments I felt at liberty to say that it would be very gratifying to the United States if Japan would deal kindly and fairly with her feeble neighbor, whose helplessness enlisted our [Page 38] sympathy. I further remarked that this Government cherished sentiments of sincere respect for both Japan and China, and that the former’s apparent determination to engage the latter in war on Korean soil was nowhere more regretted than here. The minister replied that his Government did not covet Korean territory that its demands were in the interest of peace and that he admitted Korea was an independent sovereign state.
On the 29th ultimo Mr. Dun was instructed to ascertain Japan’s reason for sending a military force to Korea, and what demands, if any, were expected to be enforced thereby.
On the 5th instant Mr. Dun replied that after the first troops had been sent under the convention of 1882,1 Japan learned of the dispatch of large bodies of Chinese troops, which necessitated an increase of the Japanese force; that the rebellion was due to official corruption and oppression; that Japan had asked as a guarantee of future peace that radical administrative reforms be made in Korea, and had proposed joint action to that end with China, which offer that Government had refused; that disclaiming designs upon Korean territory, Japan would carry out such reforms in defiance of China, and that the good offices of the United States at Peking and Tokyo might reopen negotiations.
On the 3d instant a telegram was received from Mr. Denby, our chargé d’affaires ad interim at Peking, saying that the Korean situation was critical; that hostilities were imminent; that the attitude of China was conciliatory in spite of the aggressive action by Japan, and that China had asked the good offices of England and Russia for a peaceful settlement.
On the 8th instant the British ambassador read to me an instruction he had received from Lord Kimberley, directing him to ascertain whether the United States would unite with Great Britain in an intervention to avert war between China and Japan. Being furnished with no copy of the instruction, I give the substance of it from memory. The ambassador expressed the belief that only friendly intervention was contemplated. I informed him that this Government could not intervene otherwise than as a friendly neutral; that it had already so intervened with Japan, and I did not think the President would feel authorized to go further in the exercise of our good offices. The next day I handed the ambassador a copy of the instruction sent to Mr. Dun on the 7th, at the same time informing him that this Government could not join another power even in a friendly intervention.
On the 11th instant Mr. Dun telegraphed that, after communicating the Substance of the Department’s instruction of the 7th to the Japanese Government, he was informed that the Japanese troops were not kept in Korea to make war on that country, but to insure order, Korean independence, and to prevent a recurrence of rebellion; that Japan desired the removal of official corruption, peculation, and misgovernment, the real causes of discontent; that China’s equivocal attitude prevented Korea from adopting needed reforms, thus endangering the peace of the East; that the insurrection had not been entirely quelled; that, while anxious to withdraw her troops, Japan would do so when, and not before, future order was insured; and that war with Korea was not apprehended.
On the 8th instant our chargé d’affaires in Peking informed the Department that the viceroy requested the United States to take the [Page 39] initiative in urging the powers to unite in a request to Japan to withdraw her troops from Korea.
On the 13th the Chinese minister at this capital visited the Department by appointment and informed me that he was directed by the viceroy to bring to the attention of the United States the fact that by the, presence of a large force of troops in Korea, Japan was endeavoring to induce the Government of that country to change its domestic administration; that China had proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops, which offer Japan had declined; that he was, instructed by the viceroy to express the hope that this Government would instruct its minister at Tokyo to unite with other diplomatic representatives there in a joint effort to influence Japan to abandon her warlike purpose against China. The minister further said that China’s policy was one of peace, and that she did not desire to engage in war with Japan or any other power. I replied that the United States desired to continue and strengthen friendly relations with both China and Japan; that while we earnestly hoped to see those Governments remain on terms of peace, we could not intervene between them otherwise than with our good offices; that we had neither the right nor the inclination to go further; that by direction of the President I had already, through our minister at Tokyo, made a strong but friendly representation to Japan in the interest of peace, and did not see that we could do more; and that we could not unite with other powers in any kind of an intervention. The minister repeated that Japan refused to withdraw her troops until the above-named reforms had been made; that he feared war was inevitable unless the powers exerted strong influence upon Japan, and asked what I thought of the situation, and whether I could make a suggestion that would improve it.
I replied that from information received from Mr. Dun and other sources I was slow to believe that Japan would resort to war, and that a course was open to China which had been adopted by other powers, namely, an offer to settle the controversy by friendly arbitration.
I am, etc.,