Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894
Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham.
Tokyo, Japan, February 27, 1895. (Received March 21.)
Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith a clipping from the Japan Mail of the 25th instant, giving a translation of a speech on the subject of the proposed Korean loan delivered by Count Ito, minister president of state, before the lower house of the Imperial Diet on the 21st instant.
The bill, as recommended by the Government, authorizing a loan of 3,000,000 yen to the Korean Government has been passed by the House of Representatives.
I have, etc.,
the proposed korean loan.
The following is a translation of the speech delivered by His Excellency Count Ito, minister president of state, in the House of Representatives, on the 21st instant, in connection with the proposed loan of 3,000,000 yen to the Korean Government:
Gentlemen: I have presented a special budget to the house. Its object is to lend money to Korea, which step is temporarily necessitated by the present financial difficulties of that country. As to the condition of Korea since last year, you are well aware that the Tonghak rebellion, which commenced early last summer, was followed by a failure of the harvest, and then came the war between Japan and China. Korea has ever since stood as our ally, and being still to-day in the midst of the war, our Government can not remain unconcerned, and is therefore brought under the necessity of making a loan to Korea. You are also aware that even to-day there are still some remnants of the Tonghak rebels; but the King and the Government of Korea, acting upon the advice of our Government, are desirous to enforce reforms without delay.
With regard to the Korean reforms, our Government proposed in June last year to the Chinese Government that Japan and China should jointly carry them out, with the object of maintaining Korea’s independence. But the refusal of China in this matter led at length to the present great war. Since then our country has lent its aid to Korea to maintain her independence by our own power and out of pity for her isolation and weakness, and now, she having fallen into her present difficulties, we can not avoid the necessity of giving her temporary assistance. The Korean Government is planning to raise a loan sooner or later to meet the various national expenditures; and as soon as the plan is matured we intend to require the repayment of our own loan. Such being the unavoidable circumstances, I desire that you will, after full discussion, give your speedy consent to the budget. If there are questions to be put regarding details, it is, the intention of the Government to send a delegate conversant with the matter to give explanations at the meeting of the special committee. Further, as I shortly leave the capital and return to the headquarters, I do not think I shall have an opportunity of meeting you gentlemen again this session. I also express my desire that a decision on the supplementary budget of war expenditures will be quickly given.
In reply to Mr. Haseba Sumitaka, who desired to know the general policy of the Government with regard to the internal administration of Korea and the attitude of foreign powers toward that policy, the minister president said:
I do not think that the policy of our Government toward Korea has once changed since the opening of relations with that country. China regarding her as a tributary [Page 105] State and we considering her an independent power, our views have clashed from the outset. Though it need hardly he said that there are at times changes of circumstances more or less marked in one power’s relations with another, still I can say confidently that the general policy of our country toward Korea has not up to to-day undergone change. In proof of this I may state that, while China, declaring the autonomy of Korea, generally evaded responsibility for that country’s foreign relations, she attempted to interfere forcibly in her internal administration. Now there is no nation that has closet and more intimate relations with Korea than ours, and therefore Chinese interference became a constant obstruction to the friendly relations between the two countries.
In matters of small importance we could not go on removing that obstruction perpetually. I do not know if you, gentlemen, have cause to condemn the policy of our Government since the dispatch of our embassy to Korea in 1876 and the conclusion of a commercial treaty; but leaving that apart as an unimportant branch of the history of the past and coming down to the events of the last year, we have at length clear evidence from China’s making the Toughak rebellion a pretext; from the internal condition of Korea before the outbreak of the rebellion, and from the action and behavior of the officials dispatched from China, that efforts were made to sever the relations between our country and Korea. There also exists conclusive evidence that on the King of Korea’s appealing, or rather being compelled to appeal, to China for the dispatch of troops, China intended by using the suppression of the Tonghak rebellion as a pretext to destroy the independence of Korea and make her in reality a tributary State. Thereupon our country was obliged to wage war; for though I have always firmly believed that war is not only a matter of the greatest national importance, but also that a nation as such should not lightly wage it, yet if we had borne the matter in silence and remained passive to the known designs of China, our attitude would have affected not only our interests, but our honor as well, or rather the maintenance of our national dignity, and we were therefore compelled as a result to carry out the general policy to which we have consistently adhered since the conclusion of the treaty of 1876. [Hear! hear!]
But, as all the world knows, Korea is a truly poor and weak country. Though I do not think that the Kingdom is wanting in natural resources, still there exists as yet not the least means or method of exploiting such resources. And the nation also is content with inaction and temporizing methods, and does little more than pass the day without effort of any kind. Both high and low live in a state of indolence. I believe this arises from absolute ignorance of the present condition of the world; and as the necessity of making such a nation independent not only concerns Korea but has also a great bearing on our Empire, which is separated from Korea by a narrow strip of water, I am confident that the maintenance of her independence has also a most important relation to the position of our Empire as a nation. And, therefore, though we had hoped by effecting reforms in Korea, to maintain her independence in conjunction with China, our Government, though China’s intention being, as I have already stated, different from ours, assumed alone this responsibility. As to the question, then, of the interference of other powers, I firmly believe that there is no reason for any power to object to our sympathy with the isolated and weak or to our extending aid to others to maintain their independence. [Hear! hear!] To realize and preserve such independence in the case of Korea appears to be a most difficult undertaking, but we can not escape from the duty imposed upon us.
The necessity, as I stated at the outset, now causes us to lend to Korea 3,000,000 yen; and on inquiring into the reforms contemplated I do not think that Korea can rise alone by a mere change of officials at Seoul, or by the suppression of the Tong-haks. Therefore, when the Korean rebellion is suppressed the provincial government must be reorganized, access to national resources must be provided for by the improvement of the means of transportation; and while the country may be unable to maintain a large army, still sufficient provision must be made to guarantee peace throughout the Kingdom. Before rapid progress can be made in these directions the extent of Korea’s national resources must be fully investigated. Though of course our principal object is to make the Koreans themselves maintain their own, independence, it is necessary for us to give them aid for that purpose. I need not point out that there is naturally a distinction between principal and accessory. [Hear! hear!] Though there may be in the details of the reforms some matters not yet definitely determined and others that are already determined, I do not think there is any necessity to make special mention of either. Our Government has not in the least mistaken this policy. Indeed, there are, I believe, reasons that effectively obviate any mistake in policy. Is the general outline I have given sufficient?
On Mr. Haseba’s again rising and expressing his hope that the minister president would remain firm in his determination that nothing can triumph over reason, Count Ito replied:
I have already replied to the interrogation arising out of the Korean question. Being in a position of responsibility for the present great affair, I can not offer any [Page 106] undertaking for the future. That must depend upon the august will of His Gracious Majesty, as will he clear to you if you consider the facts. Again, there was a slight misapprehension in Mr. Haseba’s speech just now. With regard to the maintenance by Japan of Korean independence and sympathy with her isolation and weakness, and the determination to assist her to the last in her efforts to assume a sovereign position, I did not say that no one would interfere, neither did I declare that no one would object. I said that I believed everyone would agree. Again, what has happened up to to-day since the outbreak of affairs last year? In regard to diplomatic matters, such as the relations between different powers—for instance, between Japan, and Korea, other powers and Korea, Japan and China, or other powers and China—these things constitute, in my opinion, quite a different question. But I make this one statement: I am here to-day as a representative of His Gracious Majesty’s Government, and am charged with important affairs affecting the well-being of this Empire of Japan. Therefore I must be careful not only not to utter a single irresponsible word, but I must also not violate what should be inviolable. That much I must state to the house. [Cheers.]