Mr. Abbott to Mr. Blaine.

No. 190.]

Sir: With my No. 164, of December 17 last, I forwarded a copy of my note to this Government relative to the interpretation of article iii, section 10, of the consular convention of 1850.

On the 24th instant I received your No. 145, of January 16 ultimo, approving the tenor of my communication.

On the 11th instant I received from this Government a reply to my note, a translation of which is herewith inclosed. The translation forwarded is believed to express the idea of the minister’s reply; but I have not expended much time upon that portion quoted from Dalloz, since you undoubtedly have the original, to which reference should be made. With this exception, I think the translation may be depended upon.

It will be perceived that the foreign office continues to dissent in the most radical manner from the views presented by the Department.

It will be unnecessary to weary you with any comments upon the learned argument to which the minister has felt inclined to affix his signature. I have deemed it prudent to refrain from attempting any reply thereto, in view of the fact that you will undoubtedly desire to consider, before further action, that portion of the document which says in effect that Colombia will denounce the convention rather than accept the interpretation contended for by the United States, a course which would involve the termination of the general treaty of 1846. This position might easily be construed as notice to the Department that the presentation of further considerations in support of our claim will be ineffectual, even if Colombia should thereby be compelled to admit their validity. If such be the intention of this Government, it is entirely consistent with its every act since the discussion of this matter arose.

Of the manner in which it has responded to the extremely cautious and friendly attempts of the legation and the Department to secure a candid discussion of the questions involved without wounding the susceptibilities of Colombia or prejudicing the original situation of the parties interested, you are fully informed in my previous dispatches.

The fact that certain officials of the foreign office have nourished, their opposition to our claims with an almost passionate fondness has always been well known to me. But I have cherished the hope that a calm and dispassionate consideration of the case by the minister himself would lead to an acquiescence in our position, so evidently sound as to command the unqualified approval of every interested foreign representative at this capital.

The fact that the minister would prefer to denounce the convention [Page 473] than yield his assent to our claims is, however, unexpected, and it is not impossible that he has taken this position because he has recognized the strength of our contention and the weakness of his own, so far as ordinary argument is concerned.

It will be noted that in his report to Congress upon the Smith estate, transmitted with my No. 120, of August 22 last, the minister gave notice that, on account of the great delays sometimes occurring in the settlement of the estates of foreigners, reforms in the existing laws would be proposed.

The foreign representatives here whose countries are wholly (as in the case of France) or partially (as in the cases of Germany and Italy) without the supposed advantages of treaty stipulations conceding consular powers in the matter under discussion presented to the foreign office their views of such modifications as they hoped might be recommended. They earnestly dissented from certain provisions of the proposed law and repeatedly urged a reconsideration on the part of the Government.

Depending, as we do, upon a plain treaty stipulation to regulate the settlement of the estates of our citizens, I declined to manifest any interest in the proposed changes and refrained from making any suggestions in regard thereto.

But I am informed that the representations of my colleagues were entirely without effect, and that the law passed as originally framed in the foreign office. I forward a copy of this law, but hardly regard a translation necessary. Its chief aim and purpose is to render more explicit and mandatory the duty of local authorities to assume jurisdiction over the estates of deceased foreigners. It has the merit of attempting to provide more carefully for the preservation of the property of the deceased. The most commendable provision is the reduction of the time when the final settlement of an estate may be hoped for from four to two years. A most objectionable provision to my colleagues is that subjecting the proceeds of an estate to the order of the local judge having jurisdiction thereof. I bring the foregoing suggestions to your notice to show the evident determination of the Government not to yield its control over the estates of deceased foreigners, nor to listen to any modifications proposed by other interested nations. On the whole, however, the law will probably facilitate the final settlement of estates.

Returning to the communication of the minister, I call attention to his statement relative to the action of Great Britain in the matter of the subsidiary labor tax. A perusal of my previous dispatches and in-closures relative to this matter will, I think, show that Great Britain only consented not to oppose the interpretation contended for by Colombia, given certain conditions, but never agreed to the restrictive interpretation as stated in the minister’s note. I further call attention to the claim that custom, in a measure, makes the rule of interpretation. Various cases are cited in which this legation has acquiesced in the jurisdiction of Colombian courts over the estates of our citizens, deceased intestate. Before speaking of the individual cases mentioned, I would say that I can produce scores of instances since 1850 where American, British, and German consuls have settled the estates of their fellow-countrymen dying here, with no objection whatever on the part of the authorities. My information is that the cases in which the local authorities have intervened have been rare in comparison with the whole number of decedents. It is only recently that the Government has begun to insist upon taking jurisdiction in such cases, although I am not aware that it has ever admitted officially in any way anything which would militate against the position now assumed.

[Page 474]

The first case cited is that of Jacinto Rodriguez, who is said to have died in Rio Hacha in 1853. On an examination of the legation records, I find that on December 5, 1859, Mr. Jones, our then minister, in a note to the foreign office, said:

I beg leave again to call your attention to the case referred to in the accompanying letter and copy of your papers referred therein [sic], and to beg that you will use your potential influence with the proper authorities at Rio Hacha for an early settlement of Mr. Jacinto Rodriguez [sic].

The note also requests that collections made be forwarded to Boston for the widow of the deceased. The previous correspondence which had evidently taken place is not of record. May 18, 1860, Mr. Jones, in a note to the foreign office, said:

* * * May I ask that you will direct the proper authorities to pay over said amount and whatever may be here collected to the legal representatives of said Rodriguez, who, etc.

This is all I can find about this case. Whether we had a consul at Rio Hacha from 1850 to 1860 I am uninformed.

It will be noted that the above is the only case cited by the minister which occurred during the existence of the “Confederation of New Granada,” the Government with which the convention was concluded. All the other cases occurred during the time of the “United States of Colombia,” when the centralized form of the New Granada Government had given way to the system of independent States. In this connection, I suggest that it would be desirable for me to know whether the Department is of opinion that the consular functions ceased or not during the time of the “United States of Colombia” and whether it is considered that the States of the United States erected since the date of the convention stand on the same footing as those then existing.

The next case named is that of Frederick E. Gilbert in 1865, the correspondence in which will be found in Mr. Burton’s No. 215 to Mr. Seward, dated January 26, 1866, and in dispatches therein referred to.

The correspondence in the case of Carlos Hoffman will be found in Mr. Burton’s No. 216 to Mr. Seward, dated January 28, 1866.

That in the case of Martin P. Morris will be found in Mr. Burton’s No. 231 to Mr. Seward dated May 3, 1866.

The case of Gustavus Wall occurred during the term of Mr. Hurlbut. After a careful search I am unable to discover a single one of his letters to this Government among the archives of this legation.

The case of Alexander Henry is fully explained in my No. 121, of August 22, 1890.

The British and German legations take great interest in the result of the discussion of this question, since by reason of the favored-nation clause England and the Hanseatic cities are entitled to the benefits of our convention.

I think that in the light of past events all interested parties are convinced that there has never been any intention on the part of Colombia to yield to any theory of intrepretation that would invest consuls with any rights or privileges not granted by Colombian statute law. The intimation of the minister of a possible denouncement of the convention seems to confirm this supposition.

I would further suggest that a statement, showing in what parts of the United States Colombian consuls are deprived by reason of State laws of the privileges stipulated for in the convention, might be interesting.

I am, etc.,

John T. Abbott.
[Page 475]
[Inclosure in No. 190.—Translation.]

Señor Roldán to Mr. Abbott.

Sir: I have the honor to answer the note which you addressed to this ministry upon December 16 last, relative to the settlement of the estate of Susannah Smith.

In the inclosed memorandum will be found expressed the reasons which induce the Government of this Republic to adhere to its former opinion concerning this case, thus differing, although with regret, from the conclusion of your excellency, to whom I with pleasure reiterate the assurances, etc.

Antonio Roldán.
[Inclosure.—Translation.]

Memorandum.

The local judges of the department of Panama have taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate of Susannah Smith, a citizen of the United States of America, who died in Colon without leaving a will.

The Government of the Republic authorizing, as it has authorized, this judicial proceeding has taken into account reasons which still subsist, notwithstanding the contrary opinion set forth in the name of his Government by the minister of the United States in his note of December 16 last.

The course of the judges, undoubtedly correct in the light of international law, which subjects every foreigner to the local jurisdiction of his place of abode or domicile, and in the light of the Colombian public law, which contains the same principle in article 10 of the national constitution, is also so considered in relation to the stipulations of the existing consular convention between this Republic and the United States.

Article 3 of the consular convention, which is that which touches the present case; reads thus:

Article III. The consuls admitted in either Republic may exercise in their respective districts the following functions:

* * * * * * *

“10. They may take possession, make inventories, appoint appraisers to estimate the value of articles, and proceed to the sale of the movable property of individuals of their nation who may die in the country where the consul resides without leaving executors appointed by their will or heirs at law. In all such proceedings the consul shall act in conjunction with two merchants, chosen by himself, for drawing up the said papers for delivering the property or the produce of its sale, observing the laws of his country and the orders which he may receive from his own Government; but consuls shall not discharge these functions in those States whose peculiar legislation may not allow it. Whensoever there is no consul in the place where the death occurs, the local authorities shall take all the precautions in their power to secure the property of the deceased.”

In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the contracting parties, in agreeing upon the above-quoted article, did not contract equal obligations, either at the time when the treaty was signed or for the future. According to that opinion, this Republic ceded absolutely and unconditionally to the consuls of the United States of America a very considerable part of its jurisdiction, while the United States did not promise an equal privilege to Colombian consuls, except on condition that the laws of the integrant States of the North American Union might not forbid it.

The basis of this opinion is derived from the form of Government which New Granada, to day Colombia, had at the time of the making of the consular convention.

Since that form of government was a centralized one, it is said that the phrase “those States” which appears in the article can only have reference to the North American Union; all the more so, since the same article speaks of the special legislation of those States, a thing incompatible with the circumstances of the Republic in 1850.

The argument would be conclusive if the stipulation had referred solely to the state of things at that time, and if it had excluded the subsequent changes and modifications which might occur in the legislation and form of government of the contracting parties.

Since this was not the case, but rather the contrary, the reasoning necessarily loses its force.

[Page 476]

If the clause had said, e. g. “This privilege shall only he operative in those States whose special legislation allows it,” (permite) there would he no doubt but that New Granada had made the concession just as the Government of the United States claims, because it would have referred exclusively to the States and special legislation then existing; but, as the clause provides that the privilege shall only take effect in those States whose special legislation may allow it (permite, a word which has a signification applicable to the future), it must be admitted that the contracting parties not only took into account the existing circumstances at the date of the treaty, but also those of the future. The foregoing is further supported when it is considered that the United States, in the applications which it may have made or may have been able to make of the above-examined stipulation, has been obliged to take into account the legislation of the States created in that country since the year 1850.

If the contrary were true, the convention would appear to have been framed, not upon any just or scientific principle, but upon mere caprice, since it would lay down a rule for certain circumstances existing at one period and would lay aside that rule under identical circumstances which might present themselves in the course of time.

Now, then, if natural reason, founded in the letter itself of the convention, leads to the conclusion that the conditions of the referred to privilege ought not to be limited to the state in which things were in 1850, the treaty could not have stipulated unequal obligations. Therefore, the form of the Government of New Granada having been modified by the creation of Federal States, they ought to be comprehended in the clause under consideration, since the convention does not confine to one of the two parties the supposition of federation.

The federation of this Republic was changed in its turn, and the separate States with their corresponding laws disappeared, and one single State or nation, called the Republic of Colombia, became their heir. It being a rule of law that variations in the form of government of states or nations do not alter the rights and obligations derived from public treaties, it is entirely reasonable that if the United States of Colombia had need to consult the codes and special laws, in order to concede to the consuls of the United States the privilege in question, the Republic of Colombia, in granting the same privilege, must equally examine whether it is so authorized by the general legislation of the country.

It is necessary to remember, however, that this case, by a series of events which have occurred relative to the conditions of the privilege, and on account of the reading of the clause, which may not be clear to everyone, is among those which the law of nations classes as doubtful. Therefore, it must be interpreted in harmony with the practices of nations, the dictates of natural law, and the opinions of publicists who are authorities.

II.

According to the universal doctrine, international treaties are contracts of good faith, on account of which their scope is determined, more than that of any other agreement, by reasons of equity, and not by arguments of strict right, which might be founded in the obscurity or deficiency of language.*

In the present case equity demands that the convention be interpreted so that it may produce equal obligations, as the Republic claims, instead of advantages in favor of one party alone, as the Government of-the United States maintains.

This is frequently applied in the relations of states. We will cite, not to go far back, what has recently occurred in respect to article 16 of the existing treaty between Colombia and Great Britain.

That article, considered in its grammatical sense, exempted British subjects from the payment of certain general contributions authorized by international law and by the constitution and local laws. This Republic expressed to the Government of Her Majesty that in its opinion it was a case for a restrictive interpretation of that stipulation, since in any other manner results would be produced contrary to equity, and the British Government agreed to such interpretation.

The above rule is akin to that which considers the results of an interpretation as a means of determining the most reasonable and convenient interpretation. Generally the interpretation which produces the most humanitarian and most advantageous effects for both parties, and those most in harmony with public law and with the legislation of the contracting states, ought to be preferred to that which gives opposite results.

If the clause in question were interpreted as the Government of the United States claims, it would impose upon this Republic an obligation altogether too onerous, which would affect unfavorably the administration of justice in the country and would eventually vest in the citizens of the United States a privilege repugnant to the laws and the constitution of this Republic.

[Page 477]

On the contrary, the interpretation sustained by Colombia avoids this so serious inconvenience and harmonizes with the universal practice relative to consular rights.*

To-day consular attributes may be considered as fixed by custom and by the treaties of civilized nations; the exaggerated privileges with which, in another time, some nations undertook to invest them have been laid aside. Especially in the matter of the settlement of estates these privileges are seen to be exceedingly prejudicial, since it often happens that the public treasury or some native or foreign creditors may have claims against the estate of the deceased.

To define and make effective these claims it is indispensably demanded that the judicial authorities should intervene, determine the case, and pronounce sentence according to law, since in any other manner those claims might suffer injury.

On the other hand, if the doctrine which the United States defends in the present case were that ordinarily received, it would result that the transmission of personal property of foreigners dying intestate to their successors or heirs, would take place in an entirely private manner, and without the judicial character which seals and sanctions the acquisition of rights in Christian states.

It thus follows that the rule of interpretation which teaches that these interpretations contrary to the principles universally accepted by civilized peoples ought to be rejected is applicable in favor of the interpretation maintained by Colombia.

The inconveniences of the interpretation defended by the Government of Washington would be multiplied by the fact that other nations with which this Republic cultivates relations are by virtue of treaties in the same position as the United States respecting the prerogatives and rights of consuls. As a matter of fact, the most-favored-nation clause is found to apply to this matter in the existing treaties between Colombia and Chile, Ecuador, Great Britain, Holland, and Portugal, and in those which may be held to exist with the cities of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, and with the state succeeding the ancient Kingdom of Sardinia.

Such great inconveniences would oblige this Republic to take steps to put an end to a compact which would eventually produce a profound revolution in its legislation, and to leave its cordial and valued relations with the United States to be governed by those general principles which rule in the absence of treaties.

Fortunately the necessity of going to this extreme appears remote, since the United States, the same as other interested nations, have practically given to the stipulation under consideration an interpretation which entirely conforms to that which the Colombian Government defends.

This has been the case as to the settlement of various estates consisting of personal property of citizens of the North American Union dying intestate in Colombia, which have been submitted to local jurisdiction with the knowledge and acquiescence of the Government of the United States.

Certain cases are cited as examples:

In the year 1853, on the death in Rio Hacha of the United States citizen Jacinto Rodriguez, the probate proceedings took place before the judge of that circuit.

The legation of the United States, in charge of the Hon. George W. Jones, received from the secretary of foreign affairs documents relating to the cause, and confined himself to asking that a sum of dollars might be delivered to the attorney of the heirs, and that the settlement of the estate might be hastened.

The Hon. Allan A. Burton, minister resident of the United States, in his note of May 8, 1865, in thanking the Colombian Government for the intervention of the authorities of Cauca in the management of the effects which remained after the death of Frederick E. Gilbert, expresses the opinion that the latter was a debtor to Colombian citizens and asks that the local authorities may cause the estate to be administered.

The same representative solicited of the Government of the Republic, July 10, 1865, a report upon the property of Carlos Hoffman, deceased.

October 13, 1865, and January 10, 1866, he acknowledged receipt of the reports which had been transmitted to him. The property amounted to $153.50.

April 20, 1866, he acknowledged receipt of the report which the Colombian Government had sent him relative to the effects belonging to the estate of Martin P. Morris, who died in Cali, and expresses his thanks for the intervention of the local authorities in the matter.

In his note of April 12, 1870, the Hon. S. A. Hurlbut, minister resident of the United States, requested that a report might be asked of the competent local authorities as to the value and kind of the property, debts, and credits of the estate of Gustavus Wall, who died in Socorro. In conclusion, he added: “The undersigned also requests that the papers, letters, and other private documents of the deceased which [Page 478] may not be necessary for the settlement of the estate and of any value to his kindred may be forwarded to this legation.”

The Hon. V. O. King, chargé d’affaires, in acknowledging receipt, July 10, 1886, of the note in which the legation of the United States was informed that Mr. Alexander Henry had died in Handa intestate, did not question the right of this Republic to intervene in the settlement of the estate of his fellow-citizen. Referring to the instructions sent to the local authorities to proceed according to the provisions of the law in such cases, he said: “I know of no facts to justify any other course than that pursued in the case, and therefore for the present fully acquiesce in your excellency conclusions.”

The same is applicable to the other nations whose rights, as above explained, might be compared, as to the prerogatives of consuls, to those which the Government of the United States may have, since not one has made any objection to the execution of the Colombian law in the sense which the Republic upholds.

This conduct constitutes what is customarily called “usual interpretations,” whose authority is decisive in doubtful cases.*

III.

As the stipulation in question requires, besides the authority of the local law, another condition in order that the consular prerogative should obtain, which is that the property should be personal, it remains to determine the character which under this view is possessed by the houses left by the late Mrs. Smith.

According to the civil code of the Republic, which is the law applicable to the case in point, houses are real estate, since in them is realized the nature of this class of property. Although the denominations “movable” and “immovable” signify literally that which is susceptible and that which is not susceptible of being moved, these terms, as is obvious, are rather the equivalents of objects which are not attached to the soil and of those which are so. A house like that left by Mrs. Smith, whatever may be its materials, and although it may be built upon the land of another proprietor, fulfills that condition; therefore, it must be considered as real estate. It is so declared by the Colombian law, and where the law does not establish distinctions there is no room to make them.

It is true that the houses were perhaps designed to remain for a limited time upon the land of the Panama Railway Company, but it is also true that property which is found in a similar condition—for example, growing crops and produce—is classed as real estate. In this respect Dalloz says, in his great dictionary of jurisprudence: “It seems to us that they go too far (certain authors) when they exact as a condition of the immovability of an edifice that its incorporation with the soil may have been made in perpetuity. In our opinion here is inconsiderately applied to things declared real by their nature a rule established only, as we shall see presently, with respect to what are real by reason of the uses for which they are designed. We can not admit, for example, that a building, the foundations of which rest upon the ground, lacks the character of realty from the mere fact that, in the mind of the proprietor by whom it was constructed, it may only possess a temporary character, or may be replaced some day by another larger or more substantial structure. The intention of the proprietor is indeed worthy of consideration when it is attempted to fix the character of an object which, being naturally personal, only obtains by virtue of such intention a fictitious immovability; but with respect to a building the law takes into consideration exclusively its nature and not the will, often uncertain, of the proprietor.”

It is equally true that the system of construction of houses permits, perhaps, that they should be taken apart and transported from one point to another, but being attached to the ground their removal would have to be effected by forcing, in some manner, such connection, as in the case of the flags of a pavement or the tubes of an aqueduct, which the civil code classes as real estate, even when they are essentially removable. On the other hand, by the same argument, it would be possible to demonstrate the personal character of whatever building, since the progress in mechanics promises the means for removing even the heaviest.

The fact that the owners of the house and of the land are distinct does not destroy the character of the building. It is not deemed that in this case the old principle res salo cedit is inapplicable, and that for the same reason there is no room for accession, since the lease forbids it. The doctrine of Kent, cited in the note of the minister, is unobjectionable; but the case is not decided by that, since accession is not always the lawful criterion for determining the character, as realty, which a [Page 479] thing may possess. This character is based upon the nature itself of the buildings or, it may be, upon the circumstances of their being affixed to the soil.

The opinion of Dalloz is also conclusive as to this proposition:

“A building does not cease to be real estate even when it may have been constructed by another than the owner of the soil. M. Deloincourt has expressed a contrary opinion, founded upon the fact that the building, not being real estate, except as accessory to and a part of the soil, can only belong, as such and while not demolished, to the proprietor of the soil. But the reasonable answer is, in the first place, that a building belongs to the owner of the soil, although it may have been constructed by another (C. Cir. 553–5), and in the second place that it is not correct to claim that a building is only real estate in so far as it belongs to the owner of the soil; indeed, on the contrary, it can not be denied that an owner may well sell his house, reserving the ownership of the land upon which it is built.”*

Neither can we accept the distinction between the character of the rights of the owner of the house and that of the rights of the proprietor of the soil, calling personal the first and real the second, pertaining as they do to the same object. Such a distinction, besides being unfounded and too subtile, would in the present case entail grave inconveniences. The Government of this Republic should consider the well-known character of these houses as real estate, without undertaking to make distinctions which pertain to courts, which are the proper authorities to decide whether the houses which Mrs. Smith left belong to the owner of the soil or to the heirs, assigns, or purchasers thereof. To accept the practical effects of that distinction would be in a certain way to prejudge a point the decision of which belongs exclusively to the courts.

As to this point the opinion of Dalloz is also decisive, who, after having considered various decisions of certain tribunals upon the same question, says:

“Nevertheless we are inclined to adopt the decision of the supreme court as being conformable to article 518, which declares generally that houses are real by their nature, without distinguishing between the case of those which may be constructed by the proprietor of the soil and those which may have been built by another. In order to create an exception to so absolute a rule, very serious motives not within our reach would be required. Undoubtedly he who has built upon the land of another has rights distinct from those of the proprietor of the soil; undoubtedly these rights will be made definite according to the will of the latter, either by a pecuniary indemnification or by removing the materials, what is equivalent in both cases to something purely personal; but from this it does not follow that the building, while it is in existence and while he who built it retains possession, is as to the latter personal property also. No, this building is real, as the law says. The right which the builder has to enjoy it is therefore a right in realty. This right will be transformed later into a right in personalty, since then its purpose will be changed, being applied not now to a building, but to materials or to an indemnity; but at present it partakes of the nature of the thing upon which it stands, which is real, and if the builder conveys it to a third person the grant which takes place is also in fact real.” And later he concludes: “The buildings erected upon the soil of another are real estate, not only when the proprietor of the latter has the right or is obliged to retain them in virtue of law or by contract at the expiration of the enjoyment of the builder, but also when the latter has expressly reserved the right to demolish them and take away the materials, so that it results from the judgments of the supreme court already cited that in both cases it has decided to the same effect, and indeed we do not see why the same rule should not be applied to both hypotheses.”

Demolombe explains this whole doctrine in the following terms:

“It is necessary to include under this heading of buildings, employed in article 518, all constructions and works, whatever they may be, superficial or subterranean, of whatever material or form, or for whatever purpose, from the time that such works are incorporated with the soil and become an integrant part thereof, whether they be dwellings, barns, storehouses, walls or inclosures, excavations, etc., it does not matter.

“There is no object in inquiring by whom, nor with whose funds, nor with what materials the building or work has been constructed; whether by the owner of the soil itself, or by a lessee, tenant at will, or any other holder.

“The building once constructed is real estate by its nature; that is to say, in a manner absolute and independent of the character of the builder. Undoubtedly, when the proprietor builds upon his land with materials of another, or when an individual builds upon the land of another with his own materials, there is room upon the part of both for an arrangement, and now we shall see that, in fact, the Code Napoleon has foreseen these two hypotheses. But as to the character of the building itself, [Page 480] viewing it in its nature as realty, the principle remains the same always and in every case.”*

These opinions are very probably correct, not only on account of the evident validity of the reasons upon which they are founded, and the great respectability of their authors, but, also, because they relate to legislation which is the source of the civil code of this Republic. If any tribunal or jurisconsult shall have given a different opinion, it is certain that their moral authority will not have the force of that of the supreme court of France, nor of that of the learned expositors who support the opinions of the ministry for foreign affairs. But if uniformity of opinion should be demanded, a thing which can not be demanded in these matters, it could be admitted, by way of hypothesis, that the character of the houses left by Susannah Smith is doubtful—a concession the same as that which was made respecting the meaning of the words of article 3, clause 10, of the consular convention.

On this supposition the considerations set forth in No. 2 of this memorandum, founded upon the rules which the law provides for interpreting doubtful clauses of treaties, will become at once applicable.

  1. Savigny, Dr. Rom., 1–4. Phillimore Inter. Law 5, 8, 64.
  2. Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, 216, 27. Fiore, Dir. Inst. Pub., 1038.
  3. Fiore, Ib., 1043.
  4. Phillimore, loc. cit.
  5. Voz Biens., Dist. des biens, 2, 11, 19.
  6. Ib., 2, 11, 20.
  7. Ib., 2, 11, 24, and 25.
  8. Code Napoleon, 2, 11, 103 and 104.