Mr. Egan to Mr.
Blaine.
Legation of
the United States,
Santiago, June 9, 1891.
(Received July 16.)
No. 172.]
Sir: On Tuesday, the 2d instant, I had the honor to
receive from Mr. Wharton a telegram.*
I also received on same day two letters from Rear-Admiral McCann now at
Iquique, copies of which I inclose, marked No. 1 and No. 2, in the latter of
which he says:
I have just been authorized by the authorities here to ask the
belligerents, through our Government and yourself, to act on my
suggestion of yesterday with reference to the truce, and have
telegraphed to Washington accordingly.
I took the earliest opportunity to obtain an interview with the President and
intimated to him, informally, the object of my visit. He requested me to
convey to the President of the United States his most cordial appreciation
of the generous interest which he is taking with a view to terminating the
present unhappy conflict in Chile, and to say that it would be an especial
pleasure to him if such a happy result could be arrived at through the
medium of the good offices of the United States. He requested me to convey
the assurance that both he and his Government are ready to consider, in the
most kindly spirit, any propositions coming from the revolutionary or
opposition party based upon the maintenance of legitimate authority; that
they seek no harsh measures against the other side, no penalties, no
confiscations of personal property; and that they are prepared to make any
reasonable sacrifices for the restoration of peace. The Government will not,
however, make any proposals until it first has before it the propositions of
the revolutionary party, and to this the revolutionary leaders here will
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not consent. The idea of a truce,
suggested by Admiral McCann, would not at present be entertained.
Judging from the letters of Admiral McCann, and from information which has
reached me through other sources, I consider that the revolutionary leaders
here have an exaggerated idea of the condition of things with their friends
in the North and on that account it is extremely difficult to deal with
them.
I have replied to Admiral McCann, under date of 2d instant, suggesting to him
the possibility of getting some proposals from the leaders in the north
which might serve as the basis of negotiations. I inclose copy of my letter
marked No. 3.
I shall avail of every possible opportunity that may offer to carry into
effect the desire communicated to me on behalf of His Excellency the
President 5 but, from the temper of the leaders of the revolution, and from
their bitter personal hatred against President Balmaceda, I have but slight
hopes of accomplishing anything practical at the present time.
The election of the next President will take place on the 25th of July, when,
I believe, Hon Claudio Vicuña will be chosen unanimously, or nearly so. This
gentleman, with whom I have the honor to be on terms of cordial personal
friendship, is an ardent admirer of the United States, and, as his family
connections and associations extend in various directions among the leaders
of the opposition, I have strong hopes that after his election it will be
possible to negotiate a truce which, after his installation in office on the
18th of September next, may be converted into a permanent peace.
I have, etc.,
[Inclosure 1 in No. 172.]
Rear-Admiral McCann
to Mr. Egan.
My Dear Sir: I have just had a visit from Capt.
Montt and Señor Errazuriz, with the latter of whom I had a conversation
about the Itata affair, as well as about the
political and military situation of affairs in Chile.
He (Errazuriz) informed me that he expected the Itata here yesterday, and that she might arrive any time. He
complained of the unjust treatment of the Esmeralda at Acapulco by the Mexican Government, stating that
it was in violation of their rights as belligerents, and that sufficient
coal and other supplies should have been allowed that vessel to enable
her to reach the nearest home port; but that he was now in communication
with the Mexican authorities, who were reconsidering the situation and
were inclined to act more favorably. Mr. Trumbull was still in San
Francisco, but had been unable to communicate with Capt. Silva of the
Esmeralda and learn the whereabouts of the
Itata.
The conversation then turned on the political parties in Chile, and Señor
Errazuriz spoke of the unconstitutional manner of electing the present
Congress as being the greatest obstacle to any peaceable adjustment of
the difficulty between the revolutionary party and the Balmaceda
Government, and also of the confiscation of the property of the
insurgents. I then inquired if he still had representatives of the Junta
government in Santiago and if there remained any hope of further
negotiations for peace. He replied that their representatives were still
there, and that the ministers of the three Governments who had offered
their good offices were still prepared to continue their efforts for
peace, and that the Junta commissioners had receded from their first
condition, of the retirement of Balmaceda from the office of
President.
I then asked his opinion as to the probable conduct of Señor Vicuña when
elected to the office of President. He thought that he would be more
inclined for a peaceable settlement than Balmaceda had been.
I then suggested, “Why not consent to a truce until the expiration of the
term of
[Page 137]
office of Balmaceda?
This would give time for the three foreign ministers and the members of
the Junta to reconsider the negotiations for peace.”
Señor Errazuriz thought “that it would be impracticable to suspend
hostilities, with the armies now in the field.” But a moment later he
replied: “I have never thought of that; I thank you for the suggestion;
it is a broad and generous view to take of the situation, and I will
telegraph the fact immediately.”
This is substantially the conversation, to the best of my
recollection.
My impression has been for some time that the success of the
revolutionary party is about hopeless, and these impressions were
somewhat strengthened by an admission made by Capt. Montt, that he
placed no reliance upon the disloyalty to the Government of the troops
in the southern provinces.
There is no important change in the situation of affairs here, although
the torpedo cruisers and the Imperial have kept
the garrisons and naval vessels about the nitrate ports in a continual
state of commotion by threatening to attack.
The Pensacola is at Arica, and the Charleston is expected to be there in a few
days.
Yours, very sincerely,
W. P. McCann,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.
[Inclosure 2 in No. 172.]
Rear-Admiral McCann
to Mr. Egan.
Dear Sir: In my hurried note of yesterday I
omitted one part of the conversation which I think will be of interest
to you.
In my first interview with Capt. Montt and Señor Errazuriz I stated that
I was aware of the fact that our minister to Chile had been subjected to
much undeserved abuse by the revolutionary party and their sympathizers,
both on this part of the coast as well as in Santiago and Valparaiso,
and that there was no doubt of Mr. Egan’s impartiality in his conduct as
our representative or that he had been befriending many of the
opposition and had protected them and saved them from punishment.
During the interview yesterday Señor Errazuriz remarked that he was aware
of the fact and that he had the highest regard for Mr. Egan.
As to the suggestion for a truce which I made yesterday, it is my opinion
that if proposed by the insurgents the Government would be placed in an
embarrassing position if it were to be declined. This, however, is a
matter entirely for diplomatic agents to deal with and arrange.
The sailing of the Puno having been put off till
this afternoon, I avail myself of the delay to send this short
postscript to my note of yesterday.
Yours, very sincerely,
W. P. McCann,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.
P. S.—I have just been authorized by the authorities here to ask the
belligerents, through our Government and yourself, to act on my
suggestion of yesterday with reference to the truce, and have
telegraphed to Washington accordingly.
[Inclosure 3 in No. 172.]
Mr. Egan to
Rear-Admiral McCann.
Legation of the United States,
Santiago, June 2,
1891.
My Dear Sir: Your much-esteemed and very
interesting letters of the 25th and 26th ultimo came to hand to-day, and
I am greatly pleased to receive, and very thankful for, all the
information which they conveyed. I have also to-day received a telegram
from the Department of State, instructing me, in the name of the
President, to ascertain, discreetly and informally, whether there is any
way in which the friendly offices of our Government can be used for the
termination of the conflict now raging in Chile, which suggestion is
made in an entirely disinterested manner and prompted solely by a desire
to restore peace. In pursuance of that instruction I had to-day a
conference with the President, in which he manifested a very good spirit
and a strong desire for peace, based, of course, upon legitimate
principles. The late negotiations were broken off because the delegates
of the opposition would not consent that their bases of peace should be
made known to the Government until
[Page 138]
the latter had first given in writing to us as
mediators its conditions, which the Government could not consent to
do.
The President assured me that his Government will consider in a kindly
spirit any proposals which the opposition may submit, and that there is
no medium through which he would be so much pleased to receive
propositions as through your good self and through the United States
legation in Santiago.
If your view of the situation be correct, as I have no doubt it is, the
opposition leaders here are greatly mistaken and as a consequence they
have got their notions entirely too high. They assert, and I am sure
they honestly believe, that the revolutionary army in the north is
composed of about 14,000 to 15,000 men, and that very soon they can
invade the south with 10,000 to 12,000 men well armed and equipped. In
this frame of mind it is entirely useless to talk compromise with
them.
I believe that the only chance of effecting an arrangement is by
negotiating direct with the leaders in the north, and I would suggest to
you to endeavor to obtain from them some definite propositions which may
serve as a basis for negotiation.
Your idea of a truce would not, I fear, be entertained. I suggested the
matter to-day, but it was not favorably received.
The Government has now about 30,000 regular troops and about 10,000 armed
police. If these men continue loyal—and I believe they will—it seems to
me that the Government can not be disturbed and a continuance of the
present state of things must be ruinous for every interest in Chile. It
is therefore a duty, in the interest of humanity, to do everything
possible to restore peace and save the country from further bloodshed
and ruin.
You can assure the gentlemen of the opposition in the north that my best
and most cordial efforts will be freely and fully at their disposal for
the attainment of these ends.
I remain, etc.,
