No. 121.
Mr. Osborn
to Mr. Evarts.
Santiago, Chili, September 9, 1880. (Received October 22.)
Sir: Responding to your instruction No. 98, I have the honor to inclose an English translation of a note received by me from the minister of foreign relations on the day of its date. You will observe that it is simply an acknowledgment of the receipt of my note to which your instruction refers concerning the course to be observed by Chili in the prosecution of the war in this section, and an assurance that it should be laid before the President. A similar note was received at the European legations, but no further response has been deemed necessary by this government. I am assured, however, that our respective notes have received that consideration which the gravity of the subject of which they teach demanded, and I am led to believe that they have exercised no small influence in the subsequent conduct of the war. In so far as the naval operations are concerned, I have heard of no cause of complaint since about the first of last January. Unfortunately their land forces are not so easily controlled. I judge that the reports which have gone to the world from Peruvian sources regarding the behavior of the Chilian soldiery at Pisagua, Mollendo, Tacna, and Arica are more or less exaggerated; still it is undoubtedly true that they are not wholly without foundation. The common Chilian soldier is a strong and reckless man, paying but little regard to discipline, and, in battle, stranger, alike, to fear and to instincts of mercy. He is impatient cinder restraint, and is too apt to turn a deaf ear to commands which do [Page 134] not conform to his liking. This is the one great fault with the Chilian army—its want of respect for the commands of its officers in battle. The authorities here understand that perfectly, and to this knowledge, in a great degree, is due the hesitation of the government in entering upon the Lima campaign. There is not the slightest doubt entertained here as to the ability of the Chilian army to enter Lima, but it is feared by the more considerate ones, that once there, the soldiers might be guilty of excesses which would not redound to the credit of their country. The Chilian peon hates the Peruvian as if by instinct, and his hatred is as bitter as it is natural. To this common feeling add the flame which stories of torpedoes and of hidden mines laid for his destruction necessarily produce, and you will be able to comprehend, perhaps in a modified degree, the spirit which animates the common Chilian soldier in this war.
Preparations for an extensive campaign continue, and unless peace shall come soon, the government will undoubtedly be driven into the movement against Lima.
* * * * * * *
I think I see some slight evidences here of apprehension upon the part of the government of armed intervention by the European powers, to the extent of preventing the Chilian army from entering Lima, if that campaign should be undertaken, but my inquiries * * * have failed to develop anything in justification of this fear further than can be implied from the uncommon interest in behalf of peace now being manifested by the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy. I have the honor, &c.,