Two of General Burriel’s statements are deserving of especial remark. It
will be noticed that he avers that the orders under which the Virginius
was seized, and her officers and crew tried and shot, were contained in
the decree of General Dulce of March 24, 1869, which, as he says, has
never been repealed or abrogated. When the language of the preamble to
the decree of July 7, 1869, in which it was stated that General Dulce
orders were thereby superseded, and the many positive assurances,
received from nearly every successive cabinet of Madrid deprecating the
celebrated decree of March 24 are remembered, it appears indeed strange
that General Burriel’s assertion should not only be made public, but
suffered to remain uncontradicted.
The second noteworthy fact is found in the certificate of General
Riquelme, chief of staff of the army of Cuba, which is given by General
Burriel as an ample disculpation from the insinuation of the Revue des Deux Mondes, that the stoppage of
telegraphic communication between Havana and Santiago at the time of the
Virginius slaughter was “more or less fortuitous.” From this official
document it appears that, while the cable connecting those cities was
inoperative from October 13, 1873, to the date of the certificate,
February 11, 1874, the land-line was only interrupted from the 1st to
the 7th of November, and after a day’s interval, in which it may be
inferred that it was temporarily in working order, it again became
obstructed on the 8th of November, and continued so until the 13th of
that month. As General Riquelme’s testimony in this regard confirms the
report that the break in the line coincided with the arrival of the
Virginius at Santiago, it can hardly be said to afford the triumphant
exoneration claimed for it. On the contrary, it seems to have escaped
attention that another and more serious suspicion might possibly be
raised by the publication of this paper, since the news of the capture
of the Virginius was received in Madrid at an early hour on the 6th of
November, and not on the 7th, as General Burriel erroneously avers, and
the orders of President Castelar, issued the same morning, which were
not received in Havana, as Mr. Carvajal said, until the morning of the
7th, might not unreasonably be presumed to have reached that capital in
season to be transmitted during the temporary resumption of
communication by the land-line to which General Riquelme bears witness,
and, consequently, it is not impossible that they might have been
transmitted to Santiago before the shooting of the last batch of victims
on the 8th.
Passing this by, however, it appears to me that, in view of the explicit
declarations that General Burriel was obeying orders, it would not be
out of place to ask an explanation of the matter in the proper quarter,
and, in event of their inaccuracy, to demand the public retraction of
this extraordinary letter.
[Inclosure.—Translation.]
Letter of General Juan Burriel to the Revue des
Deux Mondes.
[From La Epoca, April 21, 1874.]
To the Director of the Revue des
Deux Mondes:
Esteemed Sir: In the review which you so
skillfully edit, and which merits general acceptation by reason of
the distinguished judgment with which it touches upon all the
matters of which it treats, in volume xii, of date March 2d last,
second edition, a few pages (from the 434th) are devoted to the
Cuban question, and I have seen with regret that, alluding to the
recent question of the Virginius, place is given to views which are
very far from the truth, and interrogatories are printed to which it
seems taken for granted that a reply is very doubtful, or, rather,
it is sought to intimate such, a reply in a manner favorable to
gratuitous suppositions. Such views and interrogatories published in
a work of high standing and worthy of credit, and one which
consequently has a large circulation, may to-morrow form data for
history, while, in truth, they would not be trustworthy without a
clear rectification alike due to the honor of my country and to my
own, and which, I cannot doubt, will be made in your review, when
you, Mr. Director, are convinced of the truths which I propose to
set forth with the brevity which a communication of this kind
requires, and avoiding comments.
It is said on page 457, with reference to the capture of the
Virginius, “that a court-martial was forthwith installed on board
the Tornado; that all the prisoners were tried as pirates; that only
18 escaped sentence of death, among whom there were four or five
only who were ignorant of the object of the expedition.”
The facts show these inaccuracies, as will be seen in the following
statement of them: There were on the Virginius 155 prisoners, of
whom 103 were tried by the military tribunal of the general
headquarters of Santiago de Cuba, and the remaining 52, who composed
the crew of the vessel, from the captain to the cabin-boy, were
tried by the marine tribunal in a council of war which was hejd on
board the steamer Francisco de Borja on the 6th of November, and
lasted until six o’clock in the morning of the 7th, 37 being
sentenced to death, of whom 27 were Americans or Englishmen, and the
other 10 Cubans; of the rest, 15 in number, 3 were sentenced to
liberty, (sic) because the fact of their
unwillingness to embark had been proven by Captain Fry himself, and
12 to different terms of imprisonment on account of being seamen and
ship’s hands, of a low grade. This is the truth, and is proved by
official documents, as it has also been clearly proved that the
vessel was a pirate, because she unduly carried the American flag,
and that her capture was legal. Of the remaining prisoners, 16 were
sentenced to death, and executed, because they were so-called
generals, chiefs, and officers; and 87 remained at the disposal of
the captain-general of the island, when, on the 8th, I sent him an
aid-de-camp with the war-steamer Bazan, under full steam, in order
that, if he wished, he might commute their death-penalties; and for
this reason, and because of having received on the same 8th day, in
Havana, the orders of the Castelar government to suspend the
executions, there were delivered to the steamer Juniata, (American,)
on the 18th of December, the 102 surviving foreign and Cuban
prisoners. Consequently, those shot were 53; and 102, the survivors,
returned in virtue of the Polo Fish protocol.
The same paragraph goes on to say: “The foreign consuls protested
energetically in favor of their countrymen; but Governor Burriel
only awaited the end of the trials in order to begin the shootings.
Was his object to assert his authority and forestall the
intervention of the government?” The answer is very simple. The
pretensions of the consuls and commanders of vessels who made these
protests were not conceded, because I was prohibited from doing so
by the special circumstances of the case and the superior orders
then in force, and my “desire to assert my authority” is very soon
explained. The laws or orders under which I tried the prisoners of
the Virginius and applied the extreme penalty to the insurgent
chiefs were the following: That of February
[Page 491]
24, 1869, ordering that all insurgent leaders
captured should be shot “without any other condition than the proof
of their identity,” and the same with those who were known to
exercise influence in the insurrection, although they might not be
styled chiefs, (cabecillas;) that of October
20, 1870, which peremptorily prescribed the same thing, excepting
certain named personages of note, whose punishment on being captured
was to be inflicted in Havana; that of January 28, 1871, in the
seventh article of its penal regulations; the bando or proclamation of May 14, 1872; and the circular of
the 8th of June following, ordering the prompt and exemplary
punishment of those who may wound in an alarming manner the
integrity of the country.
If stronger grounds are needed to justify my conduct in those
circumstances and to carry conviction to the most scrupulous and
conscientious mind, see the decree of March 14, 1869, which has not
been abrogated by any order whatever, issued by the superior
political governor of Cuba, in the exercise of the extraordinary
discretionary powers with which he stood invested, for the purpose
of preventing precisely such piratical expeditions as that of the
Virginius, which provides in its sole article “that vessels which
may be captured in Spanish waters or on the high seas, in the
neighborhood of this island, laden with men, arms, and munitions and
war-material that can in any manner contribute to inciting or giving
aid to the insurrection in this province, whencesoever they may come
or whithersoever they may be found, after examination of their
papers and registers, shall be de facto
considered as enemies and treated as pirates in conformity to the
ordinances of the navy, and the persons captured in them, whatever
may be their number, shall be immediately shot.”
These are the superior orders by which my conduct was governed—orders
which admitted of no consultation or delay, and the exact
fulfillment of which was obligatory upon me. And even thus, is it
true that I only awaited the end of the trials in order to begin the
shootings? It is not true; and, as before, I repeat that the facts
prove it. A few hours had sufficed for the identification of the
persons of the delinquents, and this would have been enough for
compliance with the law, but I desired that the justice of the
matter should be clearly evident. I desired that all should be heard
in their defense, and for this reason the first four chiefs of most
importance who suffered the rigor of the same (the law) did so on
the 4th of November; that is, four days after being made prisoners.
The next were the thirty-seven of the crew, on the 7th of the same,
and the twelve last on the 8th; or, in other words, seven and eight
days after the capture.
It is not permitted to military men to vacillate when they have
peremptory orders to obey, and still more when they are grave and
important and refer to acts of war; consequently no consideration
whatever could make me pause before this duty, and still less the
protests presented wholly without right by the American vice-consul.
If the laws of Spain are too severe in the judgment of foreigners, I
am not the one called upon to arrest their action, and they are at
liberty not to tread the soil of Spain if its method of ruling and
governing itself does not suit them. Their protests in these extreme
cases should not be heard, for they only seek thereby to hinder the
action of the law. Let their respective governments come with
reclamations, and this is the way to modify them, (the laws,) if it
be deemed necessary to do so. There follows another answered
interrogatory, which says: “Did he yield only to the pressure of the
volunteers?” “This is still possible in Havana as in Santiago,” says
an American correspondent. It is very easy for me to prove to that
correspondent that his assertion is not based on authentic
information. All my acts in the posts I have filled in the island of
Cuba are publicly known, and whoever may be even slightly acquainted
with the different events which have taken place in Cuba, will
easily remember what occurred in Matanzas on the night of the 1st of
February, 1870, by reason of the receipt of the news of the
assassination of Castañon.
Here I shall permit myself to make a slight digression. On page 447
of the article which occupies my attention, it is stated that
Castañon was wounded in a duel by a Creole hand,” and it is
indispensable to throw light on this, so that what is public and
notorious may be put on record, that Castañon was assassinated in a
hotel in Key West by several Cuban insurgents. Well, then, because
of this affair, the minds, not only of the volunteers, but of all
the Spaniards and foreigners who chanced to be in the island, became
aroused, demanding, as was just, blood for blood; and as in Matanzas
several suspected persons had been recently imprisoned, and the
corresponding proceedings were being initiated against them, the
volunteers, in their natural indignation, demanded speedy and
immediate justice against the accused, in whom for the time they
beheld, not suspected persons, but culprits or enemies of ours. I
flung myself among their bayonets, and, with the energy which in
such cases is necessary, I made them comprehend that the government
would do justice, and that this should be done in the form and
manner prescribed by our laws. I do not deem it necessary to go
further into details, since the voice of my authority was heeded,
and what afterward took place is well known. In the matter which now
occupies us, was there in Santiago de Cuba a single Spaniard who was
not filled with indignation on learning that the prisoners of the
Virginius who survived the fifty-three would have to be delivered up
to
[Page 492]
the Government of the
United States? Have the shadows of the night hidden what occurred on
that (the night) of the 16th of November in Santiago de Cuba, and
has it consequently not reached the notice of the American
correspondent? I believe that the way in which the public feeling
was exhibited on that night is well known, and it is most notorious
that I, although appreciating the just indignation of those loyal
inhabitants, said to them that the government had commanded it, and
that they would have to pass over my dead body before its orders
should be left unobeyed. For the second time the voice of my
authority was heard with marked signs of respect; and this is, in
sum, the pressure to which I yielded in obeying the laws and the
mandates of my superiors.
Further on it adds: “That Mr. Castelar, as soon as he knew of the
event, sent a telegram peremptorily ordering the suspension of all
executions; but that by reason of an interruption, more or less
fortuitous, in the telegraphic communications between Havana and
Santiago, General Burriel was left in full liberty of action, and
fifty-seven executions had already taken place when the dispatch of
the government arrived.” The “more or less fortuitous” has its
marked intent, and the effect it may have produced on its readers
will, I judge, be completely dispelled by copying the following
document:
“Don José Riquelnie y Gomez,
major-general (mariscal de campo) of
the national armies and chief of staff of the armies of this
island, whose general-in-chief is his excellency
Lieutenant-General Don Joaquim Jovellar y Soler, certifies
that, according to the antecedents on record in this
headquarters of the staff, it appears that at the time of
the capture of the filibuster steamer Virginius it was not
possible to make use of the submarine cable or of the land
telegraph-wires established between Santiago de Cuba and
this capital, because those lines were interrupted, the
first from the 13th of October last up to date, and the
second from the 1st of November to the 7th, inclusive, and
from the 8th to the 13th of the same month. And that this be
of record for such purposes as may arise, I sign the present
in Havana the twelfth of February, one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-four.
“JOSÉ RIQUELME.
“Here follows a flourish. Seen and approved.
“JOVELLAR.
“Here follows a flourish and a seal, which says: Army of
Cuba, general staff-office.
Moreover, in Madrid, Mr. Castelar did not receive the news of the
capture of the pirate steamer until the 7th; consequently any order
of the government was already late.
Further on it is said: “That in the United States, from the North to
the South, there broke forth a unanimous cry of wrath and of warlike
and patriotic ardor, and there was no town or hamlet where there
were not demonstrations of indignation.”
It is true that the mob (populacho) broke out
even to insults against the Spaniards; but are we, perchance,
ignorant how, why, and by what a mob is led, and in the present case
can we doubt by whom it would be excited, especially in
strongly-marked races, and what occurs under certain circumstances
in all nations? But is not that which the sober and prudent press of
the United States has said more likely to be true? Let us see, then,
what is written and preserved in the journals in favor of order. The
high financial and commercial interests, the lawyers of universal
fame, all the persons of judicial knowledge, and the well-informed
military men—that is to say, the genuine common-sense element in the
United States—not only did not utter a single expression in favor of
war, but, on the contrary, was shown to oppose it and to recognize
our right. Concerning the calculations which were made of the cost
of an expedition and the pretensions of conquering Cuba, I need not
now occupy myself, for enough has been said and written, and very
clearly, too.
The interrogatory which follows, as to whether Spain is really in
fault in this affair, is a very delicate matter, and as in its main
facts it concerns our honor, it will have to be cleared up in due
time, and then the whole truth will shine forth.
It is also said, further on, referring to the Spanish war-steamer
Tornado, “that her commander has violated international laws by
capturing on the high seas a foreign vessel sailing under the
American flag, with all her papers in due order and viséd by the consul of that nation at
Kingston, and which vessel was bound to Costa Rica, carrying
laborers, for at that time the construction of a railway was in
progress.”
It would be excusable (and it was) that, the capture having been
recently effected, a thousand versions and commentaries and
inaccuracies, more or less inspired by passion, should arise; but at
the date of the publication of the article, a date when the object
of the voyage of the Virginius was already proved by facts and
established under every point of view, although this was already
well known long beforehand not only in America but in Europe; when
the public is possessed of the spontaneous declarations of the
captain of the vessel, recognizing his grave offense, but that he
confided in its good result to obtain “a positive and considerable
reward,” and that of the insurgent leaders, the crew, and the other
insurgent prisoners, all agreeing, all
[Page 493]
unanimous in setting forth all that was
necessary to prove before the whole world the abundant right we had
to seize, try, and execute the sentence of the laws of our country,
it cannot be suffered to pass without calling attention toward the
path of truth; and as whatever has occurred in the matter has been
published in journals of good standing, with copies of authentic
documents demonstrating all with exactness, I confine myself here to
the passing statement that the commander of the Tornado fully
complied with his duties in seizing a pirate vessel, as the
Virginius was, and not a foreign ship bound to the coast of the
island of Cuba, with men, arms, and munitions to aid the war, even
though that vessel carried the American flag unduly, for she might
have flown that of any other nation just the same; that he obeyed
his duty in seizing the vessel in question, especially as, when
stopped and searched, she did not carry any document in regular
form, but, on the contrary, presented a thousand signs that made her
mission evident at the first glance; and even if any doubt had still
remained, it would have been promptly dispelled by the surrender and
clear and unmistakable confession of Bernabé Barona (Varona) alias
“Bembetta,” the chief of the expedition, and the so-called
generalissimo of the rebel army.
This matter must still involve many claims for indemnification and
many consequences, and the truth of the facts will be made fully
clear in due time by those to whom this pertains; and as it is
expedient to shed all possible light on it in anticipation of that
time, this gives rise to my desire that errors or mistakes be
corrected, so that all may stand forth as it is and as it took
place.
I therefore address myself to you, Mr. Director, hoping, from your
goodness, that you will do the favor to make these explanations in
your enlightened publication, which favor will be ever gratefully
acknowledged by him who improves this occasion to offer himself to
you as your most obedient, faithful servant,
Q. B. S. M.
