Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 1, 1873

Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley.

Department of State,
Washington, September 25, 1869.

No. 70.]

Sir: When you left here upon your mission, the moment was thought not to be the most hopeful to enter upon renewed discussion or negotiation with the government of Great Britain on the subject of the claims of this Government against that of Her Majesty, and you were instructed to convey to Lord Clarendon the opinion of the President that a suspension of the discussion for a short period might allow the subsidence of any excitement or irritation growing out of events then recent, and might enable the two governments to approach more readily to a solution of their differences.

You have informed me that Lord Clarendon saw no objection to this course, and agreed with you that it would be well to give time for emotions which had been excited of late to subside. The President is inclined to believe that sufficient time may have now elapsed to allow subsidence of those emotions, and that thus it may be opportune and convenient at the present conjuncture to place in your hands, for appropriate use, a dispassionate exposition of the just causes of complaint of the Government of the United States against that of Great Britain.

In order to do this in a satisfactory manner, it is necessary to go back to the very beginning of the acts and events which have in their progress and consummation so much disturbed the otherwise amicable relations of the two governments.

When, in the winter of 1860 and 1861, certain States of the American Union undertook by ordinances of secession to separate themselves from the others, and to constitute of their own volition, and by force, a new and independent republic, under the name of the Confederates States of America, there existed as between Great Britain and the United States a condition of profound peace; their political relations were professedly and apparently of the most friendly character, and their commercial and financial relations were as close and intimate in fact as they seemed to be cordial in spirit, such as became the two great, liberal, progressive, and maritime and commercial powers of the world, associated as they were by strong ties of common interest, language, and tradition.

The Government of the United States had no reason to presume that the amicable sentiments of the British government would be diminished, or otherwise prejudicially affected, by the occurrence of domestic insurrection within the United States, any more than those of the latter had been impaired by the occurrence of insurrection in British India, or might be impaired by such occurrence elsewhere in the dominions of Great Britain. Least of all could the Government of the United States anticipate hostility toward it, and special friendship for the insurgents of the seceding States, in view of the inducements and objects of that insurrection, which avowedly, and as every statesman, whether in Europe or America, well knew, and as the very earliest mention of the insurrection in the House of Commons indicated, were the secure establishment of a perpetual and exclusive slave-holding republic. In such a contest the Government of the United States was entitled to expect the earnest good-will, sympathy, and moral support of Great Britain.

It was with painful astonishment, therefore, that the United States Government received information of the decision of Her Majesty’s government, which had already been made on the 6th day of May, 1861, and was announced on that day, in the House of Commons, by her ministers, and was followed by the issue, on the 13th of May, 1861, of a proclamation, which in effect recognized the insurgents as a belligerent power, and raised them to the same level of neutral right with the United States.

The President does not deny, on the contrary he maintains, that every sovereign power decides for itself, on its responsibility, the question whether or not it will, at a given time, accord the status of belligerency to the insurgent subjects of another power, as also the larger question of the independence of such subjects, and their accession to the family of sovereign states.

But the rightfulness of such an act depends on the occasion and the circumstances., and it is an act, like the sovereign act of war, which the morality of the public law, and practice requires should be deliberate, seasonable, and just in reference to surrounding facts; national belligerency, indeed, like national independence, being but an existing fact, officially recognized as such; without which such a declaration is only the indirect manifestation of a particular line of policy.

The precipitancy of the declaration of the Queen’s government, or, as Mr. Bright characterized it, “the remarkable celerity, undue and unfriendly haste” with which it was made, appears in its having been determined on the 6th of May, four days prior to the arrival in London of any official knowledge of the President’s proclamation, (of April 19, 1861,) by reference to which the Queen’s proclamation has since been defended, and that it was actually signed on the 13th of May, the very day of the arrival of Mr. Adams, the new American minister, as if in the particular aim of forestalling and preventing explanations on the part of the United States.

The prematureness of the measure is further shown by the very tenor of the proclamation, which sets forth its own reasons, namely, “Whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the Government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America.” Moreover it is not pretended by the proclamation that war exists, but only a “contest,” in reference to which it is not unimportant to note that the language used is such as would fitly apply to parties wholly independent one of the other, so as thus to negative, or to suppress, at least, the critical circumstance, that this bare commencement of hostilities, this incipient contest, was a mere domestic act of insurrection within the United States.

But that which conclusively shows the unseasonable precipitancy of the measure is the fact that on that day, May 13, 1861, and indeed until long afterward, not a battle had been fought between the insurgents and the United States, nor a combat even, save the solitary and isolated attack on Fort Sumter. Did such a bare commencement of hostilities constitute belligerency? Plainly not.

There was at that time no such thing as a population elevated into force, and by the prosecution of war, which Mr. Canning points out as the test of belligerent condition. The assumed belligerency of the insurgents was a fiction, a war on paper only, not in the field, like a paper blockade; the. anticipation of supposed belligerency to come, but which might never have come if not thus anticipated and encouraged by the Queen’s government.

Indeed, as forcibly put by Mr. Adams, the Queen’s declaration had the effect of creating posterior belligerency, instead of merely acknowledging an actual fact; and that belligerency, so far as it was maritime, proceeding from the ports of Great Britain and her dependencies alone, with aid and co-operation of subjects of Great Britain.

The Government of the United States, that of Great Britain, and other European powers, had repeatedly had occasion to consider this question in all its bearings.

It was perceived that the recognition of belligerency on the part of insurgents, although not so serious an act as the recognition of independence, yet might well be prejudicial to the legitimate government, and therefore be regarded by it as an act of unfriendliness. It was a step, therefore, to be taken with thoughtfulness, and with due regard to exigent circumstances. Governments had waited months, sometimes years, in the face of actual hostilities, without taking this step. But circumstances might arise to call for it. A ship of the insurgents might appear in the port of the neutral, or a collision might occur at sea, imposing on the neutral the necessity to act; or actual hostilities might have continued to rage in the theater of insurgent war, combat after combat might have been fought for such a period of time, a mass of men may have engaged in actual war until they should have acquired the consistency of military power, to repeat the idea of Mr. Canning, so as evidently to constitute the fact of belligerency, and to justify the recognition by the neutral; or the nearness of the seat of hostilities to the neutral may compel the latter to act. In either of these contingencies the neutral would have a right to act; it might be his sovereign duty to act, however inconvenient such action should be to the legitimate government. There” was no such fact of necessity, no such fact of continued and flagrant existing hostilities, to justify the action of Great Britain in the present case. Hence the United States felt constrained at the time to regard this proclamation as the sign of a purpose of unfriendliness to them, and of friendliness to the insurgents, which purpose could not fail to aggravate all the evils of the pending contest, to strengthen the insurgents, and to embarrass the legitimate government. And so it proved, for as time went on, as the insurrection from political came at length to be military, as the sectional controversy in the United States proceeded to exhibit itself in the organization of great armies and fleets, and in the prosecution of hostilities on a scale of gigantic magnitude, then it was that the spirit of the Queen’s proclamation showed itself in the event; seeing that in virtue of the proclamation maritime enterprises in the ports of Great Britain, which would otherwise have been piratical, were rendered lawful, and thus Great Britain became, and to the end continued to be, the arsenal, the navy-yard, and the treasury of the insurgent confederacy.

A spectacle was thus presented without precedent or parallel in the history of civilized nations. Great Britain, although the professed friend of the United States, yet, in time of avowed international peace, permitted armed cruisers to be fitted out and harbored and equipped in her ports, to cruise against the merchant-ships of the United States and to burn and destroy them, until our maritime commerce was swept from the ocean. Our merchant-vessels were destroyed piratically by captors who had no ports of their own in which to refit or to condemn prizes, and whose only nationality was the quarter-deck of their ships, built, dispatched to sea, and not seldom in name, still, professedly owned in Great Gritain. Earl Russell truly said, “It so happens that in this conflict the confederates have no ports, except those of the Mersey and the Clyde, from which they send out ships to cruise against the Federals.” The number of our ships thus directly destroyed amounts to nearly two hundred, and the value of property destroyed to many millions. Indirectly the effect was to increase the rate of insurance in the United States, to diminish exports and imports, and otherwise obstruct domestic industry and production, and to take away from the United States its immense foreign commerce, and to transfer this to the merchant-vessels of Great Britain, so that while in the year 1860 the foreign merchant tonnage of the United States amounted to 2,546,237 tons, in 1866 it had sunk to 1,492,923 tons. This depreciation is represented by a corresponding increase in the tonnage of Great Britain during the same period, to the amount of 1,120,650 tons. And the amount of commerce abstracted from the United States and transferred to Great Britain during the same period is in still greater proportion. Thus, in effect, war against the United States was carried on from the ports of Great Britain by British subjects in the name of ‘the confederates. Mr. Cobden, in the House of Commons, characterized by these very words the acts permitted or suffered by the British government: “You have been carrying on war from these shores against the United States,” he said, “and have been inflicting an amount of damage on that country greater than would have been produced by many ordinary wars.”

The gravity of these facts may be appreciated by considering what had happened at other periods. In the latter period of the war of the French revolution, Great Britain was compelled to strain every nerve to maintain “herself against the power of Napoleon. In such straits, by a sort of war in disguise, she, trespassed on the rights of neutrals, with special prejudice to the United States, to the result, at length, of solemn war between the two nations. But neither in the events which preceded that war, nor in the events of the war itself, did the United States suffer more at the hands of Great Britain than we did during the late rebellion, by the aid, direct or indirect, which she afforded to the confederated insurgent States; for while on the ocean our merchant marine was destroyed by cruisers sent, out from Great Britain, and our military marine was mainly occupied in watching and counter-working blockade-runners fitted out in Great Britain by official agents of the insurgents, on the land it was in like manner the munitions of war and the wealth drawn by the insurgents from Great Britain which enabled them to withstand, year after year, the arms of the United States. In the midst of all this, remonstrances of the Government of the United States were prompt, earnest, and persistent. Our minister in London appealed to the international amity of the British government; he called on it to discharge its obligations of neutrality; he invoked the aid of the municipal laws of Great Britain. Ample proofs of the wrongs committed were submitted to the Queen’s government. Indeed, these wrongs were open, notorious—perpetrated in the face of day—the subject of debate and of boast, even, in the House of Commons.

The Queen’s ministers excused themselves by alleged defects in the municipal law of the country. Learned counsel either advised that the wrongs committed did not constitute violations of the municipal law, or else gave sanction to artful devices of deceit, to cover up such violations of law. And, strange to say, the courts of England or of Scotland, up to the very highest, were occupied month after month with judicial niceties and technicalities of statute construction, in this respect, while the Queen’s government itself, including the omnipotent Parliament, which might have settled these questions in an hour by appropriate legislation, sat with folded arms, as if unmindful of its international obligations, and suffered ship after ship to be constructed in its ports to wage war on the United States.

We hold that the international duty of the Queen’s government in this respect was above and independent of the municipal laws of England. It was a sovereign duty attaching to Great Britain as a sovereign power. The municipal law was but a means of repressing or punishing individual wrong-doers. The law of nations was the true and proper rule of duty for the government. If the municipal laws were defective, that was a domestic inconvenience, of concern only to the local government, and for it to remedy or not by suitable legislation, as it pleased. But no sovereign power can rightfully plead the defects of its own domestic penal statutes as justification or extenuation of an international wrong to another sovereign power. When the defects of the existing laws of Parliament had become apparent, the Government of the United States earnestly entreated the Queen’s minister to provide the required remedy, as it would have been easy to do by a proper act of Parliament; but this the Queen’s government refused.

The United States, at an early day in their history, had set the example of repressing violations of neutrality to the prejudice of Great Britain by their own authority, and in the discharge of their own national duty, without waiting for the assistance of municipal statute. They afterward enacted such statutes for their own convenience, and as attestation of their good faith toward other nations. And on special occasions, when defects were perceived in such laws, we enacted new ones to meet the case, not; deeming that such legislation was derogatory to our public dignity; but, on the contrary, conceiving that in so doing we best consulted the highest dictates of national dignity, self-respect, and public honor. And if Great Britain had so understood her national duty on this occasion, she would have done much to save the two countries from the present controversy and all its possible consequences.

Once before, in its intercourse with the United States, the Queen’s government had fallen into the error of assuming that municipal laws constitute the measure of international rights and obligations; that is to say, when official agents of the British government attempted to enlist military recruits in the neutral countries of Prussia, the United States, and elsewhere, for service against Russia, on the hypothesis that, if the prohibitions of municipal law could be evaded, that would suffice, overlooking the paramount consideration of the respect due to the sovereign rights of the neutral power.

So, on the present occasion, the Queen’s ministers seem to have committed the error of assuming that they needed not to look beyond their own local law, enacted for their own domestic convenience, and might, under cover of the deficiencies of that law, disregard their sovereign duties toward another sovereign power. Nor was it, in our judgment, any adequate excuse for the Queen’s ministers to profess extreme tenderness of private rights, or apprehension of actions for damages, in case of any attempt to arrest the many ships which, either in England or Scotland, were with ostentatious publicity being constructed to cruise against the United States.

Surely, that was an imaginary difficulty; or if a real one, it presented the election between a serious complication of relations with the United States and the hazard of a legal conflict with John Laird and Charles Kuhn Prioleau.

But the Government of the United States has never been able to see the force of this alleged difficulty. The common law of England is the common law of the United States. In both countries, and certainly in England, revenue seizures are made daily, and ships prevented from going to sea on much Jess cause of suspicion than attached to the suspected ships of the confederates.

In both countries, and not least in England, the previous order of the government, or its subsequent approval, covers the acts of the subordinate officers. In both countries, or if not in England assuredly in the United States, under municipal laws in this behalf substantially the same, the Government finds no difficulty in arresting ships charged with actual or intended violation of the sovereign rights or neutral duties of the States.

Signal examples of this occur in the history of the United Stages. Thus, during the late war between Great Britain and Russia, on complaints with affidavits being filed by the British consul at New York, charging that the bark Maury was being equipped there as a belligerent cruiser, and this on far less evidence than that which the American consul at Liverpool exhibited against the Alabama, the bark Maury was arrested within an hour by telegraphic order from Washington.

Other examples of the same decision and promptitude, in maintenance of the sovereign rights and discharge of the neutral duties of the United States, have occurred, as is well known, under both the last and present administrations.

Nay, at every period of our history, the Government of the United States has not, been “content, with preventing the-departure of ships fitted out in violation of neutrality, and of putting a stop to military recruitments and expeditions of the same nature, but has further manifested its good faith and its respect for its own sovereignty and laws by prosecuting criminally the guilty parties. Examples of this occur in the early stages of the war of the French revolution, on occasions of the insurrection of the Spanish-American continental provinces and of revolutionary movements in the Spanish-American republics, and on various other occasions, including the existing insurrection in Cuba.

But although such acts of violation of law were frequent in Great Britain, and susceptible of complete technical proof, notorious, flaunted directly in the face of the world, varnished over, if at all, with the shallowest pretext of deception, yet no efficient step appears to have been taken by the British government to enforce the execution of its municipal laws or to vindicate the majesty of its outraged sovereign power.

And the Government of the United States cannot believe—it would conceive itself wanting in respect for Great Britain to impute—that the Queen’s ministers are so much hampered by judicial difficulties that the local administration is thus reduced to such a state of legal impotency as to deprive the government of capacity to uphold its sovereignty against local wrong-doers, or its neutrality as regards other sovereign powers.

If, indeed, it were so, the causes of reclamation on the part of the United States would only be the more positive and sure; for the law of nations assumes that each government is capable of discharging its international obligations; and, perchance, if it be not, then the absence of such capability is itself a specific ground of responsibility for consequences.

But the Queen’s government would not be content to admit, nor will the Government of the United States presume to impute to it, such political organization of the British empire as to imply any want of legal ability on its part to discharge, in the amplest manner, all its duties of sovereignty and amity toward other powers.

It remains only in this relation to refer to one other point, namely, the question of negligence; neglect on the part of officers of the British government, whether superior or subordinate, to detain confederate cruisers, and especially the Alabama, the most successful of the depredators on the commerce of the United States.

On this point the President conceives that little needs now to be said, for various cogent reasons.

First, the matter has been exhaustively discussed already by this Department, or by the successive American ministers.

Then, if the question of negligence be discussed with frankness, it must be treated in this instance as a ease of extreme negligence, which Sir William Jones has taught us to regard as equivalent or approximate to evil intention. The question of negligence, therefore, cannot be presented without danger of thought or language disrespectful toward the Queen’s ministers, and the President, while purposing, of course, as his sense of duty requires, to sustain the rights of the United States in all their utmost amplitude, yet intends to speak and act in relation to Great Britain in the same spirit of international respect which he expects of her in relation to the United States, and he is sincerely desirous that all discussions between the governments may be so conducted as not only to prevent any aggravation of existing differences, but to tend to such reasonable and amicable determination as best becomes two great nations of common origin and conscious dignity and strength.

I assume, therefore, pretermitting detailed discussion in this respect, that the negligence of the officers of the British government in the matter of the Alabama, at least, was gross and inexcusable, and such as indisputably to devolve on that government full responsibility for all the depredations committed by her. Indeed, this conclusion seems in effect to be conceded in Great Britain. At all events, the United States conceive that the proofs of responsible negligence in this matter are so clear that no room remains for debate on that point, and it should be taken for granted in all future negotiations with Great Britain.

It is impossible not to compare and contrast the conduct of the States General, as regards Great Britain on occasion of the revolt of the British colonies, with that of Great Britain as regards the insurrection in the Southern States. No fleets were fitted out by America in the ports of the Netherlands to prey on the commerce of Great Britain. Only in a single instance did American cruisers have temporary harborage in the Texel. Year after year the exports of munitions of war for the Netherlands were forbidden by the States General, the more completely to fulfill their duty of amity and neutrality toward Great Britain; but, nevertheless, Great Britain treated a declaration of neutrality by the States General, and the observance of that declaration, as a sufficient cause of war against the Netherlands; prior to which the British government continually complained of the occasional supplies derived by the colonies from the island of St. Eustatius. How light, in this respect, would have been the burdens of the United States during the late insurrection if British aid had been confined to a contraband commerce between the insurgents and the port of Nassau.

Not such is the complaint of the United States against Great Britain. We complain that the insurrection in the Southern States, if it did not exist, was continued, and obtained its enduring vitality, by means of the resources it drew from Great Britain. We complain that by reason of the imperfect discharge of its neutral duties on the part of the Queen’s government, Great Britain became the military, naval, and financial basis of insurgent warfare against the United States. We complain of the destruction of our merchant-marine by British ships manned by British seamen, armed with British guns, dispatched from British dock-yards, sheltered and harbored in British ports. We complain that, by reason of the policy and the acts of the Queen’s ministers, injury incalculable was inflicted on the United States.

Nevertheless, the United States manfully and resolvedly encountered all the great perils and difficulties of the situation, foreign and domestic, and overcame them. We endured, with proud patience, the manifestation of hostility there, where we had expected friendship, in England, the protagonist of the abolition of negro servitude, in order to perpetuate which the Southern States had seceded from the Union. We entered on a great war, involving sea and land; we marched to the field hundreds of thousands of soldiers and expended thousands of millions of treasure for their support; we lavished the blood of our bravest and best in battle, as if it were but water; we submitted to all privations without a murmur; we staked our lives, our fortunes, and our honor on the issue of the combat; and, by the blessing of God, we came out of the deadly struggle victorious, and with courage proved, strength unimpaired, power augmented, and our place fixed among the nations second to none, we may without presumption say, in the civilized world. Providence had smiled On our sacrifices and our exertions; and in the hour of supreme triumph we felt that, while mindful of goodwill shown us by friendly powers in the hour of trial, we could afford to account in moderation with others, which, like Great Britain, had, as we thought, speculated improvidently, and to their own discomfiture, on the expected dismemberment and downfall of the great American republic.

As to Great Britain, we had special and peculiar causes of grief. She had prematurely, as we deemed it, and without adequate reason, awarded the status of belligerency to our insurgents. But this act of itself, and by its inherent nature, was of neutral color, and an act which, howsoever we might condemn it in the particular case, we could not deny to be of the competency of a sovereign state. Other European governments also recognized the belligerency of the insurgent s; but Great Britain alone had translated a measure indefinite of itself into one of definite wrong to the United States; as evinced by the constant and efficient aid in ships and munitions of war which she furnished the confederates, and in the permission or negligence which enabled confederate cruisers from her ports to prey on the commerce of the United States. Great Britain alone had founded on that recognition a systematic maritime war against the United States. And this, to effect the establishment of a slave government; as to which Mr. Bright might well say, “We supply the ships; we supply the arms, the munitions of war; we give aid and comfort to the foulest of crimes; Englishmen only do it.” Thus, what in France, in Spain, as their subsequent conduct showed, had been but an untimely and ill-judged act of political manifestation, had in England, as her subsequent conduct showed, been a virtual act of war. We reflected that the confederates had no ships, no means of building ships, no mechanical appliances, no marine, no legal status on the sea, no open sea-ports, no possible courts of prize, no domestic command of the instruments and agencies of modern maritime warfare. We asked ourselves what would the Queen’s government have said if the United-States had awarded the rights of belligerency to insurgents in India, or in Ireland, in the same circumstances, that is, on the occurrence of a single act of rebel hostility, and had bestowed upon them their only means of maritime as well as territorial warfare against Great Britain?

In truth, while, in the hour of their great triumph, the United States were thankfully inclined to sentiments of moderation, both at home and abroad—for at home no man has suffered death for political causes—were the more inclined to moderation, especially, as regards Great Britain, in view of the very enormity of the wrongs we had sustained, and the consequent difficulty of measuring the reparation due, even if sincerely proffered by the Queen’s government—we desired no war with England; we shrank from the thought of another lustrum of fratricidal carnage, like that through which we had just passed, with no change in the conditions of war but the substitution, on one side, of misguided Englishmen in the place of misguided Americans. “We preferred, if possible, to find some satisfaction of our great grievances by peaceful means, consistent alike with the honor of Great Britain and of the United States. The influence of this condition of mind is apparent in all the discussions of the subject by or under the instruction of this Department during preceding administrations of the Government. It resulted in earnest efforts on our part to determine the controversy by arbitration in the interest of peace and of international good-will, which efforts, if promptly met by the Queen’s ministers in the spirit in which they were made, would long since have removed the present controversy from the fields of diplomacy, and effectually harmonized the relations of the United States with Great Britain.

But the amicable advances of the United States to dispose of the question by arbitration were at the start, and persistently long afterward, met by Lord Russell, in the name of the Queen’s government, with subtleties of reservation and exception, the effect of which would have been, instead of closing up the controversy, to leave us in a condition worse than before, and more perilous to the cause of peace.

The Government of the United States has never been able to appreciate the force of the reasons alleged in support of such reservations and exceptions. When one power demands of another the redress of alleged wrongs, and the latter entertains the idea of arbitration as the means of settling the question, it seems irrational to insist that the arbitration shall be a qualified and limited one, through apprehensions lest, peradventure, there might thus be implication that such wrongs had been committed by intention, and that such implication would be injurious to the honor of the wrong-doing government. On these premises arbitration may be the means of adjusting immaterial international wrongs, but not of material ones; that is to say, if the grievances be serious, the two nations must of necessity go to war, while-neither desires it, which would be an absurd conclusion.

Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon appear to have seen this, and therefore to have regarded the particular question with more correct estimation of its incidents than Lord Russell, and thereupon to have admitted as theory comprehensive arbitration concerning all questions between the governments.

But the convention, which in this view was negotiated by the Earl of Clarendon and Mr. Reverdy Johnson, did not prove satisfactory to the Senate of the United States.

It is well known to the government of Great Britain that the President and the Senate of the United States aro distinct powers of the Government, associated in the conclusion of treaties and in the appointment of public officers, but not dependent one on the other, nor of necessity entertaining the same opinion on public questions. Each acts on appropriate convictions of duty and of right, and the Senate has the same absolute power to reject a treaty as the President has to negotiate one.

Of course it is not necessarily incumbent on the President to express approval or disapproval of an act of the Senate.

But the President deems it due to the Senate, to himself, and to the subject, to declare that he concurs with the Senate in disapproving of that convention. His own particular reasons for his conclusion are sufficiently apparent in this dispatch. In addition to these general reasons, he thinks the provisions of the convention were inadequate to provide reparation for the United States in the manner and to the degree to which he considers the United States entitled to redress. Other and special reasons for the same conclusions have been explained in a previous dispatch—such, namely, as the time and circumstances of the negotiation, the complex character of the proposed arbitration, its chance, agency, and results, and its failure to determine any principle, or otherwise to fix on a stable foundation the relations of the two governments.

The President is not yet prepared to pronounce on the question of the indemnities which he thinks due by Great Britain to individual citizens of the United States, for the destruction of their property by rebel cruisers fitted out in the ports of Great Britain.

Nor is he now prepared to speak of the reparation which he thinks due by the British government for the larger account of the vast national injuries it has inflicted on the United States.

Nor does he attempt now to measure the relative effect of the various causes of injury, as whether by untimely recognition of belligerency, by suffering the fitting out of rebel cruisers, or by the supply of ships, arms, and munitions of war to the confederates, or otherwise, in whatsoever manner.

Nor does it fall within the scope of this dispatch to discuss the important changes in the rules of public law, the desirableness of which has been demonstrated by the incidents of the last few years now under consideration, and which, in view of the maritime prominence of Great Britain and the United States, it would befit them to mature, and propose to the other states of Christendom.

All these are subjects of future consideration; which, when the time for action shall arrive, the President will consider with sincere and earnest desire that all differences between the two nations may be adjusted amicably and compatibly with the honor of each, and to the promotion of future concord between them; to which end ‘he will spare no effort within the range of his supreme duty to the rights and interest of the United States.

At the present stage of the controversy, the sole object of the President is to state the position and maintain the attitude of the United States in the various relations and aspects of this grave controversy with Great Britain. It is the object of this paper (which you are at liberty to read to Lord Clarendon) to state calmly and dispassionately, with a more unreserved freedom than might be used in one addressed directly to the Queen’s government, what this Government seriously considers the injuries she has suffered. It is not written in the nature of a claim, for the United States now make no demand against her Majesty’s government on account of the injuries they feel that they have sustained.

Although the United States are anxious for a settlement on a liberal and comprehensive basis of all the questions which now interfere with the entirely cordial relations which they desire to exist between the two governments, they do not now propose or desire to set any time for this settlement. On the contrary, they prefer to leave that question, and also the more important question of the means and method of removing the causes of complaint, of restoring the much desired relations of perfect cordiality, and the preventing of the probability of like questions in the future, to the consideration of her Majesty’s government. They will, however, be ready, whenever her Majesty’s government shall think the proper time has come for a renewed negotiation, to entertain any proposition which that government shall think proper to present, and to apply to such propositions their earnest and sincere wishes and endeavors for a solution honorable and satisfactory to both countries.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

HAMILTON FISH.

[Inclosure in No. 7.]

Observations on Mr. Fish’s dispatch to Mr. Motley of September 25, 1869, respecting the Alabama, &c., claims.

I—The Queen’s proclamation of neutrality.

Mr. Fish recapitulates the arguments previously used by Mr. Seward as to the “precipitate recognition “of belligerent rights, which, he says, “appears in its having been determined on the 6th of May, four days prior to the arrival in London of any official knowledge of the President’s proclamation of the 19th of April, 1861.” * * * * and “signed on the 13th of May—the very day of the arrival of Mr. Adams, the new American minister, as if in the particular aim of forestalling and preventing explanations on the part of the United States.”

The facts are—

The President’s proclamation of blockade was published April 19. Intelligence of its issue was received by telegraph (see the Times) on the 2d of May.

It was published in the Daily News and other papers on the 3d of May. Mr. Seward, in his dispatch to Mr. Adams of the 12th of January, 1867, says, “it reached London on the 3d of May.”

A copy was received officially from her Majesty’s consul at New York on the 5th; another copy, from Lord Lyons, on the 10th.

It was communicated officially by Mr. Dallas to Lord Russell on the 11th, with a copy of a circular from Mr. Seward to the United States ministers abroad, dated the 20th of April, calling attention to it, and stating the probability that attempts would be made to “fit out privateers in the ports of England for the purpose of aggression on the commerce of the United States.”

The reason of the delay in receiving the copy from Washington was in itself a proof of the existence of civil war, arising, as it did, from the communication between Washington and Baltimore being cut off, in consequence of the confederate troops threatening the capital.

The prematureness of the measure is further shown by the very tenor of the proclamation: “Whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the Government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America.” Exception is also taken to the use of the word “contest” as distinct from “war.”

It will be seen, on referring to the report of the royal commission for inquiring into the neutrality laws, (Appendix,) that the form of words used is taken from previous proclamations: “Whereas hostilities at this time exist,” (June 6, 1823;) “engaged in a contest,” (September 30, 1825, Turkey and Greece;) “Whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced,” (May 13, 1859, Austria, France, and Italy.) The same form was used in the case of Spain and Chili, (February 6, 1866,) and Spain and Peru, (March 13, 1866.) “Hostilities have unhappily commenced,” (Austria, Prussia. Italy, Germany, June 27, 1866.)

The order prohibiting prizes from being brought into British ports, for which the United States Government thanked the British government, as being likely to give a death-blow to privateering, speaks of “observing the strictest neutrality in the contest which appears to be imminent,” (June 1, 1861.)

It is remarkable that in the case of Turkey and Greece, British subjects were warned to respect “the exercise of belligerent rights.” This is omitted in the United States case, the belligerents being spoken of as “the contending parties.”

The expression, “States styling themselves the Confederate States of America,” was purposely adopted to avoid the recognition of their existence as independent States, and gave them great offense.

The French proclamation of the 10th of June has “la lutte engagée entre le Gouvernement de l’Union et les Etats prétendent former une Confédération particulière.”

The Spanish proclamation, which the United States minister at Madrid (see Diplomatic Correspondence laid before Congress, 1861, p. 224) informed the Spanish government “the President had read with the greatest satisfaction,” issued on the 17th of June, 1861, has “Confederate States of the South,” and uses the term “belligerent” three times over.

Mr. Fish’s dispatch states that the “assumed belligerency” was a “fiction,” the “anticipation of supposed belligerency to come, but which might never have come if not thus anticipated and encouraged by the Queen’s government.”

What are the facts? A large group of States, containing a population of several millions, and comprising a compact geographical area, enabling them to act readily in concert, had established a de facto government, with a president, congress, constitution, courts of justice, army, and all the machinery of military and civil power. They possessed the ports along upward of 2,000 miles of coast; with the exception of Forts Pickens and Monroe, all the Federal posts and forts had been evacuated, including Harper’s Ferry, the arsenal of the Potomac Valley. Fort Sumter, the only one which had offered resistance, had fallen a month previously, April 13. The confederate troops were in occupation of the Shenandoah lines, and threatening Washington. The confederate president had declared war, and called for a levy of 32,000 troops, to which all the seceded States had responded promptly. On the other hand, the Federal President had called for 75,000 volunteers on the 15th of April, and for 42,000 more on the 3d of May; and as fast as the regiments could be armed they were hurrying to the defense of Washington. The contending armies were, indeed, face to face.

So much for the hostilities on land. The operations at sea, in which British interests were more directly affected, had been carried on with equal vigor. On the 17th of April the confederate president issued his proclamation offering to grant letters of marque, which was followed, two days afterward, by the Federal proclamation of blockade. At the date of the Queen’s proclamation of neutrality both these had been carried, or were being carried, into effect. The Federal Government had instituted the blockade of Virginia and North Carolina, which was declared to be effective on the 30th of April, and were rapidly dispatching all the merchant-vessels which they could procure, and which they were able to convert into ships-of-war, to the blockade of the other ports. The General Parkhill, of Liverpool, was captured by the United States ship Niagara while attempting to run the blockade of Charleston, on the 12th of May; and the British vessels Hilja and Monmouth warned off on the same day. Confederate privateers were already at sea. One was captured at the mouth of the Chesapeake River on the 8th of May by the United States ship Harriet Lane. On the 15th the Federal bark Ocean Eagle, of Rockhead, Maine, was taken by the confederate privateer Calhoun off New Orleans. At the same port Captain Semmes had already received his commission, and was engaged in the outfit of the Sumter.

Could any explanations which Mr. Adams might have had to offer alter such a state of things as this? Can any other name be given to it than that of civil war?

It is stated that there was no fact of continued and flagrant “hostilities” to justify the action of Great Britain in issuing a proclamation of neutrality. Mr. Seward writing at the time, and previously to the Queen’s proclamation, (May 4,) characterized the proceedings of the confederates as “open, flagrant, deadly war,” and as “civil war,” (Congress Papers, 1861, page 165;) and in a communication to M. de Tassara, the Spanish minister, referred to the operations of the Federal blockade as belligerent operations which would be carried on with due respect to the rights of neutrals.

Judge Betts, in the cases of the Hiawatha, &c., said: “I consider that the outbreak in particular States, as also in the confederated States, was an open and flagrant civil war.”

It is also judicially decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the ease of the Amy Warwick and other prizes, that “the proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized such a measure.” Moreover, the joint resolution of Congress, in July, 1861, approving and confirming the acts of the President, (North America, No. 1, 1862,” page 57,) commences: “Whereas, since the adjournment of Congress on the 4th of March last, a formidable insurrection in certain States of this Union has arrayed itself in armed hostility;” and a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22d of July, 1861, speaks of the “present deplorable civil war” and of “this war.”

The date at which the civil war actively commenced has, therefore, been fixed by the published dispatches of the Secretary of State, by proceedings in Congress, by the formal judgment of the United States prize-courts, as well as by the universal assent of all the neutral powers concerned; but it is urged that, nevertheless, there was no necessity for Great Britain to take notice of it, as no ship of the insurgents had appeared in British ports, no collision occurred at sea, nor did the nearness of Great Britain to the seat of hostilities compel her to act.

With regard to the latter point, it is difficult to see how one nation can be much nearer to another than England to the United States, seeing that the British dominions, touch the United States on two sides, while the British islands of New Providence, &c., lie immediately in front. As to a collision at sea, it was apparent that British commerce must be interfered with the moment the blockade came into operation, as indeed was the case, several British vessels having been captured before there was time for the intelligence of the proclamation of neutrality to reach America. As to the arrival of confederate ships in British ports, such ships were afloat and might at any time be expected. As Mr. Dana, in the notes to the eighth edition of Wheaton, expresses it, (p. 35,) “it is not fit that cases should be left to be decided as they may arise, by private citizens, or naval or judicial officers, at home or abroad, by sea or land.”

The British government were compelled to take action of some sort. Was that action really unfriendly; was it intended to be unfriendly?

No one who recollects what actually passed, or will consult “Hansard,” can suppose that the proclamation was intended to be unfriendly. On the contrary, as was stated by Mr. Forster in his speech at Bradford, it was absolutely pressed upon the government by the friends of the Northern States, who were afraid lest confederate privateers, should be fitted out in British ports.

Nor was its immediate result injurious to the Federal States. Far from being so, it legitimatized the captures of the blockading squadron, and, in the language of the prize-court, “estopped” the British merchants, whose vessels were seized, from making reclamation.

While the intelligence of the issue of the Queen’s proclamation was still fresh, and almost immediately after hearing of the French and Spanish proclamations of neutrality, the President, in his message of the 4th of July, 1861, stated that he was “happy to say that the sovereignty and rights of the United States are now practically respected by foreign powers, and a general sympathy with the country is manifested.’ throughout the world.”

Does any one really believe that the Queen’s proclamation in the very least influenced the movements of the confederate armies? All the preparations for war had been made long before, munitions collected, troops levied, and generals appointed. The proclamation reached America at the end of May, by which time the confederates had taken up their position on the Upper Potomac, and the Federals had occupied Alexandria, in Virginia, with a force of thirteen thousand men, May 24.

The armies on both sides were in motion; skirmishes were daily occurring; engagements took place at Little Bethel on the 10th of June, at Carthage, Missouri, on the 6th of July, and at Centreville on the 18th, followed by the great battle of Manassas Junction on the 21st. Can any one suppose that if the proclamation had not been issued that battle would not have been fought?

The charge of premature recognition, on examination, reduces itself to this, that the proclamation ought not to have been issued until Mr. Adams arrived, or until some event called for it. Against this is to be set the fact that the proclamation was considered by some friends of the Northern States as a step taken in their interests and that It was further pressed upon the government by Mr. Dallas’s communication of Mr. Seward’s circular. Moreover, confederate privateers were at sea, and British vessels being made prizes by the Federal blockading fleet.

Besides the assertion of the premature recognition of belligerent rights, the dispatch states that maritime enterprises in the ports of Great Britain which would otherwise have been piratical were, “by virtue of the proclamation,” rendered lawful, “and thus Great Britain became, and to the end continued to be, the arsenal, the navy-yard, and the treasury of the insurgent confederacy.”

Mr. Fish, in a preceding passage, admits that national belligerency is “an existing fact,” and he might Lave added that it exists independently of any official proclamations of neutral powers, as is shown by the records of the American prize-courts, which continually recognize the belligerency of the South American States; although, as Mr. Seward stated in one of his dispatches, the United States have never issued a proclamation of neutrality except in the case of France and England, in 1793. This was proved in the civil war by the reception at Curaçoa of the confederate vessel Sumter as a belligerent cruiser, though the Netherlands had issued no proclamation of neutrality. It was this recognition of the Sumter, after her departure from New Orleans, (July 6, 1861,) at Curaçoa, and at Cienfuegos, which first practically accorded maritime belligerent rights to the confederates, a fact which is overlooked when it is alleged that confederate “belligerency, so far as it was maritime,” proceeded “from the ports of Great Britain and her dependencies alone.”

Indeed, it is not going too far to say that the confederates derived no direct benefit from the proclamation. Their belligerency depended upon the fact (a fact which, when we are told that the civil war left behind it two millions and a half of dead and maimed, is unfortunately indisputable) that they were waging civil war. If there had been no proclamation, the fact would have remained the same, and belligerency would have had to be recognized either on behalf of the Northern States by admitting the validity of captures on the high seas for the carriage of contraband or breach of blockade, or on the arrival of the Sumter, or some similar vessel, in a British port.

In no case can it be really supposed that the recognition of belligerency, which, unless neutral nations abandoned their neutrality and took an active part in the contest, was inevitable, materially influenced the fortunes of such a fearful and protracted civil war.

At all events, if it did, the confederates never acknowledged it; the recognition of belligerency they regarded (as indeed was the case) as a right which could not be denied to them. What they sought was not the mere technical title of “belligerents,” but a recognition of independence; and when they found that it was hopeless to expect England to accord it, they cut off all intercourse with this country, expelled her Majesty’s consuls from their towns, and did everything in their power to show the sense which they entertained of the injury which they believed had been inflicted upon them. The result being that, while one side has blamed us for doing too much, the other side has blamed us for doing too little; and thus an assumption of neutrality has been regarded both by North and South as an attitude of hostility.

As to the Queen’s proclamation, rendering lawful the dispatch of the Alabama, Shenandoah, and Georgia, from British ports, to which it is to be presumed the expression “maritime enterprise” refers, it is to be remarked that it is exactly against such enterprises that the proclamation reciting the terms of the foreign enlistment act was intended to warn British subjects. Instead of rendering them lawful, it rendered them additionally unlawful, by giving notice of their illegality.

There would be no difficulty in showiug by precedents from American prize-courts that no proclamation of neutrality is required to confer belligerent rights on vessels commissioned by a de facto government.

It is admitted that at the time these “enterprises” were undertaken “hostilities” in America were being prosecuted “on a scale of gigantic magnitude.” After, therefore, the Alabama escaped on the 29th of July, 1862, she became, by virtue of her confederate commission, undoubtedly a belligerent cruiser, irrespective of any acknowledgment of belligerency by Great Britain, and was received accordingly by the French authorities at Martinique, where she first touched after leaving Liverpool.

A pirate is hostis humani generis, one owing obedience to no authority. If the Alabama had been really a pirate depredating on American commerce, it would have been the duty of the French to seize her and execute justice on her commander and crew, a pirate being triable wheresoever found.

Judge Nelson, in the case of the confederate privateer Savannah, ruled that though confederate privateers were pirates quoad American jurisdiction, they were not pirates jure gentium; and, in the case of the Golden Rocket, in which the owner brought an action in an American court against an insurance company for the capture of his ship by the Florida, he being insured against piracy, but not against war risk, it was decided that captures by confederate cruisers were not “piracy” within the usual meaning of the word, and that the company was not liable.

The American courts having thus conclusively dealt with the matter, it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further. What is probably meant is that, if the confederates had not possessed a de facto government, and had not been belligerents in the sense of waging public war, vessels under their commission would have been mere roving adventurers, pursuing merchantmen for the sake of private plunder; in short, pirates; but by the admission that “hostilities” (the very word to which exception is taken in the neutrality proclamation) were being prosecuted on a great scale, the only ground on which such a supposition could rest is cut away.

II.—The dispatch of confederate cruisers from British ports.

Any one who read the dispatch, without any previous knowledge of the subject, might suppose, from the language used, that fleets of privateers had been dispatched from British ports with the connivance, if not with the direct support, of her Majesty’s government.

“Great Britain * * * permitted armed cruisers to be fitted out,” &c.

“The Queen’s government * * * suffered ship after ship to be constructed in its ports to wage war in the United States.”

“Many ships * * * were, with ostentatious publicity, being constructed.”

“Permission or negligence which enabled confederate cruisers from her ports to prey,” &c.

“Great Britain alone had founded on that recognition a systematic maritime war,” * * * “a virtual act of war.”

“Suffering the fitting out of rebel cruisers.”

The fact being that only one vessel, of whose probable belligerent character the British government had any evidence, escaped, viz, the Alabama.

The Shenandoah was a merchant-ship, employed in the India trade, under the name of Sea King. Her conversion into a confederate cruiser was not heard of until more than a month after she had left England.

The Georgia or Japan was actually reported by the board of trade surveyor, who had no idea of her destination, to be built as a merchant-ship, and to be rather crank. Nothing was known of her proceedings until she had taken her arms and crew on board in Morlaix Bay and reached Cherbourg. Her real point of departure, as a cruiser, was France and not England.

The Florida was detained at Nassau on suspicion, but discharged by the local admiralty court, there being no evidence of her being anything but a blockade-runner. She was fitted out as a ship of war at Mobile.

On the other hand, the British government prevented the outfit of the Rappahannock, prosecuted and detained the Alexandria, seized the Liverpool rams, and stopped the Pampero, besides investigating carefully every case of suspected outfit brought forward by Mr. Adams, and he complained of nineteen, as well as every case which could be discovered independently. Among other things, taking charge of Captain Osborne’s Anglo-Chinese flotillia, which it was apprehended might fall into the hands of the confederates, at a cost to this country of £100,000.

That any sea-going steamer can be converted into a cruiser by strengthening her bulk-heads and arming her, which can be done at sea as well as on shore, is proved by the fact that the most efficient blockading vessels in the Federal Navy were converted blockade-runners.

The Alabama.—Mr. Fish speaks of the neglect of the officers of the British government to detain confederate cruisers, and especially the Alabama.

There was no neglect to detain the Shenandoah or Georgia, for the reason that neither the government nor its officers knew they were being intended for the confederate service. Indeed, it has never been proved that the persons who sold those vessels knew it. Probably they did, but a case might very readily arise in which the vendors might be really ignorant. The American government could not have expected the English revenue officers to prevent every large steamer leaving England in ballast.

With regard to the Alabama, it is assumed “that the negligence of the officers of the British government was gross and inexcusable, and such as to indisputably to devolve on that government full responsibility for all the depredations committed by her. Indeed, this conclusion seems in effect to be conceded in Great Britain. At all events, the United States conceive that the proofs of responsible negligence in this matter are so clear that no room remains for debate on that point; and it should be taken for granted in all future negotiations with Great Britain.”

By a petitio principii, the whole argument is thus assumed to be in favor of the United States.

There is no doubt that the Alabama might, if she had not escaped at the moment when the case against her appeared to be legally established, have been seized and tried under the foreign enlistment act, though the result, looking to what occurred in the case of the Alexandra, might have been doubtful.

This, however, is a very different thing from admitting that her sale to the confederates was a violation of British neutrality for which the nation is responsible. This was the first instance which occurred of the sale of a ship under such circumstances, and the British government had, in fact, no suspicion of what was going to be done in the matter, no information having been received of an intention to take out her arms and crew in a separate vessel.

Judge Story, in the well-known case “Santissima Trinidad and Santander,” laid it down as indisputable that” there is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial venture which no nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation.”

But it must be remembered that when Mr. Fish claims compensation for all her depredations, he should not overlook the fact of the negligence shown by the Federal Navy in twice letting her escape from them. First, when Mr. Adams urged the captain of the Federal ship, which at his instance had gone to Holyhead to look after her, to pursue her, when the captain refused and went off to his station at Gibraltar instead—a proceeding at which Mr. Adams expressed the greatest indignation; (see Congress Papers, 1862, p. 159;) and secondly, when the United States ship “San Jacinto “blockaded her in the French port of St. Pierre, Martinque, and then suffered her to slip away at night from under her bows.

III.—Supplies furnished to the confederates by British subjects.

Mr. Fish states that the confederates had no ships, no mechanical appliances, no open sea-ports, &c., and implies that the maritime force of the confederates was entirely derived from England.

The Sumter, Nashville, and Florida, however, all sailed from confederate ports in which they were armed and fitted out, besides a variety of small coasting privateers, such as the Tallahassee, whose captures form a considerable item in the list of Federal maritime losses lately presented to Congress.

“On the land it was in like manner the munitions of war and the wealth drawn by the insurgents from Great Britain which enabled them to withstand, year after year, the arms of the United States.”

If, as Mr. Fish states, the confederates had no open sea-ports, how did these munitions and arms reach them?

Either the blockade was inefficient, in which case it was illegal, and neutral nations were not bound to respect it, or it was efficient, as it was recognized by Great Britain to be, and the supply of arms, &c., was hazardous and uncertain.

There is no doctrine more clearly settled than that neutral nations are not responsible for the supplies of contraband sent through a blockade by their subjects. Indeed, the very existence of a blockade implies this, for, if it were the duty of neutrals to prevent the shipment of supplies to belligerents, why should there be a blockade at all? Each side would claim compensation for the assistance rendered to the other, and neutrality would become impossible.

If once it be conceded that blockade-running is an offense against neutrality in a civil war, the precedent would not fail to be invoked in all wars by whichever belligerent considered himself most aggrieved. Instead of establishing a principle in the interests of future peace, this would lead to endless complications and claims and counter-claims, which would make the end of one war the sure beginning of another.

The question of the action of the Dutch in the war of independence cannot be dealt with without a review of the history of the period, for which this memorandum does not afford space. An account of the proceedings at Saint Eustache, and subsequent discussions with the Dutch government, will be found in De Marten’s “Nouvelles Causes Cé1èbres du Droit des Gens.”

As to the supplies sent through the blockade having been organized by confederate agents in England, the example was set them by the bureau established by Franklin at Paris for the assistance of the American provinces.

On the other hand, it is notorious that the Federal troops were plentifully provided with arms and munitions from this country.

Her Majesty’s government have yet to learn that it has been held in international discussions that individuals are precluded from supplying belligerents with munitions of war.

IV.—Indirect injury to American commerce.

“Indirectly the effect was to increase the rate of insurance in the United States, to diminish exports and imports, and otherwise obstruct domestic industry and production, and to take away from the United States its immense foreign commerce and to transfer this to the merchant-vessels of Great Britain.”

Mr. Fish proceeds to quote figures, showing the decrease in American tonnage between 1860 and 1866.

This allegation of national, indirect or constructive, claims was first brought forward officially by Mr. Reverdy Johnson in his attempt to renew negotiations on the claims convention in March last. (North America, No. 1, 1869, page 46.)

Mr. Thornton has shown the difficulty there would be in computing the amount of claim even if it were acknowledged, (North America, No. 1, 1869, page 53,) in a dispatch I in which he mentions the continual decrease of American tonnage.

This is partly, no doubt, to be ascribed to the disturbance of commercial relations, consequent on a long war, partly to the fact that many vessels were nominally transferred to British owners during the war to escape capture. Sir E. Hornby, in a recent report, states that this was a constant practice in China.

Is not, however, a good deal of it to be attributed to the high American tariff, which makes the construction of vessels in American ports more expensive than ship-building in England, and has thereby thrown so large a proportion of the carrying trade into English hands?

There must be some such cause for it, or otherwise American shipping would have recovered its position since the war, instead of continuing to fall off.

“Neither in the events which preceded that war,” (of 1812,) “nor in the events of the war itself, did the United States suffer more,” &c.

No one can now wish to recall to recollection the particular events of that war; it would be much better for the two nations to congratulate themselves that one of the principal causes of it, the nationality dispute, has, it is to be hoped, been set at rest finally by Lord Stanley’s protocol.

V. The dispatch, in conclusion, refers “to important changes in the rules of public law,” the desirableness of which has been demonstrated, but does not say what are the changes to which it alludes.

This is in the spirit of the proposal made by Her Majesty’s government in December 1865, (North America, No. 1, 1866, page 164:)

“I, however, asked Mr. Adams whether it would not be both useful and practical to let bygones be bygones, to forget the past, and turn the lessons of experience to account for the future. England and the United States, I said, had each become aware of the defects that existed in international law, and I thought it would greatly redound to the honor of the two principal maritime nations of the world to attempt the improvements in that code which had been proved to be necessary. It was possible, I added, that the wounds inflicted by the war were still too recent, and that the ill-will toward England was still too rife, to render such an undertaking practicable at the present moment; but it was one which ought to be borne in mind, and that was earnestly desired by Her Majesty’s government, as a means of promoting peace and abating the horrors of war; and a work, therefore, which would be worthy of the civilization of our age, and which would entitle the governments which achieved it to the gratitude of mankind.”

It is not necessary in this memorandum to dwell on the alleged efficiency of the American as compared to the English foreign enlistment act. The failure of the American act in the Portuguese cases, in the repeated filibustering expeditions of Walker against Central America, and the acquittal under it of Lopez, the invader of Cuba, are proofs that its action cannot always be relied upon; and this is further corroborated by the difficulties now being experienced in dealing with the Hornet at Wilmington. Although, as Mr. Fish says, there have been prosecutions under it, it is believed that from the trial of Gideon Henfield in 1793 to the present day there has never been a criminal conviction. The only result of the proceedings in rem has been to restore prizes, never to punish privateering; and the effect of the bonds which the act provides may be taken that the owners of a vessel shall not themselves employ her in a belligerent service, and which has, it is believed, never been practically enforced, is, as Mr. Bemis, of Boston, points out in his volume on American neutrality, to add so much to the price of the vessel.

With regard to the claims for “vast national injuries,” it may be as well to observe that Professor Woolsey, the eminent American jurist, has repudiated them as untenable, while the strongest arguments in favor of the recognition of confederate belligerency are to be found in the notes to Mr. Dana’s eighth edition of Wheaton; and Mr. Lawrence, (the editor of the second annotated edition of Wheaton,) in a recent speech at Bristol, stated that “as far as respects the complaint founded on the recognition of the belligerent rights of the confederates, I cannot use too strong language in pronouncing its utter baseless character. No tyro in international law is ignorant that belligerency is a simple question of fact. With the late Sir Cornewall Lewis, we may ask, if the array of a million of men on each side does not constitute belligerency, what is belligerency? But what was the proclamation of the President, followed up by the condemnation of your ships and cargoes for a violation of the blockade which is established, but the recognition of a state of war? At this moment the United States, in claiming the property of the late confederate government, place before your tribunals their title on the fact of their being the successors of a de facto government. I repeat that, however valid our claims may be against you on other grounds there is not the slightest pretext for any claim against you based on the public admission of a notorious fact, the existence of which has been recognized by every department of the Federal Government.”

The course pursued by Great Britain in toe contest between Hungary and Austria in 1848–’49 may be cited as being in striking contrast with the course pursued toward the United States in 1861.

After the suppression of the insurrection at Vienna (October 29, 1848) the Austrian generals determined to march against Hungary. At this time the combined Austrian armies consisted of about 135,000 men. The Hungarians, on the other hand, with about 125,000 men, occupied their entire territory, including their capital and all their fortresses. The fortress of Komorn, perhaps the strongest in Europe, appears to have been held by the Hungarians until the end of the revolution. On the 13th of December, 1848, the Austrians seemed to have gained no victories. The capture of Raab, the first of a number of successes which they obtained prior to their complete defeat in March, 1849, did not occur until December 20, 1848; meanwhile the Hungarians had been organizing for nearly a year for the purpose of making war against Austria.

[See Annual Register, vol. 90, p. 401; and vol. 91, p. 324.]

On the 11th of December, 1848, an envoy of the Hungarian executive government addressed a note to Viscount Palmerston, offering to furnish him with precise information of the actual state of the kingdom of Hungary, and asking an interview for that purpose.

On the 13th of December, 1848, the following reply was made to this request:

Lord Edisbury to * * * *.

Foreign Office, December 13. 1848.

Sir: I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, and in reply I am to say that Viscount Palmerston is sorry he cannot receive you. The British government has no knowledge of Hungary except as one of the component parts of the Austrian Empire;, and any communication which you have to make to Her Majesty’s government in regard to the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and Hungary should, therefore, be made through Baron Roller, the representative of the Emperor of Austria at this court.

I am, &c.,

EDISBURY.

(British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 37, page 733.)

2.—memorandum concerning the rebel cruisers.

1. Alabama.

2. Chickamauga.

3. Clarence.

4. Conrad. (See Tuscaloosa.)

5. Florida.

6. Georgia.

7. Nashville.

8. New York. (See Chickamauga.)

9. Retribution.

10. Shenandoah.

11. Sumter.

12. Tacony. (See Clarence.)

13. Tallahassee.

14. Tuscaloosa.

Unless otherwise noted, the references to volume and page that follow are to be found in the published Compilation Claims of the United States against Great Britain.

the alabama.

1862, April 4. Mr. Dudley informs his government that a powerful gunboat is building in Messrs. Laird & Co.’s yard, at Birkenhead, probably for the rebels. (Mr. Dudley to Mr. Seward, April 4, 1862—not printed.)

May 16. He gives notice that she has been launched—undoubtedly for the rebels. (Claims of the United States against Great Britain, vol. III, page 1.)

July 23. Mr. Adams requests Earl Russell to prevent her from sailing. (Claims, &c., vol. III, page 5.)

July 5. Mr. Wilding, vice-consul at Liverpool, sends a description of the gun-boat to his government, stating that she is called the “No. 290.” (Claims, &c., vol. III, page 3.)

June 25. Earl Russell refers the case to the commissioners of customs. (Claims, &c., vol. III, page 6.)

July 1. They report the description of the vessel, and state that her builders do not deny her to be a man-of-war, but say she cannot be seized without legal evidence of the purpose for which she is built. (Claims, &c., vol. III, page 7.)

July 9. In accordance with Earl Russell’s suggestion, Mr. Dudley furnishes Mr. Edwards, collector at Liverpool, with the evidence that the “No. 290” is intended for the rebels. (Claims, &c., 9 vol. III, pages 17, 18.)

July 15. The commissioners of customs decide the evidence insufficient to justify the detention of the vessel. (Claims, &c., vol. III, pages 19–28.)

July 16. Mr. R. P. Collier, Queen’s counsel, gives it as his opinion that Messrs. Laird & Co. are fitting out the “290” as a rebel privateer, and that her detention would be justifiable. (Claims, &c., vol. III, pages 16–28.)

July 23. Counsel for the United States applies to have the decision of the commissioners of customs reconsidered before the vessel escapes. (Vol. III, pages 29–31.)

July 29. The “290” sails without a clearance, under pretense of a trial trip, with a part of her crew and provisions for six months. Some ladies and other passengers go in her as far as Bell Buoy, as a ruse. (Vol. III, pages 31–37, Claims, &c.)

In accordance with the report of the law-officers orders are sent by telegraph to Queenstown and Nassau to seize her. She, however, avoids those ports. (Claims, &c., vol. III, pages 47, 140–142.)

The “290” anchors near Port Lynas, where the tug Hercules takes more men to her. Mr. Dudley states that she also receives cutlasses and powder, and has six guns concealed in her hold. (Claims, &c., pages 34, 45, 46, 50, 139, 146, 147.)

Aug. 12. She arrives at Terceira, Azores.

Aug. 17. The bark “Agrippina” arrives from London with guns, ammunition, clothing, and coal, which are all transferred to the “290” at Terceira.

1862, Aug. 20. The steamer “Bahama” also arrives from Liverpool, and ‘proceeds with the “290” and the “Agrippina,” all three vessels flying British colors, to Angra. Here her cargo, consisting of money and guns, is put on board of the “290.” Semmes and other officers and men are also brought out in her. (Claims, &c., pages 45, 46, 50; also, 149–50.)

1862, Sept. 4. Mr. Adams addresses a note to Earl Russell, calling attention to the further prosecution of illegal and hostile measure: against the United States in connection with the rebel cruiser now called the “Alabama,” and transmits evidence. (Claims, &c., vol. III, pages 44–47.)

1862, Sept. 22. His lordship replies that the report of the law officers of the Crown was not received in time to detain the vessel, bat that on July 29 (the day when she sailed) orders were sent to Queenstown and Nassau to stop her. She, however, avoided those ports. (Claims, &c., page 47; also, pages 134–142.)

1862, Sept. 30. Mr. Adams informs Earl Russel of the depredations committed by the “Alabama” at the Azores, and that other similar enterprises are on foot; (vol. III, pages 49, 50;) transmits deposition of George King, and urges the enforcement of the laws of neutrality.

1862, Oct. 4. Earl Russell replies that much as he regrets such occurrences, “Her Majesty’s government cannot go beyond the laws municipal and international.” (Vol. III, page 51.)

1862, Oct. 9. Mr. Adams transmits an intercepted letter substantiating the allegations made of the infringements of the enlistment law by the insurgents, which receives the same answer as his preceeding note. (Vol. III, pages 51, 56.)

1862, Oct. 9. Earl Russell communicates report of the law officers that the Alabama did not receive her armament within the British dominions, and that no steps can be taken to prevent a repetition owing to the difficulty of ascertaining the intention of the parties making the shipments. (Vol. III, page 53.)

1862, Oct. 20. Mr. Seward sends copies of papers to Mr. Adams relating to the depredations of the Alabama, and instructs him to send copies to Earl Russell. (Vol. III, pages 54–57.)

1862, Oct. 21. Mr. Seward sends to Mr. Adams the resolutions of the New York Chamber of Commerce. (Vol. III, pages 61–63.)

1862, Nov. 3. Informs him of further devastation by the Alabama on the high seas. (Vol. III, page 64.)

1862, Nov. 20. Mr. Adams submits to Earl Russell copies of papers received from Washington, and from the consul at Liverpool, relative to the depredations of the Alabama, and asks redress. (Vol. III, pages 70–73.)

1862, Dec. 19. Earl Russell informs Mr. Adams that her Majesty’s government cannot admit their liability for the proceedings of the rebel cruiser, but thinks that amendments might advantageously be made to both the British and American laws. (Vol. III, pages 88–92.)

Further correspondence on this subject produces no effect, (vol. III, pages 93–100, 114–118, 164, 164.) Earl Russell expresses the hopes that no further claims will be made. (Page 164.)

1863. Jan. 11. Sinking of the Hatteras.

1863, Jan. 21. Her crew taken to Port Royal, Jamaica, where the Alabama is repaired and receives provisions and coal. The British admiral makes Semmes a visit on board of his vessel, which is treated like a regular ship of war. (Claims, &c., vol. III, page 150; Brit. Blue Book, N. America, No. 1, 1866, page 141.)

1863, July. 28. The Alabama enters Saldanha Bay, Cape Colony, where she discharges her prisoners, is painted, &c. (Page 166.)

1863, Aug. 5. She captures the Sea Bride off Cape Town. The United States consul protests against this outrage, but receives no satisfaction from the governor of the colony. (Claims, &c., vol. III, pages 167–172.)

N. B.—For a list of vessels which took our arms, supplies, &c., for the rebels, from Great Britain, see Claims, &c., vol. 1, page 730.

1863, Oct. 6. Mr. Adams is instructed to inform Earl Russell that he must continue to give him notice of claims. (Claims, &c., vol. III, pages 176–178.

1863, Oct. 23. He so informs Earl Russell, and transmits further evidence. Claims, &c., vol. III, pages 180–201.) The Alabama continues her depredations on American commerce, for which no reparation is made by the British government, notwithstanding the continued protests of Mr. Adams. (Vol. III, pages 201–257.)

1863, Dec. 21. She coals at Singapore, where her commander is entertained by the officers of the garrison. (“My Adventures,” &c., Semmes, pages 714, 715.)

1863, Dec. 25. She is allowed to land her prisoners at Malacca. (“My Adventures,” &c., page 719.)

1864, Mar. 20 The Alabama returns to Cape Town and takes in coal and provisions. (“My Adventures,” &c., page 744.)

1864, June 19. She is sunk by the Kearsarge. (Claims, &c., vol. III, page 257.) After this an extended correspondence takes place, the United States Government demanding the surrender of the prisoners carried to England by the yacht Deerhound. This demand is refused. (Claims, &c., vol. III, pages 258–313.).

chickamauga.

1864, Mar.—. British-built vessel, (manuscript dispatch, Dudley, 250,) to run blockade; arrived at Bermuda early in April, (manuscript dispatch, Allen, 106.) Engaged in running blockade, with cotton, between Bermuda and Wilmington. Then known as Edith.

1864, Oct. 24. Left Wilmington in rebel service to cruise against commerce of the United States; made captures. Name changed to Chickamauga.

1864, Nov. 8. Came into Bermuda; was allowed one week to make repairs, and 25 tons of coal.

1864, Nov, 15. Left Bermuda.

1864, Nov. 20. At Wilmington, North Carolina, to unload guns and take in cargo of cotton. This vessel is also reported to have made captures under the name Olustee.

clarence.

The brig Clarence was captured by the rebel steamer Florida, May 6, 1863, and manned with one twelve-pound howitzer, 20 men, and 2 officers, under command of Lieutenant Reed. She subsequently captured the bark Tacony, June 12. The guns, &c., were transferred to the Tacony, and the Clarence burnt. The Clarence was cleared at the Liverpool custom-house, November 20, 1862, by W. & H. Laird. (Hunt’s Merchants’ Mag., vol. 53, 448.)

the florida.

The iron screw steam-gunboat Oreto, or Florida, with three masts, bark-rigged, eight port-holes for guns, carrying sixteen guns, was built at Liverpool, February, 1862.

1862. Feb. 18. Mr. Adams notified Lord Russell and inclosed evidence. (Vol. 2, Claims, page 593.)

1862, Feb. 26.Lord Russell communicated a report of commissioners of customs that the Oreto was a man-of-war built for the Italian government, and was taking on board coal and ballast. (Ib., page 595.)

1862, Mar, 25.Mr. Adams again addressed Lord Russell with further evidence. (Ib., page 599.)

1862, April, 3. Mr. Adams informed Mr. Seward that the vessel had sailed.

1862, Mar. 27. Lord Russell acknowledged Mr. Adams’s communications and said that inquiries would be made. (Ib., page 602.)

1862, April 8. Lord Russell informed Mr. Adams that the commissioners of customs at Liverpool report that the Oreto cleared for Palermo and Jamaica in ballast, and sailed with a crew of 52 men. (Page 605.)

1862, Aug. 1. Mr. Adams reported a conversation with Lord Russell, informing him of outrages committed by the Florida, or Oreto, upon American vessels, and of the conduct of the authorities of Nassau toward this vessel, which was deemed to be at variance with the proclamation of neutrality, (Ib., page 608.)

It appears from the consular records of the State Department that the Oreto was seized at Nassau on the 8th of June, by Her Majesty’s gunboat Bull-dog, for infringement of the foreign enlistment act, and was released on the arrival of Captain Semmes at that port about that time; that she was again seized, libeled, tried in admiralty, and released on the 2d of August. It appeared in evidence that she was, when seized, in the same state of armament and equipment as when she left Liverpool; that the judge held that, had he been sitting as judge at Liverpool, he should have condemned her; but that his limited jurisdiction at Nassau prevented him from doing so. (Appendix to Alexandra case.) She left Nassau on the 9th of August; ran into Mobile 4th of September; sailed from there January 15, 1863.

1862, Oct. 9. Mr. Adams gave Lord Russell additional evidence of the character of this vessel. (Ib., pages 613, 614, 615.

The Florida entered Nassau and the officers dined with the governor; she took on board provisions, also chain-cable, and rigging, and ten or fifteen recruits, and sailed on the 31st instant, (Ib., page 617.)

1863, Feb. 26. Took on board coal and provisions at Barbadoes, under protest from United States consul.

1863, July 7. Mr. Adams communicated to Lord Russell further evidence of the character of this vessel. (Ib., page 629.)

1863, Sept. 16. Mr. Adams communicated to Lord Russell further information concerning this vessel. (Ib., page 637.)

1863, Oct. 31. Mr. Adams communicated to Lord Russell further evidence in regard to this vessel. (Ib., page 641.)

1863, Aug. 19. Mr. Adams communicated to Lord Russell further evidence of the abuse of the neutrality of the island of Bermuda in the treatment of this vessel, saying that she was allowed to remain nine days in port, and to make that port a base of operations against American commerce. (Ib., page 651.)

1863, Sept. 5. Lord Russell informed Mr. Adams that Her Majesty’s authorities at Bermuda had exhibited commendable strictness and diligence in enforcing the regulations, and that no substantial deviation from their letter or spirit took place. (Ib., page 653.)

Mr. Adams communicated further evidence in regard to this vessel, (Ib., page 656.) Among these affidavits is evidence of her arriving in British waters. (Ib., 663.) Lord Russell objected that this proof was not under oath, (ib., 660,) but it appears to have been taken before a notary.

japan, alias virginia, alias georgia.

) 1863, Mar. 20.
1863, Mar. 31. British-owned vessel; was built at Dunbarton, on the Clyde. She was equipped by a Liverpool firm—Jones & Co. Her crew was shipped by same Liverpool firm for Shanghai, and sent around to Greenock in a steamer—Heron. She was entered on the 31st of March, 1863, as for Point de Galle and Hong Kong. (Vol. II, page 676.)

1863, April 1.
1863, April 2. She cleared on the 1st of April. She left her anchorage on the 2d of April, ostensibly to try her engines, but did not return. She had no armament on leaving Greenock, but a few days after her departure (page 671) a small steamer called the Alar, (page 673,) freighted with guns, shot, shell, &c., and having on board a partner of the Liverpool firm who had equipped her and shipped her crew, left New Haven and met the Georgia off the coast of France, near Ushant. The cargo of the Alar was successfully transferred to the Georgia.

1863, April 8. On the 8th of April Mr. Adams brought the case to the attention of the British government, and repeatedly thereafter, as occasion arose, reminded Her Majesty’s government of the unlawful and piratical character of the vessel. (Page 666.)

1863, April 9. The crew of the Georgia consisted of British subjects. On the 9th of April she left Brest on her cruise against commerce of the United States. (Page 687.)

1863, April 11. The Alar put into Plymouth on the 11th of April, bringing the Liverpool merchant, who had directed the proceedings throughout, and bringing also fifteen seamen who had refused to proceed in the Georgia, on learning her character as a confederate cruiser. The rest of the crew remained.

1863, June 23.
1863, April 25. At the time of her departure the Georgia was registered as the property of a Liverpool merchant, a partner of the firm which shipped the crew. She remained the property of this person until the 23d of June, when the register was canceled, he notifying the collector of her sale to foreign owner, Edward Bates. (Page 677.) From the 1st of April to the 23d of June, the Georgia being still registered in the name of a Liverpool merchant, and thus his property, was carrying on a war with the United States, with whom Great Britain was at peace. During this period she captured the Dictator and burned her; captured and ransomed the Griswold. (Page 687.)

1863, Oct. 28.
1864, May 1.
1864, June 7. The crew of the Georgia was paid through the same Liverpool firm. A copy of the advance-note used is to be found on page 683. After cruising in the Atlantic, burning and bonding a number of vessels, the Georgia put in at Simons’ Bay, Cape of Good Hope, and calked her decks. At the end of two weeks she departed, continuing her depredations until the 28th of October, when she arrived at Cherbourg. (Page 687.) Many of the crew left the ship. The wages were all paid by the Liverpool firm. The same firm enlisted more men at Liverpool; sent them to Brest. (Pages 707, 708.) The Georgia left Cherbourg on a second cruise; was unsuccessful, and returned to Liverpool on the 1st of May, 1864. It was discovered that she had been sold, and Mr. Adams, on the 7th of June, 1864, informed British government that United States did not recognize validity of sale in neutral port; that the United States claimed right to seize vessel wherever she could be found. (Page 710.)

1864, July 30.
1864, Aug. 11. On the 30th of July she entered at the custom-house as loading for Lisbon and Africa, by Edward Bates, the pretended owner. (Page 722.) On the 11th of August she steamed out to sea, under British colors, bound for Lisbon, to fill an engagement with the Portuguese government to carry mail from Lisbon to Africa. Before she reached Lisbon she was captured by United States steamship Niagara, Captain Craven commanding, and sent to Boston as a prize. (Page 720.)

On the 13th of August, Jones & Co., of Liverpool, were tried for fitting out and enlisting men for the pirate Japan, alias Virginia, alias Georgia, before Lord Chief Justice Cockburn and a special jury. The jury found them guilty, and the court fined John Jones and Robert Highat £50 each.

the nashville.

1861, Oct. 30. Steamer Nashville, carrying two guns, and flying confederate flag, arrived at Bermuda on October 30, 1861, having run out of Charleston on the night of October 26, 1861. (See page 538, Vol. II.)

She took in a large supply of coal against the protest of the United States consul. (See pages 538, 539, Vol. II.) Although the commander of the Nashville had told the governor that she was strictly a merchant-vessel, (see page 570, Vol. II,) nevertheless the governor ordered that she should be treated as a vessel of war, and unusual courtesies were extended to her officers by the officers of the garrison. (See pages 540, 541, Vol. II.)

1861, Nov. 5. On the 5th of November, 1861, she sailed from Bermuda, and on the 19th of the same month fell in with the American packet-ship Harvey Birch, which she first plundered, and then burned, and on the 21st November she arrived at Southampton. (See pages 540, 550, Vol. II.)

1861, Nov. 28. On the 28th November, 1861, in reply to a note from the American minister, Mr Adams, inquiring “as to the authority possessed by this vessel to commit so aggressive an act on the citizens of a friendly power, and then to claim a refuge in the harbors of Great Britain,” Earl Russell says: “I have to state that the Nashville appears to be a confederate vessel of war, her commander and officers have commissions in the so-styled confederate navy; some of them have written orders from the navy department at Richmond to report to Lieutenant Pegrarn” for duty “on board the Nashville, and her crew have signed articles to ship in the confederate navy.” (See page 555, Vol. II.)

The British authorities practically carried out their determination to consider the Nashville a regular man-of-war by detaining the United States man-of-war twenty-four hours after the former’s departure from Southampton. (See page 588, Vol II.)

After having been in port over two months, having undergone repairs, and having taken in a supply of coal, the Nashville sailed from Southampton on February 3, 1862. (See pages 563, 588, 589, 590, Vol. II.)

1862, Feb. 20. On the 20th of February, 1862, the Nashville reached Bermuda, having met with no vessels on the way. (See page 590, Vol. II.)

While at Bermuda the Nashville was allowed to coal, notwithstanding the fact that, on the day before her arrival, the governor had informed the United States consul that the British government had determined not to allow the formation in any British colony of a coal-depot, for the use of their vessels, by either the Government of the United States or of the so-styled Confederate States. (See pages 590, 591, Vol. II.)

1862, Feb. 5. Mr. Allen, the United States consel at Bermuda, writes that the Nashville left February 4, having taken on board a hundred and fifty tons of coal; supposed destination, Charleston. (See page 591, Vol. II.)

Nashville captured and burnt off Savannah by United States blockade squadron. (Hunt’s Merch. Mag., vol. 53, p. 447.)

the rappahannock.

1857.
1863, Nov. 6. The Rappahannock was built for the British government, and named the Victor. She was sold by the admiralty in the early part of November, 1863. Her register, dated November 6, shows that Robert Gorden Coleman, a British subject, of 28 Clement’s lane, London, was sole owner. (Vol. II, page 736.)

1863, Nov. 10. She was delivered to the purchaser on 10th November, at Sheerness, in an incomplete state, without masts, sails, or rigging. (Vol. IV, page 586.)

Preparations for a voyage were at once proceeded with rapidly, under the superintendence of the dock-yard officials; the captain of the government yard having sanctioned the leave of absence to a party of riggers, they were placed on board by the master rigger, (Vol. II, page 732,) and continued work until two days after her arrival at Calais. (Vol. II, pages 742, 743.) While at Sheerness her name was changed to the Scylla; the masts of Her Majesty’s ship Cumberland were used as shears to set her masts; the engine-room stores were put on board while she lay in the stream; these consisted of gauge cocks for the boilers, blocks, and other things having the government mark upon them; they were ordered to be buried under the coal by Mr. Rumble, the chief inspector of machinery afloat at Sheerness, and Mr. Ramsey, the then captain. (Vol. II, page 748.)

It was given out that she was destined for a voyage to China. (Vol. II, page 741.) Mr. Rumble undoubtedly knew the true character of the ship; he with the captain introduced all the workmen on board, (Vol. II, pages 748–774;) he gave directions with respect to the rigging and other equipments; he engaged men indifferent capacities, (Vol. II, page 743,) and agreed with them as to wages. Similar services were rendered by the petty officers of the government yard. Mr. Bagshaw, a foreman in the boiler department, in the absence of Mr. Rumble, engaged boiler-makers to go to Calais, in which transaction Mr. Greathead, a chief engineer in the royal navy, also participated as paymaster to the families of the men. (Vol. II, page 745.)

She was prepared for service with the greatest secrecy and dispatch as a confederate privateer, under cover and protection which her former ownership, proximity to the yard while being fitted out, and the employment of hands from the yard, threw around her. (Vol. II, page 724.)

The equipment proceeded up to the 24th of November. On that day the parties interested in her appear to have received intelligence which changed their plans, (Vol. II, page 734,) for in the evening of that day, about midnight, she suddenly made her departure, (Vol. II, page 732,) in a very incomplete condition, with Mr. Reuben Harvey, the government pilot, in command, in tow of a tug-boat, (Vol. II, page 742.) The master rigger of Sheerness dock-yard was on board when she left, but returned in the tug. Bedding, blankets, and remaining part of her stores were put on board from the tug-boat which took her out to sea. Soon after she left Sheerness the ship’s name (Scylla) was painted from off her stern, (Vol. II, page 734,) and the name Rappahannock was painted on. (Vol. II, page 595.)

She arrived at Calais in the night of Wednesday, the 25th of November, and entered the harbor the next day, (Vol. II, page 734,) just previous to which she raised the confederate flag. (Vol. II, page 742.)

1863, Dec. 1. During the stay at Calais of the Rappahannock, agents were employed in London and Liverpool in procuring men to serve on her. (Vol. II, pages, 756–785.) Allotments were to be paid by Messrs. Jones & Co., of Liverpool. These certificates were all signed by Wm. V. A. Campbell, the commander of the Rappahannock. (Vol. II, page 762.) Mr. Rumble, who had arrived about the 1st of December, used his influence to procure enlistments. (Vol. II, page 745.)

1865, July 4. 1865, July 7. The Rappahannock remained at Calais until July 2, 1865, when she left that port and arrived at Southampton on the 4th, bearing the name of the Beatrice. (Vol. II, page 793.) Here she coaled and made her way to Liverpool, where she arrived on the 7th of that month. Proceedings were here instituted against her by the United States Government. She was condemned and sold and the proceeds of the sale passed into the hands of the United States.

1863, Nov. 28.
1863, Nov. 30.
1863, Dec. 5, 12.
1863, Dec. 16.
1863, Dec. 23.
1864, Jan. 9,
1864, April 5, 16.
1864, May 4, 23.
1864, Dec. 16. Although without any technical evidence upon which to rest a remonstrance, the United States minister at London considered the case of the Rappahannock so peculiar as to justify him in making a representation to Her Majesty’s government, which he did on the 28th of November, 1863. (Vol. II, page 727.) Earl Russell replied on the 30th that the attention of the proper officers had been called to the matter, and that steps would be taken to verify the truth of the statements made. (Vol. II, page 728.) Further representations were made by Mr. Adams on the 5th (Vol. II, page 729) and 12th (Vol. II, page 733) of December, and again on the 16th (Vol. II, page 735) of that month, supported by affidavits showing the proceedings in connection with her fitting out at Sheerness, and the enlistment of men for service on her. On the 16th, (Vol. II, 737,) Earl Russell, in reply to the notes of the 5th and 12th, states that Her Majesty’s government are fully determined to put in force the laws against any persons who have trangressed them in this matter. Further evidence was furnished by Mr. Adams on December 23, 1863, (Vol. II, page 738,) January 9, (Vol. II, page 747,) April 5 (Vol. II, page 751) and 16, (Vol. II, page 754,) and May 4 (Vol. II, page 771) and 23, 1864, (Vol. II, page 776.) To these notes Earl Russell replied that the attention of the proper departments of Her Majesty’s government had been called to the matter.

retribution, afterward etta—schooner.

Rebel cruiser; originally a blockade-runner; received armament from schooner Dixie; captured several prizes.

1863, Feb. 25. Came into Nassau, and sold, in Bahamas, her prize schooner Hanover. (Manuscript dispatch, Hawley, 5.)

1863, Mar.— Was sold herself in Bahamas. Name changed to Etta; Etta seized in New York by United States authorities. Messrs. Renouard & Co. have claim as owners against United States for damages. (British Blue Book, North America, 10, 1864.)

the shenandoah.

1864, Oct. 8. On October 8, 1864, the steamer Laurel, of about 300 tons, cleared from Liverpool, having on board a portion of the late Alabama’s crew, one hundred men, and six guns, munitions, and stores. (Page, 318.)

1864, Oct. 8. The steamer Sea King, built at Glasgow, of about 1,070 tons and 250 horse-power, cleared for Bombay, October 8, 1864, with a cargo of coal only. (Vol. III, pages 319, 320.)

Both vessels proceeded to an island near Madeira, where the cargo of guns and munitions was transferred to the Sea King from the Laurel, the former now assuming the name of Shenandoah. (Pages 320, 321.)

1864, Nov. 18. Mr. Adams submits affidavits concerning the Sea King to Lord Russell. (Page 323.)

1864, Dec. 8. Earl Russell transmits to Lord Lyons the dispatch of the British consul at Teneriffe, showing how the Sea King was transferred to the confederates. (Page 331.)

1864, Nov. 19. Lord Russell acknowledges receipt of Mr. Adams’s note of November 18, with the depositions. (Page 335.)

1864, Feb. 1. Lord Russell informs Mr. Adams that the sale of the Sea King is stated to have been regular. (Page 337.)

1865, Feb. 23. United States consul at Melbourne informs Mr. Seward of the arrival of the Shenandoah there. She is recognized as a belligerent, allowed to go into dock for repairs, to coal, and ship a crew. Authorities render assistance. (Pages 384–444.)

1865, Mar. 7. Mr. Adams calls Lord Russell’s attention to further proceedings of the Laurel at Nassau. Remonstrates against her clearance with confederate mails, and demands her detention. (Page 339.)

1865, Mar. 10. Lord Russell replies that efforts were made to prevent viola-Jon of law at Nassau, and will inquire as to her carrying confederate mail. (Page 341.)

1865, April 6. Lord Russell informs Mr. Adams that the proceedings of the Laurel may have rendered her liable to capture on the high seas, but that carrying the mail was not unlawful. (Page 344.)

1865, April 7. Mr. Adams lays before Lord Russell evidence of the Shenandoah’s depredations in the Brazilian waters. (Pages 345–349.)

1865, May 4. Lord Russell replies that Her Majesty’s government have done all that could be done legally to stop the evil complained of. (Pages 350–357.)

1865, Sept. 7. Mr. Seward incloses to Mr. Adams the Melbourne dispatch and papers and a claim for indemnification, which Mr. Adams submits to Lord Russell on October 21, reviewing the Shenandoah’s history. (Pages 369–376 et seq. to page 444.)

1865, Oct. 25. Lord Russell acknowledges receipt of these papers. (Page 444.)

Shenandoah arrives at Liverpool, and is surrendered and received by British authorities. (Pages 444, 445.)

1865, Nov. 7. Mr. Adams will receive the vessel, but calls for punishment of her crew. (Page 447.)

1865, Nov. 7. Earl Clarendon replies that attention will be given to Mr. Adams’s note. (Page 448.)

1865, Nov. 11. Mr. Dudley gives the history of the Shenandoah’s transfer to his custody. (Pages 454, 455.)

1865, Nov. 11. Earl Clarendon informs Mr. Adams that the government will not detain the Shenandoah’s crew, and it is reported that none of them are British subjects. (Pages 460, 461.)

1865, Nov. 14. Mr. Adams expresses his dissatisfaction to Lord Clarendon over the release of the crew. (Pages 462, 463.)

Lord Clarendon represents, in reply, that no evidence is contained in the papers heretofore submitted warranting a prosecution. (Pages 463, 464.)

Reply of Lord Clarendon to Mr. Adams’s note of October 21, affirming that the action of his government in relation to the Shenandoah is according to law, and no other course was open to it than that followed. (Pages 464, 468.)

Mr. Seward directs Mr. Adams to inform Lord Clarendon of the Government’s views as to the depredations of the Shenandoah and release of her crew. (Pages 469, 470.)

1865, Dec. 28. Mr. Adams transmits to Lord Clarendon full testimony concerning the cruise of the Shenandoah, her armament and crew. (Pages 475–491.)

1865, Dec. 30. The above acknowledged by Lord Clarendon. (Page 491.)

1866, Jan. 19. Lord Clarendon states that Mr. Adams’s letter of December 28 contains the first evidence submitted bearing on the piracy of Waddell, and breach of the foreign-enlistment act, but it was not sufficient for conviction. (Pages 491–493.)

1866, Jan. 19. Lord Clarendon to Sir F. Bruce replies to Mr. Seward’s dispatch of November 30, affirming the strictly legal conduct of his government in discharging the Shenandoah’s crew, and refusal to prosecute for piracy. Inquiries will be made concerning the action of the Melbourne authorities. (Pages 494–498.)

1866, Feb. 9. Mr. Seward informs Sir F. Bruce, in reply to Lord Clarendon’s dispatch of January 19, that the convictions of his government had not been changed thereby. (Page 498.)

1866, June 6. Lord Clarendon reviews the testimony submitted by Mr. Adams on December 28, with a letter from the governor of Victoria, as to the charges concerning the action of the authorities there, and the enlistment of seamen on the Shenandoah. (Pages 499–507.)

the sumter.

The Sumter was an American-built vessel, trading between New Orleans and Havana.

1861, June 30. Having been armed and equipped as a vessel of war, she ran the blockade at New Orleans.

1861, Sept. 30. Mr. Adams informed Lord Russell that she had been supplied with coal and other necessaries at Trinidad, which is complained of as a breach of the proclamation of neutrality. (Vol. II Claims, page 484, 5.)

1861, Oct. 4. Lord Russell denied that there had been, in what was done, a violation of neutrality. (Ib., page 486.)

1862, Jan. 18. She arrived at Gibraltar, where she received a new anchor and cable. Owing to the representations of the American consul, she was not able to supply herself with coal.

1862, Dec. 12. She was sold at auction. (Ib., 510.)

1863, Feb. 17. She proceeded to Liverpool. (Ib., 519, 520.)

1863. Feb. 16. Mr. Adams invited Lord Russell’s attention, claiming that the sale was invalid, and that her remaining in port was in violation of the Queen’s proclamation Lord Russell denied this, and a correspondence ensued. (Ib., page 520 et seq.)

1863, July 3. She sailed from Liverpool with, a cargo of guns and supplies, and was afterward wrecked at Charleston.

the tallahassee.

This vessel was originally a blockade-runner, British-built, called the Atlanta.

1864, Aug. 15. In 1864, as appears by a letter from Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, she ran out of Wilmington armed, and commenced cruising and pillaging off New York.

She was reconverted into a merchantman, christened the Chameleon, and took a cargo to Liverpool, where at the close of the war she was claimed by the United States and sold, and the proceeds paid to the credit of the United States.

For the correspondence in regard to her see Vol. III Claims, page 314 et seq.

tacony.

1861, June 28. The Tacony, formerly the Clarence, Lieutenant Reed, made several captures, and was destroyed by her crew June 22, 1863, who left in the schooner Archer, and were subsequently captured by an expedition from Portland. (Hunt’s Merchants Mag., vol. 53, 448.)

the tuscaloosa.

1864, June 24. The Tuscaloosa, originally called the Conrad, was captured off the coast of Brazil by the Alabama. Guns were placed upon her, and she was put in charge of a lieutenant and ten men, and employed as tender of the Alabama.

1864, Aug. 7. She entered Simon’s Bay, remaining there seven days; her cargo was sold to a British merchant in Cape Town. She was detained by British authorities, and subsequently released, with warning to the captain of the Alabama that ships of war of the belligerents were not allowed to bring prizes into British ports.

She made two captures in her character of rebel cruiser. (Claims, &c., vol.—.)

3. amount of claims.

1. Claims belonging to the United States.

The United States should be re-imbursed for all the actual outlay expended in the pursuit and capture of the rebel cruisers.

They may also fairly claim, as representing the community, to be reimbursed for the outlay caused by the increased premium and enhanced freights resulting from the special risk growing out of the operations of the rebel cruisers fitted out in English ports.

2. Claims of individuals.

The following is believed to be a proximately complete statement of the amount of claims thus far presented to the Department of State for injuries committed by the rebel cruisers:

By the Alabama	$5,245,103 06
By the Boston	400 00
By the Chickamauga	114,146 85
By the Clarence	14,520 00
By the Florida	3,029,448 98
By the Georgia	326,351 50
By the Nashville	70,583 95
	$72,869 00
By the Retribution	20,982 26
By the Sallie	5,540 00
By the Shenandoah	4,479,100 36
By the Sumter	2,250 00
By the Tacony	8,400 00
By the Tallahassee	272,864 38
Total	13,662,560 34

4. the duty of great britain to remain neutral, and to enforce the neutrality of british subjects during the contest.

It will not be denied that whatever obligation there may be to maintain a neutral position in a war between two recognized soverign powers, exists certainly to an equal extent in civil war in which both parties are recognized as belligerents, and with still greater force in a contest between a friendly government and an insurgent portion of its population, whose resistance to its authority has not assumed the proportions and attained the probability of success to entitle it to be recognized by other nations as a belligerent.

In 1867 the British government appointed a commission to inquire into and consider the character, working, and effect of the British laws available for the enforcement of neutrality during the existence of hostilities between other states with whom Great Britain was at peace. In 1868 this commission made a report, containing, among other things in the appendix, a memorandum by Mr. Abbott (now Lord Tenterden) of the various foreign enlistment acts of Great Britain and other countries, including the United States. This memorandum is to be found in the fourth volume of Claims against Great Britain, page 93 et seq.

It resulted from this report that the comprehensive enlistment act, which may be found in the “Foreign Relations for 1870,” page 158, was passed.

It is not supposed that the liability of Great Britain to indemnify individual losses occasioned by the several cruisers will be seriously disputed, if it be first established that the cruisers were constructed, equipped, armed, or reinforced in her ports, in violation of her international obligations to the United States. But to make that point sure, the following correspondence (not contained in Mr. Abbott’s memorandum) between Mr. Jefferson, then Secretary of State, and Mr. Hammond, British minister at Washington, is introduced. This correspondence grew out of the illegal acts committed by French cruisers, alluded to in Mr. Abbott’s memorandum. It is to be observed that this correspondence took place before any statute or municipal law had been enacted by the United States, and the duty of the United States in that respect is placed upon its international obligations to Great Britain; and also that the action of the United States was taken without any information furnished by any agent or representative of the British government.

Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond.

Germantown, November 14, 1793.

Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant on the subject of the British ship Roehampton, taken and sent into Baltimore by the French privateer the Industry, an armed schooner of San Domingo, which is suggested to have augmented her force at Baltimore before the capture. On this circumstance, demand is grounded that the prize she has made shall be restored.

Before I proceed to the matters of fact in this case, I will take the liberty of calling your attention to the rules which are to govern it. These are—

1st. That restitution of prizes has been made by the Executive of the United States only in the two cases of capture within their jurisdiction, by armed vessels originally constituted such without the limits of the United States; or 2d, of capture either within or without their jurisdiction, by armed vessels, originally constituted such within the limits of the United States, which last have been called proscribed vessels.

2d. That all military equipments within the ports of the United States are forbidden to the vessels of the belligerent powers, even where they have been constituted vessels of war before their arrival in our ports; and where such equipments have been made before detection, they, are ordered to be suppressed when detected, and the vessel reduced to her original condition. But, if they escape detection altogether, depart and make prizes, the Executive has not undertaken to restore the prizes.

With due care it can scarcely happen that military equipments of any magnitude shall escape discovery; those which are small may sometimes, perhaps, escape, but to pursue these so far as to decide that the smallest circumstances of military equipment to a vessel in our ports shall invalidate her prizes through all time, would be a measure of incalculable consequences. And since our interference must be governed by some general rule, and between great and small equipments no practicable line of distinction can be drawn, it will be attended with less evil on the whole to rely on the efficiency of the means of prevention, that they will reach with certainty equipments of any magnitude, and the great mass of those of smaller importance also; and if some should in the event escape all our vigilance, to consider these as of the number of cases which will at times baffle the restraints of the wisest and best-guarded rules which human foresight can devise. And I think we may safely rely that since the regulations which got into a course of execution about the middle of August last, it is scarcely possible that equipments of any importance should escape discovery.

These principles showing that no demand of restitution lies on the ground of a mere military alteration, or an argumentation of force, I will consider your letter only as a complaint that the orders of the President prohibiting these have not had their effect in the case of the Industry, and inquire whether, if this be so, it has happened either from neglect or connivance in those charged with the execution of these orders. For this we must resort to facts, which shall be taken from the evidence furnished by yourself and the British vice-consul at Baltimore, and from that which shall accompany this letter.

About the beginning of August the Industry is said to have arrived at Baltimore with the French fleet from San Domingo. The particular state of her armament on her arrival is lately questioned, but it is not questioned that she was an armed vessel of some degree. The Executive having received an intimation that two vessels were equipping themselves at Baltimore for a cruise, a letter was, on the 6th of August, addressed by the Secretary of War to the governor of Maryland, desiring an inquiry into the fact. In his absence, the executive council of Maryland charged one of their own body, the Hon. Mr. Kilty, with the inquiry. He proceeded to Baltimore, and, after two days’ examination, found no vessel answering the description of those which were the object of his inquiry. He then engaged the British vice-consul in the search, who was not able, any more than himself, to discover any such vessels. Captain Kilty, however, observing a schooner, which appeared to have been making some equipments for a cruise, to have added to her guns, and made some alteration to her waist, thought these circumstances merited examination, though the rules of August had not yet appeared. Finding that his inquiries excited suspicion, and fearing the vessel might be withdrawn, he had her seized, and proceeded in the investigation. He found that she was the schooner Industry, Captain Carvin, from San Domingo; that she had been an armed vessel for three years before her coming here, and as late as April last had mounted sixteen guns; that she now mounted only twelve, and he could not learn that she had procured any of these or done anything else, essential to her as a privateer, at Baltimore. He therefore discharged her, and on the 23d of August the executive Council made the report to the Secretary of War, of which I inclose you a copy.

About a fortnight after this (September 6) you added to a letter on other business a short paragraph, saying that you had lately received information that a vessel named the Industry had, within the last five or six weeks, been armed, manned, and equipped in the port of Baltimore. The proceedings before mentioned, having been in another Department, were not then known to me. I therefore could only communicate this paragraph to the proper Department. The separation of the Executive within a week after prevented any explanations on the subject, and without them it was not in my power either to controvert or admit the information you had received. Under these circumstances I think you must be sensible, sir, that your conclusions from my silence, that I regarded the fact as proved, was not a very necessary one.

New inquiries at that time could not have prevented the departure of the privateer or the capture of the Roehampton, for the privateer had then been out for some time, the Roehampton was already taken, and was arriving at Baltimore; which she did about the day of the date of your letter. After her arrival new witnesses have come forward to prove that the Industry had made some military equipments at Baltimore before her cruise. The affidavits taken by the British vice-consul are dated about nine or ten days after the date of your letter and arrival of the Roehampton; and we have only to lament that those witnesses had not given their information to the vice-consul when Mr. Kilty engaged his aid in the inquiries he was making, and when it would have had the effect of our detaining the privateer till she should have reduced herself to the condition in which she was when she arrived in our ports, if she had really added anything to her then force. But supposing the testimony just and full, (though taken ex parte, and not under the legal sanction of an oath,) yet the governor’s refusal to restore the prize was perfectly proper, for, as has been before observed, restitution has never been made by the Executive, nor can be made, on a mere clandestine alteration or augmentation of military equipment, which was all that the new testimony tended to prove.

Notwithstanding, however, that the President thought the information obtained on the former occasion had cleared this privateer from any well-grounded cause of arrest, yet that which you have now offered opens a possibility that the former was defective. He has, therefore, desired new inquiry to be made before a magistrate legally authorized to administer an oath and indifferent to both parties; and should the result be that the vessel did really make any military equipments in our ports, instructions will be given to reduce her to her original condition whenever she shall again come into our ports.

On the whole, sir, I hope you will perceive that, on the first intimation, through their own channels, and without waiting for information on your part, that a vessel was making military equipments at Baltimore, the Executive took the best measures for inquiring into the fact, in order to prevent or suppress such equipments; that an officer of high respectability was charged with the inquiry; that he made it with great diligence himself, and engaged similar inquiries on the part of your vice-consul; that neither of them could find that this privateer had made such equipments, or, of course, that there was any ground for reducing or detaining her; that at the date of your letter of September 6 (the first intimation received from you) the privateer was departed, had taken her prize, and that prize was arriving in port; that the new evidence, taken ten days after that arrival, can produce no other effect than the institution of a new inquiry, and a reduction of the force of the privateer, should she appear to have made any military alterations or augmentation, on her return into our ports; and that in no part of this procedure is there the smallest ground for imputing either negligence or connivance to any of the officers who have acted in it.

I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, yours, &c.,

TH. JEFFERSON.