In July, 1864, the Russian minister at Washington informed Mr. Seward that,7 according to existing laws of Russia, every foreigner who becomes a subject of Russia [Page 1304] and at a later time renounces this character, is obliged to pay before his departure the equivalent for the taxes for three years, and some other imposts, to obtain the right to export his property.
“The imperial government has stated to me that, under a new regulation, the subjects and citizens of powers by whom the dues above mentioned are not enforced, will be exonerated therefrom.”
Mr. Seward replied that no such impost was levied in the United States.
On the 31st of January, 1866, Mr. Seward1 directed Mr. C. M. Clay, the United States minister at St. Petersburg, to do what he could, should it be deemed advisable, to procure the release of a Russian Pole, Benjamin Goldberg, a naturalized citizen of the United States, who was said to have been arrested and forced into the Russian army.
No further papers respecting this case are published.
On the 14th of July, 1866, Mr. Clay reports:2
“I am informed that Stanislaus Pongoski, a Russian Pole and naturalized citizen of the United States, has been proved to have become our fellow-citizen without leave of the Emperor of Russia, and by the article 367 of the penal code he has been deprived of all the rights of Russian citizenship and banished forever from the Russian Empire, and this sentence has been put into execution. I don’t see that we can complain, as it settles the question of denaturalization virtually in our favor, and avoids unpleasant issues.”
Mr. Seward, in reply, says that he is “glad to see that the Russian government has accepted that important principle definitively. Certainly there is no cause of complaint to the proceeding on our part, provided that Pongoski does not feel himself aggrieved.
“The case may, perhaps, demand careful examination if it shall turn out that the decree of perpetual exclusion thus pronounced against an admitted American citizen was based upon no other ground than his having voluntarily accepted that character under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In the mean time we may presume that political or other offenses entered into the merits of the decree.”