Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 1, 1873

Naturalization laws.

AN ACT to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or any of them, on the following conditions, and not otherwise:

First. That he shall have declared, on oath or affirmation, before the supreme, superior, district, or circuit court of some one of the States or of the territorial districts of the United States, or a circuit or district court of the United States, three years at least before his admission, that it was, bona fide, his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, arid particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whereof such alien may, at the time, be a citizen or subject.

Secondly. That he shall, at the time of his application to be admitted, declare, on oath or affirmation, before some one of the courts aforesaid, that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whereof lie was before a citizen or subject; which proceedings shall be recorded by the clerk of the court.

Thirdly. That the court admitting such alien shall be satisfied that he has resided within the United States five years at least, and within the State or Territory where [Page 1263] such court is at the time held, one year at least; and it shall further appear to their satisfaction, that during that time he has behaved as a man of a good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well-disposed to the good order and happiness of the same: Provided, That the oath of the applicant shall in no case he allowed to prove his residence.

Fourthly. That in case the alien applying to he admitted to citizenship shall have home any hereditary title, or been of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he came, he shall, in addition to the above requisites, make an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the court to which his application shall be made; which renunciation shall be recorded in the said court: Provided, That no alien who shall be a native citizen, denizen, or subject of any country, state, or sovereign with whom the United States shall be at war at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to be a citizen of the United States.

Sec. 3. And whereas doubts have arisen whether certain courts of record in some of the States are included within the description of district or circuit courts: Be it further enacted, That every court of record in any individual State having common law jurisdiction, and a seal and clerk or prothonotary, shall be considered as a district court within the meaning of this act; and every alien who may have been naturalized in any such court shall enjoy, from and after the passing of the act, the same rights and privileges as if he had been naturalized in a district or circuit court of the United States.

Sec. 4. And he it further enacted, That the children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States, or who, previous to the passing of any law on that subject by the Government of the United States, may have become citizens of any one of the said States, under the laws thereof, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of their parents being so naturalized or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States; and the children of persons who now are or have been citizens of the United States shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided within the United States: Provided also, That no person heretofore proscribed by any State, or who has been legally convicted of having joined the army of Great Britain during the late war, shall be admitted a citizen as aforesaid without the consent of the legislature of the State in which such person was proscribed.

Sec. 5. And he it further enacted, That all acts heretofore passed respecting naturalization be, and the same are hereby, repealed.

Approved >April 14, 1802.

AN ACT in addition to an act entitled “An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject.”

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That when any alien who shall have complied with the first condition specified in the first section of the said original act, and who shall have pursued the directions prescribed in the second section of the said act, may die before he is actually naturalized, the widow and the children of such alien shall be considered as citizens of the United States, and shall be entitled to all rights and privileges as such, upon taking the oaths prescribed by law.

Approved March 26, 1804.

AN ACT for the regulation of seamen on board the public and private vessels of the United States.

Sec. 12. And be it further enacted, That no person who shall arrive in the United States from and after the time when this act shall take effect, shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, who shall not for the continued term of five years next preceding his admission as aforesaid have resided within the United States, without being at any time during the said five years out of the territory of the United States.

Approved March 3, 1813.

AN ACT in further addition to “An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject.”

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any alien, being a free white person, and a minor, under the age of twenty-one years, who shall have resided in the United States three years next preceding his arriving at the age of twenty-one years, and who shall have continued to reside therein to the time he may make application to be admitted a citizen thereof, may, after he arrives at the age of twenty-one years, and after he shall have resided [Page 1264] five years within the United States, including the three years of his minority, he admitted a citizen of the United States without having made the declaration required in the first condition of the first section of the act to which this is an addition, three years previous to his admission: Provided, Such alien shall make the declaration required therein at the time of his or her admission; and shall further declare, on oath, and prove, to the satisfaction of the court, that for three years next preceding it has been the bona-fide intention of such alien to become a citizen of the United States, and shall in all other respects comply with the laws in regard to naturalization.

Sec. 2. And be further enacted, That no certificates of citizenship or naturalization heretofore obtained from any court of record within the United States shall be deemed invalid in consequence of an omission to comply with the requisition of the first section of the act entitled “An act relative to evidence in cases of naturalization,” passed the twenty-second day of March, one thousand eight hundred and sixteen.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the declaration required by the first condition specified in the first section of the act to which this is an addition, shall, if the same has been bona fide made before the clerk of either of the courts in the said condition named, be as valid as if it had been made before the said courts respectively.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That a declaration by any alien, being a free white person, of his intended application to be admitted a citizen of the United States, made in the manner and form prescribed in the first condition specified in the first section of the act to which this is in addition, two years before his admission, shall be a sufficient compliance with said condition, anything in the said act, or in any subsequent act, to the contrary notwithstanding.

Approved May 26, 1824

AN ACT to amend the act entitled “An act for the regulation of seamen on hoard the public and private vessels of the United States,” passed the third of March, eighteen hundred and thirteen.

Be it enacted by the Senate and Rouse of Bepresentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the last clause of the twelfth section of the act hereby amended, consisting of the following words, to wit, “without being at any time during the said five years out of the territory of the United States,” be, and the same is hereby, repealed.

Approved June 26, 1848.

AN ACT to secure the right of citizenship to children of citizens of the United States born out of the limits thereof.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Tbat persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided, however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen.

Approved February 10, 1855.

Second Session, Thirty-seventh Congress, chap. 200.

Section 21. And be it further enacted, That any alien of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has enlisted or shall enlist in the armies of the United States, either the regular or the volunteer forces, and has been or shall be hereafter honorably discharged, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States upon his petition, without any previous declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and that he shall not be required to prove more than one year’s residence within the United States previous to his application to become such citizen; and that the court admitting such alien shall, in addition to such proof of residence and good moral character as is now provided by law, be satisfied by competent proof of such person having been honorably discharged from the service of the United States as aforesaid.

Approved July 17, 1862.

Article XIV of the Constitution of the United States adopted July 28, 1868.

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

AN ACT to amend the naturalization laws and to punish crimes against the same and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in all cases where any oath, affirmation, or affidavit shall be made or taken under or by virtue of any act or law relating to the naturalization of aliens, or in any proceedings under such acts or laws, and any person or persons taking or making such oath, affirmation, or affidavit, shall knowingly swear or affirm falsely, the same shall be deemed and taken to be perjury, and the person or persons guilty thereof shall upon conviction thereof be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years and not less than one year, and to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person applying to be admitted a citizen, or appearing as a witness for any such person, shall knowingly personate any other person than himself, or falsely appear in the name of a deceased person, or in an assumed or fictitious name, or if any person shall falsely make, forge, or counterfeit any oath, affirmation, notice, affidavit, certificate, order, record, signature, or other instrument, paper, or proceeding required or authorized by any law or act relating to or providing for the naturalization of aliens; or shall utter, sell, dispose of, or use as true or genuine, or for any unlawful purpose, any false, forged, ante-dated, or counterfeit oath, affirmation, notice, certificate, order, record, signature, instrument, paper, or proceeding as aforesaid; or sell or dispose of to any person other than the person for whom it was originally issued, any certificate of citizenship, or certificate snowing any person to be admitted a citizen; or if any person shall in any manner use for the purpose of registering as a voter, or as evidence of a right to vote, or otherwise, unlawfully, any order, certificate of citizenship, or certificate, judgment, or exemplification, showing such person to be admitted to be a citizen, whether heretofore or hereafter issued or made, knowing that such order or certificate, judgment, or exemplification has been unlawfully issued or made; or if any person shall unlawfully use, or attempt to use, any such order or certificate, issued to or in the name of any other person, or in a fictitious name, or the name of a deceased person; or use, or attempt to use, or aid, or assist, or participate in the use of any certificate of citizenship, knowing the same to be forged, or counterfeit, or ante-dated, or knowing the same to have been procured by fraud, or otherwise unlawfully obtained; or if any person, and without lawful excuse, shall knowingly have or be possessed of any false, forged, ante-dated, or counterfeit certificate of citizenship, purporting to have been issued under the provisions of any law of the United States relating to naturalization, knowing such certificate to be false, forged, ante-dated, or counterfeit, with intent unlawfully to use the same; or if any person shall obtain, accept, or receive any certificate of citizenship known to such person to have been procured by fraud or by the use of any false name, or by means of any false statement made with intent to procure, or to aid in procuring, the issue of such certificate, or known to such person to be fraudulently altered or ante-dated; or if any person who has been or may be admitted to be a citizen shall, on oath or affirmation, or by affidavit, knowingly deny that he has been so admitted, with intent to evade or avoid any duty or liability imposed or required by law, every person so offending shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to be imprisoned and kept at hard labor for a period not less than one year nor more than five years, or be fined in a sum not less than three hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or both such punishments may be imposed, in the discretion of the court. And every person who shall knowingly and intentionally aid or abet any person in the commission of any such felony, or attempt to do any act hereby made felony, or counsel, advise, or procure, or attempt to procure, the commission thereof, shall be liable to indictment and punishment in the same manner and to the same extent as the principal party guilty of such felony, and such person may be tried and convicted thereof without the previous conviction of such principal.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall knowingly use any certificate of naturalization heretofore granted by any court, or which shall hereafter be granted, which has been, or shall be, procured through fraud or by false evidence, or [Page 1266] has been or shall he issued by the clerk, or any other officer of the court without any appearance and hearing of the applicant in court and without lawful authority; and any person who shall falsely represent himself to be a citizen of the United States, without having been duly admitted to citizenship, for any fraudulent purpose whatever, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, in due course of law, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars, or be imprisoned not exceeding two years, either or both, in the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the same.

And be it further enacted, That the provision of this act shall apply to all proceedings had or taken, or attempted to be had or taken, before any court in which any proceeding for naturalization shall be commenced, had, or taken, or attempted to be commenced; and the courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of all offenses under the provisions of this act, in or before whatsoever court or tribunal the same shall have been committed.

Approved July 14, 1873.

AN ACT to authorize the appointment of shipping-commissioners by the several circuit courts of the United States, to superintend the shipping and discharge of seamen engaged in merchant ships belonging to the United States, and for the further protection of seamen.

Sec. 29. That every seaman, being a foreigner, who declares his intention of becoming a citizen of the United States in any competent court, and shall have served three years on board of a merchant ship or ships of the United States subsequent to the date of such declaration, may, on his application to any competent court, and the production of his certificate of discharge and good conduct during that time, together with the certificate of his declaration of intention to become a citizen, be admitted a citizen of the United States; and every seaman, being a foreigner, shall, after his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, and shall have served said three years, be deemed a citizen of the United States for the purpose of manning and serving on board any merchant ship of the United States, anything to the contrary in any previous act of Congress notwithstanding; but such seaman shall, for all purposes of protection as an American citizen, be deemed such, after the filing of his declaration of intention to become such citizen.

Approved June 7, 1872.

expatriation.

AN ACT concerning the rights of American citizens in foreign states.

Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherit right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this principle this Government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descendents, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore,

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this Government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this Government.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That all naturalized citizens of the United States, while in foreign states, shall be entitled to, and shall receive from this Government, the same protection of persons and property that is accorded to native-born citizens in like situations and circumstances.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That whenever it shall be made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons for such imprisonment, and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, it shall be the duty of the President to use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate such release, and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.

Approved July 27, 1868.

[Page 1267]

B.—Opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered at the December term, 1872, “The Butcher’s Benevolent Association of New Orleans, plaintiff in error, vs. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company,” and other cases commonly called “The Slaughter-House Cases.”

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the Court:

These cases are brought here by writs of error to the supreme court of the State of Louisiana.

They arise out of the efforts of the, butchers of New Orleans to resist the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company in the exercise of certain powers conferred by the charter which created it, and which was granted by the legislature of that State.

The cases named above, with others which have been brought here and dismissed by agreement, were all decided by the supreme court of Louisiana in favor of the Slaughter-House Company, as we shall hereafter call it for the sake of brevity, and these writs are brought to reverse those decisions.

The records were filed in this court in 1870, and were argued before it at length on a motion made by plaintiffs in error for an order in the nature of an injunction or supersedeas, pending the action of the court on the merits. The opinion on that motion is reported in 10 Wallace, 273.

On account of the importance of the questions involved in these cases they were, by permission of the court, taken up out of their order on the docket and argued in January, 1872. At that hearing one of the justices was absent, and it was found, on consultation, that there was a diversity of views among those who were present. Impressed with the gravity of the questions raised in the argument, the court under these circumstances ordered that the cases be placed on the calendar and re-argued before a full bench. This argument was had early in February last.

Preliminary to the consideration of those questions is a motion by the defendant to dismiss the cases, on the ground that the contest between the parties has been adjusted by an agreement made since the records came into this court, and that part of that agreement is that these writs should be dismissed. This motion was heard with the argument on the merits, and was much pressed by counsel. It is supported by affidavits and by copies of the written agreement relied on. It is sufficient to say of these that we do not find in them satisfactory evidence that the agreement is binding upon all the parties to the record who are named as plaintiffs in the several writs of error, and that there are parties now before the court, in each of the three cases at the head of this opinion, who have not consented to their dismissal, and who are not bound by the action of those who have so consented. They have a right to be heard and the motion to dismiss cannot prevail.

The records show that the plaintiffs in error relied upon, and asserted throughout the entire course of the litigation in the State courts, that the grant of privileges in the charter of defendant, which they were contesting, was a violation of the most important provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The jurisdiction and the duty of this court to review the judgment of the State court on those questions is clear and is imperative.

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The institution of African slavery, as it existed in about half the States of the Union, and the contests pervading the public mind for many years, between those who desired its curtailment and ultimate extinction and those who desired additional safeguards for its security and perpetuation, culminated in the effort, on the part of most of the States in which slavery existed, to separate from the Federal Government, and to resist its authority. This constituted the war of the rebellion, and whatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to bring about this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause was African slavery.

In that struggle slavery, as a legalized social relation, perished. It perished as a necessity of the bitterness and force of the conflict. When-the armies of freedom found themselves upon the soil of slavery they could do nothing less than free the poor victims whose enforced servitude was the foundation of the quarrel. And when hard pressed in the contest these men (for they proved themselves men in that terrible crisis) offered their services and were accepted by thousands to aid in suppressing the unlawful rebellion, slavery was at an end wherever the Federal Government succeeded in that purpose. The proclamation of President Lincoln expressed an accomplished fact as to a large portion of the insurrectionary districts, when he declared slavery abolished in them all. But the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-establishing the authority of the Federal Government were not content to permit this great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or the proclamation of the Executive, both of which might have been questioned in after times, and they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the restored Union as one of its fundamental articles. Hence the thirteenth article of amendment of that instrument. Its two short sections seem hardly to admit of [Page 1268] construction, so vigorous is their expression and so appropriate to the purpose we have indicated:

1.: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
2.: Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

To withdraw the mind from the contemplation of this grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this Government—a declaration designed to establish the freedom of four millions of slaves—and with a microscopic search endeavor to find in it a reference to servitudes which may have been attached to property in certain localities, requires an effort, to say the least of it.

That a personal servitude was meant is proved by the use of the word “involuntary,” which can only apply to human beings. The exception of servitude as a punishment for crime gives an idea of the class of servitude that is meant. The word “servitude” is of larger meaning than “slavery,” as the latter is popularly understood in this country, and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery. It was very well understood that in the form of apprenticeship for long terms, as it had been practiced in the West India Islands, on the abolition of slavery by the English government, or by reducing the slaves to the condition of serfs attached to the plantation, the purpose of the article might have been evaded, if only the word “slavery” had been used. The case of the apprentice slave, held under a law of Maryland, liberated by Chief Justice Chase, on a writ of habeas corpus under this article, illustrates this course of observation. (Matter of Turner, 1 Abbott U. S. R., 84.) And it is all that we deem necessary to say on the application of that article to the statute of Louisiana, now under consideration.

* * * * * * *

The first section of the fourteenth article, to which our attention is more specially invited, opens with a definition of citizenship—not only citizenship of the United States, but citizenship of the States. No such definition was previously found in the Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define it by act of Congress. It had been the occasion of much discussion in the courts, by the Executive Departments, and in the public journals. It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States, except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been born and resided always in the District of Columbia or in the Territories, though within the United States, were not citizens. Whether this proposition was sound or not, had never been judicially decided. But it had been held by this court, in the celebrated Dred Scott case, only a few years before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United States. This decision, while it met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitutional lawyers of the country, had never been overruled; and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the negro race who had recently been made freemen, were still, not only not citizens, but were incapable of becoming so by anything short of an amendment to the Constitution.

To remove this difficulty primarily, and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizenship of a State, the first clause of the first section was framed:

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”

The first observation we have to make on this clause is, that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, “subject to its jurisdiction” was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, Consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign states born within the United States.

The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the present case. It is that the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union.

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which, are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.

[Page 1269]

We think these distinctions and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section, which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those of citizens of the several States. The argument, however, in favor of plaintiffs rests wholly on the assumption that the citizenship is the same, and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the clause are the same.

The language is, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State, that the word “citizen of the State” should be left out when it is so carefully used, and used in contradistinction to “citizens of the United States,” in the very sentence which precedes it. It is too clear for argument that the change in phraseology was adopted understandingly and with a purpose.

Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respectively are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment.

If, then, there is a difference between the privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the citizen of the State as such, the latter must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore

rested, for they are not embraced by this paragraph of the amendment.

* * * * * * *

But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws.

One of these is well described in the case of Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wallace, 36. It is said to be the right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied guarantees of its Constitution, “to come to the seat of Government to assert any claim he may have upon that Government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its sea-ports, through which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, land-offices, and courts of justice in the several States.” And quoting from the language of Chief Justice Taney in another case, it is said “That for all the great purposes for which the Federal Government was established, we are one people, with one common country; we are all citizens of the United States;” and it is as such citizens that their rights are supported in this court in Crandall vs. Nevada.

Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care and protection of the Federal Government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor that the right depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right to use the navigable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several States, all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations are dependent upon citizenship of the United States and not citizenship of a State. One of these privileges is conferred by the very article under consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona-fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State. To these may be added the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the other clause of the fourteenth, next to be considered.

But it is useless to pursue this branch of the inquiry, since we are of opinion that the rights claimed by these plaintiffs in error, if they have any existence, are not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the clause of the fourteenth amendment under consideration.

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without clue process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”

* * * * * * *

The judgments of the supreme court of Louisiana in these cases are affirmed.

Mr. Justice Field, dissenting:

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The provisions of the fourteenth amendment, which is properly a supplement to the [Page 1270] thirteenth, cover, in my judgment, the case before us, and inhibit any legislation which confers special and exclusive privileges like these under consideration. The amendment was adopted to obviate objections which had been raised and pressed with great force to the validity of the civil-rights act, and to place the common rights of American citizens under the protection of the National Government. It first declares that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” It then declares that “no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

The first clause of this amendment determines who are citizens of the United States and how their citizenship is created. Before its enactment there was much diversity of opinion among jurists and statesmen whether there was any such citizenship independent of that of the State, and, if any existed, as to the manner in which it originated. With the greater number the opinion prevailed that there was no such citizenship independent of the citizenship of the State. Such was the opinion of Mr. Calhoun and the class represented by him. In his celebrated speech in the Senate upon the force bill, in 1833, referring to the reliance expressed by a senator upon the fact that we are citizens of the United States, he said: “If by citizen of the United States he means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship extends to the entire geographical limits of the country without having a local citizenship in some State or Territory, a sort of citizen of the world, all that I have to say is that such a citizen would be a perfect nondescript; that not a single individual of this description can be found in the entire mass of our population. Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on the occasion, every citizen is a citizen of some State or Territory, and as such, under an express provision of the Constitution, is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States; and it is in this and no other sense we are citizens of the United States.”

In the Dred Scott case this subject of citizenship of the United States was fully and elaborately discussed. The exposition in the opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis has been generally accepted by the profession of the country as the one containing the soundest views of constitutional law. And he held that, under the Constitution, citizenship of the United States in reference to natives was dependent upon citizenship in the several States, under their constitution and laws.

The Chief Justice, in that case, and a majority of the court with him, held that the words “people of the United States” and “citizens of the United States” were synonymous terms; that the people of the respective States were the parties to the Constitution; that these people consisted of the free inhabitants of those States; that they had provided in their Constitution for the adoption of a uniform rule of naturalization; that their descendants and persons naturalized were the only persons who could be citizens of the United States, and that it was not in the power of any State to invest any other person with citizenship so that he could enjoy the privileges of a citizen under the Constitution, and that therefore the descendants of persons brought to this country and sold as slaves were not, and could not be, citizens within the meaning of the Constitution.

The first clause of the fourteenth amendment changes this whole subject, and removes it from the region of discussion and doubt. It recognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United States, and it makes their citizenship dependent upon the place of their birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws of any State or the condition of their ancestry. A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in that State. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State. The exercise of these rights and privileges, and the degree of enjoyment received from such exercise, are always more or less affected by the condition and the local institutions of the State, or city, or town where he resides, They are thus affected in a State by the wisdom of its laws, the ability of its officers, the efficiency of its magistrates, the education and morals of its people, and by many other considerations. This is a result which follows from the constitution of society, and can never be avoided, but in no other way can they be affected by the action of the State, or by the residence of the citizen therein. They do not derive their existence from its legislation, and cannot be destroyed by its power:

The amendment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existing. It assumes that there are such privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State legislation. If this inhibition has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but only refers, as stated by the majority in the court in their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging [Page 1271] to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage. With privileges and immunities thus designated, no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit such interference. The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United States always controlled any State legislation of that character. But, if the amendment refers to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the inhibition has a profound significance and consequence.

What, then, are the privileges and immunities which are secured against abridgment by State legislation?

In the first section of the civil-rights act, Congress has given its interpretation to these terms, or at least has stated some of the rights which, in its judgment, these terms include; it has there declared that they include the right “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property.” That act, it is true, was passed before the fourteenth amendment, but the amendment was adopted, as I have already bid, to obviate objections to the act, or, speaking more accurately, I should say, to obviate objections to legislation of a similar character extending the protection of the National Government over the common rights of all citizens of the United States. Accordingly, after its ratification, Congress re-enacted the act under the belief that, whatever doubts may have previously existed of its validity, they were removed by the amendment.1

The terms, privileges, and immunities, are not new in the amendment; they were in the Constitution before the amendment was adopted. They are found in the second section of the fourth article, which declares that “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” and they have been the subject of frequent consideration in judicial decisions. In Corfield vs. Coryell,2 Mr. Justice Washington said he had “no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which were, in their nature, fundamental; which belong of right to citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose the Union from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign;” and, in considering what those fundamental privileges were, he said that perhaps it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate them, but that they might be “all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the Government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.” This appears to me to be a sound construction of the clause in question. The privileges and immunities designated are those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments. Clearly among these must be placed the right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally affects all persons. In the discussions in Congress upon the passage of the civil-rights act, repeated reference was made to this language of Mr. Justice Washington. It was cited by Senator Trumbull with the observation that it enumerated the very rights belonging to a citizen of the United States set forth in the first section of the act, and with the statement that all persons born in the United States, being declared by the act citizens of the United States, would thenceforth be entitled to the rights of citizens, and that these were the great fundamental rights set forth in the act; and that they were set forth “as appertaining to every freeman.”

The privileges and immunities designated in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution are, then, according to the decision cited, those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments, and they can be enjoyed under that clause by the citizens of each State in the several States upon the same terms and conditions as they are enjoyed by the citizens of the latter States. No discrimination can be made by one State against the citizens of other States in their enjoyment, nor can any greater imposition be levied than such as is laid upon its own citizens. It is a clause which insures equality in the enjoyment of these rights between citizens of the several States while in the same State.

Nor is there anything in the opinion in the case of Paul against Virginia3 which at all militates against these views, as is supposed by the majority of the court. The act of Virginia, of 1866, which was under consideration in that case, provided that no insurance company, not incorporated under the laws of the State, should carry on its business within the State without previously obtaining a license for that purpose; and that it should not receive such license until it had deposited with the treasurer of the State bonds of a specified character, to an amount varying from thirty to fifty thousand dollars. No such deposit was required of insurance companies incorporated by the State, [Page 1272] for carrying on its business within the State; and in the case cited, the validity of the discriminating provisions of the statute of Virginia between her own corporations and the corporations of other States was assailed. It was contended that the statute in this particular was in conflict with the clause of the Constitution which declares that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” But the court answered, that corporations were not citizens within the meaning of this clause; that the term citizens as there used applied only to natural persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature and possessing only the attributes which the legislature had prescribed; that though it had been held that where contracts or rights of property were to be enforced by or against corporations the courts of the United States would, for the purpose of maintaining jurisdiction, consider the corporation as representing citizens of the State, under the laws of which it was created, and to this extent would treat a corporation as a citizen within the provision of the Constitution extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between citizens of different States, it had never been held in any case which had come under its observation, either in the State or Federal courts, that a corporation was a citizen within the meaning of the clause in question, entitling the citizens of each State to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. And the court observed, that the privileges and immunities secured by that provision were those privileges and immunities which were common to the citizens in the latter States, under their constitution and laws, by virtue of their being citizens; that special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own States were not secured in other States by the provision; that it was not intended by it to give to the laws of one State any operation in other States; that they could have no such operation except by the permission, express or implied, of those States; and that the special privileges which they conferred must, therefore, be enjoyed at home unless the assent of other States to their enjoyment therein were given. “And so the court held, that a corporation, being a grant of special privileges to the corporators, had no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created, and that the recognition of its existence by other States, and the enforcement of its contracts made therein, depended purely upon the assent of those States, which could be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States might think proper to impose.

The whole purport of the decision was, that citizens of one State do not carry with them into other States any special privileges or immunities, conferred by the laws of their own State, of a corporate or other character. That decision has no pertinency to the questions involved in this case. The common privileges and immunities which of right belong to all citizens stand on a very different footing. These the citizens of each State do carry with them into other States, and are secured there by the clause in question in the enjoyment of such privileges and immunities upon terms of equality with citizens of the latter States. This equality in one particular was enforced by this court in the recent case of Ward vs. The State of Maryland, reported in the 12th of Wallace. A statute of that State required the payment of a larger sum from a nonresident trader for a license to enable him to sell his merchandise in the State than it did of a resident trader, and the court held that the statute in thus discriminating against the non-resident trader contravened the clause securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. The privilege of disposing of his property, which was an essential incident to his ownership, possessed by the non-resident, was subjected by the statute of Maryland to a greater burden than was imposed upon a like privilege of her own citizens. The privileges of the non-resident were in this particular abridged by that legislation.

What the clause in question did for the protection of the citizens of one State against hostile and discriminating legislation of other States the fourteenth amendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others, whether they reside in the same or different States. If under the fourth article of the Constitution equality of privileges and immunities is secured between citizens of different States, under the fourteenth amendment the same equality is secured between citizens of the United States.

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Mr. Justice Bradley dissenting:

Can the Federal courts administer relief to citizens of the United States whose privileges and immunities have been abridged by a State? Of this I entertain no doubt. Prior to the fourteenth amendment this could not be done, except in a few instances, for the want of the requisite authority.

As the great mass of citizens of the United States were also citizens of individual States, many of their general privileges and immunities would be the same in the one capacity as in the other. Having this double citizenship and the great body of municipal laws intended for the protection of person and property being the laws of the State, and no provision being made, and no machinery provided by the Constitution, [Page 1273] except in a few specified cases, for any interference by the General Government between a State and its citizens, the protection of the citizen in the enjoyment of his fundamental privileges and immunities (except where a citizen of one State went into another State) was largely left to State laws and State courts, where they will still continue to be left unless actually invaded by the unconstitutional acts or delinquency of the State governments themselves.

Admitting, therefore, that formerly the States were not prohibited from infringing any of the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, except in a few specified cases, that cannot be said now, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. In my judgment it was the intention of the people of this country in adopting that amendment to provide national security against violation by the States of the fundamental rights of the citizen.

The first section of this amendment, after declaring that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are citizens of the United States.and of the State wherein they reside, proceeds to declare further, that “no State ohall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;” and that Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.

Now, here is a clear prohibition on the States against making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.

If my views are correct with regard to what are the privileges and immunities of citizens, it follows conclusively that any law which establishes a sheer monopoly, depriving a large class of citizens of the privilege of pursuing a lawful employment, does abridge the privileges of those citizens.

The amendment also prohibits any State from depriving any person ( citizen or otherwise ) of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as property, without due process of law. The right of choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is their property. Such a law also deprives those citizens of the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the last clause of the section.

The constitutional question is distinctly raised in these cases; the constitutional right is expressly claimed; it was violated by State law, which was sustained by the State court, and we are called upon in a legitimate and proper way to afford redress. Our jurisdiction and our duty are plain and imperative.

It is futile to argue that none but persons of the African race are intended to be benefited by this amendment. They may have been the primary cause of the amendment, but its language is general, embracing all citizens, and I think it was purposely so expressed.

The mischief to be remedied was not merely slavery and its incidents and consequences; but that spirit of insubordination and disloyalty to the National Government which had troubled the country for so many years in some of the States, and that intolerance of free speech and free discussion which often rendered life and property insecure, and led to much unequal legislation. The amendment was an attempt to give voice to the strong national yearning for that time, and that condition of things, in which American citizenship should be a sure guarantee of safety, and in which every citizen of the United States might stand erect in every portion of its soil, in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging to a freeman, without fear of violence or molestation.

But great fears are expressed that this construction of the amendment will lead to enactments by Congress interfering with the internal affairs of the States, and establishing therein civil and criminal codes of law for the government of the citizens, and thus abolishing the State governments in everything but name; or else that it will lead the Federal courts to draw to their cognizance the supervision of State tribunals on every subject of judicial inquiry, on the plea of ascertaining whether the privileges and immunities of citizens have not been abridged.

In my judgment no such practical inconveniences would arise. Very little, ifany, legislation on the part of Congress would be required to carry the amendment into effect. Like the prohibition against passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract, it would execute itself. The point would be regularly raised in a suit at law, and settled by final reference to the Federal court. As the privileges and immunities protected are only those fundamental ones which belong to every citizen, they would soon become so far defined as to cause but a slight accumulation of business in the Federal courts. Besides, the recognized existence of the law would prevent its frequent violation. But even if the business of the national courts should be increased, Congress could easily supply the remedy by increasing their number and efficiency. The great question is, what is the true construction of the amendment? When once [Page 1274] we find that, we shall find the. means of. giving it effect. The argument from inconvenience ought not to have a very controlling influence in questions of this sort. The national will and national interest are of far greater importance.

In my opinion the judgment of the supreme court of Louisiana ought to he reversed.

C.—Extract from the analytical index to the “Treaties and Conventions of the United States with other Powers.”

Naturalization:

citizens of one nationality are to he deemed and taken to have become citizens of the other, who during a continuous residence of five years in the territories of the other have become naturalized there—Austria, Sweden and Norway; who have resided uninterruptedly there five years, and before, during, or after that time, have become or shall become naturalized—Baden; who have become or shall become naturalized, and shall have resided there uninterruptedly five years—Bavaria, Hesse, Mexico, North Germany; as explained in the protocol—Wiirtemberg; who may or shall have been naturalized there—Belgium, Denmark; who have become or shall become naturalized—Great Britain.

the declaration of intention to become a citizen has not the effect of citizenship—Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, Mexico, North Germany, Sweden, and Norway, Würtemberg.

naturalized citizens are liable on return to their original country to be tried and punished for offenses committed before emigration, subject to the limitations established by law—Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Mexico, North Germany, Sweden and Norway, Wiirtemberg; but not for emigration itself—Bavaria, Sweden and Norway.

when a naturalized citizen remains liable to trial and punishment for violation of laws of his old country relative to military duty—Austria, Baden, Belgium, Sweden and Norway.

a naturalized citizen may renounce his acquired citizenship—Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, Mexico, North Germany, Sweden and Norway, Wiirtemberg; but this renunciation does not entitle him to recover his former citizenship without the consent of the government—Bavaria.

a return of the naturalized citizen to his original country is not of itself a renunciation—Austria, Baden.

no fixed period of residence in his original country works of itself a renunciation— Austria, Baden.

a residence in the old country without intent to return works a renunciation—Bavaria, Denmark, Hesse, Mexico, North Germany, Sweden and Norway, Wiirtemberg.

the intent not to return may be held to exist when the residence is for more than two years—Bavaria, Denmark, Hesse, Mexico, North Germany, Sweden and Norway, Wiirtemberg; but that presumption may be rebutted by evidence—Mexico.

naturalized citizens may re-acquire their lost citizenship in the old country in the manner provided by law—Belgium, Denmark; in the manner and on the conditions prescribed by the old government—Great Britain, Sweden and Norway.

provisions concerning citizenship of inhabitants of territories annexed to the United States—France, Spain, Mexico, Russia.

D.—Extract from the Regulations for the Consular Service.

Article XI.—Passports and protection of citizens of the United States.

102.: Passports are to be issued only to citizens of the United States. To issue a passport to a person not a citizen is a penal offense, punishable, on conviction, by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding $500, or both. Persons who have merely declared their intention to become citizens are not citizens of the United States within the meaning of the law.
103.: Passports can be issued only at this Department, or by the chief diplomatic representative of the United States at a legation; or, in the absence of such a representative from the country, then by the consul-general, if there be one, or, in the absence of both of the officers last named, by a consul, (Form 9.)
104.: Passports are to be verified only by the consular officer of the place where if is required, for which a fee of one dollar in the gold coin of the United States, or its equivalent, will be collected. In the absence of such consular officer the visa may be given by the principal diplomatic representative; in which case there will be no fee. (See Form 10.)
105.: At the close of each quarter, returns are to be made to this Department, in the manner heretofore prescribed, of the names, and all other particulars, of the persons to whom the passports shall be granted, issued, or verified, as embraced in such passports, together with the amount of the taxes or fees collected for the same, which taxes or fees will be charged on the books of the Treasury to the person receiving the same, and will be brought to the credit of the United States in the adjustment of his quarterly accounts.
106.: The rules and practice on this subject hitherto prevailing in the Department will remain unchanged. In the legations and consulates of the United States the best evidence of the citizenship of the applicant will be the production of a passport from this Department, coupled with proof that the person in whose behalf it is presented is the person named in the passport. In the absence of such evidence the applicant will make a written declaration stating his name, place of birth, age, and such other facts as shall be required. He shall also furnish such proof of his identity as shall be required by the minister or consul; and if a naturalized citizen, he shall also furnish the original, or a certified copy of the decree of the court by which he was declared to be a citizen; and it shall be the duty of the minister or consul, at the close of each quarter, to transmit to the Department a statement of the evidence on which all such passports were issued or granted.
107.: When the applicant is accompanied by his wife, minor child, or servants, it will be sufficient to state in the passport the names of such persons, and their relationship, to or connection with him. A separate passport must be, issued for each person of full age, not the wife or servant of another, with whom he or she is traveling.
108.: No visa will be attached to a passport after a year from its date. A new passport may, however, be issued in its place by the proper authority, as hereinbefore provided, if desired by the holder.
109.: Applications have sometimes been made to the diplomatic and consular agents of the Government for the issue of certificates of citizenship to persons residing in foreign lands and claiming to be American citizens. Hereafter no certificates will be issued, except in the form of passports under the regulations herein prescribed, unless a different form be prescribed by the laws of the country in which the agency or consulate is situated; in which case the agent or consul will transmit to the Department a copy of the prescribed form. And inasmuch as such evidence of citizenship may be claimed as prima facie evidence of the right of the holder to be protected by the power of the Government of the United States, so long as he conducts himself peaceably and obeys the laws of the foreign state in which he resides, therefore, to protect the dignity of such citizenship, and to guard against fraudulent assumption of it, consuls and ministers will be strict in the observance of the rules herein laid down, and will exercise due caution in issuing passports to applicants. And when their intervention is invoked on behalf of citizens of the United States residing in foreign countries, they will be careful to remember that it is as incumbent on such persons, as it is upon the citizens or subjects of such foreign countries, to observe the laws of the country in which they reside.
110.: The official action of the representatives of the United States may also be asked in foreign lands in favor of natives thereof who have been naturalized in the United States. Should passports or other protection be asked for by persons, it will be the duty of the officer to satisfy himself that they have done nothing to forfeit their acquired rights. For a naturalized citizen may, by returning to his native country and residing there with an evident intent to remain, or by accepting offices there inconsistent with his adopted citizenship, or by concealing for a length of time the fact of his naturalization, and passing himself as a citizen or subject of his native country Until occasion may make it his interest to ask the intervention of the country of his adoption, or in other ways which may show an intent to abandon his acquired rights, so far resume his original allegiance as to absolve the government of his adopted country from the obligation to protect him as a citizen while he remains in his native land.
111.: Cautious scrutiny is enjoined in such cases, because evidence has been accumulating in this Department for some years that many aliens seek naturalization in the United States without any design of subjecting themselves by permanent residence to the duties and burdens of citizenship, and solely for the purpose of returning to their native country and fixing their domicile and pursuing business therein, relying on such naturalization to evade the obligations of citizenship to the country of their native allegiance and actual habitation. To allow such pretensions would be to tolerate a fraud upon both the governments, enabling a man to enjoy the advantages of two nationalities and to escape the duties and burdens of each.
112.: If the consul is satisfied that an applicant for protection has a right to his intervention, [Page 1276] he should interest himself in his behalf, examining carefully into his grievances. If he finds that the complaints are well founded, he should interpose firmly, but with courtesy and moderation, in his behalf.
113.: If redress cannot be obtained from the local authorities the consul will apply to the legation of the United States, if there be one in the country where he resides, and will, in all cases, transmit to the Department copies of his correspondence, accompanied by a report.
114.: The United States have treaties with several powers regulating the rights of naturalized citizens of the United States on their return to their native lands. The protection which the passport gives is regulated in each such case by the terms of the treaty. Copies of those several treaties are given in Appendix 2.
115.: It is provided by the laws of 1855 (10 Statutes at Large, p. 604) that persons born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered to be citizens of the United States, provided that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States. Within the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the United States such persons are entitled to all the privileges of citizens; but, while the United States may by law fix or declare the conditions constituting citizens of the country within its own territorial jurisdiction, and may confer the rights of American citizens everywhere upon persons who are not rightfully subject to the authority of any foreign country or government, it ought not, by undertaking to confer the rights of citizenship upon the subject of a foreign nation who had not come within our territory, to interfere with the just rights of such nation to the government and control of its own subjects. If, by the laws of the country of their birth, children of American citizens born in such a country are subjects of its government, the legislation of the United States will not be construed so as to interfere with the allegiance which they owe to the country of their birth while they continue within its territory. If, therefore, such a person, who remains a resident in the country of his or her birth, applies for a passport as a citizen of the United States, such passport will be issued in the qualified form shown in Form No. 11.
116.: The same law of 1855 further provides that any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who’ shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen. The recognition of this citizenship will be subject to the qualification above referred to.
117.: Passports should be numbered, commencing with No. 1, and so continuing consecutively until the end of the incumbent’s term of office.