No. 72.
Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.
Legation of the
United States,
Peking, May 22, 1873.
(Received July 21.)
No. 259.]
Sir: Refering to my No. 253 of 2d instant, I have
now the honor to enclose copy of a dispatch from Mr. Consul
Sheppard upon the same subject—military operations
in the vicinity of Tien-tsin.
[Page 183]
The statements of the consul concerning the works now in course of
construction, and his estimate of the number of native troops in that
vicinity, are corroborated by other information which has come to me, and
may be accepted as substantially correct.
As to the real object of these military preparations opinions differ. It is
quite impossible to obtain reliable information concerning the purposes of
the Chinese government; hence opinions upon this subject must of necessity
be to a large extent mere conjectures.
It is perhaps but natural that this government should take steps to fortify
the main water approach to its capital, although the practical uselessness
of such works was demonstrated in 1860, and would be again should occasion
arise for moving a foreign army on Peking; nor is it surprising that the
viceroy of this province—by far the ablest military mandarin in the
empire—should desire to have a large military force about him. The empire
being now exceptionally free from domestic disturbance, few troops are
required for active duty, hence there is no reason why an unusually large
force may not be stationed in the vicinity of the capital. So far as I am
aware the total of the force in this province is not exceptionally large,
and therefore there is nothing in this that need occasion alarm; it is the
sudden concentration of troops near Tien-tsin that excites remark, and
causes uneasiness among foreigners.
The discussion of the audience question is regarded by most people as the
principal cause of the recent military activity. It is not impossible that
the Chinese at one time feared that trouble would grow out of this question;
or it may be (which is much more likely) the officials thought that the
assembling of troops near here would have an influence upon the foreign
ministers, and cause them to moderate their demands.
It is proper that I should, in this connection, observe that nothing has
occurred in our discussions which leads me to think that such was the case)
on the contrary, the Chinese ministers have never used language that could
be construed into a threat, nor have they, at any time, intimated that the
demand would possibly be resisted by force.
In a previous dispatch I gave it as my opinion that the advent of a Japanese
embassy in China, which rumor said had come to make unpleasant demands upon
this government, was the chief cause of the warlike demonstrations before
referred to; I also said that it was not probable the Chinese would
inaugurate an offensive movement against Japan or any other nation. I am of
the same opinion now.
But while it is not likely that the safety of the lives or property of
foreign residents is, or will be, materially affected by the presence of a
greater or less number of native troops near Tien-tsin, I have deemed it
prudent to take steps to allay, to some extent, the fears of our people
resident in this vicinity, and also to afford them protection in case it
shall be found necessary.
From my correspondence with Admiral Jenkins, copies of which are inclosed,
you will learn what has been done in this direction, and also what I deem
necessary in the immediate future.
It gives me pleasure, to add that I have invariably found the naval
authorities ready and willing to co-operate in all measures necessary for
the safety and well being of foreign residents.
I have, &c.,
[Page 184]
[Inclosure 1.]
Mr. Sheppard to Mr.
Low.
United
States Consulate,
Tien-tsin, May 19,
1873.
Sir: I beg to lay before you for your
information a few facts which I have gathered regarding certain military
preparations on the part of the Chinese government within this immediate
consular district, during the past few days.
The first intimation I received of the presence of an unusual number of
Chinese troops was about the 15th of April, while passing down the
river, on my way to Chefoo. At that time a small body of soldiers were
encamped in tents along and near the south bank of the Peiho, near the
village of Hsin Chêng, about eight miles west of
the Taku forts, and about four miles east of the more important village
of Ko Ku.
On my return a few days later I discovered that this small force had been
greatly augmented, and that the soldiers were busily engaged in throwing
up strong earthworks and constructing forts in different places
admirably suited to command the river in either direction. It was also
ascertained that these troops had been moved down the Taku military road
and past the foreign settlement of Tien-tsin at night, and that their
force already consisted of about 15,000 troops, mostly armed with
foreign rifles.
From the best information in my possession, these troops came from a
large camp at Ma Chang, on the grand canal, about 100 li south of
Tien-tsin. A missionary who passed through that camp recently states
that there are about 60,000 soldiery there, all southern soldiers; a
great portion of this body of soldiery is cavalry.
I learn from reliable gentlemen who lately visited the south fort at Taku
that great activity is manifested at that garrison. The last of the
three cavaliers is being rapidly pushed forward to completion, and will
be finished in about two weeks. The other two cavaliers were completed,
and three 100–pound Krupp guns mounted in each, commanding the entire
entrance to the river. The rear defense of the fort has been
strengthened by a second and inner wall as high as the outer wall, and
about 20 feet from it. It has since transpired that guns are being
mounted on this inner wall to the rear, and commanding the river in that
direction also. A recent order of the military commandant was posted up
in the fort, ordering the soldiers not to neglect the work they were
about, but to attend to their duties and not absent themselves, as the
work then going forward was of the utmost importance.
On the Taku road, five miles west of the fort, a new entrenched camp of
500 men was found close to the road. This camp, like many of the others
which are being established, cannot be seen from the river, being hidden
by clumps of trees. Three miles further west, the main encampment was
found at Hsin Chêng. Hsin
Chêng appears to be the name of a walled town that
existed at this place some 60 or 70 years ago, of which nothing now
remains but a few mounds.
The camps here extend for about a mile in double parallel lines on both
sides of the Taku road. Seventeen camps were counted, but the number has
since been increased to twenty-eight. Two forts have already been built,
commanding the river. These forts, it is said, are to be mounted with
guns cast at the Tien-tsin arsenal. The people and soldiery all say
there are at present 20,000 soldiers in these camps, and that there are
more to come, chiefly cavalry and field artillery. The soldiers are
chiefly Honan men, and are, it is said, mostly armed with breech-loading
rifles. General Chou is in command.
As to the real object and purpose of this unusual and apparently
unnecessary preparation on the part of the Chinese government, it does
not, probably, become me to venture a decided opinion at this time. The
fact is, however, apparent that the Chinese are for some reason
strengthening their military defenses from Taku to Tien-tsin. As these
preparations are all being pushed forward with unwonted vigor and haste
in a time of profound peace, and without any apparent cause, it seems to
me that such a proceeding, unexplained on the part of the Chinese
government, pending the discussion of a great international question so
full of possible consequences as that of the audience question, now
under consideration at Peking, is susceptible at least of a very serious
interpretation. Between civilized countries such an act would
unquestionably be considered as a menace, unless accompanied by
satisfactory explanations.
I am, &c.,
ELI T. SHEPPARD,
United States Consuls.
[Page 185]
[Inclosure 2.]
Mr. Low to Admiral
Jenkins.
Legation of
the United States,
Peking, May 13, 1873.
Admiral: I have the honor to transmit copy of a
note which I have addressed to Commander Bunce, of the Ashuelot.
In further explanation of the reasons for wishing to detain the Ashuelot
at Tientsin, I would observe that within the last four weeks a large
number of Chinese troops have been concentrated near the river, between
Tien-tsin and Taku, where entrenchments are being thrown up. It is also
said that a new fortification is being built near the place where these
soldiers are concentrated.
From information which may be considered reliable, I estimate the number
of troops now encamped along the river between Tien-tsin and Taku at
15,000 to 20,000. There are also at other camps, away from the river,
but within ten or fifteen miles of Tien-tsin, as many more,
probably.
What these warlike demonstrations mean I am unable to say. It is not
impossible the government thinks that this demonstration of force will
have the effect to intimidate the foreign ministers who have made a
request for personal audience of the Emperor, or it may be a preparation
for possible contingencies in case the demand is refused and foreign
governments decline to submit quietly to the rejection of their demand.
My own impression is, however, that the reason for assembling these
troops at this moment may be set down to a desire on the part of the
Chinese to make something of a display of force, as an intimation to the
Japanese embassy now here that unreasonable demands will be resisted. I
do not anticipate in any event an offensive movement, either against the
Japanese or foreigners generally.
But while this is my belief, I cannot shut my eyes to the possible danger
there may be in these movements, nor to the necessity of adopting every
reasonable precaution for the protection of the lives and property of
our citizens in this vicinity.
In view of these considerations I should regret to see the navalforce now
at Tien-tsin withdrawn. I may add that Commander Bunee’s apparent
anxiety to leave Tien-tsin is because his vessel needs repairs. But even
if repairs are necessary to render her safe and serviceable at sea, they
would not, I imagine, add to her usefulness in her present position.
If, however, it should be decided to withdraw the Ashuelot from
Tien-tsin, I would most respectfully suggest that the Monocacy be sent
to relieve her, and that the former should remain until relieved by the
latter.
I have, &c.,
P. S.—Since writing the foregoing I have received your dispatch of
18th April. With reference to your suggestion about the Yantic, I
have to say that, if her presence is not absolutely needed
elsewhere, I would be glad if she were ordered to Chefoo.
[Inclosure 3.]
Admiral Jenkins to
Mr. Low.
U. S. Ship
Hartford, Flag-ship on the Asiatic Station,
Hong-Kong, April 18, 1873.
Sir: I had the honor to receive to-day your
dispatch, dated April 5, informing me of your request to Commander
Bunce, commanding the Ashuelot, to delay his departure from Tien-tsin
until the 1st of May, or longer should events seem to require the
retention of the vessel at her present station.
I had already received dispatches from Commander Bunce, informing me of
your request and of his compliance therewith, and, on the 7th instant,
transmitted to him instructions to remain at Tien-tsin until he is
informed by you that the presence there of the ship is no longer
necessary, or until he is relieved by another vessel.
I trust that it may not be necessary to keep the Ashuelot at Tien-tsin
much longer, as her crew need a change and the ship requires some
repairs; but if it should seem to be important to have a vessel there I
shall relieve her by another.
If you deem it to be of any advantage, either as a precaution or
otherwise, I will order the Yantic, a small sloop of war drawing about
13 feet of water, (just arrived on the station,) to Chefoo, as she could
probably pass the Taku bar with a high tide. She might be useful should
difficulties arise. I hope, however, that the present causes of
uneasiness will soon be removed by a satisfactory settlement of the
questions which have recently proved so embarrassing to the ministers at
Peking, and, meantime,
[Page 186]
I beg
to assure you that every suggestion from yourself as to any measures
which may lie in my power to carry into effect to assist you will
receive the most cordial and careful attention.
I expect to reach Shanghai on or before the 10th of May, and I shall be
glad to receive there any communication you may favor me with.
I have, &c.,
THORNTON A. JENKINS,
Rear-Admiral Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic
Station.
