No. 120.
Count de
Rémusat to the Marquis de
Noailles.
[Translation.]
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Versailles, February 13,
1873.
[Received from Marquis de
Noailles, March 13, 1873.]
Marquis: You are, perhaps, already acquainted with
the nature of the intelligence which has been recently received from China.
Various decrees published shortly after the marriage of the Emperor have
fixed the date of his majority, which is about to be solemnly declared.
These events possess special importance for the powers represented at
Peking. The Chinese government has hitherto refused to treat with foreign
ministers concerning the question of their admission to the palace, on the
ground of the minority of the sovereign. It is very desirable, for the
strengthening of the friendly relations with China, that diplomatic officers
in that country should enjoy a privilege the denial of which deprives
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them of a great source of
influence with the central government, and encourages denials of justice on
the part of the central authorities which are quite too frequent, and
sometimes encourages feelings of dangerous hostility. It will only be when
the sovereign shall have publicly manifested his consideration for the
representatives of the countries with which he has entered into treaty
obligations that we can hope to see a people as docile as the Chinese
accept, in their turn, the presence of foreigners without an afterthought.
It seemed, therefore, proper to us to try to put an end to a state of things
which equally affects our dignity and our interests, and not to allow this
opportunity to pass unimproved, since, should we do so, the Chinese
government would not fail to use this afterwards as an argument against us.
With a view to securing, among the agents of the various powers in China,
the unity of action necessary to overcome the opposition of the Chinese
ministers, I recently instructed our embassador at London to solicit the
co-operation of the principal secretary of state in this matter. In reply to
the note of Count d’Harcourt, the London cabinet instructed its embassador
at Paris to send me the dispatch of which I have the honor to inclose you a
copy, and of which copies will be sent to all the governments interested. On
the ground that the relations of England with China have assumed a most
satisfactory character, and fearing the complications which might arise from
the refusal of the Chinese government to accede to the request to grant
audience, the English government expresses its preference for a
postponement. It would be best, in its opinion, for the envoys of the
different countries to confine themselves to stating to Prince Kung that
they would have been glad to present the congratulations of their
governments to the Emperor in person on the occasion of his attaining his
majority, but that in order not to force an innovation at such a time, and
without relinquishing a right, the assertion of which they reserve until
such time as they may think proper, they do not desire to insist upon a
decision which they hope to see reached by the Emperor himself, who will
become convinced, by experience, of the propriety of conforming to the usage
of other nations in this matter.
We still think that by unanimously manifesting their desire the powers would
have obtained a concession from the cabinet of Peking, which it no longer
has any motive for refusing to them. From this would have resulted an
improvement in the entire policy of China, as also in the disposition of the
authorities toward foreigners, and these advantages were worthy of the
efforts which we recommended. We have, however, constantly adhered to the
policy of maintaining that unity which seems to us so essential among
foreign representatives in China, not to be ready to sacrifice our own
private views if they were to result in an unfortunate misunderstanding.
Before adopting our final resolution we should be glad to know how the
English communication is regarded by the Washington Cabinet, whose
representative at Peking seemed, judging from the advices received from our
minister, to ‘share our view of the case, and I will thank you to make
inquiry with regard to this matter, with as little delay as possible, of the
Secretary of State.
Earl Granville to
Lord Lyons.
Foreign
Office, February 5,
1873.
My Lord: The French embassador placed in my
hands some days ago the paper of which I inclose a copy, the object of
it being to call the attention of Her Majesty’s
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government to the expediency, when the Emperor of
China shall have obtained his majority, of a combined action on the part
of the treaty powers at Peking for the personal reception of their
representatives by the Emperor.
The question involved in this communication had for some time engaged the
attention of Her Majesty’s government, and the communication which they
had it under consideration to make to other powers has only been
anticipated by that which I have now received from Count d’Harcourt. It
is therefore fitting that I should now enable your excellency to explain
to M. de Rémusat the view taken of the question by Her Majesty’s
government.
They have considered it under the twofold aspect, namely, whether the
admission of foreign representatives to audience of the Emperor of China
would improve the position of the powers either politically or
commercially, and whether the attempt to obtain it be successful or the
reverse might not lead to serious complication, either as regards the
stability of the Emperor’s throne or the maintenance of friendly
relations with the Chinese Empire.
Her Majesty’s government are aware that an opinion has long prevailed
among the foreign community in China that direct access to the Emperor
would be attended with benefits to commerce, and establish a better
state of relations between their countries and China. But, regarded in
this point of view, it may be asked whether commerce has suffered, or
friendly relations with China been impaired, under the exclusive system
which has hitherto prevailed? It cannot be said in the face of the
wonderful development assumed by trade, and which is yearly increasing,
that the merchant suffers from the want of occasional direct
communication with the Emperor; neither can it be said that friendly
relations with China have suffered from it. There may be points of
detail which might be regulated to the advantage of commerce, but it is
not likely that the imperial interference could be invoked for the
purpose; there might be greater cordiality in the personal relations of
foreigners and Chinese, but the remedy for the absence of it could
hardly be the result of diplomatic interference. It might be found,
perhaps, in the greater disposition of the foreign community to study
the language and to consult the prejudices of the people, to seek
friendly and social intercourse with them, rather than to keep aloof
from them, and to abstain from pressing questions in opposition to the
sentiments and received traditions of the government authorities and
people.
But be this as it may, it can hardly be doubted that whatever influence
the Emperor of China, if a man of mature age and endowed with
administrative talents, and of an enlightened mind, might have in
reforming the system under which foreign relations are carried on in
China, the young Emperor who has just assumed the government on the
declaration of his majority at a very early age, could not be expected
to have any at all, and that any attempt on his part to press forward
innovations repugnant to the general feelings of the nation would either
be disregarded or lead to disturbances in the empire.
But it is alleged that if the question of audience were pressed to a
successful issue the result would have a very important influence on the
authorities and people of China, who would see in it an acknowledgment
on the part of the Emperor that he is not superior to other foreign
sovereigns. But is there certain assurance of such a result if the
audience were now to be insisted on, and would it be prudent to risk the
consequences of a failure?
Assuredly the powers have a right under treaty to require that their
representatives should be personally received by the Emperor. But if the
Chinese government seek to evade the concession, or attach to it
conditions which cannot be submitted to, what in such a state of things
would be the position of the powers? Are they to submit to being
baffled, and desist from their demand? But this would scarcely be
consistent with their dignity, or the safety of their important
relations with China.
Are they to resent the refusal by withdrawing their missions from Peking?
But this, while it would probably be most acceptable to the Chinese
government, would involve a return to the old vicious system, now
happily discarded, and throw the powers back on the local authorities at
the different ports, instead of dealing with those authorities by the
supreme powers of the central government held responsible for the
conduct of its subordinate authorities.
There remains indeed one alternative, which as regards themselves, indeed
Her Majesty’s government are not prepared to encounter for such an
object as the audience, and from which other powers would, in all
probability, equally shrink, namely, a recourse to hostilities to obtain
access for their representatives to the Emperor. But independently of
all other considerations warfare, even in its most mitigated form of a
blockade of the ports of China, and the consequent stoppage of foreign
trade, would inflict a far greater amount of injury on the foreigners
than on the Chinese, who might find some consolation in escape from
holding intercourse with foreigners, and be content for that object to
forego the financial benefit to the country which such intercourse
brings with it. Still as it has been so long assumed that occasion would
be taken by the powers, from the majority of the Emp eror, to bring
forward the question of audience,
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they might expose themselves to some discredit if
they let the opportunity pass by without some allusion to it.
Her Majesty’s government are, therefore, inclined to think that the
foreign representatives at Peking might well, collectively or
individually, state to Prince Kung that they are instructed to request
his highness to convey to the Emperor the congratulations of their
respective sovereigns on the attainment of his majority and his
assumption of the government; that their governments would gladly have
conveyed these congratulations directly to the Emperor in the manner and
with the ceremonial observed at other courts; but as this would involve
innovation in the practice of the Chinese empire, and might therefore
produce inconvenience to the young Emperor at the moment of his
accession, which the powers would be sorry to do, they are satisfied,
without abandoning the right at a time which they reserve to themselves
to fix, as they may find it expedient, to seek for their representatives
audience of His Imperial Majesty, not to press the question at the
present time, in the hope that experience of affairs will teach His
Imperial Majesty the expediency of adopting the ordinary usages of
nations in this matter, and in the belief that the alteration in the
custom of the imperial court will be more satisfactory when inaugurated
by the Emperor’s own matured judgment.
Your excellency will read and give a copy of this dispatch to M. de
Rémusat, and a copy will also be communicated by Her Majesty’s ministers
at other places to the governments to which they are accredited.
I am, &c., &c.,
